«»»t «.«'  ..Jffoi't.^ 


m 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


GIFT  OF 


Mrs.  Jefferson  P.  Chandler 


^^ 


THE 


Laws  of  Discursive  Thought: 


BEING 


^  ^cxWBook  of  jTormal  JLo^xc. 


BY 


JAMES    McCOSH,    LL.D., 

PRESIDENT  OP  NEW  JERSEY   COLLEGE,   PRINCETON  ; 
FORMERLY  PROFESSOR   OP  LOGIC  AND   MEIAPUYSICS,   QCEEN'S   COLLEGE,  BELFAST. 


NEW  YORK: 

ROBERT   CARTER  AND   BROTHERS, 
530  Broadway. 


iSntered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  In  the  year  1870,  by 

ROBERT  CARTER  &  BROTHERS, 

In  tbo  aerk'B  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  Dnited  States  for  th* 
Southem  District  of  New  York. 


6^ 


PREFACE. 


If  we  look  back  baK  a  century  we  find  Formal 
Logic  taugbt  in  nearly  all  tbe  colleges  of  Great 
Britain  and  America,  but  exercising  an  influence  infi- 
nitely less  tban  notbing  (to  use  a  pbrase  of  Plato's)  on 
tbe  tbougbt  of  tbe  countries.  Some  of  tbe  professors 
and  tutors  were  expounding  it  in  a  dry  and  tecbnical 
manner,  wbicb  wearied  young  men  of  spirit,  and  bred 
a  distaste  for  tbe  study ;  wbile  otbers  adopted  an 
apologetic  tone  for  occupying  even  a  brief  space  witb 
so  antiquated  a  department,  and  tbrew  out  bints  of  a 
new  Logic  as  about  to  appear  and  supersede  tbe  old. 
Tbe  Ungering  bfe  maintained  by  tbat  old  AristoteHan 
and  Scbolastic  Logic,  in  spite  of  tbe  ridicule  poured 
upon  it  by  nearly  all  tbe  fresb  tbinkers  of  Europe  for 
two  or  tbree  centuries  after  tbe  revival  of  letters,  is 
an  extraordinary  fact  in  tbe  bistory  of  pbilosopby  ;  I 
believe  it  can  be  accounted  for  only  by  supposing 
tbat  tbe  syllogism  is  substantially  tbe  correct  analysis 
of  tbe  process  wbicb  passes  tbrougb  tbe  mind  in  rea- 
soning. Certain  it  is  tbat  no  profi'ered  logical  system 
bas  been  able  to  set  aside  tbe  Aristotelian,  wbetber 
devised  by  Eamus,  by  tbe  scbool  of  Descartes,  tbe 
scbool  of  Locke,  or  tbe  scbool  of  Condillac ;  all  bove 


iv  PREFACE, 

disappeared  after  creating  a  brief  expectation  fol- 
lowed by  a  final  disappointment.  It  is  a  remarkable 
cii'cumstance  tliat  the  revived  taste  for  logical  studies 
in  the  last  age  proceeded  fi'om  a  restoration  of  the 
old  Logic  by  two  distinguished  men,  both  reformers 
in  their  way,  but  both  admirers  of  the  Analytic  of 
Aristotle.  I  refer  to  Archbishop  Whately  and  Sir 
^YilHam  Hamilton. 

Whately  fiirst  gave  his  views  to  the  public  in  an  ar- 
ticle in  the  EncydopcEdia  Metropolitana,  which  was  ex- 
panded into  his  Elements  of  Logic  in  1826.  The  pub- 
lication constitutes  an  era  in  the  history  of  the  study 
in  Great  Britain  and  America.  The  admirable  defence 
of  the  old  Logic  against  the  objections  of  such  men 
as  Principal  Campbell  and  Dugald  Stewart,  and  still 
more,  the  fi-esh  and  apt  examples  substituted  for  the 
dry  stock  ones  which  had  been  in  use  for  a  thousand 
or  two  thousand  years,  speedily  attracted  the  favor- 
able attention  of  the  young  thinkers  of  the  times ;  and 
Aristotle  was  once  more  in  the  ascendant.  But  while 
"Wliately's  Elements  is  an  interesting  and  healthy 
work,  it  can  scarcely  be  described  as  specially  a 
philosophic  one.  Li  order  to  complete  the  reaction, 
another  thinker  had  to  appear,  and  subject  the  whole 
science  to  a  critical  examination  fitted  to  satisfy  the 
deeper  philosophic  mind  of  the  times.  It  is  a  curious 
circumstance  that  Hamilton  uttered  his  first  oracular 
declarations  on  Logic  in  a  severe  article  on  Whately, 
in  the  Edinhurcjh  lieview,  pubhshed  afterwards  in  his 
Discussions.  He  embraced  the  opportunity  to  bring 
forth  the  result  of  his  profound  researches,  and  spe- 
cially to  introduce  to  the  English  speaking  countries, 
the  Logic  which  had  sprung  up  in  Germany  out  of 


PREFACE.  V 

Kant's  Critich  of  Pure  Beason.  Since  that  date, 
Logic  has  had  a  greater  amount  of  interest  collected 
round  it  in  Great  Britain  than  any  other  mental 
science,  and  has  become  incorporated  with  the  fresh- 
est and  brightest  thought  of  the  country.  The  in- 
terest in  the  study  has  been  increased  by  the  Lorjic  of 
Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill,  who  has  evidently  felt  the  in- 
fluence of  Whately  in  the  respect  which  he  pays  to 
JFormal  Logic,  but  adheres,  as  a  whole,  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  his  father,  Mr.  James  Mill,  introducing  some 
elements  from  the  cognate  Positive  Philosophy  of  M. 
Comte.  Mr.  Mill  has  given  an  impulse  to  the  study, 
not  by  the  portion  of  his  work  which  treats  of  Formal 
Logic — which  is  not  of  much  scientific  value — but  by 
his  valuable  exposition  of  the  Logic  of  Induction, 
which  would  have  been  of  much  more  value  had  he 
left  out  the  constant  defences  of  his  empirical  meta- 
physics. 

Hamilton  is  entitled  to  be  regarded  as  the  author 
of  the  "  New  Analytic  of  Logical  Forms  " — as  he  calls 
it — after  the  Old  Analytic,  or  syllogistic  analysis  of 
the  reasoning  process  unfolded  in  the  Prior  Analytics 
of  Aristotle.  But  he  has  had  powerful  co-laborers  in 
Dean  Mansel,  in  his  valuable  edition  of  Aldrich's 
Artis  Logicae  Rudimenta  and  Prolegomina  Logica,  and 
in  Archbishop  Thomson,  in  his  Outline  of  the  Laws  of 
Thought.  The  clearest  account  of  the  new  Logic  is 
to  be  foimd,  not  in  Hamilton's  own  Lectiu-es,  which 
were  left  in  a  crude  state,  but  in  the  Logic  of  Profes- 
sor Bowen,  of  Harvard  College.* 

•  It  ie  not  my  office  to  criticise  the  logical  treatises  of  the  United'  States  ;  in 
lact  I  have  not  a  complete  collection  of  them.  I  have  observed  in  some  of  them, 
us  Atwater'B  excellent  Manual  of  L'lerneiiiary  Logic,  a  dieposition  to  ar.ite  tho 
real  improvementa  of  tho  New  Analytic  with  the  established  truths  of  tho  old 
Loi;iu. 


vi  PREFACE. 

The  New  Analytic  proceeds  directly  or  indirectly 
from  the  metaphysics  of  Kant.     Not  that  it  is  to  be 
found  developed  in  the  works  of  Kant,  but  it  is  largely 
grounded  on  the  pecuhar  principles  of  the  Critick  of 
Pur"  Reason  ;  it  rose  out  of  the  searching  criticism  to 
which  Kant  had  subjected  the  forms  of  the  Old  Logic  ; 
and  it  ramified  directly  fi'om  the  logical  treatises  of 
such  men  as  Krug  and  Esser  who  belonged  to  tho 
school.     It  is  of  a  composite  structure,  resembling  the 
renovations  we  see  in  Biitain  of  medieval  buildings, 
the  old  and  the  new  adapted  to  each  other  with  won- 
derful skill,  but  with  an  occasional  incongi'uity  forcing 
itself  here  and  there  on  the  notice  of  the  careful  ob- 
server.    I  am  not  convinced  that  all  the  parts  are 
likely  to  be  preserved  in  the  shape  they  now  have,  or 
that  the  Analytic  always  gives  the  ultimate  expres- 
sion of  the  laws  of  thought ;  but  I  am  sure  it  is  a  valu- 
able accession  to  the  science.     Altogether  independ- 
ent of  its  positive  improvements,  it  has  done  great 
service,  by  the  careful  examination  to  which  it  has 
subjected  the  Old  Logic — which  has  come  creditably 
out  of  the  trial.    Forms  which  had  become  venerable, 
and,  I  may   add,  stiff,  fi"om   age ;   and   which   were 
inclined  to  stand  on  their  dignity  and  acknowledged 
authority,  have  been  obliged  to  submit  to  a  sifting 
Bcinitiny,  which  may  have  shorn  them  of  some  of  their 
lidiculous  pretensions,  but  has,  at  the  same  time,  de- 
livered them  from  the  dry  dust  which  had  gathered 
around  them  and  threatened  to  bury  them.    The  time 
lias  now  come  for  suljjecting  the  New  Analytic  to  a 
like  examination.     It  has  been  before  us  for  an  age 
in  a  half  developfid  form,  and  for  half  an  age  in  a 
fully  unfolded  shape ;  and  we  should  now  be  in  a  suf- 


PREFACE. 


TU 


ficientlj  impartial  position  to  be  able  to  take  from  it 
•what  is  wortliy  of  being  retained,  and  to  lay  aside 
what  is  fallacious  or  mistaken.* 

Had  I  been  satisfied  witli  the  peculiarities  of  the 
New  Analytic,  with  its  fundamental  Kantian  princi- 
ples, or  its  special  doctrines,  such  as  that  of  the  uni- 
versal quantification  of  the  predicates  of  propositions 
■with  its  extensive  consequences,  I  would  never  have 
published  this  treatise.  On  the  supposition  of  the 
Hamiltonian  analysis  being  correct,  I  cannot  conceive 
of  there  being  better  works  written  than  those  of 
Thomson  and  Bo  wen. 

The  defects  and  errors  of  the  new  Logic  are  de- 
rived mainly  from  its  German  paternity.  It  is  in- 
fected throughout  "wnth  the  metaphysics  of  Kant — ^just 
as  the  Art  of  Thinking  is  with  the  metaphysics  of 
Descartes,  and  Mill's  Logic  with  the  empiricism  of 
Comte.  It  ever  presupposes,  or  implies,  that  there 
are  Forms  in  the  mind  which  it  imposes  on  objects  as 
it  contemplates  them  ;  and  it  makes  the  science  alto- 
gether a  jDriori,  and  to  be  constructed  apart  fi"om, 
and  altogether  independent  of  exjierience.  Hamilton 
quotes  (Loijic,  Lect.  IV.)  Esser  with  approbation.  "It 
is  evident  that  in  so  far  as  a  form  of  thought  is  neces- 
sary, this  form  must  be  determined  or  necessitated  by 
the  nature  of  the  thinking  subject  itself.  .  .  .  The  fii'st 
condition  of  a  form  of  thought  is  that  it  is  subjec- 
tively, not  objectively,  determined."  This  fundamen- 
tal error  (so  I  reckon  it)  runs  through  the  whole 
system,  and  injures  and  corrupts  the  valuable  tiiitb 
to  be  found  in  the  Logic  of  Hamilton.    I  acknowledge 

•I  believe  copies  may  be  had  of  a  limited  cditiou  of  Philosophic  Papers  pub- 
Bshed  by  me,  aud  in  which  I  examined  Hamilion's  Logic.  I  have  reviewed 
MiU':i  Lojjic  in  my  Exaiidiiation  of  Mr.  J.  S.  MiWs  Philodophs/. 


VUi 


PREFACE. 


that  there  are  principles  or  laws  in  the  minci,  original 
and  native ;  but  these  do  not  superinduce  or  impose 
forms  on  objects  as  we  look  at  them ;  thej  simplj 
enable  us  to  perceive  what  is  in  the  objects.  True, 
there  are  a  priori  laws  in  the  mind  operating  prior  to 
experience  ;  but  we  can  discover  their  nature,  and  give 
an  accurate  expression  of  them,  only  by  means  of  care- 
ful observation.  The  science  of  Logic  is  to  be  con- 
structed only  by  a  careful  inductive  investigation  ol 
the  operations  of  the  human  mind  as  it  is  employed 
in  thinking. 

In  conducting  my  independent  researches  in  this 
spirit,  I  have  been  thrown  back  on  the  old  Logic 
more  than  even  the  logicians  of  the  school  of  Kant 
have  been.  But  I  have  been  obliged,  in  order  to 
explain  certain  operations  of  thought  to  which  Kant 
and  Hamilton  have  called  attention,  to  unfold  laws 
which  were  not  noticed  by  the  older  logicians. 

The  main  feature  of  this  Logical  Treatise  is  to  be 
found  in  the  more  thorough  investigation  of  the  na- 
ture of  the  Notion,  in  regard  to  which  the  views  of 
the  school  of  Locke  and  Whately  are  very  defective, 
and  the  ^dews  of  the  school  of  Kant  and  Hamil- 
ton altogether  eiToneous.  The  Port  Boyol  Logic 
complains  that  the  part  of  Logic  which  comprehends 
the  rules  of  reasoning  is  regarded  as  the  most  impor- 
tant; and  maintains  that  the  greater  part  of  the 
en-ors  of  men  arises  from  their  reasoning  on  wrong 
principles,  rather  than  fi'om  their  reasoning  wrongly 
from  their  principles.  It  is  as  true  of  this  age  as  of 
the  seventeenth  century,  that  the  attention  of  logicians 
has  been  confined  almost  entirely  to  Eeasoning.  I 
believe  that  it  is  the  Notion  which  rec|[uires  at  this 


PREFACE.  ix 

time  to  be  specially  examined.  I  believe  that  errora 
spring  far  more  frequently  from  obscure,  inadequate, 
indistinct,  and  confused  Notions,  and  fi'om  not  plac- 
ing the  Notions  in  their  proper  relation  in  Judgment, 
than  from  Batiocination,  Even  in  Reasoning,  most 
mistakes  proceed  from  confusion  lurking  in  the  Ap- 
prehensions of  the  mind.  We  are  in  more  need,  at 
present,  of  a  new  analysis  of  the  Notion  and  the 
Judgment,  than  of  the  Reasoning  process.  I  have 
found  that  in  the  more  thorough  evolution  of  the 
nature  of  the  Notion,  especially  in  the  thorough-going 
separation  of  the  Abstract  Notion  fi'om  the  Singular 
and  Universal,  we  have  the  means  of  setthng  the 
curious  questions  which  have  been  started  in  regard 
to  Judgment  and  Reasoning  in  the  New  Analytic.  In 
this  treatise,  the  Notion  (with  the  Term,  and  the 
Relation  of  Thought  to  Language)  will  be  found  to 
occupy  a  larger  relative  place  than  in  any  logical 
work  written  since  the  time  of  the  famous  Art  of 
Thinking. 

I  cannot  close  this  preface  without  referring  to  the 
pleasure  I  had  in  discussing  these  questions  with 
successive  Honor  Classes  in  Queen's  College,  Belfast, 
and  expressing  my  gratification  that  there  have  thence 
sprung — besides  others  eminent  in  other  departments 
— three  professors  occupying  important  chairs  of 
mental  philosophy. 

Pbtnceton,  New  Jbeset,  U.  S.,  April,  1870. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


-«=coo< 


INTRODUCTION. 


■BonoiT 


PACC 


1—5.— Definition  of  Logic 1 

6— 7.— Division  of  the  Science 8 

FORMAL  LOGIC. 

8— 11.— The  Notion,  Judgment,  and  Reasoning 4 


PART   FIRST. 
THE    NOTION. 

1.— Definition  of  Notion 7 

2.— Tlie  Term f 

8. — All  Notions  either  Concrete  or  Abstract. 8 

CONCRETE  AND  ABSTRACT  NOTIONS. 

4 — 6.— Nature  of  Concrete  and  Abstract  Notions 8 

7.— The  Phiantasy 10 

8— 9.— AbBtractions  from  Concretes  and  other  Abstractions lO 

10. —Comprehension  of  Abstract  Notions 12 

LAWS  OP  THOUGHT  INVOLVED  IN  ABSTRACTION. 

11.— The  Abstract  implies  the  Concrete 13 

12.—  W/ien  Ui^  Concrete  is  Real  ttie  Abstract  is  Real 13 

13.  —An  Attribute  has  no  Imlependent  Existence 14 

14.— The  Reality  in  the  Abstract  Notion 15 

16— 17.— Importance  of  Abstraction 16 

SINGULAR   AND  UNRTERSAL  NOTIONS. 

18.— All  Notions  either  Singular  or  Universal 18 

19.— Our  Primary  Knowledge  is  of  Singulars 18 


ru 


CONTENTS. 


BECTIOH  TAQB 

20— 21.— Abstraction  and  Generalization  not  the  same 19 

22.— What  is  presupposed  in  Generalization 20 

^.— First  iY<p.— Observation  of  ResemblanceB 21 

24 — 'i)a.—Sicond  ^/<7j.— Fixing  on  Points  of  Resemblance 21 

Ti.— Third  <S<<p.— Formation  of  a  Class 23 

88.— A  Universal,  ^r herein  Indefinite,  wherein  Definite 25 

LAWS  OF  THOUGHT  mVOMTa)  IN  GENERALIZATION. 

29. — The  Universal  Implies  Singulars 24 

30.—  When  Singulars  are  Real  the  Universal  is  Ileal 25 

31.—  The  lieality  of  the  Universal  is  in,  Common  Properties  of  Singulars  25 

EXTENSION  AND  COMPREHENSION  OF  GENERAL  NOTIONS. 

as — 33. — A  General  Notion  embraces  Objects  (Extension),  and  Attributes 

(Comprehension) 26 

HIGHER  AND  LOWER  GENERALIZATIONS. 

34.— Common  Notions  with  an  aggregate  of  Attributes 27 

85.— Genus  and  Species 28 

30.- It  is  Implied  that  the  same  Objects  are  Generalized 29 

37.— Co-ordinate,  Subordinate,  and  Communicant  Species 29 

SINGULAR  CONCRETE,  ABSTRACT  AND  UNIVERSAL  NOTIONS. 

88— 39.— Explanation  of  this  Threefold  Division 29 

40. — The  Singular  Concrete,  or  Percept 30 

41. — The  Abstract  Notion  or  Abstract 31 

42. — The  Universal  Notion  or  Concept 31 

4;3.— Distinction  between  Generalized  Abstract  and  Generalized  Con- 
crete   32 

44.— The  General  Abstract 32 

45.— The  General  Concrete 32 

46. — Admits  of  Higher  and  Higher  Generalizations 33 

47.— Relation  of  General  Concrete  to  Natural  Clauses 33 

MIXED    NOTIONS. 

48.— Singular  Terms  Proper.    Singulars  Classified.    Collective.     Sin- 
gulars Abstracted 34 

49.— Terms  both  Abstracts  and  Concepts,  (Denotation  and  Connota- 
tion)    35 

60. — Abstract  Notion*  becoming  General 36 

61 . — Mixed  Moden  of  Locke 37 

62.— All  Notions  arc  Percepts,  Abstracts,  or  Concepts 37 

5'{.— Privative  Notions 3ft 

64.— C'oNTiiAiiY  AND  Contradictory  Notions 30 

65.— liFLATIVE  AND  CoUUBLATIVB  NoTIONH 2fi 


CONTENTS.  iiii 

SECTION  FaOS 

LOGICAL  DIVISION. 

66.— ItB  Natnre 89 

hi.— First  Bule.—Wa  muBt  proceed  according  to  Marks 40 

5S.— Second  liiik.—Tbe  Species  must  make  up  tiie  Genus 41 

m.— Third  liule.—The  Meiubers  must  exclude  one  another 4a 

60—01.-  FouHh  Eule.— There  should  be  a  due  Subordination 43 

ANALYSIS  AND  SYNTHESIS. 

82.— Analysis ** 

63.— Synthesis 45 

64.— Purpose  served  by  Analysis  and  Synthesis 48 

LOGICAL  DEFINITION. 

65— Its  Nature 46 

66.— Distinguished  from  Description 46 

67.— Definition  of  Abstract  Notions 46 

68.— Notions  which  cannot  be  defined 47 

69.— Definition  of  General  Notions 47 

to.— Rule  First.— Bring  out  a  Distinguishing  Attribute 48 

71.— Definition  of  General  Concrete  Notions 48 

Ti.—Bule  Second.— The  Definition  must  be  Adequate 49 

73.— The  Test  of  a  good  Definition 49 

7^— Rule  Third.— Give  the  Genus  and  Differentia 49 

75.— Practical  Kules BO 

AIDS  TO  ABSTRACTION  AND  GENERALIZATION. 
76.— Need  of  a  Sign  of  some  kind 60 

I. — ^Mentai,  Luage,  oe  Phantasm. 

77. — Nature  of  such 50 

78.— Diff"erence  between  Phantasm  and  Abstract  and  General  Notion.      61 
79. — Criticism  of  Locke's  views 19 

n.— Language. 

80.— Advantage  op  Language  as  an  Instkument  or  Thought 63 

81. — (1)  A  Sign  and  Register  of  Abstractions  and  Generalizations 64 

82.— (2)  Puts  us  in  possession  of  Abstractions  and  Generalizations 55 

83— 85.— Character  of  a  people  8ho\\'n  in  their  Language 56 

8(j.— Advantage  of  being  acquainted  with  more  than  one  Language 68 

87. — Benefit  got  by  our  tongue  from  other  tongues 59 

88— 90.— (.3)  Civesa  form  to  Thought 69 

91.— How  it  may  restrain  Thought 61 

93— 94.— (4)  Lightens  Thought  by  being  used  as  a  Symbol 63 

95.— (5)  Enables  us  to  carry  on  Thinking  to  a  greater  extent 64 

96—97. — Men  can  reason  without  Language 66 

98— 101.— But  are  always  the  better  of  Language CT 


Xiv  CONTENTS. 

BKcnoif  PAaH 

10-2.— (6)  Helps  Thought  to  make  Progress 69 

103— 105.— INCEDENTAI  DISADVANTAGES  OP  L ANQC AGE TO 

106. — (1)  The  vagTienees  of  so  many  phrases 73 

107— 110.— (2)  Different  Meanings  of  the  same  Word TS 

111. — (3)  Misleading  Associations 76 

112           Words  derived  from  Matter  applied  to  Mind 77 

113.— (4)  We  use  Words  without  inquiring  into  their  Meaning 77 

114.— How  are  the  E\-ils  to  be  avoided 78 

(1)  Ascertain  the  Meaning  of  the  Word 79 

115. — (2)  When  Ambiguous  ascertain  the  Various  Meanings 79 

116.— (3)  Determine  the  Notion  for  which  it  stands 79 

117. — (4)  Ask  whether  the  Notion  ie  Singular,  Abstract,  or  Universal. . .  80 

118.— Especially  in  Abstruse  Thinking 81 

119. — (5)  Consider  the  Things  from  which  the  Notions  are  formed 83 

LAWS  OF  THOUGHT  INVOLVED  IN  USE  OF  SIGNS. 

\^.— First  Law.— A  Term  stands  for  a  Notion,  Singular,  Abstract,  or 

Universal 83 

I'TLSecond  Law.—V^e  can  Predicate  of  Sign  only  what  can  be  Predi- 
cated of  Notion 84 

VtSi.— Third  Law.— We  may  demand  that  the  Notion  be  substituted  for 

Sign. 84 

HL — Classes  ih  Natubb. 

123— 1-25.- There  are  ench  Classes 86 

126— 127.— Classes  called  Kinds 88 

128.— Are  Aids  and  Guides  in  Generalizing 89 

REALISM,  NOMINALISM,  AND  CONCEPTUALISM. 

129— 132.— Brief  History  and  Criticism  of  Opinions 90 


PART  SECOiXD. 
JUDGMENT. 

L—DeflDition  of  Judgment 98 

CATEGORICAL  PROPOSITIONS. 

8.— Subject,  Copula,  and  Predicate S8 

8.— Nature  of  the  Copula M 

4.— ModalB 95 

6. — In  Quality,  either  Affirmative  or  Negative 95 

6. — In  Quantity,  either  Universal  or  Particular 95 

7.— Meaning  of  words  'All'  and  'Some' 95 

8.— Indefinite  or  Indenignate  Propositions 96 


CONTEN^TS.  XV 

SECTION  PAOH 

9.  -Fourfold  Division  of  Propositions,  A,  E,  L,  O % 

10.— Distribution  of  Terms 96 

11.— Distribution  of  Subject  and  Predicate 97 

12— 13.— Various  Relations  between  Subject  and  Predicate 97 

14.— Equtvalknt  Pkopositions 98 

15.— Propositions  in  which  the  Relation  is  of  Extension  and 

compkeiiension 99 

16.— Inconvertible  and  Convertible— Substitutive  and  Attributive 100 

17— 18.— Difference  between  these 100 

19_oo_(;;age8  in  which  Predicate  is  a  General  Notion  Distributed  (IT) 101 

ai.-Predicablesof  Aristotle  and  Porphyry  103 

22.— Should  the  Predicate  always  be  QuantLfled  ? 103 

23.— Hamilton's  Table  of  Judi,Tnent8 104 

CONJUNCTIONS  OF  PROPOSITIONS,  CONDITIONALS,   AND   DISJUNC- 
TIVES. 

24. — Various  Conjunctions —  105 

25. — Conditionals  and  Disjunctives 108 

26.— Conditionals,  their  Nature 106 

27— 28.— Antecedent.  Consequent,  and  Consequence 106 

29.— Conditionals  may  be  Equivalent  or  Attributive  107 

80— 31.— Disjunctives,  their  Nature 107 

IMPLIED  JUDGMENTS,  OR  IMMEDIATE  INFERENCES. 

82.— Their  Nature 108 

83.— Conversion 108 

81.— Opposition  in  Equivalent  Propositions 109 

85.— Opposition  in  Attributive  Propositions 109 

y&.—Subaltemation 110 

87. —  Contrary  Opposilion Ill 

38.-  Contradictory Ill 

89.—I)enionst)-ation 112 

40.— In  discussion  Propositions  put  as  Contradictories 112 

41. — Transposed  Propositions  obtained  by  Opposition 113 

42. — Transposed  .Judgroents  obtained  by  Extension 114 

43. — These  not  applioiible  to  Equivalent  Propositions 114 

44.— The  Interpretation  of  Judgments  gives  Implied  Propositions...  114 

45. — Implied  Judgments  are  obtained  by  Comprehension 115 

The  Interpretation  of  Marks 115 

46.— Added  Marks 115 

47. — Added  Subject  and  Predicate 115 

^.—Surtimation  of  Predicates 115 

<i9.~Privative  Conceptions 115 

BO.—  Conditional  Pro}X>dtions 117 

tl.—Dlyunctive  PropoHtions 117 

62. — Rule  as  to  Distribution  of  Terms  in  Implied  Judgments  117 

68.— Implied  Judgments  obtained  from  "  men  are  responsible  " 117 

64.— How  Logic  aids  in  Determining  the  Truth  of  a  Proposition 118 


svi  CONTEXTS. 


PART  THIRD. 
EEASONINa. 

•ICTTOir  PASl 

1. — The  Process  in  the  mind  when  we  reason 120 

2. — The  Sameness  of  the  Process 121 

3. — Importance  of  Analyzing  the  Process 121 

4. — Difference  between  Judgment  Proper  and  Reasoning 12i 

5.— Involves  Three  Propositions.    The  Syllogism 123 

6. — Syllogistic  Analysis  made  by  Aristotle 123 

7.—  Cannot  reason  from  One  Judgment.    Enthymeme 123 

8.~Extremes  and  Middle  ;  Premisses  and  Conclusion 124 

RULES  APPLICABLE  TO  EVERY  KXNT)  OF  REASONING. 

9.— (1)  There  should  be  only  Three  Terms 125 

10.— (2)  And  only  one  Middle laS 

11. — (3)  One  Premiss  must  be  Affirmative 125 

12. — (4)  If  either  Premiss  Negative,  the  Conclusion  Negative 125 

13.— (5)  To  prove  a  Negative,  one  Premiss  must  be  Negative 125 

14. — What  are  the  Regulating  Principles  of  Reasoning  ? 125 

16.— FiEST  REQtTLATiNo  Prekciple.    "  Notions  Equivalent  to  one  and 

the  same  third  Notion  equivalent  to  one  another." 126 

16.— The  Unflgured  Syllogism  of  Hamilton 127 

17. — SzcoND  Regcxatino  Pkikciple.    "  Whatever  is  predicated  of  a 

Class,  may  be  Predicated  of  the  Members  of  the  Class." 127 

18.— Major  and  Minor  Terms.    Major  and  Minor  Premisses 128 

19.— Uules  derived  from  the  Dictum  of  ArlBtotle;  being 

RULES  APPLICABLE  TO  KEA.SONIXG   IN  EXTENSION. 

«.—(l)  Middle  Term  distributed  once 128 

21. — (2)  Term  distributed  in  Conclusion  only  when  in  Premisses 12ii 

28. — (3)  From  two  Particular  Premisses  no  Conclusion 120 

23.— <4)  If  one  Premiss  Particular,  Conclusion  Particular 1 .90 

24.— These  Rules  apply  only  to  cases  in  which  there  is  a  Concept 1.30 

25— 26.— Moods 1.30 

27  — FiGiRE 131 

28— 29 —First  Figure.— lie  Special  Rules 131 

aO— 31.— Second  Figure.— Ite  Special  Rules 1.32 

32— 33.— Third  Figure.— lu  Special  Rules 132 

84— .33.— Fourth  Figure.— 16  it  allowable? 1.33 

3C.— Mnemonic  Lines 134 

37.— Reduction 1.34 

88.— Made  by  Implied  Judgments 135 

89.— Ostenei ve  Reduction 135 

40.— Eeductlo  i>er  ImpoesibUe 136 

41.— Immediate  InfereDces  In  Mediate  Reasoning 1.37 

12 — 41.— REABONIXe  IS  COKFBEHEKSION 13A 


CONTENTS.  xvii 


BELTION  FAOB 

45.— The  Two  Dicta  Combined .  IW 

46.— Hamilton's  Table  of  Forms  of  Reasoning 141 

47. — Mill's  Theory  of  Reasoning  Process 113 

48 — Reasoning  from  Plarative  Jadgmento 144 


CONDITIONAL   REASONXNG. 

49.— Its  Nature  and  Rules 1 15 

50. — Common  Forms 14a 

H— 63.— Relation  of  Conditional  to  Categorical  Reasoning 146 

DISJUNCTIVE  REASONING. 

B4.— Its  Nature  and  Rules 148 

65. — Its  Principal  Forms 149 

66.— Can  be  Reduced  to  Categorical 149 

DILEMMA. 

57.— Its  Nature 150 

68.— Its  Principal  Forms 151 

69.— A  Trilemma,  etc 151 

60.— Reduction  to  Categorical  Form 151 

CHAINS  OF  REASONING,  SORITES. 

61.— ProsyUogism  and  Episyllogism 152 

62.— Sorites 158 

63.— Reduced  to  Series  of  Syllogisms , 153 

GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  REASONING   PROCESS. 

61— We  get  the  Premisses  from  Intuition  and  Observation 155 

65.— Individual  and  Combined  Observation 155 

66.— Some  of  the  Observational  Maxims  written  out,  others  not 156 

67. — Some  of  them  Certain,  others  only  Probable 157 

68.— Demonstration,  in  which  the  new  steps  are  Intuitive 157 

69.— Experiential  or  Probable  Evidence 153 

70.— Is  all  that  can  be  had  in  Practical  Matters IfiO 

71.— Falls  under  the  Dictum  of  Aristotle,  and  needs  a  Major  Premiss..  101 

7»— 73.— Reasoning  Involved  in  Induction;  the  Canons  of  Induction;  the 

Major  Premiss ICl 

74. — When  Premisses  only  Probably  True I'S? 

75— 76.— Concurrence  of  Evidence 165 

77.— Whence  the  Rapidity  of  Reasoning  Process  ? 166 

78.— In  what  sense  are  the  Truths  reached  New  ? 168 


xviii  CONTENTS. 

eECTION  PAGH 

FALLACIES. 

79.  —Definition  of  Fallacy 169 

80.— What  Logic  can  do  in  guarding  against  Fallacies 169 

8*    -How  the  Heart  sways  the  Head 171 

82.— Division  of  Fallacies 172 

83.— Formal  Fallacies 179 

Undistributed  Middle 173 

84.— Hlicit  Process  of  Major  or  Minor  Term 173 

85. — Negative  Premi?.ses 171 

86.— Arguments  with  more  than  Three  Terms 17! 

87.— Fallacies  of  Conditionals 17.') 

88. — MATERL4X,  Fallacies 173 

88 — 90.— Ambiguous  Terms,  especially  Ambiguous  Middle 175 

91. — Fallacia  Accidentis 178 

92.— Equivocation 179 

93.— Oblique  Expression 180 

94. — Fallacies  of  Confusion 180 

95.— Fallacy  of  Division  and  Composition 181 

90. — Imperfect  Division 18;< 

97.— Fallacy  of  Shifting  Ground 183 

98. — Fallacia  Plurium  lutenogationum 184 

99.— Petitio  Principii 184 

100. — Syllogistic  Reasoning  not  Petitio  Principii 185 

101.— Arguing  in  a  Circle 185 

102.— Ignoratio  Elenchi 186 

103. — Proving  only  part  of  the  Question 187 

104.- Falkcy  of  Objections 187 

105.— Argumentum  ad  Homlnem 187 

106.— Argumen turn  ad  Populum 188 

107. — Argumentum  ad  Verecundiam 188 

108. — Argumentum  ad  Ignorantiam 188 

la).— Fallacy  of  Pretension 189 

110. — Argument  from  Consequences 189 

111.— Mistakes  as  to  Onus  Probandl 190 

112.- Fallacies  of  Analogy 191 

113. — Imperfect  Enumeration 192 

14.— Non  Causa  pro  Causa 193 

15.— Post  Hoc  ergo  Propter  Hoc 193 

16.— MisUking  Sign  for  Cause 194 

17. — Causa  Essendi  and  Causa  Cognoscendi ;  Reason  and  Cause 194 

FUNDAMENTAL  LAWS  OF  DlSCURSrVT:  TnOUGET. 

118. — How  they  are  discovered 195 

119.— The  Law  of  Identity 195 

120.— The  Law  of  Contradiction 106 

121  .-The  Law  of  Excluded  Middle 196 

122.— The  Principle  of  Equiility 196 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

SECTION  PAOB 

123.— The  Dictum  of  Aristotle lilt? 

la*.— The  Principle  of  Attribution 1!)7 

125.— Tlic  Law  of  Division 197 

126.— Tlie  Princii)le  of  Whole  and  Parts 198 

127. — The  Consideration  of  these  belongs  to  Metaphysics 193 


APPENDIX. 

I.— Exercises  as  to  Forms 

1—7.— The  Notion 199 

8— 14.— Judgment 201 

15— 27.— Reasoning 203 

II. — Exercises  as  to  Violations  of  Laws  of  Thought 

27— 31.— In  Notions 907 

82— 35.— In  Judgments 209 

8&--e2.— In  Reasoning 309 


INTRODUCTION. 


■XDOOo- 


DEFINITION  AND  DIVISION   OF  THE   SCIENCE. 

1,  Logic  may  be  defined  as  the  Science  of  the  Laws  ot 
Disciu'sive  Thought.  The  matter  about  -which  it  is  em- 
ployed Lies  in  the  mind :  it  is  Thought,  which  is  an  exer- 
cise of  the  understanding,  the  intelHgence,  or  the  intellec- 
tual or  cognitive  powers,  as  distinguished  fi'om  operations 
of  the  motive  faculties  such  as  emotion,  moral  perception 
or  volition.  Thought  or  intelligence  may  be  of  two  kinds. 
Li  some  cases  we  perceive  the  object  or  truth  at  once  : 
as  when  we  see  or  touch  the  table  before  us,  as  when  we 
know  that  the  shortest  distance  between  two  points  is  a 
straight  line.  In  other  exercises  we  perceive  the  thing  or 
truth  by  a  process  :  from  something  given  we  di'aw  some- 
thing else,  as  when  we  argue  from  certain  appearances  in 
the  sky  that  it  will  be  rain,  or  fi'om  the  structm-e  of 
certain  strata  of  the  earth's  sui'face  that  they  have  been 
formed  in  water.  This  second  kind  of  thought  is  called 
Discursive,  in  which  we  proceed  fi'om  something  allowed 
to  something  else  derived  from  it  by  thinking  ;  as  dis- 
tinguished fi'om  Intuitive  Thought,  in  which  we  discern 
the  truth  immediately.  The  science  which  treats  of  the 
intuitive  operations  of  the  mind  is  called  MetajDhysics ; 
the  science  which  considers  the  discui'sive  acts  is  Logic 

2.  The  disciu'sive  operations,  like  all  other  agencies  in 
natiu-e,  proceed  in  a  regulai-  manner,  that  is,  according  to 
laws.     By  carefully  observing  the  acts  of  the  mind  in 


2  INTRODUCTION. 

thinliing,  we  may  discover  what  these  laws  are,  and  ex- 
press them  in  language  or  in  formulre.  In  doing  this,  we 
are  constnicting  a  science,  which  is  co-ordinated  know- 
ledge, as  distinguished  from  the  knowledge  of  individual 
things  as  they  present  themselves.  As  Logic  co-ordinates 
what  it  observes,  it  is  a  science  ;  it  is  the  science  of  the 
laws  of  discursive  thought. 

S.  There  is  no  definition  of  Lo^c  in  any  of  the  extant  writings 
of  Aristotle  the  founder  of  the  science.  Of  later  logicians  some 
have  given  a  narrower  and  some  a  wider  definition  than  that 
adopted  in  the  text.  Some  represent  it  as  a  -pure  science  ;  some  as 
a  mere  art.  Some,  such  as  Whately,  would  have  it  treat  of  Reasoning 
exclusively  (omitting  the  Notion  and  Judgment),  while  others 
would  enlarge  it  so  as  to  make  it  embrace  all  intelligence.  The 
definition  of  the  text  gives  it  a  rigidly  exact  field,  while  it  comprises 
all  the  mental  operations  embraced  under  the  laws  of  discursive 
thought. 

4.  It  should  be  noted  that  Lo2:ic  does  not  profess  to 
impart  to  man  the  power  of  thinking  any  more  than 
Grammar  gives  him  the  capacity  of  speech.  Logic  finds 
men  engaged  in  apprehending,  judging,  and  reasoning, 
and  it  seeks  to  unfold  the  laws  involved,  just  as  Grammar 
presupposes  that  men  can  speak,  and  proceeds  to  detect 
the  niles  of  correct  speech.  And  as  Grammar  by  its 
rules  enables  persons  to  express  themselves  accurately, 
so  Logic  by  expounding  the  laws  of  thought  guards 
against  mistakes  in  thinking.  So  far  as  Logic  unfolds 
the  laws  of  a  department  of  our  nature  it  is  a  science;  so 
far  as  it  supplies  rules  to  guide  and  guard  us  in  our  dis- 
cursive operations  it  is  an  art. 

a.  As  Logic  deals  with  Tliought  primarily,  and  looks  at  Language 
only  Becmdarily  and  incidentally,  it  is  thus  easily  distinguished  from 
Grammar,  Rhetoric,  and  the  Science  of  Language,  which  all  treat  of 
Bijcech,  writing  or  language  generally. 

6*.  Discursive  Thought  may  be  ■viewed  in  its  general 
aspects  or  in  its  more  special  ai:)phcations.  It  may  be 
contemx^lated  as  directed  to   objects  of    any  kind,  no 


DEFINITION  OF   THE  SCIENCE.  3 

matter  what  they  be,  within  or  without  us  ;  or  it  may 
be  considered  as  looking  to  certain  classes  of  objects  : 
thus  it  is  evident  that  thinking  is  somewhat  difierently 
employed  in  mathematical  demonstration  from  what  it  is 
when  arranging  objects  in  natural  histoiy.  This  gives  us 
the  gi-and  division  of  the  science.  So  far  as  it  treats 
of  discursive  operations,  whatever  be  the  objects  about 
which  it  is  employed,  it  is  called  Universal  or  more  com- 
monly Formal  Logic.  So  far  as  it  considers  thinking  as 
directed  to  special  kinds  of  objects,  it  has  been  called 
Particular  Logic  or  might  be  called  Objective  Logic ;  it 
embraces  such  subjects  as  Demonstration  and  Liduction. 
This  work  takes  up  the  former  of  these. 

7.  Kant  Bays,  "  Logic  may  bo  considered  as  two- fold ;  as  Logic  of 
the  general  (universal)  or  the  particular  use  of  the  understanding. 
The  first  contains  the  absolutely  necessary  laws  of  thought,  without 
which  no  use  whatever  of  the  understanding  is  possible,  and  gives  laws 
therefore  to  the  understanding,  without  regard  to  the  difference  of  ob- 
jects on  which  it  may  be  employed.  The  Logic  of  the  particular  use 
of  the  understanding  contains  the  laws  of  correct  tliinkingupon  a  par- 
ticular class  of  objects.  The  former  may  be  called  elemental  logic  ; 
the  latter  the  organon  of  this  or  that  particular  science.  The  latter  is 
for  the  most  part  employed  in  the  schools  as  a  propaedeutic  to  the 
sciences,  althoiigh,  indeed,  according  to  the  course  of  human  reason, 
it  is  the  last  tiling  we  arrive  at,  when  the  science  has  been  already 
matured  and  needs  only  the  finishing  touches  towards  its  coirection 
and  completion;  for  our  knowledge  of  the  objects  of  our  attempted 
science  must  be  tolerably  extensive  and  complete  before  we  can 
indicate  the  laws  by  which  a  science  of  these  objects  can  be 
established.  General  Logic  is  again  either  pure  or  applied.  In  the 
former,  we  extract  all  the  empirical  conditions  under  which  the 
understanding  is  exercised,  for  example  the  influence  of  the  senses, 
the  laws  of  the  memory,  the  force  of  habit,  of  inclination,  conse- 
quently also  the  sources  of  prejudice,  &c."  He  tells  us,  General  Logic 
"  makes  abstraction  of  all  content  of  cognition,  that  is  of  all  relation 
of  cognition  to  its  object,  and  regards  only  tlie  logical  form  in  the 
relation  of  cognitions  to  each  other,  that  is  the  form  of  thought  in 
general."  {Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Part  IL,  Meiklejohn's  Trana- 
lation.)    The  distinction  between  Universal  and  Paiticular  Logic  ia 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

adopted  in  the  text,  but  witli  an  important  modification.  Kant 
makes  Universal  Logic  look  at  thought  apart  altogether  from  content 
or  objects,  and  supposes  that  the  mind  has  laws  or  forms  which  il 
imposes  on  objects.  In  the  text  it  is  supposed  that  the  laws  of 
thought  are  the  laws  of  the  understanding  in  contemplating  objects. 
Formal  or  Univer.sal  Logic  treats  of  thought,  not  apart  from  content, 
Dut  whatever  he  the  content,  that  is,  wJiatcverbe  the  objects. 


UNIVEESAL   OE  TORMAL  LOGIC. 

8*  Let  us  look  at  some  of  the  common  exercises  of 
Discursive  Thought.  We  have  before  us  a  piece  of  ice. 
So  far  as  Tve  simj)ly  look  at  it,  and  perceive  its  form  and 
color,  there  is  no  discursive  thought.  But  we  can  distin- 
guish between  its  form  and  color,  or  we  may  think  of  its 
qualities,  say,  its  coldness,  its  brittleness,  its  transparency  ; 
we  are  now  exercising  thought  upon  the  object  perceived. 
The  mere  bodily  senses  can  di*aw  no  such  distinction. 
I  can  not  by  the  eye  separate  the  shajje  of  the  piece  of  ice 
from  its  transparency.  But  on  the  bare  inspection  of  the 
object  the  mind  can  distinguish  between  it  and  any  of  its 
properties,  or  between  one  property  and  another.  This 
is  Absteaction,  a  simple  and  elementary  exercise  of  dis- 
cui'sive  thought. 

0,  Again,  on  looking  at  two  or  more  objects,  we  may 
notice  that  thoy  resemble  each  other.  An  inhabitant  of  a 
northern  country  is  travelling  for  the  first  time  in  a  south- 
em  clime,  and  beholds  a  plant  such  as  never  feU  under 
his  view  before,  a  plant  with  a  leaf  like  a  fan,  and  on 
going  a  little  farther  he  notices  another  plant  of  much 
the  same  general  form.  Already  he  is  exercising  dis- 
cursive thought.  He  was  not  doing  so  as  long  as  he  was 
a  mere  passive  recipient  of  the  impression  left  on  the  eye 
by  the  shape  and  color  ;  but  when  he  discovers  the  like- 
Qoss  of  the  plants  he  is  exercising  what  is  called  Com- 


DIVISION  OF   THE  SCIENCE.  5 

paiison.  As  other  like  plants  fall  under  his  view,  he 
will  probably  take  a  farther  step  ;  he  \vill  form  a  class  or 
kind  which  shall  embrace  not  only  the  plants  which  he 
has  seen,  but  aU  others,  with  the  points  of  agi*eeinent, 
which  may  fall  under  his  notice  or  that  of  any  other  man  ; 
and  he  wiU  rejoice  if  some  one  gives  him  the  name  of 
*  fan  palm '  to  designate  them. 

The  product  of  these  two  processes  is  the  Abstract  aiid 
General  Notion.  The  Fii'st  Part  of  Formal  Logic  con- 
siders the  Notion,  specially  the  Abstract  and  General 
Notion. 

10,  Suppose  now  that  we  have  acquired  Notions,  we 
may  proceed  to  compare  them.  By  a  process  Hke  that 
described  above,  the  traveller  may  have  formed  the 
notion  of  fig-tree  out  of  sjDecimcns  of  j)lants  of  a  different 
order  growing  in  the  same  region,  and  he  may  compare 
the  two  kinds  of  objects  of  which  he  has  the  notion, 
and  he  declares  the  fig  to  be  of  a  different  shape  from 
the  palm,  and  its  leaves  to  be  of  a  different  color.  "^Tien 
he  does  so,  he  is  said  to  be  exercising  Judgment,  which 
is  a  discui'sive  operation  comparing  two  or  more  notions. 

The  Second  Part  of  Logic  treats  of  Judgment. 

1 1,  But  Judgment  may  be  of  two  kinds.  Li  many 
cases  we  pronounce  a  judgment  at  once  on  the  bare  con- 
templation of  two  notions.  It  is  thus  that,  considering 
the  palm  tree  and  the  fig-tree,  we  discern  that  the  leaf 
veins  of  the  one  are  parallel,  whereas  those  of  the  other 
ai'e  cui-vilinear.  But  in  other  cases  we  cannot  discover 
the  agreement  or  disagTcement  at  once  by  simply 
considering  the  notions  we  have.  Thus  we  cannot  by 
merely  looking  at  the  palm  and  fig-tree  determine  how 
they  gi'ow,  whether  fi'om  one  seed  lobe  or  two  seed  lobes  • 
whether  from  within  or  by  adding  rings  from  without. 
But  we  observe  that  the  veins  of  the  palm  leaves  are 
pai'aUel,  and  that  those  of  the  fig  are  reticulated  ;  and  wo 


6  mTRODUCTION. 

bftve  Jearaed  someliow  that  parallel-veined  plants  proceed 
from  one  seed  lobe  or  cotyledon  (are  monocotyledons), 
and  gi'o-sv  from  witbin  ;  wbereas  net-veined  plants  spring 
from  two  cotyledons  (are  dicotyledons),  and  add  rings 
witbout ;  and  now  we  are  in  a  position  to  draw  an  in- 
ference ;  we  argue  tbat  tbe  palm,  being  parallel-veined,  is 
monocotyledonous,  and  tbe  lig-trec,  baving  netted  veins,  is 
dicotyledonous.  In  drawing  tbcse  conclusions,  we  called 
in  a  tbird  notion,  monocotyledons  or  dicotyledons,  to 
combine  tbe  otber  two.  Tbe  process  is  one  of  Judgment ; 
but  it  is  to  be  distinguisbed  fr-om  tbe  second  oj^eration 
mentioned  above,  tbe  Judgment  Proper,  or  wbat  we  sball 
commonly  call  Judgment.  In  Judgment  we  compare  two 
notions  directly,  and  declare  tbeir  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment ;  wbereas  in  tbe  process  now  before  us,  we  compare 
two  notions  by  means  of  a  tbii'd.  Tbe  process  is  called 
Reasoning,  Ratiocination  or  Inference,  and  its  laws  are 
unfolded  in  tbe  Tbii'd  Part  of  Loeric 


PART    FIEST. 

THE     NOTION, 


1,  The  operation  of  tlie  mind  in  contemplating  an  ob- 
ject or  objects  is  called  Simple  Apprehension.  The  object 
or  objects  ai:)prehcnded  constitute  the  Notion.  Sometimes 
the  notion  is  of  an  object  ap)art  from  any  relation  to 
others,  as  '  man  '  and  '  horse,'  and  is  called  Simple  or  In- 
complex  ;  sometimes  it  is  of  objects  in  a  relation  to  each 
other,  as  *  man  on  horseback,'  and  is  said  to  be  Complex. 
In  order,  however,  to  its  being  a  Notion,  the  mind  must 
have  brought  the  objects  into  a  unity  of  apprehension. 
'  Man  on  horseback '  is  one  notion  ;  we  contemplate  it  as 
one  thing. 

2.  A  notion  expressed  in  language  is  called  a  Term,  as 
two  terms  constitute  the  termini  or  boundaries  of  a  pro- 
position, A  term  may  consist  of  one  word  or  of  several 
and  one  word  may  contain  two  terms  and  express  their 
connection.  A  word  is  said  to  be  categorematic  when  it  is 
capable  of  being  employed  by  itself  as  a  term,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, nominative  nouns,  such  as  horse,  dog,  deer.  Other 
words,  such  as  adverbs,  prepositions,  and  nouns  not  in 
the  nominative  case,  can  only  form  part  of  a  term,  and  are 
said  to  be  syncategorematic  :  thus  '  bii'd  on  the  wing ' 
is  one  term,  though  expressed  in  four  words.  Again ; 
such  words  as  sum  (I  am  existing),  amat  (he  is  loA-ing), 
contain  two  terms,  /  and  exiding,  he  and  loving^  and  in- 


8  TUE  IfOllOJS. 

timate  theii'  relation.  In  all  cases  -we  must  look  to  the 
tbonght — to  the  notion  in  the  mind — and  not  to  the  mere 
words,  to  determine  what  is  the  notion,  and  what  sort  Oj 
notion  it  is. 

3,  All  notions  arc  either  Concrete,  as  ice,  or  Abstract, 
as  coldness.  Again,  aU  notions  are  either  Singular,  as 
Aristotle,  or  Universal,  as  logician.  Combining  these 
cross  divisions  we  get  a  three-fold  division  of  notions,  the 
Singular,  the  Abstract,  and  Universal.  It  is  of  great 
importance  in  Logic  that  we  know  the  exact  natiu'e  of 
each  of  these  kinds  of  notion  and  the  distinction  between 
them.  Terms  are  divided  as  notions  are  into  Singular, 
Abstract,  and  Universal,  which  last  are  usually  called 
General  or  Common 


THE  CONOEETE  ASB  ASSTEACT  ITOTION. 

4,  All  Notions  are  either  Concrete  or  Ahdract.  A  Con- 
crete Notion  is  of  objects  as  they  are  with  an  aggregate  of 
qualities.  An  Abstract  Notion  is  of  part  of  an  object  as  a 
part,  more  technically  of  an  attribute  of  an  object.  In 
order  to  comprehend  this  distinction  we  must  look  at  the 
nature  of  the  original  cognitions  or  apprehensions 
which  we  have  by  the  poAver  of  intuition  which  looks 
immediately  on  things.  In  all  such  wo  contemplate  ob- 
jects with  qualities  more  or  fewer,  and  the  notions  thus 
formed  are  said  to  be  concrete.  The  word  is  derived 
from  con  together,  and  crenco  I  grow,  and  means  literally 
grown  together.  Some  have  derived  it  from  con  and 
oemo,  when  it  means  seen  together.  Either  derivation 
brings  out  the  meaning  :  in  a  Concrete  Notion  the  ob- 
jects Anth  tlieir  quuhties  as  it  were  grow  together,  and 
are  perceived  together.  Wo  cannot  look  on  that  table 
without  perceiving  it  at  one  and  the  same  time  as  colored 


IHE  CONCRETE  AND  ABSTRACT.  9 

and  extended  :  we  never  can  view  the  color  without  the 
colored  surface,  or  the  surface  without  seeing  it  as  hav- 
ing color  of  some  kind.  Nor  can  we  by  any  mechanical 
or  chemical  process  separate  the  one  from  the  other.  But 
human  intelligence  is  subtler  than  any  material  agent;  and 
we  can  in  thought  consider  the  one  without  taking  the 
other  into  account.  This  process  is  called  Abstraction, 
from  ahs  hova,  and  traho  to  draw,  and  signifies  a  drawing 
off ;  and  an  Abstract  Notion  is  of  a  part  or  a  quahty  or 
qualities  di-awn  off  from  the  rest  of  the  object. 

♦7.  Abstraction  may  be  taken  in  a  wider  or  a  narrower 
sense.  In  the  wider  sense  it  is  thus  defined  by  Whately: 
"  "When  we  draw  off  and  contemplate  separately  any  part 
of  an  object  presented  to  the  mind  disregarding  the  rest 
of  it,  we  are  said  to  abstract  that  part  of  it."  Thus  under- 
stood, the  part  abstracted  may  exist  separately  :  thus  if  I 
speak  of  the  leg  of  a  table  in  relation  to  the  table,  the 
phrase  is  abstract ;  but  I  may  cut  off  the  leg  or  consider 
it  as  it  is  in  itself  and  without  reference  to  the  table, 
in  which  case  our  notion  is  concrete.  But  abstraction 
may  be  viewed  in  a  more  limited  way  as  that  operation 
of  mind  in  which  we  contemplate  an  attriljute  of  objects ; 
"  by  abstract  name,  I  mean  the  name  of  an  attribute." 
(Mill.)  In  this  sense  the  thing  abstracted  cannot  be  said 
to  have  a  separate  or  independent  existence.  Thus  I  can 
think  and  reason  about  the  coldness,  or  transparency,  or 
brittleness  of  ice,  but  there  cannot  be  coldness  or  trans- 
parency or  brittleness  existing  separate  or  apart  from  the 
ice  or  an  object  that  is  cold,  brittle,  and  transparent. 

6*.  We  may  now  give  examples  of  each  of  these  kinds 
of  Notions.  "NiMien  I  think  of  a  stone,  the  notion  is  con- 
crete ;  but  if  of  heaviness  or  harcbiess,  the  notion  is  ab- 
stract. If  I  contemplate  a  fellow-man,  the  notion  is  con- 
crete ;  but  if  I  consider  his  wisdom,  or  his  learning,  or  his 
wealth,  the  notion  is  abstract.     If  I  remember  a  mother, 


10  THE  NOTION 

the  mental  operation  is  concrete ;  but  if  I  muse  on  her 
kindness,  lier  care  or  faitlifulness,  the  process  is  ab- 
Btract.  If  I  contemplate  God,  the  notion  is  concrete — it  is 
God  with  all  his  j^erfections  as  known  to  me  ;  but  if  I 
meditate  on  his  intinity,  his  justice,  or  benevolence,  my 
idea  is  abstract. 

7.  In  Abstraction  taken  in  the  wider  sense,  we  are 
much  aided  by  the  phantasy  or  the  imaging  power  of  the 
mind.  Having  seen  an  object  in  its  totality  I  can  pic- 
ture to  myself  a  part,  provided  that  part  can  be  separated, 
Thus,  having  seen  a  plant,  I  can  have  an  idea  of  its  roots, 
its  stem,  its  leaves,  separately.  Ha\'ing  seen  a  lion,  I  can 
picture  its  head  and  its  jaws  distinct  from  the  rest  of 
its  body.  But  these  are  exercises  of  the  imaging  power 
of  the  mind,  and  not  of  abstraction  considered  as  an  act 
of  thought  In  forming  the  Notions  of  attributes,  the  pic- 
turing power  of  the  mind  can  be  of  little  service.  True, 
when  they  are  of  properties  of  objects  perceived  imme- 
diately by  the  senses,  it  may  help  us  soraewliat,  thus  in 
thinking  of  transparency,  we  may  have  an  idea  before  us 
of  glass  or  of  ice  ;  but  when  the  abstractions  are  high 
and  refined,  we  can  find  no  image  to  represent  them,  and 
any  idea  we  might  fashion,  would  rather  have  a  mislead- 
ing influence,  at  least  in  rigid  thinking.  "VMio  can  form 
an  idea,  in  the  sense  of  image,  of  such  abstractions  as  gov- 
ernment, liberty,  peace,  prosperity,  civilization,  religion  ? 

H>  It  is  evident  that  the  mind  can  di-aw  a  number,  in 
some  cases  an  indefinite  number,  of  abstractions  from  one 
and  the  same  concrete  object.  Thus  in  contemplating  a 
rose,  we  can  abstract  its  form,  its  color,  its  odor,  its  mode  of 
growth,  its  stage  of  growth,  its  vital  functions,  its  beauty, 
and  I  know  not  how  many  quahties.  From  man  we  may 
aljstract  hLs  bodily  frame  or  any  part  of  it,  his  shape,  his 
size,  his  reason,  his  weight,  his  age,  or  any  of  his  mental 
attributes,  such  as  his  conscience,  his  feelings,  his  sinful- 


THE  CONCRETE  AND  ABSTRACT.  \\ 

ness.  It  would  require  hours  or  days  to  run  over  the 
innumerable  attributes  we  might  ascribe  to  such  complex 
objects  as  the  Hebrew  Commonwealth,  the  Roman  Empire, 
Greek  Literatui-e,  the  English  Language,  the  Pohtical  Con- 
stitutions of  Britain  and  America.  The  abstractions  made 
by  any  one  man  in  the  course  of  a  day,  or  even  an  houi-, 
are  beyond  calculation  ;  and  we  cannot  form  the  dimmest 
idea  of  the  number  fashioned  by  a  man  in  the  course  of 
his  life,  and  still  less  of  those  formed  by  all  mankind 
since  they  appeared  on  the  earth.  Some  of  these  have  been 
embodied  in  language,  but  by  far  the  greater  number 
never  have  been  and  never  will  be  expressed  in  words. 

0,  We  cannot  have  an  adequate  idea  of  the  process  of 
abstraction,  unless  we  take  into  account  that  we  may  form 
abstractions  fi'om  abstractions,  and  rise  to  abstractions 
more  and  more  refined.  Perhaps  the  fittest  illustration  is 
to  be  found  in  the  science  of  numbers.  Number  of  every 
kind  is  an  abstract  notion  :  as  one,  ten,  a  hundred,  or  a 
thousand  ;  you  cannot  find  one  aj^art  from  one  thing, 
or  ten,  a  hundred,  or  a  thousand  apart  fi-om  ten,  a  hun- 
dred, or  a  thousand  objects.  From  these  notions  we  may 
fi-ame  higher  abstractions  as,  a,  b,  c,  standing  for  known 
quantities,  and  x,  y,  z,  for  unknown.  A  stdl  higher  pro- 
cess of  abstraction  is  involved  in  the  Fluxionaiy  and  Dif- 
ferential Calculus  and  in  Quaternions.  In  thus  abstract- 
ing it  is  possible  to  think  of  (not  to  image)  an  object  apart 
from  its  qualities.  This  is  the  farthest  point  which  can 
be  reached  by  us  ;  that  is,  we  come  to  the  to  vv,  the  Ens 
or  Being  of  which  metajihysicians,  beginning  with  the 
ancient  Eleatics,  have  made  so  much,  and  yet  to  so  Httle 
j)i-ofit,  because  they  have  mistaken  its  nature.  "WTien  we 
speak  of  Being,  we  do  not  mean  that  there  is  any  one 
existing  thing  with  a  separate  or  independent  reahty 
which  can  be  so  designated  ;  but  simply  to  point  to  an  at- 
ti'ibute  which  all  things  have,  namely,  that  they  exi.st. 


12  TEE  NOTION. 

1 0,  Wlien  we  come  to  speak  of  the  General  Notion,  we  sliall  find 
that  there  is  an  important  distinction  between  the  Extension  and 
Comprehension  of  a  Notion.  By  tlie  Comprehension  of  a  Notion  ia 
meant  the  qualities  comprised  in  it ;  by  Extension,  the  objects  em- 
braced under  it.  Abstract  Notions  may  be  said  to  have  Comprehen- 
sion, for  they  embrace  qualities  ;  and  some  have  more  Comprehension, 
that  is,  more  qualities,  than  others.  Thus  '  intelligence '  and  '  char 
acter,'  which  include  a  whole  aggregate  of  properties,  is  more  Com 
prehensive  than  'reasoning,'  wliich  is  only  one  form  of  intelligence; 
or  '  tsmpcrancc  '  which  is  only  one  element  of  character.  But  Ab 
Btract  Notions  can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  Extension,  at  least  as  w* 
have  above  defined  it.  They  are  apprehensions,  not  of  objects,  but 
of  qualities  of  objects.  At  the  same  time  a  quality  always  is  in  an 
object,  and  may  be  in  more  or  fewer.  Thus  impenetrability  and 
gravity,  which  are  in  all  matter,  are  in  more  objects  than  fluidity  or 
redness,  wliich  are  only  in  certain  forms  of  matter.  The  distinc- 
tion between  Extension  and  Comprehension  is  one  applicable  to 
general,  rather  than  abstract,  notions. 

From  the  account  now  given,  tlie  following  laws  may 
be  derived : 

11.  First  Law,  The  Abstract  implies  the  Concrete. — We 
have  seen  that  the  primary  knowledge  acquired  by  us  is 
of  ol)jects  with  quaHties  more  or  fewer.  By  the  eye  we 
become  acquainted  with  bodies  as  at  one  and  the  same 
time  extended  and  colored.  By  touch,  we  know  things 
as  at  once  extended  and  solid.  By  self-consciousness, 
we  know  self  as  perceiving  by  the  senses,  as  thinking  and 
feehng.  Not  only  so,  but  when  we  recall  by  the  mem- 
oi-y,  a  scene,  a  person,  an  event,  it  comes  before  us  with 
more  than  one  quality.  Even  in  imagination,  the  figure 
or  scene  comes  up  in  the  concrete  ;  we  cannot  picture  to 
ourselves  a  body  with  a  shape  without  also  giving  it 
color,  or  as  ha'S'iiig  color  without  also  conceiving  it  v^ 
extended.  ProceeiLiig  on  these  concrete  ideas,  the  mind 
can  distinguish  between  a  whole  audits  parts,  between  an 
object  and  its  quahties,  and  between  one  quaUty  and  an- 
other. It  can  consider  specially  any  one  quahty  of  body, 
Buch  as  its  foim,  its  size,  its  weight,  its  density.     Tt  car 


TEE  CONCRETE  AND   ABSTRACT.  Vi 

distingiiisli  between  man  as  a  wliole  and  any  one  quality 
of  his,  such  as  his  bodily  strength  or  stature  ;  and  dis- 
tinguish between  any  one  attribute  and  another,  as  be- 
tween his  bodily  and  intellectual  power,  between  his  in- 
tellect and  his  feelings,  between  any  one  feeling  such  as 
joy,  and  any  other  feehng  such  as  sorrow.  But  we  are 
not  to  think  that  because  we  can  thus  distinguish  between 
a  quality  and  its  object,  or  between  one  quahty  and  an- 
other, that  therefore  the  quality  can  exist  of  itself.  The 
part  abstracted  implies  the  whole  of  which  it  is  a  part ; 
in  particular  the  quahty  or  attribute  implies  an  object 
from  which  it  is  taken.  The  question  has  often  been  put, 
Is  there  a  reality  in  the  abstract  notion,  and  if  so,  what 
sort  of  reahty  ?  The  answer  is  that  it  has  a  reality  in  the 
concrete  object  or  objects,  and  when  it  is  a  quahty,  as  a 
quahty  of  the  object  or  objects.     Hence, 

12,  Second  Law,  When  the  Concrete  is  Real  the  Ahsti^act  is 
also  Meal — In  la}'ing  down  this  rule  it  is  of  course  pre- 
supposed that  the  abstraction  has  been  properly  made  • 
that  is,  that  we  contemplate  a  real  part  of  a  whole,  a  real 
attribute  of  an  object ;  that  when  we  speak  of  the  white- 
ness of  a  lily,  the  lily  is  really  white.  Let,  then,  the  ob- 
ject be  a  reality,  that  is,  have  a  real  existence,  and  the  qual- 
ity contemplated  has  also  an  existence.  Trae,  if  the 
objects  be  imaginaiy,  say  a  hundred-handed  Briareus  in 
one  body,  we  cannot  declare  that  these  huncli-ed  hands 
ever  had  an  existence  anywhere  except  in  the  imagination 
of  the  poet ;  but  if  we  see  a  real  human  being  with  hands 
before  us,  we  are  siu'e  that  the  hands  exist  as  well  as  the 
possessor  of  them  ;  and  if  these  hands  be  strong,  that  the 
sti'ength  also  is  a  reality.  I  can  separate  in  thought  the 
beauty  of  Venus  from  the  person  of  Venus  ;  but  as  the 
person  is  an  ideal  creation,  so  also  is  the  beauty.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  if  the  beautiful  person  be  a  liviug  being, 
then  the  form  and  the  color  which   constitute  her  loveli  • 


14  THE  NOTION. 

uess  have  also  an  actuality.  This  proposition  is  laid 
down  in  opposition  to  those  who  represent  all  ab- 
Btractions  as  unreal,  as  imaginaiy.  Some  speak  of  such 
qu;ilities  as  existence,  beauty,  virtue,  as  mere  fictions  of 
the  mind,  for  which  it  is  vain  to  seek  any  corresponding 
reality.  It  is  true  all  abstractions  are  creatures  of  the 
mind,  but  when  we  abstract  a  real  part  from  a  real  whole, 
a  real  quality  from  a  real  object,  the  abstract  has  an 
existence  quite  as  much  as  the  concrete  thing. 

IS*  Third  Lav:,  TT7ien  the  Abstract  is  the  property  of  an 
object,  ice  are  not  to  regard  it  as  having  an  Tndtpendent  Exist- 
ence.— Sometimes,  indeed,  it  is  a  separable  part,  as  the 
root  of  a  plant ;  but  in  this  case,  when  actually  separated 
it  is  no  longer  an  abstract,  but  concrete.  But  when  it  is 
a  quahty  such  as  color,  solidity,  weight,  thinking,  desir- 
ing, revolving,  then  it  is  inseparable  from  the  objects,  and 
has  no  independent  existence — its  existence  is  simply  in 
the  objects.  Much  error  has  in  aU  ages  taken  its  rise 
from  mistaking  abstracts  for  independent  wholes.  The 
Eleatics  very  properly  formed  the  abstract  notion  Being, 
but  then  they  mistook  its  natui'e  and  gave  it  an  existence 
like  the  objects,  say,  earth,  or  gold,  or  animals  which  pos- 
sess it.  All  the  Greek  philosophers  eiTed,  less  or  more, 
in  this  respect,  giving  a  separate  actuahty  to  the  abstrac- 
tions fashioned  by  their  own  acute  intellects ;  and  speak- 
ing of  ideas,  substance,  physical  elements,  as  if  they  were 
agents  capable  of  action  like  God  or  individual  men.  We 
see  a  like  misapprehension  among  the  scholastic  logicians 
and  theologians  of  the  Medieval  Ages  ;  and  their  prac- 
tical errors  came  to  have  a  theoretical  sanction  given  them 
by  the  sect  of  the  Reulists,  who  gave  a  confused  and  mystic 
reality  to  the  abstract  and  general  notions  fonned  by  the 
mind.  Tlie  ideal  metaphysicians  of  Germany  have  in 
mnch  the  same  way  given  to  Nothing,  Something,  Be- 
coming, a  place  and  a  power  in  themselves.     Nor  have 


THE  CONCRETE  AND  ABSTRACT.  15 

our  modern  physical  inquirers  escaped  the  tendency,  for 
they  speak  of  natiu'c,  force,  gi-avity,  motion,  as  if  they 
were  entities,  acting  independently  of  the  objects  -whose 
action  and  mode  of  action  they  express. 

14,  Corollary. — It  is  of  gi-eat  importance  to  trace  up 
abstractions  to  the  concrete  objects  from  which  they  are 
derived.  We  should  thus  be  saved  from  the  two  opposite 
errors  into  which  we  are  apt  to  fall :  the  error  of  these 
who  regard  abstractions  as  nonentities,  and  that  of  those 
who  give  them  a  distinct  being.  By  following  them  up 
to  the  substances,  whether  mental  or  material,  fi-om  which 
they  are  taken,  we  shall  see  that  they  have  a  reality,  and 
we  shall  find  what  is  the  nature  of  that  reahty.  Gra^dta- 
tion  has  no  reality  distinct  from  matter,  but  it  has  a 
reality  in  the  stars  and  planets  which  it  holds  in  their 
spheres.  Nature  is  not  a  separate  agency,  but  is  a  name 
for  the  combined  system  of  things  faUing  under  our  view 
in  the  world.  Beauty  is  a  reahty,  as  our  esthetic  senti- 
ments testify  ;  but  has  no  embodiment  except  in  some 
beautiful  object,  though  the  foohsh  laudations  of  some 
might  lead  us  to  think  that  she  has  a  personahty  of  her 
own,  which  she  may  one  day  or  other  reveal  to  some  en- 
raptured  boy-poet,  or  painter,  provided  he  could  rise  to 
a  sufficiently  ecstatic  state.  Virtue  has  no  separate  ex- 
istence in  some  ethereal  sphere,  as  we  might  be  tempted 
to  think  by  the  way  in  which  some  speak  of  it ;  but  it  has 
a  reality  in  the  voluntary  acts  of  beings  possessed  of  intelli- 
gence, conscience  and  free  will.  The  Alexandrian  mystics 
recommended  us  to  rise  to  the  contemplation  of  the  One 
and  the  Good  :  all  very  useful  and  important,  we  say, 
provided  we  seek  for  it,  where  alone  we  can  find  it,  in 
the  One  Living  and  Good  God. 

15,  We  cannot  close  the  subject  of  Abstraction  with- 
out pointing  out  the  value  and  the  importance  of  the 
process.     It  is  involved  in  all  om*  mental  operations  which 


16  THE  NOTION. 

deserve  tlie  name  of  thinking,  and  in  all  practical  opera- 
tions which  require  thinking.  ^Ve  cannot  speak  intelli- 
gently without  abstracting,  for  in  speaking  about  an 
object  we  separate  it  from  other  things.  We  cannot  per- 
form any  practical  work  without  such  a  process,  for  in 
doing  it  we  must  distinguish  the  things  falhng  simulta- 
neously under  our  notice.  It  is  an  essential  element  in 
all  -scientific  pursuit ;  for  in  science  we  have  to  gather 
the  law  oiit  of  the  scattered  phenomena  of  nature,  and  in 
order  to  this  there  miist  be  the  "  necessary  rejections  and 
exclusions"  (Bacon),  that  is,  the  omission  of  the  acciden- 
tal and  indiflerent.  In  particular  it  is  by  this  operation 
we  reach  those  lofty  ideas  which  philosophy  ponders. 
"We  draw  off  fi-om  the  objects  which  present  themselves 
to  the  senses  that  which  is  peculiar  to  the  individuals,  and 
we  have  the  idea  of  matter  or  material  substance.  Iij 
contemplating  bodies  we  leave  out  in  our  thought  al 
other  properties  except  those  by  which  it  resists  impulse 
and  we  have  the  notion  of  solidity  or  impenetrability. 
From  extended  body  we  omit  other  ideas,  and  there  re- 
mains the  idea  of  pure  space.  In  contemplating  ourselves 
and  other  intelligent  beings,  we  pass  by  the  peculiar- 
ities of  the  individual,  and  fixing  on  the  permanent,  we 
have  the  idea  of  spiritual  substance.  We  separate 
the  producing  power  from  the  events  occui'ring,  and  we 
have  the  idea  of  potency  or  causation.  We  fix  on  the 
good  or  bad  qualities  of  moral  agents,  and  we  have  the 
notion  of  good  and  evil.  These  ideas,  matter  and  spirit, 
substance  and  quality,  space  and  time,  production  and 
power,  good  and  evil,  are  aU  reached  by  abstraction,  and 
like  the  primary  rocks  of  our  earth,  thoy  go  down  the 
deepest  and  they  mount  the  highest.  Passing  beyond 
those  quahties  that  are  fleeting.  Abstraction  goes  on  to 
those  that  are  fixed ;  brushing  aside  the  contingent,  it 
reaches  the  necessary  ;  and  thus  discovers  the  stationary 


THE  CONCRETE  AND  ABSTRACT.  IJ 

amidst  the  flowing,  the  stable  at  the  basis  of  the  tran- 
sient, and  the  eternal  underneath  the  temporary.  The 
mind  is  thus  carried  to  an  elevation  where  it  is  above  all 
passing  occurrences,  which  it  can  survey  in  the  thought 
that  it  is  above  them,  while  it  feels  itself  planted  on  a 
rock  which  is  unmoved  amid  all  mutations. 

IG.  On  tlie  other  side,  let  us  not  in  our  search  after 
the  abstract  lose  sight  of  the  concrete.  Abstract  notions 
do  indeed  serve  most  important  pui"poses.  They  have 
been  wittily  called  "  the  ghosts  of  departed  quantities  ;" 
they  might  be  more  aptly  described  as  the  bones,  the  skele- 
ton, of  real  bodies.  But  however  essential  the  skeleton 
may  be  to  the  frame,  and  however  important  the  study  of 
it  may  be  for  the  ends  of  science,  it  is  not  in  itself  an 
attractive  object — except  indeed  to  the  anatomist ; — one 
would  not  just  choose  to  dwell  in  a  chamber  full  of  rat- 
tling bones.  For  scientific  and  philosophic  purposes  it  is 
necessary  to  have  abstractions,  and  these  high  abstrac- 
tions ;  but  abstractions  cannot  promote  every  good  pur- 
pose. In  particular  they  are  not  calculated  to  call  forth 
feeling  or  to  warm  afiection  into  life :  it  can  be  shown 
that  emotion  is  evoked,  not  by  abstract  notions  and  prop- 
ositions, but  by  living  objects  and  concrete  apprehensions 
and  representations.  "We  do  not  feel  gratitude  for  ab- 
stract kindness,  but  for  the  kind  deeds  of  a  kind  person. 
Our  admiration  is  excited,  not  by  some  grand  idea  of 
beauty  or  sublimity,  but  by  a  lovely  person  or  a  gi-and 
scene.  Our  love  is  kindled  by  the  contemplation,  not  of 
goodness  (as  the  pantheist  would  have  it)  but  by  a  good 
God  or  a  good  man  or  woman. 

17.  In  order  to  brace  their  frame,  students  should  be 
encouraged  to  mount  the  heights  of  philosophy  where  they 
have  a  wide  and  glorious  prospect  opened  to  them  ;  but 
lest,  by  the  cold  to  which  they  are  there  exposed,  they  have 
the  warm  cun-ent  of  feeling  fi'ozen  at  the  heart,  let  them 


18  TEE  NOTION. 

ever  be  ready  to  return  to  wliat  they  feel  after  all  to  be 
the  dearest  of  spots — the  home  of  the  affections.  We  do 
not  wish  to  find  the  youth  parting  vrith  his  youthful  feel- 
ings ;  we  do  not  like  to  see  the  young  man  with  the  face 
of  the  old  man  ;  we  rather  like  to  see  the  old  man  retain- 
ing some  of  his  boyish  buoyancy.  Our  noble  Enghsh 
tongue  has  happily  been  retaining  the  old  Saxon  words 
and  idioms  which  furnish  "  sweet  household  words  and 
phrases  of  the  hearth,"  while  it  has  been  adding  to  them 
scientific  phrases  derived  fiom  the  Greek  and  Latin  lan- 
guages. On  a  like  principle  let  students,  while  seeking 
to  master  the  deep  abstractions,  the  high  generalizations 
of  science  and  philosophy,  cherish  their  love  of  the  indi- 
vidual, the  concrete,  the  natural :  thus  only  may  they  be 
able  to  keep  the  simphcity  of  childhood  amid  the  growing 
wisdom  of  age. 


SINGULAE  KED  UmVEESAL  NOTIONS. 

IS.  All  N'otions  are  either  Singular  or  Universal. — ^A 
singular  notion  is  of  an  object  considered  as  a  single  ob- 
ject, as  Homer,  Virgil,  Juhus  Csesar,  Cromwell,  Mount 
Blanc,  this  horse,  that  dog,  yonder  mountain.  A  Univer- 
sal is  of  objects  possessing  a  common  attnbute  or  common 
attributes,  the  notion  being  such  as  to  embrace  all  the 
objects,  real  or  potential,  possessing  the  common  attri- 
bute or  attributes,  as  poet,  warrior,  animal,  mountain. 

li)»  Our  primary  knowledge  is  of  single  objects.  The 
boy  does  not  commence  with  a  notion  of  man  or  human- 
ity in  general,  but  with  an  acquaintance  with  an  indi%-id- 
ual  person,  say  his  father  or  his  brother  ;  nor  does  he 
start  with  an  idea  of  womankind,  but  with  a  kindly  know- 
ledge of  his  nurse  or  his  mother.     It  is  the  same  with  any 


SmOULAR  AND   UNIVERSAL.  19 

other  idea  he  forms,  as  of  sheep,  or  cow,  or  dog ;  he  first 
notices  a  single  animal,  and  then  as  he  sees  others  he 
fashions  for  himself,  or  understands  as  others  speak  about 
it,  the  general  notion  '  animal.' 

20.  Abstraction  and  Generalization,  though  frequently 
confounded,  are  not  the  same.  In  Abstraction,  we  sepa- 
rate in  thought  a  part,  an  attribute,  fi'om  the  whole.  In 
generalization,  we  put  objects  together  as  possessing  the 
same  attributes.  In  contemplating  only  one  object,  we 
can  abstract :  thus  if  it  be  Alexander  the  Great,  we  can 
consider  his  miHtaiy  genius  apart  fi-om  his  other  quali- 
itics,  such  as  his  impulsiveness.  But  in  generalization 
we  must  always  have  before  us  a  number  of  objects  which 
we  place  together  by  the  supposed  possession  of  some  com- 
mon attribute  :  thus  in  the  notion  '  conqueror,'  we  com- 
prise all  the  great  mihtaiy  geniuses  of  present,  past,  and 
future  time.  At  the  same  time  the  two  processes  are 
closely  connected.  Abstraction  is  always  imphed  in  gen- 
eralization :  we  can  combine  the  objects  in  the  general 
notion  only  by  one  or  more  common  attributes,  which  we 
have  therefore  abstracted.  There  may  indeed  be  abstrac- 
tion, the  abstraction  of  a  quality,  when  there  is  no  gen- 
eralization, no  combining  of  objects  by  the  quahty.  But 
abstraction  often  leads  on  to  generalization  :  having  ob- 
served a  number  of  rocks  which  bear  marks  of  having 
been  formed  in  water,  we  put  them  in  the  one  class  of 
aqueous  rocks. 

21.  Since  the  days  of  Locke,  who  confounded  abstract  and  gen- 
eral ideas,  the  distinction  between  these  two  kinds  of  idea  has  been 
very  much  lost  si<?ht  of.  There  are  metaphysicians,  however,  who 
have  noticed  it.  Thus  Du^ald  Stewart :  "  The  words  Abstraction  and 
Generalization  are  commonly,  but  improperly,  used  as  synon\Tnoiis  ; 
Rnd  the  same  inaccuracy  is  frequently  committed  in  spcakinfr  of 
abstract  or  general  ideas  as  if  the  two  expressions  were  convertible. 
A  person  who  had  never  seen  but  one  rose  might  yet  have  been 
able  to  consider  its  color  apart  from  its  other  qualities  ;  and,  ther» 


20  THE  NOTION. 

fore,  (to  express  myself  in  confonnity  to  common  langi\age)  there 
may  be  such  a  thing  as  an  idea  which  is  at  once  abstract  and  par- 
ticular. After  haviu<T  perceived  this  quality  as  belonging  to  a 
variety  of  individuals,  we  may  consider  it  without  reference  to  any 
of  them,  and  thus  form  the  notion  of  redness  or  whiteness  in  general, 
which  may  be  called  a  general  abstract  idea."  {Elements,  Part  I,  Chap. 
IV.,  t^  2,  Hamilton's  Ed.)  Hamilton  says  :  "  We  can  rivet  our  atten- 
tion on  some  particular  mode  of  a  thing,  as  its  smell,  its  color,  its 
figure,  its  size,  etc.,  and  abstract  it  from  the  others.  This  may  be 
called  Modal  Abstraction.  The  abstraction  we  have  now  been  con 
sidering  is  performed  on  individual  objects,  and  is  consequently  par- 
ticular [singular?].  There  is  nothing  necessarily  connected  with 
generalization  in  abstraction ;  generalization  is  indeed  dependent  on 
abstraction,  which  it  supposes ;  but  abstraction  docs  not  involve 
generalization.  I  remark  tliis  because  you  will  frequently  find  the 
terms  abstract  and  general  applied  to  notions  used  as  convertible." 
{Metaphysics,  Led.  XXXV.)  But  in  his  Logic  he  has  allotted  no 
Beparate  place  to  the  Abstract  Notion,  and  like  all  the  logicians  of 
the  school  of  Kant,  he  has  no  other  notion  than  the  Concept  or  the 
General  Notion.  In  consequence  of  this  oversight  he  has  not  been  able 
to  give  accurate  account  of  certain  xjeculiarities  of  thought  which  he 
has  had  the  shrewdness  to  notice.  As  we  advance  in  this  treatise  we 
shall  find  that  we  have  only  to  give  the  abstract  notion  its  proper 
place,  to  render  a  clear  and  scientific  account  of  certain  processes  of 
thought  which  the  old  Logic  had  overlooked,  but  which  the  Kantian 
and  Hamiltonian  Logic  had  observed ;  and  that  we  can  thereby 
remove  the  hiatus  between  the  Kantian  and  Aristotelic  Logic ;  and 
rear  out  of  the  two  a  simple  and  consistent  structure. 

2fi'  There  is  no  subject  around  wliich  there  has  gath- 
ered a  greater  amount  of  confusion  of  thought  and  logom- 
achy than  the  General  Notion  or  Universal.  It  is  of 
vast  moment  that  we  should  carefully  mark  the  steps  in- 
volved in  its  formation. 

In  order  to  Generalization  two  things  are  pre-supposed. 
The  first  is,  that  objects  resemble  each  other,  that  is, 
possess  hke  qualities.  In  eveiy  department  of  nature 
there  are  common  properties  of  form,  color,  weight,  and 
number  which  enable  us  to  group  objects.  The  second 
circumstance  is,  that  the  mind  has  a  tendency  to  seek  out 


SINGULAR  AND   UNIVERSAL.  2J 

and  discover  resemblances.  It  is  induced  to  do  so  by 
a  native  tendency,  and  it  is  compelled  to  do  so  by 
the  circumstances  in  wbich  it  is  placed,  by  the  analogies 
wliich  everywhere  fall  under  oiu*  notice,  and  by  being 
obliged  to  put  the  innumerable  particulars  that  would 
oppress  the  memory  and  the  understanding  into  conve- 
nient and  comprehensible  gi'oups.  "  To  shorten  its  way 
to  knowledge  and  make  each  perception  more  compre- 
hensible, it  binds  them  into  bundles."  (Locke.)  With 
these  preHminaries  the  operation  of  generalization  is 
ready  to  commence. 

23.  First  Stcji. — We  observe  a  resemblance,  more  or  less 
clearly,  among  the  objects  which  present  themselves.  This 
operation  begins  in  early  life.  Children  soon  learn  to 
distinguish,  by  their  points  of  agreement,  human  beings 
from  other  beings,  and  the  man  from  the  woman,  and  the 
child  from  the  adult,  and  to  appreciate  practically  what 
constitutes  a  bird,  or  a  cat,  or  a  sheep,  or  a  goat,  or  a 
horse,  provided  alwaj's  that  they  are  in  the  way  of  com- 
ing fi'equently  in  contact  with  such  animals.  All  our 
lives  we  are  inchned  or  compelled  to  discover  agreements 
in  the  objects  or  incidents  falling  under  our  notice. 
Sometimes  the  analogies  observed  are  of  a  practical  kind, 
and  impart  to  the  man  who  notices  them  foresight  and 
sagacity  ;  at  other  times  they  are  of  an  intellectual  or 
scientific  character,  and  open  enlarged  views  of  the  con- 
nections of  things  in  the  universe  ;  while  others  are  more 
of  a  literary  or  poetical  nature,  and  give  rise  to  com- 
parisons, images,  similes  and  metaphors. 

2'4i.  Second  Step. — We  fix  more  or  less  definitely  on  the 
points  of  resemblance.  The  process  formerly  noticed  is 
Comparison  ;  that  now  imder  consideration  is  a  special  ex- 
ercise of  Abstraction.  This  abstraction  is  often  of  a  vci-y 
loose  description  ;  that  is,  we  have  not  accurately  defined 
what  the  common  properties  are.   We  have  observed  tha 


22  THE  NOTION. 

there  is  some  general  resemblance  among  objects  in 
shape,  color,  or  property,  and  yet  if  we  were  to  catechize 
ourselves,  or  if  others  were  to  question  us,  we  could  not 
tell  what  it  consists  in.  In  other  cases,  more  esj^eciaUy 
in  the  classifications  of  natural  science,  the  points  of  re- 
semblance are  precisely  fixed  and  rigidly  defined.  A 
great  deal  of  the  confusion  of  thought  and  unsatisfactory 
controversy  to  be  found  in  the  world,  originate  in  men 
never  having  definitely  determined  what  ai'e  the  proper- 
ties which  combine  objects  in  our  common  notions. 
Logic  promotes  clearness  of  thought  by  showing  that  all 
oui*  concepts  are  formed  by  common  attributes,  and  by 
insisting  on  our  knowing  exactly  what  those  attributes 
are.  The  common  attributes  are  called  technically  Nolce 
or  Marks  by  logicians. 

2i>*  No  absolute  rule  can  be  laid  down  as  to  which  of 
the  steps  now  referred  to  is  the  prior.  In  most  cases 
there  seems  to  be  fii-st  a  perception  of  some  sort  of  gen- 
eral likeness,  and  then  the  fixing  with  more  or  less  pre- 
cision on  the  point  or  points  of  resemblance.  But  there 
are  cases  in  which  the  abstracting  process  seems  to  come 
first.  "We  fix  on  a  quality  which  is  evidently  significant, 
and  then  put  all  the  objects  possessing  it  into  a  class.  It 
is  thus  that  in  zoology  naturalists  fix  on  the  posses- 
sion of  a  vertebrate  column  as  a  characteristic,  and  in 
botany  the  springing  from  one  (or  two)  seed  lobes, 
and  put  together  the  objects  possessing  the  mark  fixed 
on. 

20*  Whichever  of  these  may  come  first,  both  are  in- 
volved in  generalization.  But  there  is  more  in  the  process 
than  either  or  than  both  of  these.  These  are  after  all 
only  preparations  for  the  all-important  step.  Were  the 
operation  to  stop  at  this  point,  there  would  after  all  be  no 
general  notion.  For  observe  that  in  the  comparison  we 
have  only  got  individuals,  more  or  fewer,  and  in  the  ab- 


SmOULAR  AND    UNIVERSAL.  23 

stracfcion  a  quality  or  qualities  possessed  by  individuals. 
The  consummating  step  has  yet  to  be  taken. 

27,  Third  Step. — This  is  the  formation  of  a  class  or 
head  embracing  all  objects  possessing  the  common  at- 
tribute or  attributes.  In  the  first  step,  the  comparison,  ^ve 
must  have  observed  or  contemplated  more  or  fewer  objects 
possessing  points  of  likeness  ;  still  the  number  was  limited. 
Ill  the  second  step,  the  abstraction,  we  have  fixed  on  some 
quality  or  quahties  possessed  by  them  in  common.  But 
in  taking  the  final  step  the  number  of  objects  becomes  in- 
definite :  we  must  have  for  convenience  sake  a  head 
under  which  we  may  jolace  not  only  the  objects  we  have 
seen,  but  others  we  may  yet  see  ;  in  short,  all  others  possess- 
ing the  quahty  or  aggregate  of  qualities.  It  is  only  when 
we  take  this  third  step  that  we  have  a  General  Notion  or 
a  Universal.  On  seeing  only  half  a  dozen  buffaloes,  we 
may  have  been  struck  with  their  points  of  likeness,  an-i 
may  have  been  able  to  detennine  what  these  were  in  our 
minds,  specially  their  shape  and  mode  of  motion.  But 
feeling  it  to  be  useful,  wo  take  the  farther  step  and  con- 
struct the  class  '  buffalo/  which  must  include  not  only 
these  few,  but  all  others  of  the  same  form  and  habit ;  not 
only  those  now  living,  but  all  which  have  hved  and  shall 
ever  hve  ;  not  only  so,  but  all  conceivable,  all  possible  buf- 
faloes, the  wild  oxen  of  fiction  and  of  the  ever  active 
imagination. 

2H.  The  Universal  is  thus,  in  one  sense,  indefinite  ;  it 
includes  an  indefijiite  number  of  objects,  we  know  not 
how  many,  all  that  possess  the  Marks.  In  another  sense 
it  is  definite  ;  it  is  defined  by  the  Marks.  Sometimes, 
however,  the  Marks,  though  supposed  to  be  fixed,  are 
very  vaguely  apprehended  by  us  :  thus  the  great  mass  of 
mankind  know  what  a  buffalo  is  onl}'  by  some  loose  idea 
of  its  form.  We  fashion  a  class  called  the  '  beautiful,'  but 
it  has  been  found  extremely  difficult  to  determine  what 


24  THE  NOT  10 IT. 

are  the  common  qualities  possessed  by  objects  entitled  to 
the  epithet,  and  by  no  others  ;  and  provisionally  we  can 
only  define  it  as  that  which  raises  certain  pleasing 
emotions  within  us.  Most  classes  are  formed  in  the 
first  instance  without  scientific  precision,  for  mere  conve- 
nience sake.  Science  as  it  advances  seeks  to  determine 
precisely  the  Marks  of  classes,  and  generally  to  decide 
what  generalizations  are  worthy  of  being  kept,  and  what 
are  not,  and  may  therefore  be  allowed  to  disappear.  This 
advance  in  accm-acy  sometimes  breeds  confusion  from  the 
felt  discrepancy  between  the  scientific  and  popular  ar- 
rangements. The  class  heath  was  probably  formed  first 
fi-om  the  common  heather  ( Calluna  vulgaris),  which  now, 
from  the  greater  precision  of  the  marks,  is  excluded  from 
it.  The  coiTect  determination  of  what  constitutes  '  fish ' 
has  di-iven  out  the  whale,  which  is  still  j)laced  in  it  in  the 
common  apprehension.  Such  general  names  as  value 
and  money,  have  a  different  signification  in  political 
economy  fi'om  what  they  have  in  popular  language.  It 
is  one  main  advantage  of  the  advancement  of  thinking 
and  science,  that  greater  precision  and  fixedness  are  im- 
parled to  the  loose,  though  often  useful,  generahzations 
oiiginally  fashioned  for  practical  purposes. 

As  the  aim  of  every  science  is  to  discover  Laws,  and  the 
aim  of  the  science  of  Logic  is  to  discover  the  Laws  of 
thought,  let  us  enquire  what  are  the 


LAWS  or  THOUGHT  IITVOLVED  IN  GENEEALIZATION. 

2f)»  Inrsl  Laiv. — The  Universal  imphes  Singulars.  It 
has  been  formed  out  of  the  singulars.  The  boy  perceives 
an  ir: dividual  crow  before  he  forms  any  conception  of  the 
class  crow,  and  it  is  from  the  sight  or  contemplation  of  a 
number  of  crows  that  he  forms  the  general  notion.    The 


JjAWS  IN  GENERALIZATIOIf.  25 

Universal  notion  crow  tlius  throws  us  back  on  the  indi- 
viduals entitled  to  be  jiut  under  it.  It  is  the  same  with 
every  other  common  notion.  The  Universal  is  neither 
less  nor  more  than  individuals  viewed  as  possessing  cer- 
tain attributes  in  common. 

,30.  Second  LauK — "U'Tien  the  Singulars  are  Real,  the 
Universal  is  also  Eeal.  We  perceive  a  number  of  bushes 
before  us,  and  observing  that  they  agree  in  ha\ang  tJie  same 
shape  and  structure  and  in  having  spines,  we  jiut  them 
under  one  head,  thorn.  What  is  now  affirmed  is,  that 
if  the  individual  bushes  exist,  so  also  does  the  tribe.  The 
tribe  has  a  reality  in  the  real  bushes,  and  in  the  common 
attributes  possessed  by  them.  True,  if  the  singulars  are 
ideal,  so  may  also  be  the  genus.  If  there  be  no  such  beings 
as  ghosts  and  fairies,  then  the  class  cannot  be  said  to  have  a 
reahty.  The  question  of  the  reality  of  the  class  is  thus  to 
be  determined  by  inquiring  whether  the  individuals,  and 
the  attributes  involved  in  the  classification,  have  a  rea. 
existence, 

31.  Third  Law. — The  Universal  has  a  reaUty  in  the 
Singulars,  and  in  the  Common  Properties  possessed  by 
them,  but  no  Independent  Existence.  We  are  not  to  sup- 
pose that  the  species  '  rose  '  has  the  same  kind  of  existence 
as  the  individual  rose  :  or  that  '  the  beautiful '  has  the 
same  sort  of  reality  as  a  lovely  star  or  a  lovely  woman  : 
or  that  *  the  good '  exists  as  the  good  God  does.  The 
Universal,  say  rose,  beautiful,  good,  has  an  existence  only 
in  the  single  roses,  and  in  the  objects  which  are  beautiful 
and  good,  and  in  the  common  quahtics  combining  them, 
If  the  Singulars  were  to  cease,  the  Universal  would  also 
cease.  Give  us  indi^'iduals  possessing  a  common  attri- 
bute, and  we  may  form  a  common  notion  out  of  them. 
Let  the  individuals  have  an  actual  existence,  and  the 
notion  will  have  the  same,  always  in  the  objects  and  the 
marks   by  which  they  arc  gi-ouped.     In  this  sense  not 


26  THE  NOTION. 

only  what  aro  called  natural  classes  such  as  "Ranuncu- 
lacese,  Eosacere,  Mollusca,  but  even  such  generalizations 
as  beautiful,  vii-tuous,  clear,  high,  low,  level,  imited,  scat- 
tered, have  a  reality  in  the  common  properties  of  the 
things  joined  under  these  heads.  When  we  say  that  this 
rose  is  beautiful,  we  mean  that  it  is  an  object  possessing 
the  attributes  which  bind  in  one  notion  the  objects  en- 
titled to  be  called  beautiful. 


EXTmSION  AOT)  COMPEEHETTSIOIT  OF  GEKEEAL 

NOTIONS. 

.5.5.  According  to  the  account  now  given,  every  General 
Notion  embraces  two  things  :  it  embraces  objects,  and  it 
embraces  attributes.  Thus  the  notion  vertebrata  com- 
prises objects,  viz. :  all  animals  possessing  the  common 
property ;  and  it  also  implies  an  attribute,  the  possession 
by  all  the  animals  of  a  vertebrate  column.  The  former  of 
these  is  called  by  logicians  the  Extension,  and  the  latter 
the  Comprehension  or  Intension  of  a  notion.  The  no- 
tion Rational  Being  is  said  to  have  Extension,  inasmuch 
as  it  embraces  all  objects  possessing  reason  ;  and  Com- 
prehension, inasmuch  as  all  these  possess  the  attribute  of 
reason.  The  Extension  of  a  Notion  is  reached  specially 
by  generalization  as  above  described ;  the  Compre- 
hension specially  by  abstraction,  that  is,  by  fixing  on 
marks.  It  is  clear  that  some  notions  have  gi'cater  Exten- 
sion than  others  :  thus  man  has  greater  Extension  than 
Frenchman ;  that  is,  it  embraces  a  greater  number  of 
beings.  Some  Notions,  again,  have  greater  Comprehension 
than  others :  thus  Frenchman  has  greater  Comprehension 
than  man,  for  he  has  all  the  attributes  found  in  manldnd 
generally,  and  some  peculiar  to  those  who  dwell  in  France. 
It  ifl  evident  that  the  greater  the  Extension  of  a  term, 


EXTENSION  AND  COMPREHENSION.  27 

that  is,  the  number  of  objects  cTenoted  by  it,  it  has  the 
less  Comprehension,  that  is,  fewer  attributes  common  to 
the  objects  ;  and  vice  versa,  the  more  the  Comprehension 
of  a  term,  that  is,  the  number  of  marks  possessed  by  all 
the  objects,  the  less  its  Extension,  that  is,  the  fewer  are 
the  objects  possessing  the  whole  of  them. 

33.  The  distinction  between  the  Extension  and  Comprehension 
of  a  Notion,  though  stated  earlier,  was  introduced  formally  into 
L/Offic  in  La  Logique  ou  I'Art  de  Pcnser,  by  Amauld  and  Nicole 
(16G3  A.  D.).  It  is  found  in  a  number  of  logical  treatises  jiublished  in 
the  end  of  the  17th  and  beginning  of  the  18th  century.  It  has  been 
revived  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  It  should  be  remarked  that  it  applies, 
only  with  a  modification  of  its  meaning,  to  Abstract  Notions  (§  10). 


EEGKEE  KM)  LOWER  GENEEALIZATIONS. 

34:*  The  objects  embraced  in  a  Common  Term  are 
commonly  combined,  not  by  the  possession  of  one  attri- 
bute but  of  several,  sometimes  an  indefinite  number.  In 
all  such  cases  we  can  form  higher  and  higher  generaliza- 
tions. Take  the  class  Dog,  it  is  evident  that  it  includes 
an  aggregate  of  attributes,  so  many  indeed  that  we  can- 
not specify  them  aU.  Now  we  may  fix  on  any  one  ot 
these,  and  put  all  the  objects  possessing  it  into  a  gi'oup  : 
thus  we  may  fix  on  the  qiiality  of  eating  flesh,  and  form 
the  general  notion  Carnivora.  Looking  again  at  Caruiv- 
ora,  we  may  fix  on  the  possession  of  a  backbone  and  form 
the  class  Vertebrata,  and  in  Vertebrata  we  may  single  out 
the  property  of  organization  and  form  the  notion  Organ- 
ized Being.  The  following  table  may  illustrate  the  pro- 
cess : 

Being. 

Substance. 

Matter. 

Organized  Matter, 

Animal. 


28  TUE  NOTION. 

Vertebrata. 
Mammal. 

Carnivora. 
Dog. 
Terrier. 
Snap. 
3o.  It  is  desirable  to  have  a  nomenclature  to  express 
the  relation  of  the  classes  in  this  scale,  and  logicians  have 
supphed  us  Mith  such.  Thus  suppose  we  fix  on  any  class 
possessing  a  gi-oui?  or  aggregate  of  properties  such  as 
Dog,  the  logicians  would  call  this  Species  ;  and  then  the 
class  above  it,  Carnivora,  would  be  called  Genus.  But 
as  we  may  often  have  occasion  to  speak  of  the  relation  of 
a  greater  number  of  classes  we  need  other  phrases,  and 
logicians  use  Proximum  Genus  to  express  the  class  next 
above  the  species,  and  Subaltern  Species  the  class  next 
below  the  species.  Thus  fixing  on  Dog  as  the  species, 
Carnivora  might  be  the  Proximum  Genus,  and  Mammal 
the  Genus  ;  while  Terrier  would  be  the  Subaltern  Spe- 
cies. The  highest  genus  which  we  can  form  is  the  Sum- 
mum  Genus  ;  and  the  lowest  species  which  we  can  form, 
the  Infima  Species — a  point  which,  however,  we  can  never 
absolutely  fix.  If  we  take  all  things,  the  Summum  Genus 
is  Being  ;  if  we  take  merely  an  order  of  things,  the  Sum- 
mum  Genus  is  the  highest  in  that  order  ;  thus  Plant  is 
the  Summum  Genus  in  Botany,  and  Discursive  Thought 
in  Logic.  It  is  evident  that  the  Summum  Genus  can 
have  no  species  above  it,  and  that  the  Infima  Species  has 
only  individuals  and  no  species  below  it.  Looking  to 
the  Table  we  see  that  the  individual  has  the  greatest 
Comprehen.sion,  it  has  an  aggregate  of  attributes  which 
nobody  could  specify  ;  and  the  least  Extension,  for  it  has 
only  one  object.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Summum  Genua 
lias  the  go-eatest  Extension,  for  it  includes  all  objects  ;  and 
tbe  least  Intension,  for  it  comprises  only  one  atti-ibute. 
Between  these  two  extremes,  tbe  Extension  rises  as  we 


niGUER  AND  LOWER  OENEItALTZATrOXS.      29 

ascend  the  scale,  while  the  Comprehension  diminishes  ; 
and  as  we  descend,  the  Extension  is  lessened  while  the 
Comprehension  is  increased.  All  this  follows  from  the 
natui'O  of  Generalization  and  the  General  Notion. 

3(>,  These  remarks  as  to  relative  Extension  and  Inten- 
sion presuppose  that  the  same  objects  are  generalized 
throughout.  But  mankind  form  classes  among  the  in- 
numerable objects  which  present  themselves  as  conve- 
nience induces  and  necessity  i-equires  ;  and  it  is  only  in  a 
few  sciences  that  we  have  such  a  regular  subordination 
as  in  the  above  table.  In  such  general  notions  as  plant, 
planet,  money,  revolution,  virtue,  we  have  no  relation 
implied  except  that  they  may  be  all  placed  under  some 
one  high  genus  such  as  Being.  In  comparing  such  no- 
tions we  can  say  nothing  as  to  theii'  relative  Extension  or 
Comprehension. 

37.  A  notion  is  said  to  be  Subordinate  to  another  no- 
tion when  it  is  included  in  the  Extension  of  that  other  : 
thus  'carnivorous'  is  Subordinate  to  ' mammal.'  Notions 
are  said  to  be  Co-ordinate  when  they  are  species  imme- 
diately under  the  same  genus  :  thus  mammals,  birds, 
fishes,  reptiles,  are  co-ordinate  notions  under  the  genus 
vertebrate.  Notions  are  said  (by  Leibnitz)  to  be  Commu- 
nicant when  they  overlap  each  other,  as  e.  g.  '  poetical 
wiiters'  and  'wi-iters  of  tales,'  there  being  some  writers  of 
tales  who  are  poetical  writers  and  others  who  write  in  prose. 


THE   SmGUlAE  CONCRETE,  THE  ABSTKACT,  AND 
UNIVEESAL  NOTION. 

38.  All  notions  we  have  seen  are  either  Concrete  or 
Abstract.  All  notions  we  have  farther  seen  are  either 
Singular  or  Universal.  These  divisions  are  made  accord- 
ing to  diiierent  principles  or  marks.     The  former  is  a 


30  THE  NOTION. 

division  in  respect  of  attributes  or  nolce,  that  is,  marks  ; 
the  meBtal  process  involved  is  abstraction  ;  and  it  pro- 
ceeds according  to  tlie  comprehension  of  the  notions 
The  latter  is  a  division  in  respect  of  indi^iduals  and 
classes  ;  the  mental  process  involved  is  generalization  ; 
and  it  takes  place  according  to  the  extension  of  the  no- 
tions. These  are  cross  divisions  ;  let  us  combine  them. 
Our  first  idea  might  be  that  we  ought  to  have  four  kinds 
of  notions.  But  it  so  happens,  that  all  notions  which  are 
Singular  are  also  Concrete,  that  is,  have  an  aggregate  of 
attributes  ;  and  abstraction  is  in  the  Universal  as  well  as 
the  Abstract  Notion.  We  have,  in  consequence,  a  three- 
fold division  : 

1st.   The     Singular    Concrete,    as    Bucephalus,    This 
Animal. 

2d.  The  Absti-act,  as  Swiftness,  Life. 

3d.  The  Universal,  as  Swift,  Animal. 

30.  The  things  apprehended  in  the  first  may  be  called 
Percepts,  in  the  second  Abstracts,  in  the  third  Concepts. 
It  will  be  foimd  that  all  the  notions  which  the  mind  of 
man  can  form,  are  either  Percepts,  Abstracts,  or  Concepts. 

4:0,  The  Singular  Concrete  Notion,  or  Percept. — This  is 
the  notion  with  which  the  mind  starts,  and  from  which 
the  two  other  kinds  are  derived.  It  is  of  objects  as 
they  prcbent  themselves  ;  and  these  are  known  as  sin- 
gle, but  with  a  number  of  quahties.  As  our  obser^^ation 
increases  we  come  to  know  a  greater  number  of  indi- 
vidual objects  ;  and  we  know  each  possessing  a  greater 
number  and  variety  of  quahties,  as  it  were  more  and  more 
in  the  concrete.  This  piece  of  iron  :  we  may  know  it 
first  as  a  mere  lump  of  matter,  with  a  certain  shape  and 
color  ;  then  we  know  it  as  hard  ;  as  capable  of  being 
melted  by  heat ;  as  capable  of  being  rusted,  that  is,  com- 
bined with  oxygen  ;  as  capable  of  being  formed  into 
certain  useful  utensils,  and  as  possessing  special  mag- 


rnECEPTS,  ABSTRACTS,  CONCEPTS.  31 

actic  po-wers.  As  we  tlms  add  one  property  after  an- 
other to  objects,  we  are  constrained  at  last  to  acknow- 
ledge that  we  cannot  know  all  the  atti'ibutes  possessed 
by  any  one  thing.  Who  can  tcU  all  the  quahties  pos- 
sessed b}'  any  one  metal,  plant,  or  animal  ? 

4  /.  TJie  Abstract  Notion,  or  the  Abstract. — This  is  pro- 
bably the  second  kind  of  notion  formed  by  the  mind  in 
the  order  of  things.  On  a  concrete  object  coming  before 
us,  we  can  contemplate  a  part  of  it  as  a  part,  or  an  attri- 
bute of  it :  thus  having  seen  Bucephalus  we  can  think  of 
his  swiftness.  Having  an  idea  of  an  animal,  we  can  con- 
template its  life.  These  Abstract  Notions,  Uke  all  other 
notions,  may  be  expressed  in  one  word  or  in  several. 
Thus  '  swiftness '  and  '  life  '  are  abstracts  designated  by 
one  word.  Quite  as  fi-equently  the  notion  is  embraced  in 
a  number  of  words  ;  and  it  is  of  importance  that  we  be 
able  to  fix  on  the  one  Abstract  in  the  midst  of  the  multi- 
plicity of  phrases.  When  we  say,  "  to  repeat  a  hundred 
lines  on  once  hearing  them  can  be  done  only  by  a  few,"  the 
words  in  Italics  express  only  one  abstract  idea.  "  It  is  a 
true  saying,  and  worthy  of  all  acceptation,  that  Jesus  Chi'ist 
came  into  the  world  to  save  sinners ; "  here  "  Jesus 
Christ  coming  into  the  world  to  save  sinners  "  is  one  no- 
tion, and  that  abstract.  Logic  serves  a  most  important 
purpose  when  it  leads  us  to  detect  the  Abstract  No- 
tion wherever  it  is  found  ;  to  perceive  exactly  what  sort 
of  existence  it  has  ;  ever  to  go  back  fi*om  the  abstract 
quaHty  to  the  concrete  objects  ;  and  to  acknowledge  in  the 
abstract  no  other  reahty  than  that  which  is  to  be  found 
in  the  objects. 

42.  Tlie  Universal  Notion  or  Concept. — To  this  Notion, 
or  rather  thing  conceived,  I  am  inclined  to  restrict  the 
phrase  '  Concept  *  (Begriff  in  German).  The  derivation 
of  the  word  (from  con  and  capio)  requires  that  it  should 
be  applied  to  those  notions,  in  which  we  seize  on  a 


b^  TEE  IfOTION. 

number  of  tilings  and  bring  them  into  a  unity  of 
thought.  The  Concept  thus  imderstood  al-^ays  em- 
braces an  indefinite  number  of  objects,  all  the  objects,  real 
or  i^otential,  possessing  the  attribute  or  attributes  which 
we  have  fixed  on  as  the  ground  of  the  generahzation. 
The  Common  Term,  which  is  the  Concept  expressed  in 
language,  can  be  applied  to  any  one  of  these  objects. 

43,  A  distinction  of  some  importance  may  be  drawn 
between  two  kinds  of  Universals — between  what  I  venture 
to  call  the  Generalized  or  (simply)  General  Abstract, 
and  the  GeneraHzed  or  (simply)  General  Concrete. 

4:4:.  The  General  Abstract. — In  this  we  have  only  some 
one  quahty,  or  with  qualities  involved  in  it,  to  constitute 
the  marks  of  the  notion.  Thus  'just'  is  evidently  a 
common  teiTQ — it  embraces  all  intelligent  beings  and  acts 
possessing  the  quality  of  '  justness.'  But  it  denotes  only 
one  attribute,  that  designated  by  the  term.  Of  the  same 
doscrij)tion  are  such  classes,  as  faithful,  true,  frank,  gen- 
erous, hard,  soft,  tough,  elastic,  indeed  all  adjectives.  To 
such  I  would  apply  the  scholastic  phrase,  connotative  ; 
they  denote  an  attribute  and  they  connote  objects. 

4<f.  The  General  Concrete. — In  this,  a  number  of  the 
aggregate  of  qualities  to  be  found  in  the  singular  objects, 
go  up  into  the  General  Notion.  Thus  we  have  in  every 
individual  animal  a  variety  of  properties  which  no  one 
can  number.  Not  only  so,  we  have  in  the  general  term 
'  animal'  a  collection  of  attributes  the  whole  of  which  no 
wise  naturalist  will  venture  to  specify.  Of  the  same 
character  are  man,  mineral,  vegetable,  metal,  horse,  dog, 
rose,  lily ;  no  one  should  profess  to  be  able  to  fix  on  all  the 
attributes  which  are  found  conjoined  in  every  individual 
of  the  class.  It  is  not  difficult  to  perceive  the  'difierence 
between  these  two  kinds  of  notions.  Both  are  Universal, 
for  thej-  include  an  indefinite  number  of  objects.  But  in 
the  one  the  attributes  are  specified  ;  they  are  siich  as  faith- 


THE  GENERAL  ABSTRACT  AND  CONCRETE.       33 

fulness,  generosity,  hardness.  In  the  other  they  are  not 
defined  ;  they  consist  of  an  aggiegate  of  quahties  found 
in  all  the  objects. 

4:0,  It  should  be  specially  observed,  that  it  is  classes 
of  this  latter  description  which  admit  of  higher  and  ever 
higher  generalizations.  The  boy  observes  that  certain  of 
the  animals  with  which  he  is  familiar  resemble  each  other, 
and  he  groups  them  into  such  convenient  classes  as  dogs, 
horses,  cows.  Then,  as  he  is  introduced  to  the  elements 
of  science,  he  is  taught  that  all  these  have  certain 
agreements,  and  that  they  may  be  placed  in  the  class 
quadruped,  or  mammal.  Comparing  this  with  other 
tribes,  such  as  birds,  fishes,  reptiles,  he  finds  them  all  in 
possession  of  a  back-bone,  and  he  calls  them  vertebrata. 
In  this  way  we  may  moimt  upward  till  we  come  to  Being, 
which  denotes  existence  without  quality.  Let  it  be  ob- 
served that  all  this  proceeds  on  the  cu-cumstance,  that  as 
individuals  possess  an  aggi'egate  of  quahties,  so  also  may 
classes  of  objects.  ^Tien  we  come  to  Being  we  have 
risen  above  the  General  Concrete  to  the  General  Abstract 
Notion. 

47.  The  cu-cumstance  that  there  are  Concrete  General 
Notions  has  cost  logicians  a  great  deal  of  trouble,  and 
often  landed  them  in  inextricable  confusion.  It  was  sup- 
posed by  many  of  them  that  a  genus  or  a  species  was  con- 
stituted by  a  certain  number  of  knowable  attributes.  The 
schoolmen  were  ever  seeking  after  a  species  which  would 
constitute  the  whole  essence  of  its  objects.  And  this  leads 
me  to  remark  that  we  believe  the  schoolmen  would  not  have 
applied  the  phrase  Species  to  any  class  except  one  with 
an  aggregate  of  properties.  But  in  natural  classes  we 
are  not  able  to  point  out  all  the  qualities  possessed  in 
common  by  the  objects.  No  man  of  science  will  ventm^e 
to  say  that  he  knows  aU  the  qualities  which  go  to  consti- 
tute the  essence  of  metal,  or  plant,  or  man. 


84  THE  NOTION. 

"  Men  define  a  man 
The  creature  who  stands  frontward  to  the  stars. 
The  creature  who  looks  inward  to  himself, 
The  tool-wright,  laughing  creature.    'Tis  enough ; 
We'll  say  the  inconsequent  creature  man. 
For  that's  his  specialty,     ^^'llat  creature  else 
Conceives  the  circle  and  then  walks  the  square  ?" 

The  circumstance  that  every  object,  and  most  classes  of 
objects,  possess  a  number,  apparently  an  infinite  number 
of  properties,  lands  the  logician  in  perplexities  and 
threatens  to  destroy  the  symmetry  of  his  system.  And 
were  the  various  properties  of  things  loose  and  uncon- 
nected, it  would  be  impossible  to  reduce  the  Concrete 
Generals  to  anjihing  like  order.  As  an  infinitely  worse 
consequence,  it  would  be  found  impossible  to  an-ange 
nattural  objects  iuto  natural  classes.  For  the  number  of 
quahties  in  all  objects  material  and  mental  being  innu- 
merable, we  might  fix  with  equal  propriety  on  any  one  as 
the  ground  of  the  arrangement,  and  different  persons 
would  fix  on  different  qualities,  and  there  could  be  no 
agi'eement  among  those  investigating  the  kingdoms  of 
nature,  or  rather  we  should  not  be  able  to  speak  of  the 
kingdoms  of  nature.  But  the  God  who  made  all  things 
has,  happily  for  our  understandings  and  our  practical  con- 
venience, instituted  an  order  among  the  separate  qualities 
of  objects,  so  that  it  is  possible  to  arrange  them  into 
orders  which  have  such  Marks  as  enable  us  to  fit  them 
into  our  natural  systems.  This  will  be  explained  in  a 
coming  section,  when  we  consider  the  aids  to  generaliza- 
tion in  the  works  of  nature. 


MIXED  NOTIONS. 

48*  We  hold  that  all  notions  can  be  referred  to  one  or 
other  of  these  three  heads.     At  the  same  time  the  three 


MIXED  NOTIONS  35 

may  be  mixed  up  ^vitli  eacli  other  in  a  number  of  ways. 
Thus  there  is  the  Singular  Classified,  as  '  that  statesman,' 
*  that  orator,'  '  that  general,'  '  that  philanthropist.'  These 
notions  are  all  singular,  but  the  object  is  put  into  a  class. 
Such  singular  terms  are  to  be  distinguished  from  Singu- 
lars Prcipcr,  or  proper  names,  such  as  Wilham  Pitt,  Ed- 
mund Biu-ke,  George  Washington,  William  Wilberforce. 
Again,  there  is  the  Singular  Collective,  or  Collective 
Term,  which  is  in  itself  Singular,  but  embraces  objects 
put  in  a  class  :  thus  the  '  Forty-second  Eegiment '  is 
a  Singular  Notion,  but  it  applies  only  to  soldiers  who  are 
classified  ;  '  House  of  Kepresentatives  '  cannot  be  applied 
to  each  of  the  members,  but  each  of  the  members  is  a 
representative  of  the  people.  There  is  also  the  Singular 
Abstracted  :  as  when  we  say  Wellington  was  the  con- 
queror at  Waterloo,  the  term  "  Conqueror  at  Waterloo  " 
is  Singular,  is  one  thing,  but  that  thing  viewed  under  an 
abstracted  aspect. 

4.9.  It  is  to  be  specially  noticed  that  very  many  Terms 
are  used  both  as  Abstracts  and  Concepts.  The  tendency 
always  is,  when  we  have  seized  on  an  important  quahty, 
especially  when  we  have  coined  a  word  to  exj^ress  it,  to 
make  it  the  bond  of  objects,  which  we  join  in  a  class. 
Thus,  having  noticed  that  certain  persons  possess  a  qual- 
ity which  we  call  'learning,'  we  form  a  class  called 
'learned,'  to  embrace  all  who  possess  the  attribute.  Quite 
as  frequently  we  constitute  a  class  by  the  possession  of  a 
number  of  attributes,  known  or  unknown,  and  we  join 
all  these  in  one  by  giving  them  a  name.  Thus,  vrithout 
setthng  what  li\ing  beings  possess  in  common,  we  desig- 
nate what  they  agree  in  by  the  abstract  phrase  '  life.'  It 
is  thus  that  we  have  '  generous '  to  connote  the  class,  and 
'  generosity '  to  denote  the  quality.  In  these  cases  the 
abstracts  and  concepts  ai-e  designated  by  somewhat  dif- 
ferent though  related  words.     But   in  many  cases  the 


36  THE  NOTION. 

same  term  may  denote  both  the  abstract  and  general 
notions.  Thus  '  vu'tue '  is  primarily  an  abstract  term  ; 
we  have  formed  it  by  abstracting  a  certain  quahty  of  in- 
teUigent  and  moral  beings.  But  then  the  quality  has 
various  forms  as  it  appears  in  different  indiAaduals,  and 
at  different  times,  and  we  classify  the  diversities  and 
speak  of  different  virtues,  such  as  justice,  and  temperance, 
and  benevolence,  thus  making  the  phrase  general.  Fine 
Ai'ts  is  an  abstract  term,  but  it  may  become  a  common 
teiin  ■s\ith  painting,  architectui'e,  and  sculpture,  as  sub- 
classes. Pain  and  pleasure  are  in  themselves  Abstracts, 
but  may  embrace  under  them  various  kinds  of  sensations, 
as  corporeal  and  mental  enjoyment,  and  suffering  of 
body,  and  anguish  of  spuit.  In  many  cases  it  is  of 
gi'eat  importance  to  determine  as  to  a  phrase  which  may 
be  both  abstract  and  general,  in  which  of  the  senses  it  is 
employed  in  a  given  passage  or  discussion.  Such  terms 
as  '  substance,'  '  quality,'  and  '  mode,'  may  be  one  or 
other  ;  and  in  eveiy  speculative  investigation  we  sbould 
settle  in  which  of  the  senses  we  are  employing  it.  Sub- 
stance is  primarily  an  Abstract,  standing  for  that  which 
abideth  in  objects  material  or  mental.  It  stands  for  a 
Concept  when  we  sj^eak  of  two  substances,  mind  and  body. 
50,  Students  of  logic  should  notice  that  there  is  one 
class  of  Absti-act  Notions  which  always  tend  to  become 
general.  Verbs  are  primarily  abstracts  expressing  ob- 
jects, not  in  the  concrete,  but  as  being,  doing,  and  suf- 
fering. But  when  they  are  used  in  propositions  they  may 
become  generaL  When  we  say  that  "  man  speaks,"  the 
sentence  is  primarily  attributive  ;  it  means  that  man  has 
the  power  of  speaking.  But  the  term  '  speaks  '  may  also 
be  interpreted  as  universal ;  it  may  mean  that  man  is  in 
the  class  of  si^eaking  creatures.  AVe  shall  see,  as  we  ad- 
vance, that  when  a  verb  is  used  as  a  middle  term  in 
rca.soning,  it  is  always  to  be  undei'stood  as  a  universal. 


MIXED  NOTIONS.  37 

Tims,  wlieu  we  argne  that  since  men  speak,  and  gorillas 
do  not  spealc,  therefore  gorillas  are  not  men,  we  must,  in 
order  to  the  legitimacy  of  the  reasoning,  understand 
*  speak  '  as  denoting  all  speaking  creatures. 

,51*  We  form  notions  of  various  complexity  by  accre- 
tion and  agglomeration.  These  are  called  Mixed  Modes 
by  Locke.  Thus  we  speak  of  '  a  procession,'  implying 
persons,  and  a  train,  and  time,  and  succession.  We  talk 
of  '  a  triumph  '  implying  a  battle  and  a  victory,  and  a 
display.  We  join  abstracts  to  abstracts  ;  we  speak  and 
write  of  '  the  tiiumph  of  excellence,*  of  '  the  defeat  of  wick- 
edness,' of  '  the  reward  of  righteousness '  and  *  the  pun- 
ishment of  evil,'  of  '  the  beauty  of  natural  scenei-y,'  of '  the 
hopefulness  of  spring,'  of  '  the  gloominess  of  winter,'  of 
'the  madness  of  passion,'  'the  terrors  of  despair.'  We  join 
general  with  abstract  notions.  Thus  we  have  the  abstract 
idea  '  wickedness,'  and  we  have  the  general  notions 
'human,'  and  'demoniac,'  and  we  talk  of  'human  wick- 
edness '  and  '  demoniac  wickedness.'  We  have  expe- 
perienced  '  joy  '  and  '  sorrow,'  and  we  know  what  '  eleva- 
tion '  is  and  what  '  depression '  is,  and  we  speak  of  '  the 
elevation  of  joy '  and  '  the  depression  of  sorrow.' 

S2.  But  whatever  be  the  genesis  of  our  notions,  in  the 
end  they  come  to  be  either  Percepts,  or  Abstracts,  or 
Concepts.  To  avoid  confusion  of  thought  and  misappH- 
cation  of  terms,  it  is  of  moment  that  we  should  be  able 
to  say  as  to  every  given  notion,  under  which  of  these 
heads  we  are  to  place  it.  When  we  say  "  Shakespeare's 
Plays  are  the  best  in  the  English  language,"  the  one  no- 
tion "  Shakespeare's  Plays"  is  Siugiilar  Concrete  (CoDec- 
tive),  and  the  other  "the  best  in  the  EngHsh  language," 
an  Abstract.  When  we  say  "  Logic  is  the  science  of  the 
Laws  of  Discui'sive  Thought,"  the  two  terms  "Logic" 
and  "the  science  of  the  Laws  of  Discursive  Thouuht,"  ai-e 
both  Abstracts.     When  we  say  "  the  heai-ts  of  suiierers 


38  THE  NOTION. 

can  be  won  only  by  love,"  the  two  notions  "  liearts  of 
siifierers"  and  "can  be  won  only  by  love"  are  botli 
Universal. 


PRIVATIVE  NOTIONS. 

o3,  "We  have  seen  that  in  Universals,  objects  are  bound 
into  one  by  the  possession  of  Marks.  Bnt  we  may  also 
unite  objects  by  the  absence  of  Marks.  Thus  we  say  that 
aU  quadrupeds  are  vertebrates  ;  and  we  say  of  moUusca, 
that  they  are  invertebrate.  The  former  of  these  notions  is 
called  Positive,  and  the  latter  Privative.  Logicians  have 
remarked  that  a  Positive  and  Privative  Term  divide 
among  them  the  universe  of  being,  that  is,  aU  objects 
must  either  be  vertebrate  or  invertebrate.  But  when  in- 
terpreted properly,  this  means  simply  that  each  object 
must  either  possess  or  not  possess  a  given  attribute.  It 
does  not  imi:)ly  that  the  non-possession  of  that  attribute 
is  a  proper  mark  by  which  to  join  objects.  There  would 
be  no  propriety  in  putting  aU  objects  which  do  not  pos- 
sess a  back-bone,  say  thought,  the  soul,  probity,  dress, 
planet,  into  the  class  invertebrata — which  should  be  ap- 
plied only  to  those  portions  of  the  genus  animal  which 
we  wish  to  distinguish  from  vertebrates.  It  should  be 
remarked  that  some  seemingly  privative  phrases  reaUy 
imply  a  positive  Mark  :  thus  the  phrase  '  immortal '  im- 
pUes  not  merely  that  the  object  does  not  die,  but  that  it 
lives  forever  ;  and  the  term  '  infinite '  may  be  hold  aa 
meaning  more  tban  merely  the  absence  of  bounds,  it  in* 
Tolves  the  occupation  of  aU  sj)ace  and  aU  time. 


/  J  ^ 

LOGICAL  DIVISION.  89 

OONTKAKY  AND  CONTRADIOTOEY  NOTIONS. 

54.  Positive  and  Privative  Terras  are  said  to  be  Con- 
tradictory ;  that  is,  they  are  such  that  we  cannot  conceive 
them  as  appHed  to  the  same  object  at  the  same  time,  such 
as  existent  and  non-existent,  organic  and  inorganic. 
Contrary  Terms,  called  by  some  Incomj)atible,  are  such 
as  might  be  conceivably  applied  to  the  same  object,  but 
cannot,  in  fact,  be  so  ai)j)hed,  such  as  good  and  bad,  light 
and  darkness,  cold  and  hot. 

KELATIYE  NOTIONS. 

o5.  These  are  derived,  not  from  a  quality  in  one  ob- 
ject, but  from  the  relation  of  one  thing  to  another.  When 
we  speak  of  the  objects  under  this  relation,  they  are  said 
to  be  Correlative.  Thus  we  have  sovereign  and  subject, 
parents  and  children,  husband  and  wife,  master  and  ser- 
vant. The  one  of  these  implies  the  other.  The;y  are 
connected  by  the  ground  of  the  relation  {fundamentum 
relationis).  The  phrases  themselves  are  Universals  (Gen- 
eral Abstracts) ;  the  relation,  say  that  of  sovereignty  and 
subjection,  is  abstract ;  for  relatio  non  est  per  se  reale,  sed 

LOGICAL   DIVISION. 

50,  In  generification,  that  is,  in  the  formation  of 
common  notions,  we  rise  fi'om  singulars  to  classes,  and 
from  lower  classes  to  higher.  But  after  the  classes  have 
been  fashioned  by  ourselves  or  others,  wo  may  reverse 
the  proccfis  and  descend  from  higher  classes  to  lower 


40  TEE  notion: 

Tliis  operation  is  called  Logical  Division,  -wliicli  may  be 
defined  as  the  process  by  which  we  spread  out  a  genus 
into  its  co-ordinate  species.  It  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  Pai-tition,  which  consists  in  separating  an  individual 
object  into  its  parts  ;  as  when  we  sunder  a  plant  into  stems, 
roots,  and  branches.  Logical  Dix-ision  takes  up  a  common 
notion,  such  as  plant,  and  spreads  it  out  into  acotyledons, 
monocotyledons,  and  dicotyledons.  To  every  such  sub- 
class the  name  of  the  higher  class  may  be  applied  ; 
thus  we  speak  of  plants,  monocotyledonous,  and  dicotyle- 
donous, and  in  the  same  science  of  Geum  urbanum  and 
Geum  rivale.  It  is  evident  that  Division  proceeds  speci- 
ally according  to  the  Extension  of  a  notion  ;  and  it  in- 
volves Comprehension  only  so  far  as  Extension  implies 
Comprehension.     The  niles  are  : 

o7'  First  Rule. — We  must  proceed  according  to  a 
Mark  or  Marks  added,  and  according  to  the  same  Mark 
or  Marks  throughout.  We  have  seen  that  in  the  ascend- 
ing process  of  generification,  we  leave  out  marks  ;  thus 
in  ascending  from  dog  to  carnivora,  we  leave  out  every 
property  of  the  dog  except  that  of  eating  flesh.  In  the 
descending  process  of  division  we  add  marks.  Thus  in 
dividing  plants,  we  add  the  projDerty  of  growth  by  seed- 
lobes,  and  put  those  growing  from  one  seed-lobe  under 
one  head,  and  those  gi-owing  from  two,  under  another. 
J)iscursive  Thought  is  divided  into  the  Notion,  Judgment, 
and  Reasoning,  according  as  we  exercise  thought  in  ap- 
prehending, in  comparing  the  things  apprehended  di- 
rectly, or  comparing  them  by  means  of  a  middle  term. 
As  in  our  divisions  we  proceed  on  a  principle,  so  that 
principle  should  always  be  clearly  understood  and  very 
commonly  be  enunciatecL  What  should  be  the  Marks 
fixed  on  must  be  detei-mined  by  the  nature  of  the  objects, 
and  the  scientific  or  practical  oid  we  have  in  view  at  the 
time.     Here  Logic  can  be  of  little  use  to  u>s  ;  but  then  it 


LOGICAL  DIVISION.  41 

eerves  an  important  pui-pose  by  insisting  that  there  must 
be  Marji^.  It  does  more  :  it  requires  that  we  proceed 
throughout  on  the  same  Marks.  In  dividing  mankind, 
we  may  proceed  on  various  principles  :  as  on  the  princi- 
ple of  race,  into  Caucasian,  Malay,  Mongols,  Negro  ;  on 
the  principle  of  enlightenment,  into  savages,  unciviHzed 
and  civilized  ;  of  religion,  into  Christians,  Mahometans, 
Pagans.  But  it  would  be  wrong  to  flit  fi-om  one  of  these 
to  another,  and  divide  mankind  into  Christians,  Mahom- 
etans, and  savages  ;  or  into  Eui'opeans,  Americans,  Pa- 
gans and  Mahometans.  The  logician  would  err  were  he 
to  divide  discui'sive  thought  into  the  term,  the  proposition, 
and  arg-umcnt ;  for  in  the  fii'st  he  would  be  proceeding  on 
the  principle  of  language  ;  in  the  second,  on  that  of 
thought.  Arrangements  violating  this  rule  are  called 
*  cross-divisions.'  "  It  is  a  useful  practical  rale,  whenever 
you  find  a  discussion  of  any  kind  very  perplexing  and 
seemingly  confused,  to  examine  whether  some  cross- 
division  has  not  crept  in."     ("VMiatcly). 

5S,  Second  Rule. — The  species  must  make  up  the 
genus,  or,  as  it  is  otherwise  expressed,  the  dividing  mem- 
bers (membra  dividentia)  must  make  up  the  whole.  This 
rule  would  be  violated  were  we  to  divide  vertebrate  ani- 
mals into  quadi-upeds,  birds,  fishes,  and  reptiles  ;  for  there 
ai*e  animals — man,  for  instance^neluded  in  vertebrata, 
but  not  in  the  di\asion.  We  shall  see,  in  treating  of  Judg- 
ments, that  Immediate  Inferences  can  be  drawn  on  the 
principle  of  division  ;  but  this  can  be  done  only  on  the 
assurance  that  the  division  is  complete.  There  is  often  a 
fallacy  lurking  in  imperfect  divisions.  Thus  the  Eleatics 
argued  that  there  could  not  be  such  a  thing  as  motion, 
for  that  the  motion  must  either  be  in  the  place  where  it 
is,  or  in  a  place  where  it  is  not,  neither  of  which  is  pos- 
sible ;  whereas  there  is  a  third  supposition  that  it  may 
have  been  fi'om  the  place  where  it  was,  to  the  place  whero 


42  THE  NOTION. 

it  now  is.  Anotlier  sophism  proceeds  on  the  same  mis- 
take. It  is  argued  that  academical  honors  are  useless, 
inasmuch  as  they  are  not  needed  by  those  who  have  a 
taste  for  study,  and  that  they  have  no  effect  on  the  idle, 
and  such  as  are  indifferent  to  mental  improvement.  Here 
it  is  tacitly  assumed  that  all  students  must  belong  either 
to  the  dihgent  class  or  the  idle  class ;  whereas  there 
may  be  a  large  intermediate  class,  not  altogether  hope- 
lessly idle  on  the  one  hand,  nor  with  confirmed  habits  of 
application  on  the  other,  and  these  may  be  intluenced  by 
academical  distinctions. 

o9.  Third  Rule. — The  dividing  members  must  exclude 
one  another.     This  rule  woiild  be  violated  were  we  to 
divide  hues  into  straight,  curved,  circular,  and  elliptical,  or 
notions  into  singular,  concrete,  abstract,  and  universal  — 
for  concrete  notions  may  be  universal.     He  who  neglects 
to  attend  to  the  rule,  will  offend  every  person  of  correct 
judgment,  and  confuse  the  minds  of  those  who  do  not 
see  the  fault  of  the  division.     The  preacher  violated  it 
when  he   proposed  proving  a  particular  doctrine  fi-om 
reason,  and  from  revelation,  and  the  testimony  of  Paul ; 
his  di\ision  should  have  been  from  reason  and  from  rev- 
elation, and  under  the  latter,  he  might  have  said,  espe- 
cially from  the  testimony  of  St.  Paul.     The  barrister  trans- 
gressed it  when  he  talked  of  establishing   his  point  by 
moral  law,  by  the  law  of  the  land,  by  Act  of  Parliament 
and  precedent  ;  for   Acts  of  Parhament  and  precedents 
are  included  under  the  law  of  the  land.     The  Chinese  are 
said  to  furnish  a  ludicrous  example  of  this  error  in  their 
di^-ision  of  the  race  into  first  Cbinese,  then  men,  and  then 
women.     The  error   arises  comm.only  fi-om  introducing 
subordinate   species   and   not   adhering    to    co-ordinate 
species.     It  will  often  happen  that  a  division  contraven- 
ing any  one  of  these  rules  will  also  violate  all  the  others. 
Tlius  a  hbrarian  who  would  arrange  his  volumes  as  books 


LOGICAL  DIVISION.  43 

of  proso,  poetry,  morals  and  religion,  as  proceeding  on  no 
principle,  would  nevor  be  able  to  malce  up  the  whole,  and 
would  find  his  divisions  running  mto  inextricable  con- 
fusion. 

00.  Fourth  Rule. — There  should  be  a  due  subordina- 
tion of  classes — Divisio  non  facial  saltiim.  The  contents 
of  elaborate  treatises  are  commonly  distributed  into 
Books,  Chapters,  and  Sections.  We  should  never  be  able 
to  arrange  the  vegetable  kingdom  if  we  proceeded  to  dis- 
tribute plants  as  they  cast  up  into  roses,  oaks,  lilies, 
lichens  ;  nor  the  animal  kingdom  if  we  began  to  divide 
them  into  horses,  dogs,  leopards  and  lions.  NaturaHsts 
fix  on  a  regularly  ascending  or  descending  series  of 
divisions  and  sub-divisions ;  thus  Agassiz  arranges  the 
animal  kingdom  into  Branches  or  Types,  Classes,  Orders, 
Families,  Genera,  Species. 

Gl.  These  rules  are  of  value  in  the  sciences,  especially 
those  which  are  concerned  with  classification,  such  as 
Botany  and  Zoology.  True,  they  do  not  tell  us  how  we 
are  to  arrange  the  organic  world,  for  this  miist  be  done 
by  a  careful  observation  and  induction  of  the  facts  ;  but 
they  lay  down  certain  stringent  laws  of  thought  which 
must  be  attended  to  in  the  classifications  formed.  They 
may  also  be  of  gi'eat  service  in  the  construction  of  essays, 
papers,  sermons,  and  discoiu'ses  of  every  kind.  It  is  not 
necessaiy  in  all  cases  to  announce  the  division.  Some 
people  have  argued  that  such  an  announcement  must 
make  the  composition  stiff  and  formal,  and  is  apt  to 
damp  the  curiosity  of  the  reader  or  hearer  who  ought  to 
be  kept  awake  by  a  desire  to  know  what  is  coming.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  argued  that  when  our  end  is  not 
merely  to  please  or  tickle  the  fancy,  but  to  impart  in- 
struction, it  is  of  importance  to  announce  the  dirisions 
ani  subdivisions,  which  will  be  found  greatly  to  aid  the 
memory  and  comprehension.     The  question  of  whether 


44  THE  NOTION'. 

we  should  or  should  not  lay  down  a  formal  di\dsion  is  tc 
be  decided  by  the  end  we  have  in  view,  whether  it  is  sim- 
ply to  annise  or  interest  for  the  time,  or  to  convey  impor- 
tant truth  which  we  expect  to  be  recalled  and  pondered. 


ANALYSIS   AND   SYNTHESIS. 

62t  Analysis  (from  avaXvu,  I  unloose),  is  that  process 
in  which  we  separate  in  thought,  a  concrete  object  or  a 
complex  abstract  notion  into  its  parts  or  quahties.  Analy- 
sis is  always  jDerformed  by  means  of  Abstraction,  but  the 
two  differ.  In  Abstraction  we  mentally  separate  any 
quality  ;  in  Analysis  we  spread  out  the  qualities  which 
make  up  the  whole.  It  is  seldom  we  can  unfold  all  the 
properties  of  a  concrete  object,  and  not  alwaj's  that  we  can 
fix  on  all  those  of  a  complicated  notion.  There  are  times, 
however,  when  we  can  bring  out  to  view  the  attributes 
involved  in  an  abstract  which  we  have  fashioned.  Thus 
we  analyze  discui'sive  thought  into  thought  as  directed  to 
objects  whatever  they  be,  and  thought  as  directed  to  special 
classes  of  objects  ;  and  the  former  we  analyze  into  Simple 
Apprehension,  Judgment,  and  Reasoning.  We  thus  see 
that  Analysis  is  not  the  same  as  Division.  In  Division 
we  take  a  class  and  distribute  it  into  sub-classes  ;  in 
Analysis  we  take  a  concrete  object,  or  more  frequently  a 
comprehensive  abstract,  and  spread  out  its  quahties.  It 
may  happen  that  where  an  abstract  term  is  also  a  com- 
mon term,  division  and  analysis  coincide.  Thus,  as 
'  Discursive  Thought,'  and  as  '  Notions,'  '  Judgments,' 
and  '  Reasoning,'  are  at  one  and  the  same  time  Abstracts 
and  Concepts,  it  is  of  little  moment  whether  we  call  the 
distribution  of  them  a  division  or  an  analysis — whether 
fie  say  that  we  divide  or  that  we  analyze  the  notion  into 
percepts,  abstracts,  and  concepts. 


ANALYSIS  AND  SYNTHESIS  4fi 

GS,  Having  found  the  parts  by  Analysis,  we  may  join 
the  parts  to  show  that  they  make  up  the  whole  by  a  pro- 
cess which  is  called  Synthesis  (from  ovvrcOrjin,  I  place 
together).  "When  we  can  jyvove  that  the  parts  by  their 
junction  constitute  the  whole,  the  synthesis  is  a  confirma- 
atiou  of  the  accui-acy  of  the  previous  analysis.  It  is  clear 
that  in  the  study  of  a  new  or  hitherto  unexplored  subject, 
we  must  begin  with  analysis.  But  after  we  have  made  a 
successful  analysis,  we  may  then  advantageously  employ 
synthesis  in  corroborating  the  previous  analysis,  and  the 
synthetic  method  in  expounding  the  science  which  treats 
of  the  objects.  Thus  in  chemistry,  ha\-ing  shown  what 
the  elements  of  bodies  are,  we  may  then  take  up  these 
elements  one  by  one,  and  show  how  we  can  explain  by 
them  the  composition  of  all  bodies.  Thus  in  Logic,  hav- 
ing ascertained  by  analysis  that  thinking  consists  in  Simple 
Apprehension,  Judgment,  and  Reasoning,  we  then  con- 
sider each  of  these,  and  show  how  they  together  consti- 
tute the  discursive  operations  of  the  mind.  Whately  has 
imparted  a  gi-eat  interest  to  his  Elements  of  Logic  by  in- 
troducing us  to  the  subject  by  an  analysis  of  the  reason- 
ing process,  and  then  proceeding  to  develop  the  science 
in  the  synthetic  method. 

04.  Analysis  and  Synthesis  used  to  occupy  a  much  more  important 
place  in  Logical  treatises  than  they  now  do.  They  were  represented 
as  the  main  instruments  in  the  investigation  of  nature.  It  was,  in 
fact,  very  much  by  mental  analysis  and  synthesis  that  the  philoso- 
phers of  ancient  Greece  and  Rome  and  the  medieval  logicians  and 
theologians  proceeded  in  their  fjliysical  speculations.  The  instru- 
ment is  now  seen  to  be  Induction,  and  Deduction  joined  with  it  in 
certain  walks  of  inquiry.  But  it  can  be  shown  that  analysis  is  an 
important  element  in  Induction.  Phenomena  falling  under  the 
senses  or  our  observing  faculties  are  always  concrete  or  complex 
and  we  must  so  far  separate  the  things  which  are  joined  together 
before  we  can  reduce  them  to  a  law,  or  even  observe  them.  Hence 
Bacon  says,  we  must  begin  Induction  by  the  "  necessary  rejections 
or  exclusions ;  "  and  Whewell  says  by  "  tlie  Decomposition  of  Facts." 


i.6  THE  NOTION. 

It  can  be  eliown  also  that  STnthesis  may  act  an  important  part  in 
Dwiuction.    But  these  questions  carry  us  into  Inductive  Logic. 


LOGICAL  DEPIMTION. 

Go,  By  definition  {opioixog)  is  meant  in  tlie  most  gen- 
eral sense  "  a  description  •svlaicb  manifests  the  nature  of 
the  thing  defined."  Logical  Definition  is  to  be  distin- 
guished from  mere  rerbal  explanation :  as  vrhen  a  child 
does  not  understand  "svhat  is  meant  by  perspicuous,  and 
you  say  it  means  clear  ;  or  when  you  say  that  salubrious 
means  tending  to  produce  health.  It  is  the  pro'since  of  a 
dictionary  to  give  the  explanation  of  words.  But  in  de- 
finition we  must  manifest  the  nature  of  the  thing  defined. 

GG»  We  can  logically  define  only  those  notions  in 
which  there  has  been  a  process  of  discursive  thought ; 
that  Ls,  abstract  or  general  notions.  "\r\'e  cannot,  pro- 
perly speaking,  define  a  singular  notion,  for  we  cannot 
manifest  its  natture  by  bringing  to  view  all  its  attributes, 
the  attributes  being  innumerable.  All  \\q  can  do  is  to 
give  some  marlrs  of  the  individual,  technically  called  a 
description,  .sufficient  to  detect  the  object  and  distinguish 
it  from  others.  "We  have  such  a  description  in  the  "  Hue 
and  Cry "  sent  after  a  criminal,  "  five  feet  eight,  light 
hair,  blue  eyes,  a  scar  on  the  right  cheek."  We  have 
such  descriptions,  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  recognize  them, 
of  towns,  rivers  and  mountains,  in  our  traveller's  guide- 
books. 

G7,  It  has  been  remarked  by  many  philosophers  that 
there  are  some  notions  which  cannot  be  defined.  It  wiU 
be  found  that  these  are  abstracts  :  they  are  quahties  which 
cannot  be  resolved  into  anj-thing  simpler,  such  as  sweet- 
ness, sourness,  pleasure,  pain.  We  can  give  no  idea  of 
them  to  one  who  does  not  know  already  what  they  are ; 


^ 


{LOGICAL  PWINITIO:^.  47 

all  tliat  we  can  do  in  explaining  onr  meaning  is  to  appeal 
to  our  experience  of  tbem.  But  while  we  cannot  define 
them  so  as  to  manifest  the  nature  of  the  thing,  we  can 
make  a  great  many  affirmations  and  denials  regarding 
tiiem.  Thus  we  can  say  that  such  a  sour  taste  is  pro- 
duced by  vinegar  ;  that  a  purple  color  proceeds  from  the 
union  of  yellow  and  blue  rays.  Much  information  can 
often  be  given  by  specifying  the  objects  in  which  the 
quaHty  is  to  be  found  :  thus  we  can  say  that  pleasui-e 
and  pain  are  affections  of  beings  endowed  with  sensation. 
We  can  always  make  an  indefinite  number  of  negative 
statements  regarding  these  simple  ideas,  to  face  misap 
prehensions  or  misrepresentations,  as  that  pleasure  docs 
not  consist  in  the  mere  possession  of  wealth,  or  the  means 
of  sensual  gratification.  But  there  are  cases  in  which  v,-e 
can  give  a  definition  of  an  Abstract  Notion  ;  being  com- 
plex we  can  analyze  it  into  its  constituents.  Thus  we  can 
define  Discui'sive  Thought  as  an  exercise  of  mind  in  which 
we  proceed  fi-om  something  given  or  granted,  to  some- 
thing else  founded  on  it. 

6'iV.  It  is  disputed  among  metaphysicians  whether  such  ideas  as 
those  of  Extension,  Power,  Moral  Good,  are  to  be  put  under  tho 
same  head  as  those  of  pleasure  and  pain  ;  that  is,  under  tho  head  of 
original  ideas,  revealed  to  us  by  the  senses  or  primitive  perceptions. 
When  asked  to  define  virtue,  or  moral  good,  we  can  only  say  virtue 
is  virtue,  good  is  good.  But  then  we  can  make  an  indefinite  num- 
ber of  negative  propositions  regarding  them  :  thus  we  say  that  vir- 
tue or  good  does  not  consist  in  mere  happiness  ;  and  that  the  rela- 
tion of  cause  and  effect  does  not  consist  in  invariable  antecedence 
and  consequence. 

{>J>.  We  should  always  be  able  to  define  a  General 
Notion.  We  have  seen  that  objects  are  brought  together 
into  a  common  notion  by  means  of  the  possession  of  a 
common  attribute.  Now  we  can  bring  out  this  attribute 
in  definition,  and  in  doing  so,  we  indicate  the  boirnd.;;  of 
the  common  notion,  and  thus  what  it  is  as  distinguished 


48  THE  NOTION. 

from  other  things.     It  is  evident  that  definition  proceeds 
specially  according  to  the  Comin'ehension  of  a  notion. 

70.  First  Rule. — We  must  bring  out  a  distinguishing 
attribute  of  the  notion  defined.  When  this  is  done  there 
is  always  a  true  definition.  When  this  is  not  done  there 
is  no  proper  definition.  ^Tien  we  say  man  is  a  rational 
being,  we  have  given  a  sufificient  definition  ;  for  rationality 
is  a  characteristic  quality  not  found  in  inanimate  nature, 
or  in  the  brute  creatures.  When  we  say  Logic  is  the 
science  of  the  discursive  laws  of  thought,  we  have  brought 
out  a  distinctive  mark,  distinguishing  the  science  fr'om  all 
sciences  with  which  it  might  be  confounded,  such  as 
Ethics  and  Metaphysics.  As  to  what  is  a  distinguishing 
property  of  a  notion,  this  must  be  determined  not  by 
Logic,  but  the  sciences  which  deal  with  the  objects.  But 
Logic  insists  on  our  fixing  on  such  a  propertj^  Herein  is 
the  person  trained  to  logical  habits  distingiiished  from 
others.  How  often  do  we  find  the  uneducated  man 
struggling  to  give  expression  to  what  he  knows  in  a  loose 
way,  and  faihng.  You  ask  him  what  Logic  is,  and  he 
answers  a  branch  taught  in  our  colleges  ;  what  Arithme- 
tic, and  he  says  a  branch  taught  in  our  schools  ;  what 
Language,  and  he  says  a  means  of  expression — as  if  there 
were  not  other  branches  taught  in  colleges  and  schools, 
and  as  if  there  were  not  other  ways  of  expressing  thought. 
The  person  disciphned  in  Logic  knows  that  in  giving  a 
definition  he  must  fix  on  a  distinguishing  attribute,  and 
he  seeks  for  it  and  is  not  satisfied  till  he  finds  it. 

71.  And  here  it  is  of  importance  to  remark  how  it  is 
that  what  we  have  called  the  General  Concrete  Notion  is 
defined.  It  is  evident  that  we  may  not  be  able  to  bring 
out  all  the  attiibutes  common  to  the  notion,  for  we  may 
not  know  what  they  are.  It  is  enough  in  such  cases  to 
specify  one  characteristic  which  may  be  a  sign  of  the  others. 
We  may  not  be  able  to  mention  all  the  attributes  found 


LOGICAL  DEFINITION.  49 

in  mammals ;  but  it  is  a  good  definition  wLeu  we  say 
that  "  tbey  are  animals  suckling  their  youiig,"  for  this 
brings  out  to  view  a  quality  common  to  the  whole  class, 
and  a  quality  which  is  the  sign  of  others. 

72.  Second  Rule. — The  definition  must  be  adequate  to 
the  notion,  neither  wider  nor  narrower.  If  we  defined 
grammar  the  art  of  speaking  a  language  with  propriety, 
the  definition  would  be  too  narrow,  for  gi-ammar  treats  of 
writing  a  language  as  well  as  speaking.  If  we  defined  it 
as  the  science  of  language,  it  would  be  too  wide,  for 
grammar  does  not  discuss  all  the  scientific  questions  con- 
nected with  language.  If  we  defined  Logic  as  the  science 
of  our  intellectual  natvu-e,  it  would  be  too  wide  ;  if  as  the 
science  of  reasoning,  it  would  be  too  narrow. 

73.  N.B. — The  best  test  of  this  property  of  a  good 
definition  is,  that  the  subject  can  take  the  place  of  the 
predicate,  and  the  predicate  of  the  subject,  without  any 
change.  Thus  defining  a  straight  line  as  the  shortest 
distance  between  two  points,  we  can  say  the  shortest  dis- 
tance between  two  points  is  a  straight  line.  We  can  say 
truly  •  all  poets  are  men  of  genius,'  but  this  is  no  defixiition, 
for  we  cannot  saj^  all  men  of  genius  are  poets. 

74.  Tliird  Rule. — It  is  expedient  to  give  the  genus  as 
well  as  a  chai-acteristic  quality.  "When  we  do  this  we  are 
said  to  define  by  genus  and  differentia — that  is,  characteris- 
tic quality.  This  cannot  always  be  done,  as  there  may  be 
notions  which  it  is  difiicult  to  put  into  a  genias  in  any  way 
fitted  to  clear  up  theu-  natm-e.  But  when  it  is  possible  we 
should  give  both  the  genus  and  the  differentia,  as  by  the  one 
we  show  wherein  the  notion  agi-ees  with  others  to  which 
it  is  most  clearly  aUied,  and  by  the  other  we  show  where- 
in it  differs  from  the  notions  with  which  it  might  be  con- 
founded. In  giving  a  genus  it  is  expedient  to  give  the 
proximum  genus.  Thus  we  may  define  Ethics  as  "the 
mental  science  unfolding  the  laws  of  man's  moral  nature  ; " 

3 


50  TEE  NOTION 

in  which  "  mental  science  "  is  the  proximum  genus,  put- 
ting ethics  under  the  same  head  as  psychology,  logic,  and 
metaphj'sics  ;  and  "  unfolding  the  laws  of  man's  mox'al 
natui'e"  is  the  differentia,  sejiarating  it  from  these  de- 
partments of  knowledge. 

7o,  Some  important  practical  rules  may  bo  laid  doAvn 
as  to  the  language  in  which  the  definition  should  be 
given.  The  general  rule  is,  that  the  definition  should 
always  be  clearer  than  the  thing  defined.  More  partic- 
ularly (a)  the  definition  must  not  be  expressed  in  ambig- 
uous or  figurative  language,  as  Aristotle's  definition  of 
Motion,  "  the  act  of  being  in  potency,  so  far  as  being  in 
potency;"  as  "matter  and  mind  are  sides  of  one  thing.'* 
(b)  It  must  not  contain  covertly  the  name  of  the  thing 
defined,  as  when  we  say  abstraction  is  a  process  in  which 
we  abstract  or  draw  off,  or  that  life  is  the  sum  of  the 
vital  functions,  (c)  When  the  class  has  positive  attri- 
butes, the  definition  should  not  be  put  in  a  negative  form. 
Those  who  say  that  infinite  is  a  positive  quality,  should 
give  a  better  definition  of  it  than  when  it  is  said,  it  is  that 
which  has  no  bounds.  Natiu'alists  no  longer  give  inver- 
tebrata  as  the  name  of  a  scientific  class  to  be  placed 
alongside  of  vertebrata. 

AIDS  TO  ABSTRACTION  AND  GENERALIZATION. 

70.  In  the  employment  of  abstract  and  general  no- 
tions, the  mind  must  always  have  some  sign  before  it. 
This  sign  may  be 


I.-A  MENTAL  IMAGE  OE  PHANTASM. 

77 »  We  have  occasion,  let  us  suppose,  to  speak  of  the 
rose  tribe  of  plants  ;  as  wo  do  so,  we  may  notice  that 


THE  MENTAL  IMAGE  OR  PHANTASM.  51 

we  have  a  loose  idea,  in  the  sense  of  image,  of  a  plant 
which  may  have  as  many  as  possible  of  the  characteristics 
of  the  rose  without  those  of  other  plants,  such  as  the 
tulip  or  the  lily.  Or  we  have  occasion  to  think  of  plant 
generally,  and  we  fashion  a  figui*e,  vei-y  possibly  with 
axis,  branches,  and  leaves  (though  there  are  plants  with- 
out these),  which  may  stand  for  all  plants.  The  image 
may  also  aid  us  in  our  abstractions.  When  we  think  of 
gi'eat  size,  we  pictiu-e  a  huge  bulk  ;  when  of  tallness,  we 
pictiu'e  great  length  ;  when  of  transparency,  ice  or  glass 
with  light  shining  through  ;  when  of  wealth,  a  heap  of 
money ;  when  of  dignity,  a  man  of  imposing  form  and 
addi-ess  ;  when  of  pomp,  a  dazzling  show  ;  when  of  mar- 
tyi'dom,  a  person  suffering  for  the  truth  ;  when  of  mirth, 
a  man  laughing  ;  when  of  soitow,  a  person  ci-jing.  It  is 
by  help  of  such  images,  that  childi-en,  savages,  rustics,  in 
fact  the  great  body  of  ordinary  men  and  women,  are  able  to 
form  abstracts  and  concepts.  "When  such  phantasms  can 
be  formed,  they  always  render  our  thinking  more  lively,  and 
therefore  more  interesting  and  better  fitted  to  call  forth 
emotion.  Our  pictorial,  who  are  always  our  most  popular 
writers,  help  our  understandings  by  furnishing  concrete 
pictures  of  abstract  notions,  and  thus  enable  us  to  cany 
on  our  thinking  more  easily  and  pleasantly — often,  it  has 
to  be  added,  more  obscui'ely  and  confusedly. 

78.  These  ideas  or  phantasms  are  not  to  be  under- 
stood as  constituting  the  abstract  or  general  notion.  It  ia 
usually  said  of  oiu'  common  notions  that  they  are  inade- 
quate. But  this  is  not  true  of  our  concepts  as  exercises  of 
thought ;  they  may  be  regarded  as  adequate,  for  they  are 
of  things  joined  by  common  attributes,  the  concept  em- 
bracing all  objects  possessing  the  common  attributes. 
But  it  holds  good  of  the  ideas  considered  as  mental  pic- 
tuies  :  we  can  form  no  con-ect  image  of  gi'avity,  or  hard- 
ness, or  weight,  or  indeed  of  any  quahty.     Nor  can  we 


52  TUE  NOTION. 

fashion  a  full  phantasm  of  a  concept,  for  the  objects  are 
joined  by  a  quality  or  qualities  abstracted,  and  the  ob- 
jects are  innumerable.  We  cannot  form  a  correct  picture 
of  man  in  the  general,  for  if  we  make  him  white  we  do 
not  include  the  Negro  or  Red  Indian  ;  if  we  make  him 
black  we  leave  out  the  Caucasian  race  ;  and  if  we  make 
bim  neither  black,  nor  white,  nor  red,  we  leave  out  the 
whole  of  these  three  tribes  of  mankind.  In  all  cases  tlio 
phantasm  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  mere  sign  or  representa- 
tion of  the  result  of  elaborative  thought.  It  is  not  of 
the  mere  phantasm  that  we  make  affirmations  or  denials, 
but  of  the  things  for  which  it  stands  as  ajiprehended  by 
the  mind.  In  certain  cases  the  mental  image  when  used 
as  a  sign,  is  quite  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  think  accu- 
rately, that  is,  when  it  stands  for  ideas  not  far  removed 
fi'om  the  singular  and  the  concrete.  But  when  the  no- 
tion becomes  more  and  more  abstract  or  general,  more 
especially  when  it  is  the  idea  of  spiritual  objects  or  qual- 
ities, or  when  it  is  a  composite  one,  the  formation  of  a 
mental  picture  becomes  more  and  more  difficult,  and  at 
last  is  seen  to  be  altogether  impossible.  Who  can  form 
an  image,  for  instance,  of  law,  of  truth,  of  right,  of  gov- 
ernment, of  leai'ning,  of  civilization  ?  AVhen  we  have 
occasion  to  think  of  such  things,  we  must  call  to  our  aid 
external  Signs,  and  especially  Language. 

7 it.  Locke  confused  liimself  on  tbissulyect  by  not  distinguishing 
between  the  image  and  the  notion,  both  of  which  were  embraced  in 
his  favorite  phrase  '  idea,'  wliich,  however,  he  commonly  used  in  its 
literal  sense  as  imago.  In  forming  our  idea  of  man  or  humanity, 
persons  leave  out  that  which  is  peculiar  to  tlie  individuals,  they 
leave  out  of  the  complex  they  had  of  Peter  and  James,  Mary  and 
Jane,  "  that  which  is  peculiar  to  each,  and  retain  only  what  is 
common  to  them  all."  {Essay,  Book  III,  iii,  7.).  Bishop  Berkeley 
saw  the  absurdity  of  this  view,  and  not  seeing  the  way  out  of  it, 
landed  himself  in  nominalism,  which  thence  descended  to  Hxmie, 
Stewart,  and  Whately.  "The  mind  having  observed  that  Peter, 
James,  and  John  resemble  each  other  in  certain  common  agree- 


THE  MENTAL  IMAGE  OR  PU ANT  ASM.  63 

ments  of  shape  and  other  qualities,  leaves  out  of  the  complex  or 
compoimded  idea  of  Peter,  James,  and  any  other  particular  man  that 
which  is  peculiar  to  each,  retaining  only  what  is  common  to  all, 
and  so  makes  an  abstract,  wherein  all  the  particulars  equally 
partake,  abstracting  from  and  cuttinj^  off  all  those  circumstances 
and  differences  which  might  determine  it  to  any  particular  ex- 
istence. And  after  this  manner,  it  is  said,  we  come  by  the  ab- 
stract idea  of  man,  or,  if  you  will,  of  humanity  or  human  nature ; 
wherein,  it  is  true,  there  is  included  color,  because  there  is  no 
man  but  has  some  color ;  but  then  it  can  be  neither  white  nor 
black,  nor  any  other  particular  color  wherein  all  men  partake. 
So  likewise  there  is  included  stature ;  but  then  it  is  neither 
tall  stature  nor  low  stature,  but  something  abstracted  from  all 
these."  Such  considerations  show  that  we  cannot  form  an  idea  of 
man  in  general  in  the  sense  of  a  mental  pictiire.  But  they  do 
not  prove  that  we  cannot  form  an  intellectual  conception  of  objects 
joined  by  common  properties,  the  conception  including  all  the  ob- 
jects possessing  the  properties.  We  are  thus  thrown  back  on  the 
distinction  drawn  by  Aristotle  between  the  phantasm  {<pavTda/ia) 
and  notion  (I'oi'/ua).  The  difference  between  them  and  yet  their 
relation  are  accurately  expressed  by  him  when  he  says  that  the 
notion  is  not  the  same  with  the  jjhantasm,  and  yet  is  never  without 
the  phantasm.  NoT/fxara  nvt  dcolaei  tov  fifj  (pavTcla/iara  elvai,  ij  ov6e 
ravra  (pavTaaftaTa,  uA/l'  ovk  uvev  (pavTaafiaruv.     {De  Anim,  iii,  7.) 


n.-LANGUAGE. 

80,  Language  may  be  defined  as  the  expression  of  our 
mental  actions  and  afiections  by  means  of  words  spoken 
or  written.  The  primary  benefit  derived  from  it  arises 
from  its  being  a  means  of  communicating  with  our  fellow- 
men,  and  thus  enabling  us  to  convey  to  them  our  varied 
thoughts  and  feelings,  wants  and  wishes,  and  to  have  theirs 
imparted  to  us.  This  is  the  first  and  final  end  of  lan- 
guage, subordinating  every  other,  and  determining  in  a 
great  measure  the  changes  which  it  has  undergone 
throughout  its  whole  history.  But  this  is  not  the  aspect 
under  which  we  are  requii'ed  to  contemplate  it  in  thia 


54  THE  NOTION. 

Vfort,  where  we  view  it  simply  as  the  instrument  of  dis- 
cursive thought. 

81»  First. — Language  is  advantageous,  inasmuch  as  it 
is  a  sign  and  register  of  the  abstractions  and  generaliza- 
tions which  mankind  are  ever  forming.  We  have  seen 
that  all  men  are  led  by  a  native  intellectual  tendency,  and 
by  the  circumstances  in  which  they  are  placed,  to  separate 
and  to  combine  the  objects  they  meet  with  ;  to  distin- 
guish between  a  thing  and  its  quahties  ;  to  observe  the 
relations  of  things,  and  then  put  the  things  which  are  re- 
lated into  a  class.  Many  of  the  distinctions  thus  drawn, 
and  groupings  fashioned,  are  valuable  only  for  the  mo- 
ment ;  but  others  are  of  permanent  impoi-tance,  and 
should  be  carefully  j)reserved  ;  and  this  can  be  done  only 
by  a  name,  by  what  is  technically  called  Denomination. 
A  simple  illustration  or  two  will  enable  us  to  understand 
this.  A  merchant,  say  a  druggist,  has  in  his  warerooms 
a  large  number  of  miscellaneous  articles  lying  promis- 
cuously on  the  floor ;  as  long  as  they  are  in  this  state  he 
feels  that  he  has  not  absolute  command  of  them  ;  and 
so  he  fixes  on  some  ground  of  distx-ibution  and  arranges 
them  in  shelves  or  drawers  on  which  he  puts  some  kind 
of  mark  or  labeL  Having  done  so,  he  and  his  assistants 
find  that  they  can  at  once  lay  their  hands  on  the  article 
they  require.  Or,  a  naturalist  enters  a  countiy  the  flora 
of  which  has  hitherto  been  unexplored.  As  he  views 
the  profusion  before  him  his  first  act  is  to  observe,  and 
his  second  is  to  classify  ;  but  unless  he  take  a  third  step, 
he  is  made  to  feel  that  all  his  researches  are  hkely  to  be 
valueless,  if  not  to  himself,  at  least  to  others  ;  he  has  to 
give  a  name  to  the  plants  which  he  has  put  into  a  class* 
This  name  finds  its  way  into  botanical  books,  and  becomes 
the  index  of  tlie  genus  or  species  to  students  of  every 
country  and  of  all  coming  ages.  These  illustrations  show 
tis  the  benefit  of  names  in  the  business  of  life  and  in 


LANGUAGE.  55 

natural  science.  But  they  serve  a  like,  and,  in  most 
casey,  a  vastly  more  important  purpose  in  regard  to  all 
the  iimltiplied  opcx'ations  of  the  mind;  preserving  them, 
when  they  might  otherwise  be  lost,  for  our  own  use  and 
that  of  others  ;  it  may  be  handing  them  down  to  all  \)Os- 
terity,  or  spreading  them  over  all  civilized  nations.  In 
contemplating  the  objects  which  present  themselves  in  the 
world  without,  and  the  still  more  wondrous  world  within 
under  its  divers  moods  and  impulses,  mankind  fashion  au 
infinite  variety  of  thoughts,  v/hich  can  be  preserved  and 
profitably  employed  only  by  the  instrumentality  of  lan- 
guage. 

82*  Second. — Language  puts  us  in  possession  of  the 
abstractions  and  generahzations  wliich  have  been  made 
by  other  men.  In  saying  so  we  do  not  refer  to  the  cir- 
cumstance that  it  is  not  so  much  by  personal  observa- 
tion as  by  intercourse  with  others,  that  it  is  by  the 
iustniction  imparted  by  teachers,  companions,  and  our 
fellow-men  generally,  and  by  books  ancient  and  modem, 
that  we  acquire  by  far  the  larger  portion  of  the  know- 
ledge possessed  by  us  ;  for  this  proceeds  fi'om  the  pri- 
mary use  of  language  as  a  means  of  communication.  A 
reference  is  made  mider  this  head,  not  to  the  information 
thus  conveyed,  but  to  results  of  discursive  thought  em- 
bodied in  words  and  phi-ases.  It  should  be  observed 
indeed,  that  the  abstractions  and  generalizations  must 
first  have  been  formed  before  they  could  be  expressed  in 
language.  But  the  name  being  given  it  becomes  at  once 
and  forever  a  sign  of  the  idea.  On  the  word  being 
brought  under  the  attention  of  the  young,  they  ask  what 
is  meant  by  it,  and  are  thus  put  in  possession  of  the 
thought  which  it  may  have  cost  so  much  pains  to  ela- 
borate. An  intelligent  youth  hears  the  phrases  '  conser- 
vation of  physical  force  *  and  *  correlation  of  physical 
forces '  employed,  and  on  inquiring  into  their  signification, 


66  THE  NOTION. 

he  is  tauglit  that  the  amount  of  force,  potential  and  actual, 
in  the  universe,  is  always  one  and  the  same,  and  cannot 
be  diminished  or  increased  by  any  human  means,  and 
that  all  the  physical  agencies,  mechanical,  chemical,  elec- 
tric, and  vital,  are  modiiications  of  that  one  force.  Or  he 
hears  the  word  '  sesthetics '  used,  and  is  thus  introduced 
to  a  science  which  seeks  to  investigate  the  laws,  subjec- 
tive and  objective,  of  the  beautiful  and  subhme.  "What  is 
thus  seen  so  clearly  in  science  is  also  manifested  in  moral 
and  practical  matters.  Some  one  saw  very  keenly  that 
there  is  a  vast  amount  of  pretension  in  the  world,  and 
that  there  are  persons  who  recommend  as  great  and  good 
what  is  not  really  so,  and  gave  expression  to  his  percep- 
tion in  the  word  '  humbug  ; '  and  the  phrase  goes  down 
to  posterity  because  of  its  felt  truthfulness.  Some  terms 
spring  up  by  a  sort  of  accident  and  are  retained  because 
found  to  be  useful  ;  there  is,  for  example,  the  word 
'  cabal,'  made  up  of  the  names  of  persons  who  were  sup- 
posed to  have  formed  a  party  combination,  and  the 
phrase  has  kept  its  place  ever  since,  because  an  ever 
recuriing  feature  of  human  natto-e.  The  British  sol- 
diers who  had  been  in  the  wars  of  Gustavus  Adolphus, 
brought  back  with  them  certain  terms  such  as  '  plunder,' 
'life-guard,'  and  'furlough,'  which  have  ever  since  been 
retained  in  our  tongue.  Thomas  Carlyle,  with  that  vig- 
orous grasp  of  intellect  and  atrabihous  temperament  by 
which  he  is  distinguished,  in  order  to  show  his  contempt 
for  those  who  are  ever  fawning  on  the  gi-eat,  gave  expres- 
sion to  what  he  observed  and  felt  in  the  word  '  flunkey- 
ism,'  a  phrase  hkely  to  go  down  to  all  future  generations 
To  an  American  custom  we  owe  the  phrase  'stump- 
orator,'  so  descriptive  of  a  style  of  speaking  which  cannot 
otherwise  be  so  briefly  characterized. 

8.?.  The  occupations,  the  tastes,  the  habits,  indeed  the 
whole  character  of  a  people,  are  apt  to  embody  themselves 


la:souage.  67 

in  their  language.  It  is  said  that  in  Arabic  there  are  500 
names  for  a  lion,  200  for  a  serpent,  80  for  honey,  400  for 
sorrow,  and  1000  for  a  sword  ;  and  it  seems  certain  that 
there  are  574-4  relating  to  the  camel.  The  French  have 
given  lis  the  words  '  finesse,'  '  prestige,'  '  ennui,'  *  foible,* 
'  chagrin,'  and  many  others  descriptive  of  their  character 
and  experience  ;  and  the  English  have  given  them  in 
return  '  jockey,'  '  club,'  '  sport,'  and  the  phrase  '  comfort- 
able,' so  exj^ressive  of  genuine  English  feehng.  The 
Scotch  have  designated  one  feature  of  their  national 
character  by  the  word  '  canny  ; '  and  the  Irish  have  ex- 
pressed one  of  theii'  national  traits  by  the  phrase  '  blar- 
ney.' A  number  of  words  which  have  of  late  come  in 
upon  us  with  such  weight  and  gravity,  such  as  standpoint 
God-consciousness,  claim  Germany  as  their  fatherland. 

S-t.  In  holding  intercourse  with  each  otlier,  persons  fashion  or 
modify  phrases  in  accordance  with  the  native  tendency  of  thought, 
and  in  order  to  promote  mutual  convenience.  This  remark  holds 
good,  not  only  of  individual  words,  but  of  the  structure  of  language 
generally.  Hence  we  have  in  so  many  tongues  prefixes,  suffixes, 
and  reduplications ;  the  gender,  number,  and  case  of  nouns,  and  the 
moods  and  tenses  of  verbs.  These  modifications,  say  declensions 
and  conjugations,  invented  or  adopted  in  the  first  instance  for  con- 
venience sake,  become  in  the  next  generation  the  means  of  intro- 
ducing the  young  to  the  distinctions  of  sex,  and  quantity,  and  time , 
to  the  more  important  relations  of  things  one  to  another;  and  the 
contingency,  the  certainty,  and  necessity  of  events.  Language  thua 
becomes  an  important  means  of  training  the  youthfid  mind  to  an 
acquaintance  with  the  liabitual  and  useful  modes  of  himian  thought 
and  contemplation. 

S5.  It  is  not  possible  to  express  the  higher  fonns  of  thought  iu 
the  language  of  a  people  low  in  the  scale  of  intelligence.  In  the 
Iroquois  there  is  no  word  for  goodness  i  n  the  abstract,  they  have  only 
a  word  for  good  man.  In  the  Mohican  there  is  no  verb  for  '  I  love/ 
the  forms  involve  the  subject  as  well  as  the  action,  '  I  love  him,'  '  I 
love  you.'  In  those  islands  which  the  London  Missionary  Society 
Las  done  so  much  to  elevate,  there  was  one  word  for  the  tail  of  a 
dog,  another  fur  the  tail  of  a  bird,  and  a  third  for  the  tail  of  a  sheep, 
but  no  word  for  tail  iu  general.     In  Chineso  there  are  teime  for 


58  THE  NOTIOy 

elder  and  younger  'brother,  but  none  for  brother.  Christian  mis- 
eionarics  found  great  dilliculty  in  fixing  on  an  unexceptionable  word 
in  that  tongue  for  God,  and  disputed  among  themselves  as  to  wliich 
of  the  available  phrases  was  the  least  objectionable.  The  fixed 
forms  of  that  language  and  its  want  of  inflections  have,  I  doubt  not, 
acted  with  other  causes  in  keeiung  that  people  in  a  stationary  con- 
dition for  thousands  of  years.  Notwithstanding  the  strong  attach- 
ment of  the  people  to  the  Gaelic,  the  Welsh,  and  the  Irish,  it  is  do 
Birable  that  these  tongues  should  give  way  as  speedily  as  possib.e 
in  favor  of  the  English,  with  its  advanced  intelligence,  its  refined 
sentiment,  and  noble  literature.  The  circumstance  that  one  tongue, 
and  this  enriched  by  the  thoughts  of  the  highest  science,  philoso- 
phy, and  theology,  is  used  in  all  the  schools  of  the  United  States, 
has  helped  more  than  any  other  agency  to  produce  a  unity  of  belief, 
character,  and  aims,  which  keeps  the  people  together  in  spite  of  the 
many  disturbing  causes  which  might  make  them  fly  asimder. 

<*>'6*.  The  line  of  thought  we  are  pursuing  is  fitted  to  show  the 
advantage  of  being  acquainted  with  more  than  one  tongue.  Every 
educated  people  has  fashioned  thoughts  for  itself  and  embodied  them 
in  peculiar  phrases  ;  hence  the  diOiculty  of  translating  the  words  of 
one  tongue  into  precisely  synonymous  jihrases  in  another.  By  learn- 
ing the  language  of  a  race,  we  come  into  possession  of  their  mode  of 
thought,  which  is  to  us  fresh  and  original.  Ennius  used  to  say  that 
he  had  three  hearts  (the  heart  being  reckoned  the  seat  of  intel- 
ligence) because  he  knew  three  languages,  the  Greek,  Latin,  and 
Oscan.  The  Emperor  Charles  V.  declared  that  a  person  is  as  many 
times  a  man  as  he  knows  a  number  of  languages.  Often  do  we  find 
in  other  tongues  a  phrase  embodying  an  idea  which  never  occurred 
to  U8 ;  or  we  are  delighted  to  fall  in  with  the  expression  of  an  idea 
which  had  floated  in  our  minds  without  our  being  able  to  give  it  an 
exact  shape.  It  sometimes  happens  that  an  inaccuracy  or  confusion 
of  thought  in  one  tongue  may  not  occur  in  another  tongue,  to  which 
we  have  only  to  look  to  have  our  ideas  cleared  up.  Thus  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  phantasm  and  the  general  notion,  drawn  by 
Arist^jtle  and  known  in  the  middle  ages,  was  lost  sight  of  by  the 
EnglLsh-speaking  nations  for  ages  after  the  time  of  Locke,  who  con- 
founded them  and  expressed  them  both  by  his  favorite  phrase 
'  idea.'  Of  late  years  the  distinction  has  been  re\ived  in  our  coun- 
trj'  greatly  \j»  the  benefit  of  philosophy  and  sjjecially  of  logic,  by 
K-Tolars  who  noticed,  in  perusing  works  of  German  speculative  phi 
lo'ophy,  that  the  two  had  been  distinguished. 


LANGUAGE.  69 

8K.  Modern  European  thouprbt  has  been  greatly  benefited  bvthe 
Btudy  of  the  ancient  classical  languages,  wliicb  commenced  in  the 
fifteontli  century  and  lias  been  continued  to  the  present  time  in  all 
the  higher  seats  of  learning.  Wo  have  thereby  got  good  not  merely 
from  the  faultless  models  of  brevity,  elegance,  and  taste  presented 
by  the  Greek  and  Eonuxn  writers,  but  from  the  very  words  them 
selves  and  the  ideas  embodied  in  them.  We  have  derived  a  like — 
in  some  respects  a  higher— advantage  from  the  introduction  of 
Eastern  thought,  especially  from  the  Divine  thought  received  from 
the  Scriptures  with  their  elevated  views  of  God  and  holiness — we 
get  the  very  idea  of  holiness,  or  separation  from  sin,  from  the  Word 
of  God,  there  being  no  such  idea  in  the  writings  of  Greek  or  Roman 
authors.  The  English  language  has  been  farther  enriched  by  ideas 
conveyed  by  the  Italian  from  the  time  of  Spencer  to  that  of  Milton 
by  the  French  in  the  last  century,  and  by  the  German  in  this.  Our 
language,  like  our  race,  is  a  happy  mixture  of  very  diverse  elements  : 
while  we  have  as  the  basis  the  phrases  and  inflections  of  the  old 
Saxon  tongue,  we  have  made  free  additions  from  the  Greek  and 
from  the  Latin  (either  directly  or  through  the  Norman  French) 
which  have  introduced  us  to  a  more  advanced  style  of  thought,  and 
a  more  refined  mode  of  life. 

H8.  Third. — Language  constrains  us  to  give  a  form  to 
thought  which  would  otherwise  be  loose  and  vague. 

"  Language  is  a  perpetual  Orjihic  song, 
Which  rules  with  Daedal  harmony  a  throng 
Of  thoughts  and  forms,  which  else  senseless  and  shapeless  were." 

Let  us  try  to  un-ilerstand  how  tliis  takes  place.  We 
enter  a  large  factory  ;  we  see  the  comphcated  machinery, 
the  work  done,  and  the  persons  doing  it,  and  we  are  filled 
with  a  general  astonishment.  Oiu*  ideas  meanwhilo 
may  be  very  indeterminate.  But  we  meet  with  one  ac- 
quainted with  the  work,  and  he  names  the  parts  one  after 
another,  the  machinery,  and  the  raw  materials,  and  the 
products  at  the  various  stages  of  advancement ;  we  now 
feel  that  our  notions  are  becoming  clearer.  Or,  we  know 
that  after  we  leave  the  work  we  shall  be  obUgod  to  de- 
scribe it  to  a  fi'icnd,  and  we  try  to  get  names  for  the  varied 
apparatus,  and  to  reduce  what  we  have  seen  to  heads.  No\» 


GO  THE  NOTION. 

there  is  a  like  process  going  on,  often  Tvitli out  our  noticing 
it,  in  the  formation  of  our  higher  and  subtler  thought. 
In  being  obhged  to  express  our  thoughts,  we  have  to 
make  them  definite  in  order  to  bring  them  within  the 
forms  of  settled  language.  This  is  specially  the  case 
when  we  have  to  write  out  our  thoughts.  "  Conference," 
says  Bacon,  "  maketh  a  ready  man,"  that  is,  ready  to  ex- 
press intcUigently  the  thoughts  that  occur  ;  "  and  writ- 
ing  an  exact  man,"  that  is,  having  leisure  to  put  his 
thoughts  into  shape,  and  knowing  that  others  will  have 
time  to  examine  them,  he  has  to  make  them  assume  a 
more  accurate  form.  How  often  does  a  student  imagine 
that  he  has  an  idea  of  a  subject  about  which  he  is  read- 
ing, or  on  which  he  has  heard  his  teacher  lecture,  till 
such  time  as  he  is  examined  on  it,  or  has  to  write  de- 
finitely upon  it,  when  he  discovers  how  vague  his  notions 
have  been.  It  is  the  great  advantage  of  systematic  ex- 
aminations and  of  es say- wi'i ting,  that  they  force  the  stu- 
dent to  understand  his  topic  in  order  to  his  being  able  to 
unfold  it  in  language  spoken  or  written.  The  interrog- 
ative or  maieutic  method  of  Socrates  was  specially  fitted 
to  accomplish  this  end,  by  constraining  the  person 
questioned  to  give  his  thoughts  a  definite  shape  and 
order. 

Hi).  The  determinate  moulds  supplied  by  language, 
Into  which  to  pour  our  solvent  thoughts,  are  of  various 
kinds.  Sometimes  they  are  abstractions  or  analyses, 
which  enable  and  constrain  us  to  decompose  concrete  or 
complex  oljjects.  More  frequently  they  are  common  no- 
tions, under  which  we  are  led  or  obliged  to  put  single 
ol)joctH  or  lower  classes. 

.VO.  It  ia  commonly  said  that  language  is  first  synthetic,  and  then 
analytic.  The  more  correct  statement  is,  that  it  is  first  concrete,  thai 
is,  stands  for  things  with  an  aggregate  of  qualities,  and  then  Ije- 
comes  more  and  more  abstract,  that  is,  designates  common  qualities, 
or  ohjects  joined  by  common  qualities.   First  a  word  is  fixed  on  to  d*> 


LANGUAGE.  61 

note  at  object ;  then  it  is  modified  by  additions,  T>y  affixes  orBuflixes, 
or  otherwise,  to  denote  related  objects ;  and  then  it  becomes  a  root  or 
norm  of  other  phrases  clustering  round  it  witli  allied  meanings.  It  is 
in  its  growth  that  language  becomes  synthetic  in  the  proper  sense 
of  the  term,  that  is,  words  are  joined  to  express  a  complexity. 

01*  As  thought  and  hmguage  malce  progress,  more 
and  more  is  taken  in  from  the  void  (to  drreigov,  as  the  old 
Greek  philosophers  called  it) ;  the  waste  becomes  meas- 
tu-ed  and  fenced  in  ;  and  those  who  come  after  must 
accommodate  themselves  to  what  their  predecessors  have 
settled.  It  thus  cJomes  that  while  language  aids  thought, 
it  tends  at  the  same  time  to  limit  and  restrain  it.  In 
using  the  tongue  provided  for  us,  we  must  fall  in  with  the 
forms  which  it  furnishes.  The  analyses  and  generaliza- 
tions of  words  have,  as  it  w^ere,  laid  down  rails  on  which 
our  thoughts  run  easily  and  rapidly,  and  we  are  induced 
to  travel  on  these  accustomed  ways  instead  of  striking 
out  new  paths  for  ourselves.  This  may  be  one  reason 
why  the  earliest  poets  of  a  country — such  as  Homer  and 
.ailschylus  in  Greece,  Lucretius  in  Rome,  and  Dante  in 
Italy,  and  Chaucer  and  Shakespeare  in  England — are 
often  the  freshest  ;  they  looked  at  things  with  their  own 
eyes,  and  not  as  other  men  through  the  eyes  of  others. 
This  may  be  one  of  the  ends  served  in  Providence  by  the 
confounding  of  old  tongues  and  the  necessary  fonnation 
of  new  ones  ;  as  when  the  northern  nations  came  in  upon 
the  Roman  empu-e,  and  Norman  French  became  mixed 
with  the  Saxon  ;  the  same  purpose  is  served  as  by  the 
mixture  of  races — the  hereditary  sameness  is  distui-bed 
and  we  have  a  new  progeny  with  fresh  life  and  new  char- 
acteristics. Still,  the  incidental  evils  arising  from  a 
langTiage  being  settled,  are  as  nothing  compared  with  the 
advantages  px'oceeding  from  a  cultivated  tongue,  which 
provides  innumerable  analogies  and  analyses  to  stimulate 
and  guide  thought.  Any  evils  which  might  arise  fi-om  a 
slavish  adlierence  to  fixed  inllections  and  routine  phrases, 


G2  TEE  NOTION. 

arc  to  be  overcome  by  oiu'  forming  the  resolute  determ- 
ination to  make  language  our  useful  servant  without 
allowing  it  to  become  our  arbitrary  master. 

02*  Fowth. — Language  lightens  thought  by  being 
used  as  a  symbol.  "When  we  think  of  objects  not  present, 
we  must  always  have  some  representation  of  them  before 
the  mind.  This,  we  have  seen,  may  primarily  be  a  men- 
tal image ;  thus  when  we  are  thinking  about  mothers 
generally,  we  fix  on  some  one  mother,  say  our  own,  and 
leave  out  as  many  of  her  peculiarities  as  may  make  the 
idea  stand  for  mothers  generally.  But  we  have  shown 
that  this  phantasm  must  always  be  inadequate  to  represent 
an  attribute,  or  a  class  comprising  an  indefinite  number 
of  objects  ;  and  as  the  generalizations  become  wider  and 
the  abstractions  more  refined,  and  when  different  abstrac- 
tions are  mixed  with  each  other,  it  may  be  impossible  to 
form  a  picture  resembling  the  reality  in  the  remotest 
degree.  Besides,  even  though  we  could  fashion  an  ade- 
quate image,  it  would  be  sure  to  distract  the  mind  by 
calling  it  away  to  adventitious  circumstances.  These  in- 
conveniences can  be  obviated  only  by  the  use  of  external 
signs,  and  particularly  of  language. 

03.  Let  us  notice  how  external  symbols  are  fitted  to 
lessen  the  labor  of  thinkinj?.  Thev  do  so  inasmuch  as 
they  render  it  unnecessary  to  take  notice  of  the  unnum- 
bered objects  which  go  to  constitute  a  class ;  as  they 
save  us  from  conceiving  the  attributes  which  combine 
the  objects  in  the  class  ;  and  fi'om  thinking  of  the  pecu- 
liarities of  the  individuals.  To  illustrate  by  an  example. 
In  the  natural  arrangement  of  plants  there  is  a  sub- 
class, thalamiflorce,  from  thalamus  and  flos  (flower)  ;  its 
characteristics  are  said  to  be  "  calyx  and  corolla  pres- 
ent, petals  distinct,  insei*ted  into  the  thalamus  or  recep- 
tacle, stamens  hypogynous."  Now  had  this  tribe  of 
plants    not    received    a    name,   we    should    have    been 


LANQUAOE.  63 

obliged,  every  time  we  thought  or  spoke  about  them,  to 
reprcseut  to  ourselves  or  euumenite  to  others  their 
various  characteristics,  and  we  should  have  been  forced 
to  endeavor  to  conceive  of  the  numbei'less  plants  be- 
longing to  the  class  ;  and  as  we  tried  all  this,  we  should 
have  found  ourselves  distracted  and  overwhelmed.  This 
biu'densome  work  is  avoided  by  using  the  phrase  thalami- 
flonc  to  stand  for  the  whole  tribe. 

i)4:.  As  feeling  the  convenience  of  it,  and  as  being  en- 
dowed with  the  organs  of  speech,  and  the  mental  capa- 
city and  inclination  to  employ  them,  man  naturally  and 
spontaneously  betakes  himself  to  words,  to  stand  for 
thoughts  and  things.  "  It  is  not  necessary,  even  in  the 
strictest  reasonings,  that  significant  names  which  stand 
for  ideas,  should  every  time  they  are  used  create  in  the 
understanding  the  ideas  they  are  made  to  stand  for.  In 
reading  and  discoursing,  names  are  for  the  most  part 
used  as  letters  are  in  algebra,  in  which,  though  a  partic- 
ular quantity  be  marked  by  each  letter,  yet  to  proceed 
right  it  is  not  requisite  that  in  every  step  each  letter 
should  suggest  to  youi'  thoughts  that  particular  quantity 
it  was  appointed  to  stand  for."  (Berkeley.)  In  many 
processes  of  thought,  the  attention  seems  to  be  very  much 
fixed  on  the  verbal  sign  ;  and  conception  comes  to  be  what 
I^eibnitz  calls  Symbolical.  Words  come  to  be  used  like 
algebraic  symbols,  a,  b,  c,  which  stand  for  quantities 
without  our  thinking  of  any  particular  quantity,  hke 
coTintera  which  represent  money,  like  bank-notes  which 
stand  for  gold.  The  mind  yields  willingly  to  this  stixte 
of  things,  as  feeling  how  much  the  memory  and  the  power 
of  imaging  and  apprehending  are  thereby  eased.  We  do 
not  choose  every  time  we  use  such  woi'ds  as  liberty,  in- 
dependence, order,  civilization,  virtue,  commonwealth, 
church,  religion,  to  think  of  all  that  is  comprised  in  them. 
We  pass  them  on  as  the  banker  gives  away  a  hundred 


6i  TEE  NOTION. 

pound  note,  or  a  liimdi-ed  dollar  bill,  without  thinking  of 
tlae  gold  it  stands  for  ;  or  as  we  receive  it  Viitliout  con- 
ceiving liow  man}-  articles  of  utility  or  of  comfort  it  would 
purchase.  Langiiage  is  tlius  a  species  of  stenograjDhy  by 
which  the  mind  lightens  its  labors  and  makes  its  higher 
cficrts  less  ii-ksome. 

Oo.  Fifth. — It  follows  as  a  corollary,  tliat  by  means  of 
language  we  can  caiTy  on  thinking  to  a  greater  extent 
than  we  should  otherwise  be  able  to  do. 

AVe  do  not  allow  indeed,  th;it  language,  or  even  that 
external  signs,  are  necessary  io  thought.  It  is  forever 
rung  in  our  ears  by  certain  writers,  that  there  could  be 
no  reasoning,  no  thought  of  any  kind,  without  language. 
Dugald  Stewart  goes  so  far  as  to  maintain,  tliat  "without 
the  use  of  signs  our  knowledge  must  have  been  confined 
to  individuals,  and  that  we  should  have  been  perfectly  in- 
capable both  of  classification  and  general  reasoning  ;  "  and 
"  lays  it  down  as  a  proposition  which  holds  without  any 
exception,  that  in  every  case  in  which  we  extend  our 
speculations  beyond  indi\dduals,  language  is  not  only  a 
useful  auxihary,  but  is  the  sole  instrument  by  which  they 
are  carried  on."  This  is  a  very  extreme  position,  pro- 
ceeding on  a  doctrine  which  tends  to  degi'ade  the  human 
faculties,  and  which  has  been  most  eagerly  maintained  by 
those  who  derive  all  men's  ideas  from  sensation.  In  op- 
position to  it  I  lay  down  the  counterpart  statement,  tliat 
without  thought  language  could  not  be  fashioned,  could 
not  be  understood,  could  not  be  intelligently  employed. 
"  Parrots,"  says  Locke,  "  will  be  taught  to  make  articulate 
sounds  enough,  which  yet  are  by  no  means  capable  of  Ian- 
guage.  Besides  articulate  sounds,  therefore,  it  was  farther 
necessary  that  man  should  be  able  to  use  these  sounds  as 
signs  of  internal  conceptions,  and  to  make  them  stand  as 
marks  of  the  ideas  within  his  mind."  "  From  whence  it 
fcjllows,"  says  his  critic,  M.  Cousin,  "  that  language  is  not 


LANGUAGE.  tJft 

the  product  of  sounds,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  organs  and 
the  senses,  but  of  the  intelligence  ;  2.  That  the  intelligence 
is  not  the  product  of  lang-uage,  but,  on  the  contraiy,  lan- 
guage is  the  product  of  intelligence  ;  3.  That  the  greater 
part  of  the  words  having,  as  Loclce  well  remarks,  an  ar- 
bitrary signification ;  not  only  are  languages  the  product 
of  the  intelUgence,  but  they  are  even  in  great  part  the 
product  of  the  will ;  while  in  the  system  that  has  pre- 
vailed both  in  the  school  of  Locke  and  in  a  school  alto- 
gether opposed  to  his,  intelhgence  is  made  to  come  fi'om 
language  ;  in  the  latter,  without  much  inquii'ing  whence 
language  comes,  in  the  former,  by  making  it  come  from 
the  sensation  and  the  sound,  without  suspecting  that 
there  is  a  gulf  between  the  sound  considered  as  a  sound 
and  the  sound  considered  as  a  sign,  and  that  what  makes 
it  a  sign  is  the  power  to  comprehend  it,  that  is,  the 
mind,  the  intelligence." 

0(*.  Two  circumstances  show  that  the  mind  can  reason 
without  language.  One  is,  that  we  can  point  out  cases  in 
which  there  is  reasoning  without  words.  An  experienced 
seaman  looking  on  the  sky,  which  to  our  eye  seems  so 
calm,  utters  something  about  a  storm.  We  ask  what  he 
means,  and  his  explanation  only  renders  the  subject  more 
confused.  But  we  know  what  he  intended  when  a  few 
hoiu's  after  we  see  an  angi-y  sea,  and  find  the  waves  lash- 
ing on  the  vessel  as  if  bent  on  sinking  it.  There  has  cer- 
tainly been  a  process  of  reasoning,  and  the  logician  could 
state  it  in  syllogistic  form  ;  but  it  is  doubtful  whether 
language  has  been  of  any  use  in  enabling  him  to  conduct 
it.  Another  circumstance  is,  that  infants  reason.  Refer- 
ring to  the  view  of  those  who  deny  the  possibility  ot 
reasoning  of  any  kind  without  the  aid  of  general  terms. 
Dr.  Brown  says  :  "  As  if  the  infant,  long  before  he  can  be 
supposed  to  have  acquired  any  knowledge  of  terms,  did 
not  form  his  little  reasonings  on  the  subjects  on  which  it 
5 


66  THE  KOTIoy. 

is  important  for  him  to  reason,  as  accurately  probably  as 
afterwai'ds,  but  at  least,  witli  all  tlie  accuracy  -whicli  is 
necessary  for  preserving  liis  existence  and  gratifying  his 
few  feeble  desires.  He  has,  indeed,  even  then,  gone 
through  processes  which  are  admitted  to  involve  the 
finest  reasoning  by  those  very  philosophers  who  deny 
him  to  be  capable  of  reasoning  at  all.  He  has  already 
calculated  distances,  long  before  he  knew  the  use  of  a 
single  word  expressive  of  distance,  and  accommodated 
his  induction  to  those  general  laws  of  matter  of  which  he 
knows  nothing  but  the  simple  facts,  and  his  expectation 
that  what  has  afforded  him  either  pain  or  pleasure,  will 
continue  to  afford  him  paia  or  pleasure.  What  language 
does  the  infant  require  to  prevent  him  from  putting  his 
finger  twice  in  the  flame  of  that  candle  which  has  burned 
him  once?  or  to  persuade  him  to  stretch  his  hand,  in 
exact  conformity  with  the  laws  of  optics,  to  that  very 
point  at  which  some  blight  trinket  is  ghttering  on  his 
deUghted  eye  ?  To  suppose  that  we  cannot  reason  with- 
out language,  seems  to  me,  indeed,  almost  to  involve 
the  same  inconsistency  as  to  say  that  man  is  incapable  of 
moving  his  hmbs  till  he  have  previously  walked  a  mile  " 
{Led.  :  XLMI.) 
07'  Such  considerations  show  that, 

"  Thought  leapt  out  to  wed  with  thought, 
Ere  thought  could  wed  itself  to  speech." 

And  then  have  we  not  all  had  thoughts  and  sentiments 
which,  so  far  from  being  the  product  of  words,  we  have 
felt  it  to  be  impossible  to  translate  into  words,  and  we 
have  reason  to  complain, 

"  Oh  dearth 
Of  human  words,  roughness  of  mortal  speech." 

Our  men  of  profoundest  thought  and  deepest  feeling, 
have  ever  striven  to  rise  above  human  phrases  and  gaze 
directly  upon  reahties. 


LANOUAOE.  67 

"  Words  are  but  under  agents  in  their  souls  ; 
When  they  are  grasping  with  tlieir  greatest  strength 
Tliey  do  not  breathe  among  them." 

This  does  not  prove,  on  tlie  opposite  side,  that  even  such 
thoughts  might  not  be  made  more  definite,  and  therefore 
more  thoroughly  significant,  by  being  expressed  in  words  ; 
it  simply  shows  that  language,  with  all  its  refinements, 
does  not  come  up  to  the  extent  and  variety  of  thought. 

08.  It  should  be  freely  allowed  that  very  much  of  our 
thinking  is  carried  on  by  means  of  language.  We  have 
already  had  before  us  the  circumstances  which  furnish  an 
explanation.  Though,  in  the  order  of  the  formation  of 
language,  the  notion  comes  before  the  name,  yet  it  is  com- 
monly by  the  name,  at  least  in  countries  richly  supplied 
with  common  terms,  that  the  notions  are  first  gained. 
The  name  and  the  notion  are  thus  indissolubly  associated 
in  GUI'  minds,  so  that  there  is  never  the  one  without  the 
other.  Then,  as  feeling  the  notion  to  be  complex  and  a 
burden  upon  our  conceptive  power,  we  prefer  thinking  by 
the  simple  word  rather  than  be  at  the  trouble  of  appre- 
hending all  that  is  involved  in  its  signification. 

i)i).  "WTiile  we  can  think  and  reason  without  words,  we 
are  all  the  better  of  language  in  every  case,  and  in  many 
complicated  operations  we  should  be  lost  as  in  a  laby- 
rinth ^^ithout  signs  of  some  description.  Even  in  the 
apprehending  of  abstract  and  general  notions,  we  are  the 
better  of  names ;  but  we  especially  need  them  when  we 
come  to  compare  our  notions,  either  immediately  in  Log- 
ical Judgment,  or  mediately  in  Reasoning.  The  botan- 
ist, let  us  suppose,  is  comparing  two  classes  of  plants,  one 
whose  characteristics  have  already  been  given,  and  the 
other  thus  described  : — "  Sepals  4,  deciduous,  the  twu 
lateral  ones  gibbous  at  the  base  ;  stamens  6,  tetradyna- 
mous."  How  troublesome  would  it  be  to  specify  these 
marks  every  time  we  had  occasion  to  consider  or  speak  of 


68  THE  NOTION. 

the  relation  of  these  two  tribes  of  plants.  Wo  are 
saved  fi'om  all  this  by  having  a  name  for  each  of  the 
groups  ;  the  one  is  called  thalaviiflorce,  and  the  other 
cruciferce,  and  the  relation  between  them  is  expressed 
by  saying  that  the  cruciferce  are  an  order  under  the  sub- 
class thalamijlorce. 

J 00.  And  if  language  be  useful  in  judgments  in  which 
we  have  only  two  notions,  it  is  still  more  advantageous  in 
reasoning,  in  which  we  have  three  notions.  In  order  to 
see  the  utility  of  symbols  in  reasoning,  we  have  only  to 
consider  that  all  inference,  except  in  a  few  simple  cases, 
implies  one  or  more  class  notions.  It  proceeds,  as  we 
shall  see,  on  the  principle  that  whatever  is  predicated  of 
a  class,  may  be  predicated  of  all  the  members  of  the  class. 
In  all  cases  there  is  a  class  notion  in  the  argument,  and 
in  many  cases  all  the  three  notions  compared,  minor, 
major,  and  middle,  are  general.  How  cumbersome  should 
we  find  it,  were  we  obliged  in  every  argument,  to  consider 
the  indefinite  individuals  and  the  common  marks  that 
combine  them  in  every  concept.  And  when  in  our  ratio- 
cinations there  is  not  only  one  argument  but  a  chain  of 
arguments,  each  containing  one,  two,  or  it  may  be  three 
new  concepts,  with  their  numerous  individuals  and  their 
combining  attributes,  I  believe  tlic  mind  would  feel  itself 
utterly  bewildered  and  oppressed  without  the  use  of  sym- 
bols to  stand  for  the  classes. 

101.  In  thinking  with  the  assistance  of  words,  we  can 
pass  as  far  beyond  thought  conducted  by  mei'e  mental 
signs,  as  by  numbers  we  go  beyond  counting  with  the 
fingers,  and  by  algebra  beyond  arithmetical  computations. 
The  transmission  of  messages  by  the  electric  telegraph 
hundreds  of  miles  in  a  few  seconds,  is  an  outward  picture 
of  the  rapidity  with  which  tlie  most  remote  and  recondite 
thoughts  may  bo  brought  into  communion  by  the  refined 
phrases  of  a  cultivated  language.    "  Though  we  should  bo 


LANGUAGE.  (52 

capable  of  reasoning  -without  language  of  any  sort,  and  of 
reasoning  sufficiently  to  protect  ourselves  from  ob^dous 
and  familiar  causes  of  injury,  our  reasonings  in  such  cir- 
cumstances must  be  very  limited,  and  as  little  compa- 
rable to  tbc  reasoning  of  bim  who  enjoys  all  the  new 
distinctions  of  a  refined  language,  as  the  creeping  of  a 
diminutive  insect  to  the  soaring  of  an  eagle.  Both  ani- 
mals, indeed,  are  capable  of  advancing,  but  the  one  passes 
fi-om  cloud  to  cloud,  almost  with  the  rapidity  of  the 
lightning  which  is  afterwards  to  flash  from  them,  and 
the  other  takes  half  a  day  to  move  over  the  few  shrunk 
fibres  of  a  withered  leaf."     (Brown.) 

JfO,?.  Sixth. — It  is  one  of  the  special  advantages  of 
language  that  it  helps  thought  to  make  progTCSs.  This  is 
very  happily  brought  out  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  :  "  A  sign 
is  necessary  to  give  stability  to  our  intellectual  progress 
— to  establish  each  step  in  our  advance  as  a  new  starting- 
point  for  our  advance  to  another  beyond.  A  country  may 
be  overrun  by  an  armed  host,  but  it  is  only  conquered 
by  the  establishment  of  fortresses.  Words  are  the  for- 
tresses of  thought.  They  enable  us  to  realize  our  do- 
minion over  what  we  have  already  overrun  in  thought — to 
make  every  intellectual  conquest  the  basis  of  operations 
for  others  still  beyond.  Or  another  illustration  :  You 
have  all  heard  of  the  process  of  tunnelling,  of  tunnelhng 
through  a  sand-bank.  In  this  operation  it  is  impossible 
to  succeed  unless  every  foot,  nay,  almost  every  inch,  in 
our  progress  be  secui-ed  by  an  arch  of  masonry,  before 
we  attempt  the  excavation  of  another.  Now,  langiiage 
is  to  the  mind,  precisely  what  the  arch  is  to  the  tunneL 
The  power  of  thinking  and  the  power  of  excavation  are 
not  dependent  on  the  word  in  the  one  case,  nor  on  the 
masoD-work  in  the  other  ;  but  without  these  subsidiaries 
neither  process  could  be  carried  on  beyond  its  rudimen- 
tary commencement.     Though,  therefore,  we  allow  that 


70  THE  NOTION. 

every  movement  forward  in  language  must  be  determined 
by  an  antecedent  movement  foi-^-ard  in  thouglit ;  still,  un- 
less thought  be  accompanied  at  each  point  of  its  evolution 
by  a  corresponding  evolution  of  language,  its  further  de- 
velopment is  arrested.  Thus  it  is  that  the  higher  exertions 
of  the  higher  faculty  of  Understanding,  the  classification 
of  the  objects  presented  and  represented  by  the  subsidiary 
powers  in  the  formation  of  a  hierarchy  of  notions  ;  the 
connection  of  these  notions  into  judgments  ;  the  inference 
of  one  judgment  from  another ;  and,  in  general,  all  our 
consciousness  of  the  relations  of  the  universal  to  the  par- 
ticular, consequently  all  science  strictly  so  denominated, 
and  every  inductive  knowledge  of  the  past  and  futiu'e 
fi'om  the  laws  of  nature  :  not  only  these,  but  all  ascent 
from  the  sphere  of  sense  to  the  sphere  of  moral  and  re- 
h'gious  intelligence,  are,  as  experience  proves,  if  not  alto- 
gether impossible  without  a  language,  at  least  possible  to 
a  very  low  degree." 


mOIDENTAL  DISADVANTAGES  OP  LANGUAGE. 

103.  Bacon  directed  the  attention  of  modern  thinkers 
to  that  subject  in  illustrating  the  Idola  Fori,  or  those 
which  arise  from  the  intercourse  of  mankind  one  with 
another.  "  Tliough  we  think  we  govern  oiu*  words,  yet 
certain  it  is  that  words,  as  a  Tartar's  bow,  do  shoot  back 
upon  the  understanding  and  do  mightily  entangle  and 
jjervert  the  judgment."  The  subject  thus  opened  has 
been  prosecuted  by  Hobbes,  by  Locke,  by  the  French 
school  of  Condillac,  by  Stewart,  by  Whately,  and  others, 
some  of  whom  trace  almost  all  errors  to  the  intluence  of 
language.  Locke  has  dilated  on  this  subject  {E^my,  B. 
EEL),  and  has  olTered  many  valuable  cautions,  but  often 
exaggerates  the  evUs.     "  He  that  shall  well  consider  the 


LANGUAGE.  71 

errors  and  obscurity,  tlic  mistakes  and  confusion  that  are 
spread  in  the  world  by  the  ill  use  of  words,  will  find 
some  reason  to  doubt  whether  language,  as  it  has  been 
employed,  has  contributed  more  to  the  improvement  or 
hindi-ance  of  knowledge  among  mankind,"  When  men'B 
ideas  are  confused,  the  language  they  employ  will  also  be 
confused,  and  thus  increase  the  confusion — just  as  when  a 
master  does  not  thoroughly  organize  his  household,  the 
servants  instead  of  aiding  him  will  throw  everything  into 
disorder.  Examples  of  the  evil  influence  of  terms,  are 
often  taken  from  imperfectly  formed  sciences,  material 
or  mental  ;  but  there  the  error  has  sprung  from  the  state 
of  the  department  of  knowledge  ;  and  when  the  science  is 
properly  constructed  by  its  appropriate  means,  inductive 
or  df^ductive,  it  soon  finds  an  appropriate  nomenclatiu'e. 

104.  M.  Cousin,  in  criticising  Locke,  lias  some  fine  remarks  on 
this  subject.  "  The  question  is,  does  all  error  spring  from  language, 
and  is  science  nothing  else  than  a  well-constructed  tongue  ?  No  ; 
the  causes  of  our  errors  are  very  different,  both  wider  and  deeper. 
Levity,  presumption,  indolence,  precipitation,  pride,  and  thousands 
of  causes  influence  our  judgment.  The  evils  of  language  may  join 
on  to  natural  causes  and  aggravate  them,  but  do  not  constitute  them. 
If  you  consider  them,  you  will  see  that  the  greater  part  of  disputes 
which  appear  to  be  about  words,  are,  at  the  bottom,  disputes  about 
things.  Humanity  is  too  earnest  to  trouble  itself  and  shed  its 
purest  blood  for  words.  Wars  do  not  turn  on  disputes  about  words  ; 
they  rise  from  other  quarrels — from  quarrels  theological  and  scien- 
tific, of  which  they  mistake  the  depth  and  importance  who  resolve 
tliem  into  pure  logomachies.  Assuredly  all  science  ought  to  seek 
a  language  well  constructed  ;  but  it  is  to  take  the  effect  for  the 
cause,  to  suppose  that  sciences  are  well  constructed  because  lan- 
guages are  well  constnicted.  The  contrary  is  the  truth ;  the 
sciences  have  well-constructed  languages  when  they  themselves  are 
well  constructed."  He  illustrates  this  by  mathematics,  where  the 
terms  are  good  because  the  ideas  are  thoroughly  determined ;  and 
by  such  departments  as  medicine,  where  we  must  first  employ  care- 
ful  observation  and  rigid  reasoning,  and  then  the  appropriate  no 
menclaturo  will  be  furnished. 


72  THE  NOTIOX. 

10ft.  But  it  should  be  frankly  allowed  tliat  words, 
while  they  are  generally  a  great  help  to  thought,  do  often 
hinder  it.  It  may  serve  some  good  pui-poses  to  consider 
the  evils  which  arise  from  the  abuse  of  language.  In  do- 
ing so  we  shall  not  dwell  on  the  intentional  perversion  of 
words  by  the  sophist,  the  flatterer,  the  pohtician.  For 
these  abuses  language  is  not  responsible  ;  though  it  is 
true  that  the  ambiguoiLS  nature  of  words  very  much  aids 
the  har  and  equivocator,  and  lends  some  plausibility  to 
the  saying  that  language  is  rather  an  instrument  for  con- 
ceahng  thought. 

100,  (1.)  There  is  the  vagueness  of  so  many  phrases. 
How  this  should  be,  the  observations  we  have  made  on 
the  formation  of  notions  may  enable  us  to  understand.  In 
forming  abstract  terms,  we  join  an  aggi-egate  of  attri- 
butes having  a  merely  superficial  and  no  deep  or  intimate 
relation  in  the  nature  of  things,  or  more  frequently  with- 
out knowing  what  are  the  attributes  comprised ;  and  then 
we  make  unwarranted  assertions  regarding  that  term, 
saying  of  one  part  what  is  true  only  of  another,  or  of  the 
whole  what  is  true  only  of  a  part.  Again,  what  has  been 
represented  (§  24)  as  the  second  essential  step  in  general- 
ization is  often  performed  very  imperfectly.  We  perceive 
a  general  resemblance,  and  we  form  a  class,  and  we  give 
a  name  ;  but  meanwhile  we  have  not  fixed,  except  in  a 
loose  way,  on  the  points  of  resemblance,  and  the  phrase 
goes  into  circulation  carrjang  its  dross  with  it.  Then  it 
is  to  be  taken  into  account,  that  in  oui'  fir.st  generahza- 
tions  we  may  fix  on  the  superficial  rather  than  the  deei:>er 
properties  of  things.  Tbus  the  word  money  meant  orig- 
inally articles  used  in  exchange,  and  then  was  applied  to 
coin  ;  in  time  it  came  to  have  a  larger  and  more  scientific 
meaning  ;  but  the  ambiguity  led  the  popular  mind  to 
identify  money  with  wealth,  to  conclude  that  a  country 
must  be  enriched  by  increasing  its  coin,  and  by  passing 


LANGUAGE  73 

laws  against  tlie  expoitation  of  money.  It  is  one  of  the  ad- 
vantages arising  fi-om  science,  fi'om  honest  discussion,  and 
the  progress  of  thought  generally,  that  it  gives  greater 
precision  to  language  by  compelling  us  to  distinguish  the 
diverse  things  ^vTapt  up  in  one  complex  phrase,  and  to 
get  a  separate  term  for  each.  It  was  disputed  whether 
the  syllogism  was  or  was  not  an  invention  of  Aristotle, 
and  both  parties  were  right  and  both  wrong  according  to 
the  use  they  made  of  the  terra.  Such  discussions  led  to 
a  distinction  being  di-awn  between  invention  and  dis- 
coveiy,  the  former  being  confined  to  the  devising  of  some- 
thing new,  and  the  latter  to  the  finding  out  of  what 
before  existed  :  and  we  now  deny  that  Aristotle  invented 
the  syllogism,  while  we  claim  for  him  that  he  discovered 
it  to  be  the  form  to  which  all  reasoning  can  be  reduced. 
The  ancients,  and  the  moderns  down  to  the  middle  of  last 
century,  used  the  word  Sensation  to  denote  both  the 
knowledge  and  the  sensitive  feeling  got  through  the 
senses  ;  Eeid  drew  the  distinction  between  Sensation  and 
Perception  ;  and  now,  to  avoid  ambiguity,  we  employ  the 
phrase  Sense-Perception  to  designate  both.  It  is  thus  we 
are  getting  new  notions  and  new  distinctions  to  super- 
sede or  supplement  the  old  ;  and  a  permanence  is  im- 
parted to  them  by  their  being  stamped  with  names. 

107.  (2.)  There  are  different  meanings  and  shades  of 
meaning  attached  to  a  word.  It  is  not  difficult  to  under- 
stand how  this  should  originate.  Every  word  has  a  his- 
tory. If  it  could  speak  for  itself,  instead  of  being  a  mere 
unconscious  instrament  in  the  hands  of  a  higher  power, 
it  might  furnish  us  with  a  biogi'aphy.  In  doing  so,  it 
would  have  to  commence  with  its  genealogy.  Many 
words  might  furnish  us  with  an  older  one  than  the  most 
ancient  nobility.  Some  could  point  to  their  ancestry 
among  the  Eoman  patricians  ;  some  go  back  to  the 
Gi'eek  gods  and  demigods  ;  while  others  ascend  to  the 


74  THE  NOTIOX 

Hebrew  patriarchs  and  prophets  ;  not  a  few  boast  that 
they  come  to  us  from  Paiis  with  the  last  new  fashion ; 
while  a  considerable  class  bring  with  them  the  broad 
sense  and  deep  thought  of  Germany.  Our  tongue  is  en- 
riched by  these  constant  importations.  But  it  is  to  be 
expected  that  in  such  a  mixture  of  emigrants  there  should 
be  some  whose  character  is  very  ambiguous.  There  is 
the  word  '  idea,'  which  has  had  so  many  meanings  :  des- 
ignating now  an  image,  now  an  eternal  model,  now  a  con- 
cept, now  an  intuitive  truth  ;  and  the  most  satisfactory 
judgment  we  can  pronounce  upon  one  which  has  had  so 
many  aliases  is,  that  it  shoidd  be  banished  altogether  fi'om 
the  commonwealth  of  philosophy — where  it  has  wrought 
only  mischief — leaving  it  still  a  place  in  common  conver- 
sation and  in  poetrj'.  With  some,  Eeason  stands  for  the 
undefined  quahties  possessed  by  man  and  not  by  brutes  ; 
with  others,  it  signifies  much  the  same  as  understanding 
or  intelligence,  and  including  the  process  of  reasoning ; 
with  others,  and  especially  with  the  higher  metaphysi- 
cians of  Grermany,  denoting  the  capacity  which  discovers 
necessary  truth  immediately,  as  distinguished  from  the 
logical  understanding  which  proceeds  discursively, — in 
this  last  sense  reason  and  reasoning  are  contrasted. 

10S»  The  perplexity  is  increased  by  the  cu'cumstance 
that  the  phrase  has  one  meaning  in  one  age,  and  another 
in  another  age.  Un'oilling  to  offend  prejudice,  and  to 
give  their  writings  an  affected  and  repulsive  aspect,  our 
fre.sh  thinkers  retain  the  old  phrase,  while  they  alter  the 
meaning  to  suit  the  new  aspect  of  truth  to  which  they 
would  introduce  us.  "  We  have  resolved  to  accompany 
antiquity  as  far  as  possible,  since  we  are  anxious,  so  far 
as  it  can  be  done  with  the  pen,  to  make  an  alliance  be- 
tween what  is  old  and  new  in  learning.  We  therefore 
retain  old  terms,  though  we  often  alter  their  meaning 
and   definitions,  according  to  that   moderate  and  laud- 


LANGUAGE.  75 

able  mode  of  innovating  in  ci-vil  a£fairs  wliereby  the  con- 
dition of  tilings  being  changed,  the  usual  names  are  re- 
tained ;  as  Tacitus  remarks  regarding  the  names  of  the 
magistrates  which  were  retained  even  when  the  offices 
were  somewhat  changed."  (Bacon.)  This  circumstance 
has  bred  great  confusion.  Thus  the  word  Form  as  dis- 
tinguished fi'om  Matter,  has  been  used  in  one  sense  by 
Aristotle,  in  another  by  Bacon,  in  a  third  by  Kant. 
From  the  time  of  Ai'istotle  to  that  of  David  Hume  and 
Kant,  to  argue  '  a  prion,'  meant  to  proceed  from 
cause  to  effect,  or  from  reason  to  consequent ;  and  to 
argue  '  a  posteriori,'  to  proceed  from  effect  to  cause,  and 
from  consequent  to  reason.  Since  the  rise  of  the  Kant- 
ian philosophy,  by  the  '  a  priori '  method  is  meant  pro- 
ceeding fi'om  principles  imbedded  in  the  mind  and  inde- 
pendent of  experience. 

In  the  former  sense,  the  famous  argument  of  Samuel  Clarke  for 
the  existence  of  God  would  be  called  a  priori,  as  it  proceeds  from 
reason  to  consequent ;  but  in  the  latter  s^nse  it  is  partly  a  posterion, 
inasmuch  as  arjjuinor  from  our  idea  of  space  to  a  being  of  whom 
space  is  an  attribute,  it  proceeds  on  the  fact  that  man  has  an  idea  of 
space. 

100»  Little  evil  would  arise  from  this  provided  we 
always  distinguished  between  the  meanings.  But  one 
use  of  names,  we  have  seen,  is  to  save  us  from  imaging  or 
remembering  all  the  objects  and  properties  denoted  by 
them.  But  in  the  use  of  ambiguous  phrases,  especially 
in  abstract  discussion,  we  are  apt  unconsciously  to  slide 
fi'om  one  meaning  to  another  ;  and  we  make  an  affii'ma- 
tion  or  denial  of  a  word,  using  it,  in  the  rajiidity  of 
thought,  in  one  sense,  whereas  the  predication  would  be 
vahd  only  if  we  used  the  phrase  in  another  sense.  The 
ambiguity  of  the  words  '  idea,'  '  a  priori,'  *  reason,'  has 
helped  to  prolong  the  discussion  as  to  whether  there  are 
innate  ideas,  a  priori  trath,  and  an  intuitive  and  inde- 
pendent reason  in  the  human  mind. 


7G  THE  NOTION. 

110.  The  grreater  number  of  the  words  in  our  language  have  come 
down  to  us  from  a  rude  and  simple  state  of  society,  and  they  beat 
the  impress  of  their  origin, — resembling  in  this  respect  the  man  who 
has  risen  in  the  world  from  the  lower  ranks,  and  is  now  admitted, 
because  of  his  talents  and  success,  to  the  most  jwlite  circles,  but  who 
has  not  been  able  to  shake  himself  free  from  the  manners  of  his 
youth.  This,  in  some  aspects,  is  a  disadvantage,  as  it  allows  less 
accuracy  of  language  and  thought.  To  avoid  the  evil,  we  very 
pro])erly  bring  in  terms  from  the  dead  classical  languages,  to  express 
rigidly  exact  scientific  truth.  But  seen  in  another  light,  it  is  a  bene- 
fit that  our  language  has  spnmg  from  a  less  artificial  condition  of 
tlungs, — just  as  the  most  polished  circles  are  all  the  better  of  the 
occasional  introduction  of  persons  whose  manners,  if  not  so  refined, 
are,  at  least,  more  fresh  and  natural.  These  old  home-born  phrases, 
if  not  so  fitted  to  express  abstract  truth,  are  more  eflfective  in  evok- 
ing genuine  and  heart-bom  feeling.  I  can  conceive  that  some  lan- 
guages, like  the  manners  of  some  men,  might  become  too  artificial. 
The  most  perfect  tongue  is  that  which  has  both  elements,  which 
Beeks  to  retain  the  freshness  of  youth  in  the  midst  of  the  maturity 
of  age. 

111.  (3.)  There  are  words  tliat  mislead  us  by  their 
associations.  Such  are  phrases  which  stir  up  feeling, 
pleasant  or  tumultuous.  "Who  can  reason  calmly  when 
the  appeals  made  deal  in  such  words  as  home,  native 
land,  liberty,  independence.  Any  evil  thus  arising  may 
be  counteracted  by  the  cnnobHng  influence  produced  by 
the  ideas  thus  suggested  ;  but  it  is  different  when  the 
language  raises  up  passions  which  agitate  the  soul  as  the 
wind  does  the  ocean,  or  lusts  which  pollute  it  by  sinking 
it  in  the  mire.  Again,  there  are  phrases  used  by  our  old 
authors  which  were  not  oflensive  in  their  day,  but  are  felt 
by  us  to  be  coarse  and  indelicate.  As  illustrating  the 
same  point,  we  may  refer  to  the  fallacies  into  which  men 
full  from  "  usually  taking  for  granted  that  paronymous 
(or  conjugate;  words,  i.  e.,  those  belonging  to  each  other, 
as  the  substantive,  adjective,  verb,  &c.,  of  the  same  roots, 
have  a  precisely  correspondent  meaning  ;  which  is  by  no 
means   imiversally  the  case."     (Whately.)     As  examples 


LANOUAQE.  77 

we  may  give  art  and  artful,  design  and  designing,  theory 
and  tlieorist,  scheme  and  schemer.  Thus  a  man  is  repre- 
sented as  having  an  art,  a  design,  a  theory,  or  a  scheme, 
and  we  look  upon  him  as  artful,  a  designer,  a  theorist,  or 
a  schemer.  Home  Tooke,  the  grammarian,  argued  from 
the  derivation  of  the  word  '  true,'  that  there  could  be  "  no 
such  thing  as  eternal,  immutable,  everlasting  truth." 
"  True,"  as  we  now  write  it,  or  trew  as  it  was  formerly 
written,  means  simply  and  merely,  that  which  is  trowed. 
And  instead  of  being  a  rare  commodity  on  earth,  except 
mly  in  words,  there  is  nothing  but  truth  in  the  world." 
Two  persons  may  contradict  each  other  and  yet  both 
Bpeak  the  truth,  for  the  truth  of  one  person  may  be  op- 
posite to  the  truth  of  another.  To  speak  truth  may  be 
a  vice  as  well  as  a  virtue." 

112 »  Under  this  same  head  we  may  place  the  mislead- 
ing influence  of  words  which  now  denote  mental  acts,  but 
which  were  originally  appUed  to  material  objects.  Thus 
'  idea  '  meant  originally  an  image ;  *  apprehension  '  and 
'  conception '  are  derived  from  the  act  of  taking  hold  of  a 
thing ;  '  understanding '  signifies  something  placed  be- 
neath ;  '  substance,'  that  which  stands  beneath ;  and 
'spirit,*  in  a  number  of  tongues,  air  or  breath.  Since 
mind  and  body  are  called  substances,  some  have  argued 
that  in  addition  to  the  mind  and  body  which  we  knoM , 
and  know  as  having  being,  permanence,  and  potency, 
there  must  be  something  standing  imder  tbem.  It  is 
difficult  for  those  whose  thoughts  are  habitually  em- 
ployed about  sensible  things  to  conceive  of  spiritual 
truths,  and  the  difficulty  is  increased  by  the  circumstance 
that  the  language  in  which  they  are  expressed  was  at 
first  materiahstic,  and  is  still  apt  to  call  up  sensible 
images. 

113.  (4.)  "We  are  led  by  the  advantages  which  lan- 
guage supphes  to  use  words  without  inquiring  into  their 


78  THE  NOTION. 

meaning.  This  is  in  itself  the  greatest  of  all  the  evils, 
and  is  the  source,  directly  or  indirectly,  of  most  of  the 
others.  We  have  seen  that  it  is  one  of  the  main  pur- 
poses served  by  symbols,  that  they  render  it  unnecessary 
to  conceive  all  that  is  in  the  notion,  all  its  objects,  and  all 
its  marks.  But  then,  just  because  language  so  eases  thought 
aud  labor,  we  come  to  give  up  rigid  inquirj'  and  allow 
words  to  guide  us  at  their  will  or  caprice.  This  is  one 
reason  why  mankind  are  so  apt  to  follow  hereditary  or 
popular  behefs  embodied  in  cherished  phrases.  "  Men," 
says  Locke,  "  having  been  accustomed  from  their  cradles 
to  learn  words  which  are  easily  got  and  retained,  before 
they  knew  or  had  framed  the  complex  ideas  to  which  they 
were  annexcl,  or  which  were  to  be  found  in  the  things 
they  were  thought  to  stand  for,  they  usually  continue  to 
do  so  all  their  lives  ;  and  without  taking  the  pains  neces- 
sary to  settle  in  their  minds  determined  ideas,  they  use 
their  words  for  such  unsteady  and  confused  notions  as 
they  have,  contenting  themselves  with  the  same  words 
other  peoj)le  use,  as  if  their  very  sound  necessarily  canied 
with  it  constantly  the  same  meaning.  This,  though  men 
make  a  shift  with  in  the  ordinary  occurrences  of  life, 
where  they  find  it  necessary  to  be  understood,  and,  there- 
fore, they  make  signs  till  they  are  so  ;  yet  this  insignifi- 
cancy in  their  words,  when  they  come  to  reason  concern- 
ing either  their  tenets  or  their  interest,  manifestly  fills 
their  discourse  with  abundance  of  empty  unintelligible 
noise  and  jargon,  especially  in  moral  matters,  where  the 
words,  for  the  most  part,  standing  for  arbitrary  and  nu- 
merous collections  of  ideas,  not  regularly  and  pennanently 
unitf.d  in  their  nature,  their  bare  sounds  are  often  only 
thought  on,  or  at  least  very  obscure  and  uncertain  no- 
tions annexed  to  them." 

1 14,  The  question  arises,  how  are  these  evils  to  be 
avoided  ?    It  is  evident  that  it  is  not  to  be  done  by  dia- 


LANOUAOE.  79 

carding  tbe  use  of  language — wliidi  would  be  lite  putting 
out  one's  eyes  in  order  to  avoid  mistakes  in  vision.  Ad- 
vantage may  arise  from  attending  to  some  such  rules  as 
the  following  : 

Flrd.  Let  us  begin  with  ascertaining  the  meaning  of  the 
word.  We  may  do  this  by  the  help  of  a  dictionary  ;  or  by 
looking  to  the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  by  those  who  in- 
telhgently  employ  it,  more  specially  by  resorting  to  the 
writings  of  those  who  treat  expressly  of  subjects  in  which 
it  ought  to  be  acciu'ately  employed. 

1  lo.  Second.  When  a  word  is  ambiguous,  we  should 
make  oui'selves  acquainted  with  the  various  senses  in 
which  it  is  used,  not  only  by  the  writer  whose  woi'ks  we 
are  reading,  but  those  in  which  others,  or  in  which  we 
ourselves,  have  been  accustomed  to  employ  it.  If  we 
have  not  before  us  the  various  senses  and  the  difference 
between  them,  we  shall  ever  be  tempted  to  slide  from  the 
one  to  the  other  without  knowing  it.  Thus,  in  mental 
philosophy,  we  must  never  lose  sight  of  the  various 
senses  in  which  the  phrases  'idea,'  'a  priori,'  *a  pos- 
teriori,' '  experience,'  *  form  '  and  *  mattei','  '  subject '  and 
*  object,'  '  conditioned '  and  *  unconditioned,'  are  em- 
ployed. If  we  neglect  this,  we  are  certain  to  be  led 
astray  by  the  errors  which  lurk  beneath  these  phrases, 
all  of  which  have  been  used  in  different  senses  and  been 
the  veliicles  of  false  doctrines. 

110.  Third.  We  must  be  at  pains  to  settle  the  precise 
notion  which  the  word  stands  for.  This  implies  much 
more  than  a  dictionary  understanding  of  it.  It  requires 
that  we  go  back  to  the  notion  in  the  mind.  For  every 
term  stands  pi-imarily  for  an  apprehension  of  the  mind  ; 
that  apprehension  miist,  no  doubt,  be  of  objects,  but  it  is 
of  objects  apprehended,  and  so  we  must  look  first  at  the 
api^rehension,  and  then  compare  it  with  the  things.  This 
is   a   counsel   frequently   pressed    by  Locke.     "  A   man 


80  TUE  NOTION. 

Bliould  take  care  to  use  no  word  without  a  signification, 
no  name  without  an  idea  for  wliicli  Le  makes  it  stand. 
This  rule  will  not  seem  altogether  needless,  to  any  one 
who  will  take  the  pains  to  recollect  how  often  he  has  met 
with  such  words  as  instinct,  sympathy,  antij^athy,  &c.,  in 
the  discoiu'se  of  others,  so  made  use  of  as  he  might  easily 
conclude  that  those  that  used  them  had  no  ideas  in  their 
mind  to  which  they  applied  them  ;  but  spoke  them  only 
as  sounds,  which  usually  served  instead  of  reasons,  on  the 
like  occasions.  Not  but  that  these  words,  and  the  like, 
have  very  proper  significations  in  which  they  may  be 
used,  but  there  being  no  natural  connexion  between  any 
words  and  any  ideas,  these  and  any  others  may  be 
learned  by  rote  and  pronounced  or  writ  by  men  who 
have  no  ideas  in  theu'  minds  to  which  they  have  annexed 
them,  and  for  which  they  make  them  stand ;  which  is 
necessary  they  should,  if  men  would  speak  intelligibly 
even  to  themselves."  "  Justice  is  a  word  in  evei-y  man's 
mouth,  but  most  commonly  with  a  veiy  undetermined, 
loose  signification,  which  will  always  be  so,  unless  a  man 
has  in  his  mind  a  distinct  comprehension  of  the  compo- 
nent parts  that  complex  idea  consists  of :  and  if  it  be  de- 
composed, must  be  able  to  resolve  still  on,  till  he  at  last 
comes  to  the  simple  ideas  that  make  it  ujd  ;  and  unless 
this  be  done  a  man  makes  an  ill  use  of  the  word ;  let  it  be 
justice,  for  example,  or  any  other.  I  do  not  say  a  man 
need  stand  to  recollect  and  make  this  analysis  at  large, 
every  time  the  word  justice  comes  in  his  way  ;  but  this 
at  least  is  necessary,  that  he  have  so  examined  the  signi- 
fication of  that  name,  and  settled  the  idea  in  all  its  parts 
in  his  mind,  that  he  can  do  it  when  he  pleases." 

117.  Fourth. — Lot  us  observe  whether  the  notions  are 
Singulars,  or  Abstracts,  or  Universals.  We  are  reading, 
let  me  suppose,  of  beauty,  and  we  are  anxious  to  have 
clear  ideas  on  the  subject.     Let  us  first  inquire  what  sort 


LANGUAGE.  81 

of  notion  is  denoted  by  the  word,  "We  easily  and  at  once 
discover  that  it  is  an  Abstract  notion,  and  therefore  wo 
do  not  for  one  instant  suppose  that  it  has,  or  can  have,  a 
separate  existence.  We  are  not,  on  the  other  hand, 
rashly  to  conclude  that  it  has  no  existence.  It  is  a 
reality,  but  a  reaHty  in  objects ;  and  we  are  led  to  look 
to  objects  and  inquii-e  what  it  is  in  them  that  we  desig- 
nate by  this  name. 

Or  the  word  we  have  occasion  to  employ  is  a  General 
one.  We  have  now  to  inquire  what  is  the  class  of  ob- 
jects connoted  by  it,  and  what  the  common  qualities  in 
respect  of  which  they  are  grouped.  The  word  used,  I 
shall  suppose,  is  '  instinctive  ;  *  it  is  said  of  such  an  ac- 
tion that  it  is  *  instinctive.'  We  proceed  on  the  idea  that 
it  points  to  a  reality  ;  but  we  do  not  suppose  that  it  is  a 
reahty  distinct  fi'om  the  beings  possessing  it  :  we  look 
for  it  in  the  hving  beings  endowed  with  it,  and  we  pro- 
ceed to  inquire  what  it  is,  whether  it  is  a  single  property 
or,  as  is  more  probable,  a  number  of  properties  adapted 
to  each  other  and  tending  to  one  end. 

When  the  notion  is  what  I  have  called  a  Generalized 
Concrete  one,  we  are  to  bear  in  mind  that  we  cannot 
expect  to  exhaust  all  the  propei-ties  of  the  objects  em- 
braced in  the  class.  It  was  foohsh  and  vain  to  seek,  as 
Socrates  seems  to  have  done,  for  some  one  thing  as  con- 
stituting the  TO  ov  of  a  class  notion,  say  the  rb  KaXhv  ;  or 
MS  the  schoolmen  did,  to  specify  the  essence  of  every  uni- 
versal, as,  for  instance,  of  man. 

lis*  It  is  of  great  moment  to  take  these  cautions  '^•ith 
us  in  all  our  higher  thinking,  in  which  we  are  ever  temjit- 
ed  to  look  upon  abstractions  as  independent  wholes.  The 
ancient  Greek  philosophers  often  gave  a  separate  existence 
to  the  abstractions  fashioned  by  them.  Thus  the  Elca- 
tics,  and  Plato  after  them,  were  accustomed  to  discuss  the 
nature  of  to  ov,  or  being,  as  if  it  were  a  distinct  siib- 
6 


82  THE  NOTION. 

stance  Klce  mind  or  body.  "We  liave  fallen  into  a  like 
niistalce  in  modern  times.  We  sjoeak  very  properly  of  tlie 
faculties  of  tlie  miud,  sucli  as  the  memory,  tlie  imagina- 
tion, and  judgment  ;  but  tlien  we  are  led  to  think  and 
write  about  them  as  if  they  were  acting  entities,  whereas 
they  are  merely  capacities  of  the  thinking  mind.  We 
find  ethical  writers  speaking  of  virtue  as  if  it  were  some- 
thing separate  from  and  above  the  virtuous  miud  ;  where- 
as it  is  a  mere  attribute  of  A-ii'tuous  agents,  from  which  it 
cannot  be  separated  except  in  mental  abstraction.  Some 
write  about  gi'avitation  as  if  it  had  an  independent  exist- 
ence, whereas  it  is  a  mere  property  of  matter  having  no 
existence  separate  from  individual  bodies.  Again,  gen* 
eral  tenns  are  apt  to  be  regarded  as  singulars.  Men 
speak  and  reason  as  if  general  phrases  pointed  to  some 
one  existence,  whereas  they  merely  connote  a  class  of 
things  having  one  or  more  points  of  resemblance.  Some 
discoui'se  about  the  laws  of  nature,  as  if  they  were  some- 
thing different  fx'om  the  objects  in  the  universe,  whereas 
they  are  generahzations  of  the  modes  in  which  the  objects 
operate.  Having  begun  with  this  blunder  in  thought, 
there  are  some  who  go  a  step  farther  and  make  the  laws 
of  nature  a  substitute  for  Deity.  They  have  first  given 
them  an  existence  separate  from  God's  works,  and  having 
got  such  a  convenient  mode  of  accounting  for  these 
works,  they  feel  as  if  nature  could  work  without  God  al- 
together. We  are  reminded  of  an  analogous  error.  We 
employ  the  word  '  nature  '  as  a  convenient  one  to  denote 
the  whole  knowable  creation  as  it  comes  from  God's 
hands.  But  we  forget  that  the  phrase  is  merely  a  generic 
one,  and  then  are  led  to  talk  of  nature  as  having  an 
existence  separate  from  the  combined  works  of  God, 
Having  given  it  an  independent  existence  we  end  by 
deifying  it — I  fear  nature  is  the  only  God  worshipped  by 
many  of  the  votaries  of  jihysical  science  in  our  day. 


\ 


LANQUAOE.  83 

:IW.  Fifth.— "We  must  carefully  consider  the  things 
from  -which  the  notions  have  been  formed.  I  believe,  in- 
deed, that  we  ought  first  to  look  to  the  notions,  for  words 
stand  primarily  for  apprehensions  of  the  mind.  But  ap- 
prehensions, so  far  as  they  profess  to  be  drawn  from 
things,  must  conform  to  them,  and  in  order  to  see 
whether  our  notions  are  accm-ate  and  adequate,  we  must 
ever  compare  them  with  the  things  from  which  they  are 
derived.  We  have  seen  that  the  great  English  metaphy- 
sician has  done  signal  service  to  philosophy  by  insisting 
that  we  always  rise  fi'om  terms  to  the  ideas  they  stand 
for.  But  another  English  philosopher  has,  if  possible, 
conferred  a  greater  benefit  by  requiring  that  we  should 
ever  go  beyond  notions  to  things.  Bacon  complains,  I  be- 
lieve justly,  of  the  ancient  Greek  philosoj^hers  and  of  the 
scholastic  logicians,  that  they  looked  at  names  which  had 
no  corresponding  objects,  or  at  notions  abstracted  from 
things  ;  that  their  very  definitions  consist  of  words,  and 
*'  verba  gignunt  verba.  Verba  notionum  tesserse  sunt,  quare 
si  notiones  ipsoe  (quj»  verborum  animce  simt)  male  et  varie 
abstrahantur  tota  fabrica  corruit."  And  so  he  recom- 
mends the  observation  of  things  by  a  careful  induction  as 
the  means  of  attaining  truth  and  certainty  ;  and  in  doing 
so  has  given  a  nobler  contribution  to  the  science  of  Logic, 
in  the  enlarged  sense  of  the  term,  than  any  other  except 
Aristotle.  \    i 

-  t 

LAWS  or  THOUGHT  INYOLVED  IN  THE  USE  OP  SIGNS. 

120.  First  Law. — Every  Term  stands  for  a  Notion, 
\?hich  must  be  either  a  Singular  Concrete,  an  Abstract, 
or  a  Universal.  We  should  accustom  ourselves,  in  think- 
ing, to  look  more  to  the  notion  than  the  phraseolog}-,  and 
we  should  ever  be  ready  to  translate   our   words   into 


84  THE  NOTION. 

thoughts.  But  if  the  analysis  which  we  have  given  of 
notions  bo  correct,  these  terms  when  tui'ned  into  no- 
tions will  be  found  to  be  one  or  other  of  our  threefold 
di^•isiou  :  they  wiU  be  Percepts  or  of  single  things  thought 
of  in  the  Concrete  ;  or  Abstracts,  that  is  of  qualities  ;  or 
Concepts,  that  is  of  a  class  of  objects  joined  by  common 
quahties.  Now  it  is  often  of  great  moment  in  discussing 
a  compHcated  subject,  that  we  should  know  precisely  to 
which  of  these  classes  the  notion  which  we  are  using  be- 
longs, and  that  we  should  understand  it,  and  use  it  ac- 
Ci^rdingly.  If  we  neglect  this,  if  we  employ,  for  example, 
abstract  and  general  terms  as  if  they  were  singulars,  or 
treat  abstract  and  general  terms  as  if  they  had  no  sort  of 
reality,  we  shall  find  ourselves  involved  fii'st  in  inextri- 
cable confusion,  and  then  in  positive  error. 

/,?  t.  Second  Law. — We  can  predicate  of  the  Sign  only 
what  might  be  predicated  of  the  Notion.  "We  have  seen 
that  after  we  have  denoted  a  notion  by  a  sign  we  can 
judge  and  reason  about  the  sign  without  thinking  of  all 
that  is  signified  by  it.  But  we  must  not  allow  ourselves 
for  one  moment  to  suppose  that  the  sign  has  acquired 
any  new  power  not  found  in  that  which  it  stands  for,  or 
that  we  are  at  hberty  to  affirm  or  deny  of  it  what  we 
would  not  affirm  or  deny  of  the  notion  itself  provided  it 
Btood  fairly  before  us.  If  A  stands  for  a  square  number, 
we  are  not  allowed  to  predicate  of  it  what  we  could  not 
predicate  of  the  square  number  itself,  say  that  it  is  a  virtue. 
If  B  stands  for  a  moral  quaUty,  say  justice,  we  are  not  to 
be  allowed  to  affirjn  of  it  what  could  not  be  affiimed  of 
justice,  say  that  it  has  four  sides.  The  sign  is  still  a  sign, 
a  sign  of  what  it  was  made  to  stand  for. 

12"i,  Third  Law. — We  may  demand  at  any  time,  that 
the  Notion  should  be  substituted  for  the  Sign.  As  we 
are  always  at  liberty  to  do  so,  so  we  should  actually  do  so 
fiom  time  to  time,  in  order  to  determine  whether  we  are 


LANGUAGE.  86 

or  are  not  malcing  a  proper  pretlieation.  In  abstruse 
discussion  and  in  perplexing  ratiocination,  we  are  apt  to 
lose  sight  of  the  signification,  or  at  least  of  the  precise 
signification,  of  the  language  we  employ.  But  as  we  do 
BO  we  are  ever  hable  to  make  affirmations  or  denials 
which  we  should  never  make  of  the  ideas  denoted  by  the 
words.  Principal  Campbell  inquii'es :  "  What  is  the 
cause  that  nonsense  so  often  escapes  being  detected  both 
by  the  vsa*iter  and  reader  ?  "  The  cause,  I  believe,  is  to  be 
found  mainly  in  this,  that  we  are  ever  making  assertions 
as  to  the  sign,  taking  a  loose  view  of  what  it  signifies. 
Thus  oiu-  forefathers  reasoned  that  as  money  is  wealth, 
60  wealth  might  be  increased  by  passing  restrictive  laws 
to  keep  money  from  leaving  the  country.  The  fallacy  is 
seen  at  once  when  we  properly  define  and  studiously 
comprehend  what  the  phrases  money  and  wealth  stand 
for.  From  the  causes  now  referred  to,  mainly  proceed 
the  endless  logomachies  to  be  found  in  controversy  of 
every  kind.  We  shall  often  find  that  we  have  only  to  re- 
translate the  word  into  the  notion,  and  then  compare  the 
notion  with  the  thing,  to  discover  that  the  propositions 
which  men  utter  with  such  gravity,  or  such  confidence, 
are  altogether  meaningless,  and  that  the  sophistry  which 
was  deceiving  us,  is  thus  stript  of  its  plausibihties. 
Every  one  will  be  inclined  to  allow  that  we  should  be 
careful  to  follow  this  rule  when  we  are  apt  to  run  into 
extreme  positions,  or  are  penetrating  into  profoimd 
depths  or  vast  heights.  But  in  fact,  it  is  equally  needful 
to  do  so,  when  we  are  using  familiar  phrases,  which  we 
fancy  we  understand  fully  because  we  have  been  employ- 
ing them  daily  from  oiu'  childhood.  As  Newton  is  said 
to  have  risen  to  his  great  discovei'y  by  uaiTowly  inquiring 
into  so  commonplace  a  fact  as  the  fall  of  an  apple,  so 
the  detection  of  wide-spread  fallacies  and  the  discovery  of 
important  truth  ai'e  ofttimes  made  by  instituting  a  sift- 


8G  THE  NOTION. 

ing  inquiry  into  the  real  signification  of  a  phrase,  wliich 
■without  being  questioned  by  any  one,  has  passed  current 
from  mouth  to  mouth  for  long  ages. 


•■; 


III.-CLASSES  DI  NATUEE. 


JfV.?.  These  become  aids  and  guides  to  the  mind  in  its 
geueralizations.  I  speak  of  them  as  aids,  for  the  mind  by 
its  own  internal  power  can  form  genera  without  any  spe- 
cial reference  to  natural  gi'oupings.  It  must  always,  in- 
deed, have  some  supposed  attribute  to  bind  the  objects 
together,  and  act  as  ground  of  the  arrangement.  But 
then  it  can  fix  on  any  one  attribute  and  form  a  class  com- 
posed of  all  the  objects  which  possess  it.  Every  thing 
may  be  arranged  in  as  many  classes,  actual  or  potential, 
as  it  possesses  qualities.  The  same  man  may,  in  respect 
of  his  counti-y,  be  an  Englishman  or  an  American  ;  of  his 
rehgion,  a  Catholic  or  a  Protestant ;  of  his  race,  a  Celt  or 
a  Saxon  ;  of  his  profession,  a  lawyer  or  a  physician  ;  of  his 
domestic  condition  a  bachelor,  or  married  ;  of  his  politics, 
a  conservatist  or  a  liberal ;  of  his  knowledge,  a  scholar  or 
an  ignoramus.  Looking  to  any  given  company  of  men, 
women,  and  childi-en,  we  might  arrange  them  in  a  great 
number  of  ways  :  according  to  their  native  country  or  coun- 
ty ;  according  to  their  sex,  age,  weight,  strength,  mental 
capacities,  education,  business  in  life,  character,  creed  ; 
nay,  according  to  such  insignificant  qualities  as  the  color 
of  their  hair  or  eyes,  or  thou-  Christian  names.  Wherever, 
ill  short  there  is  a  property  which  more  than  one  person 
j)o.ssc8s  or  arc  supposed  to  possess,  we  have  a  ground 
for  a  classification  which  may  be  expressed  by  a  generir 
term.  Tlie  classes  which  man  may  form  cannot  be  said 
to  be  infinite,  but  they  are  indefinite  ;  no  limits  can  be 
Bet  to  them.     There  is  a  manifest  advantage  in  all  this  : 


CLASSES  IN  NATURE.  87 

for  we  can  arrange  the  objects  we  meet  with,  now  in  thia 
way  and  now  in  that  way,  according  to  the  end  we  have 
in  view  at  the  time. 

I'H,  But  so  far  as  natural  and  especially  organic  ob- 
jects arc  concerned,  there  are  grouj)ings  formed  which 
men  should  notice,  and  which  have  an  existence  whether 
they  notice  them  or  no.  In  the  study  of  nature  we  ai'e 
constantly  made  to  feel  that  we  have  not  to  form  or  create 
classes  ;  the  classes  are  already  formed  for  us,  and  all  we 
have  to  do  is  simply  to  observe  them.  And  if  we  would 
consti-uct  any  thing  like  a  complete  classification  of  natu- 
ral objects,  it  is  imperative  on  us  to  attend  to  the  natural 
groupings.  An  arrangement  which  overlooks  this  will 
turn  out  to  be  incomplete,  and  incapable  of  serving  any 
practical  piu-pose  ;  and  however  ingeniously  formed  will 
be  characterized  as  artificial,  even  when  not  denounced 
as  arbitrary  and  capricious.  The  Creator  has  so  con- 
structed and  disposed  his  works  that  there  are  facilities 
for  forming  classes,  and  it  is  the  business  of  the  natural- 
ist to  discover  and  follow  the  natural  order.  So  far  as  he 
gets  hold  of  it  liis  classifications  will  be  natui'al,  and  use- 
ful for  the  accomplishment  of  an  immense  number  and 
variety  of  piu'poses,  scientific  and  practical 

j?Vt>.  We  have  shown  {Method  of  Dirine  Oovernment,  B.  II.,  C. 
I.,  §  4.  and  Typical  Forms  and  Special  Ends  in  Creation),  that  there 
8  an  order  running  through  all  nature  in  respect  of  such  qualities 
is  Nuiuber,  Time,  and  Fonu.  (1.)  Number.  The  laws  of  physics 
and  of  chemistry,  etc.,  are  expressed  in  quantities.  The  law  of 
gravitation  is,  that  all  matter  attracts  other  matter  inversely  ac- 
cording to  the  square  of  the  distance  ;  and  all  chemical  compositions 
and  decompositions  take  place  according  to  numerical  rule.  (2.) 
Time.  All  the  leading  events  in  the  earth  and  heavens  run  iu  pe- 
riods :  there  are  days  and  months  and  seasons  and  years,  and  magni 
anni.  (3.)  Form.  The  heavenly  bodies  have  spheroidal  shapes; 
minerals  crystallize  geometrically  with  fixed  angles  and  proportions 
and  every  animal  and  plant  and  every  organ  of  the  animal  and 
plant  has  a  typical  form  which  it  tends  to  assume. 


88  THE  NOTION. 

120.  We  are  thus  introdiicecl  to  those  classes  which 
have  been  called  Kinds  by  some  logicians.  In  these  the 
possession  of  one  characteristic  mark  is  a  sign  of  a  num- 
ber of  others.  The  botanist  has  seized  on  a  classification 
of  this  kind.  The  grand  division  of  plants  is  into  acoty- 
ledons,  monocotyledons,  and  dicotyledons.  This  is  a  dis- 
tinction of  liinds,  and  the  mark  fixed  on  becomes  the  sign 
of  others.  Thus  monocotyledons  grow  from  within  and 
their  leaves  are  parallel-veined,  whereas  dicotyledons 
grow  from  without  by  adding  rings  and  have  netted  veins. 
In  the  same  way  in  the  approved  classifications  of  zoology, 
the  possessio2i  of  one  mark  becomes  a  sign  of  others.  Thus 
certain  animals  are  called  mammals  because  they  suckle 
their  young  ;  but  all  these  are  found  besides  to  be  warm- 
blooded, and  to  have  four  compartments  in  the  heart. 
How  different  are  these  from  artificial  classes,  as  suppose 
we  were  to  divide  plants  according  to  their  height,  or 
animals  according  to  their  color.  Every  one  sees  how 
arbitrary^  in  short  how  unnatural,  such  an  arrangement 
would  be.  It  would  separate  plants  from  each  other 
which  are  most  closely  allied,  and  might  put  in  one  gi'oup 
bird  and  fish,  man  and  brute,  while  it  separated  an  ani- 
mal from  its  mate  or  fi'ora  its  offspring. 

J  2  7.  "  There  are  some  classes  the  things  contained  in  which 
differ  from  other  things  only  in  certain  particulars  which  may  be 
numbered  ;  while  others  differ  in  more  than  can  be  numbered,  more 
even  than  we  need  ever  expect  to  know.  Some  classes  have  little 
or  nothing  in  common  to  characterize  them  by,  except  precisely 
what  is  connoted  by  the  name :  white  things,  for  example,  are  not 
distinguished  by  any  common  properties  except  whiteness;  or  if 
they  are,  it  is  only  by  such  as  are  in  some  way  dependent  upon,  or 
connected  with  whiteness.  But  a  hundred  generations  have  not 
exhausted  the  a>mmon  properties  of  animals  or  of  plants,  of  sul- 
phur or  of  phosphorus  ;  nor  do  we  suppose  them  to  be  exhaustible 
Init  procf^'cd  U)  new  observations  and  experiments,  in  the  full  con 
fidence  of  discovering  new  properties  which  were  by  no  means  im 
olied  in  thf>6«  we  previously  knew."    "  There  is  no  impropriety  in 


CLASSES  IN  NATURE.  8}l 

Baying  that  of  these  two  classifications,  the  one  answers  to  a  much 
more  radical  distinction  in  the  things  themselves  than  the  other 
does,  etc."    (Mill's  Logic,  B.  I.,  C.  VII.) 

I'riS.  These  groupings  of  nature,  wliile  they  are  a 
help,  are  at  the  same  time  a  rule  in  the  formation  of 
classes.  They  assist,  but  they  also  control  mankind  in 
the  constniction  and  use  of  their  general  notions.  Things 
come  to  be  arranged  by  practical  observation  and  by 
science  in  a  certain  way  ;  a  coiTesponding  nomenclatiu'e 
is  devised,  and  all  men  must  accommodate  themselves  to 
it.  Such  divisions  of  time  as  into  days  and  years  and 
seasons,  of  material  objects  into  mineral,  plant,  and  ani- 
mal, of  the  heavenly  bodies  into  star,  planet,  comet,  and 
meteor,  come  to  be  universally  adoj^ted,  and  all  persons 
must  proceed  upon  them  ;  while  science  is  every  year  add- 
ing newly-discovered  laws,  which  become  known  fii'st  to 
the  learned  and  then  descend  as  a  heritage  to  the  people. 
The  concepts  thus  formed  on  distinctions  in  nature,  have 
a  reality  above  other  concepts.  Such  a  concept  as  '  white- 
colored,'  has,  no  doubt,  a  sort  of  reahty  in  the  nature  of 
things — it  has  a  reality  in  the  white  color  j^ossessed  by  all 
the  objects  in  the  class,  say  hlies  and  snow.  But  such 
concepts  as  Eosacere  and  Cruciferte,  as  Crustacea)  and 
Foraminiferoo,  have  a  deeper  signification — the  class  has 
a  reality  in  the  divinely  appointed  order  of  things.  It  is 
the  same  with  such  generic  notions  as  beautiful,  good, 
holy — they  denote  primarily  one  quality,  but  they  imply 
other  quahties  associated  with  it  and  numberless  affinities. 
This  was  one  of  the  truths  pointed  at,  but  never  accu- 
rately expressed  in,  the  ideal  theory  of  Plato  and  the 
medieval  doctrine  of  realism.  Concepts  of  this  descrip- 
tion have  a  place  in  the  very  natui-e  of  things  and  in  their 
ramified  connections.  But  while  this  holds  good  of  cer- 
tain concepts,  it  is  not  true  of  all ;  and  even  in  regard  to 
those  of  which  it  is  true,  the  reality  is,  after  all,  in  the 


90  THE  NOTIOJV. 

Individual  tilings  and  their  mutual  relations,  and  not  in  a 
mere  idea  in  the  mind  of  the  person  contemplating 
tliem. 


EEALISM,  NOMINALISM,  AND  CONCEPTUALISM. 

1^9.  In  fhe  Eisagoge  of  Porphyry  there  occurs  the  following 
Btatement :  "  I  omit  to  speak  about  genera  and  species  as  to  whether 
they  subsist  (in  the  nature  of  thingsj  or  in  mere  conceptions  only  ; 
whether  also,  if  subsistent,  they  are  bodies  or  incorporeal,  or  whether 
they  are  separate  from  or  in  sensibles  and  subsist  about  these." 
Boethius  (6th  Cent.)  commented  on  this  passage  and  declared : 
"  non  est  dubium  quin  vere  sint."  "  Sunt  autem  in  rebus  omnibus 
conglutinatae  et  quodam  modo  conjunctse  atque  compactae."  This 
came  to  be  the  general  and  the  orthodox  opinion  of  the  early  scho- 
lastic teachers.  But  as  curious  youths  mused  on  this  cautious  pas- 
sage of  Porphyry  with  the  comment  of  Boethius  upon  it,  we  can 
conceive  that  some  would  be  tempted  to  form  an  independent 
opinion  on  so  complicated  a  subject.  This  seems  to  have  been  the 
case  with  Roscellinus,  a  native  of  Brittany,  who  flourished  in  the 
eleventh  century.  Unfortunately  we  have  no  writings  of  Roscelli- 
nus, and  we  have  to  gather  his  opinions  from  the  statements  of  his 
opponents,  particularly  Anselm.  He  is  represented  as  maintaining 
that  genera  and  species  had  no  true  existence — that  they  were  no- 
thing but  words  {flatus  weis),  and  this  doctrine  was  denounced  as 
inconsistent  with  the  higher  doctrines  of  religion,  particularly  the 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  We  have  now,  then,  an  expounder  of 
Nominalism  as  opjjosed  to  Realism.  At  a  little  later  date  appeared 
the  illustrioas  Abelard,  who  opposed  with  great  acuteness  the  sys- 
tems both  of  the  Realists  and  the  Nominalists,  pointing  out  the  dif- 
ficulties in  which  the  former  are  involved  when  they  maintained 
that  universals  are  realities  different  from  individual  things,  and 
showing  the  insnflBciency  of  the  theory  of  the  latter.  His  own 
opinion  is  regarded  by  some  as  Concept ualisin— it  is  at  least  an 
anticipation  of  Conceptualism.  The  following  is  M.  Cousin's  ac- 
count of  it :  "  There  exists  nothing  but  individuals,  but  none  of 
these  individuals  is,  in  itself,  either  genus  or  species,  but  the  indi 
viduals  have  resemblances  which  the  mind  can  perceiv?,  and  these 


REALISM,  NOMINALISM,  ETC  91 

resemblances  considered  alone  and  abstraction  beinj;  made  of  theii 
diirorences,  form  classes  more  or  less  comprehensive  whicli  they  call 
genus  or  species.  Species  and  genus  are  then  the  real  products  of 
the  mind  ;  and  they  are  not  words,  although  words  express  them ; 
nor  are  they  things  without  or  within  the  individuals — they  are  con- 
ceptions. Hence  the  intermediate  system  named  Conceptualism." 
{Fragmens).  We  have  now  the  three  possible  systems  contending 
with  each  other.  Realism  was  the  prevailing  doctrine  tliroughout 
the  Middle  Ages,  and  was  defended  with  groat  zeal  and  ability  by 
Albert  of  Cologne  (Albertus  Magnus),  and  Thomas  Aquinas  {Doctor 
Angelicus).  Opposed  to  Thomas  the  Dominican  was  John  Duns 
Scotus  {Doctor  Subtilis)  the  Franciscan.  Like  Thomas  he  was  a 
Realist,  but  he  maintained  that  the  universal  existed  in  individuals 
not  really,  but  formally  {formaliter).  William  Occam  {Doctor  In- 
vincibilis)  a  disciple  of  Scotus,  is  usually  regarded  as  a  Nominalist, 
but  Dr.  Mausel  declares  that  he  is  a  Conceptualist  like  Abelard.  In 
modern  times  it  is  diilicult  to  find  a  genuine  Realist,  but  we  have 
one  in  Harris,  the  author  of  Hermes.  Adhering  to  the  Nominalist 
theory  we  have  Hobbes,  Berkeley,  Hume  and  Whately  ;  and  among 
numerous  Conceptualists  we  may  mention  Locke,  Reid,  Kant,  Brown, 
and  Whewell. 

J.'iO.  The  controversy  has  been  characterized  throughout  by 
great  confusion  of  thought.  The  extensive  survey  we  have  taken  of 
the  Notion  and  of  Language  should  enable  us  to  discover  the  truth 
and  the  error  in  each  of  the  systems. 

Reaiism  errs  by  excess.  It  errs  when  it  ascribes  to  the  universal 
an  existence  independent  of  singulars  or  distinct  from  them.  Plato 
held  that  Ideas  had  an  existence  in  or  before  the  Divine  Mind  from 
aU  eternity.  He  was  met  by  Aristotle,  who  showed  that  they  had 
no  existence  except  in  the  individuals.  The  medieval  doctrine  of 
the  reality  in  universals  was  a  modification  of  the  Platonic  doc- 
trine. In  both  there  is  a  tendency  to  mysticism,  and  a  disposition 
to  hypostasize  the  conceptions  of  the  mind.  Yet  the  system  has  no- 
ticed certain  important  truths.  First  the  mind  has  a  tendency  to 
rise  beyond  the  particular  to  the  general,  and  to  reduce  multijjlicity 
to  unity.  Then  all  organisms,  all  plants  and  animals,  tend  to  as- 
sume a  typical  form.  The  indi\idual8alldie,  shomnghow  perishing 
they  are,  but  the  genus  and  species  survive.  The  flowers  of  last 
summer  are  all  faded,  but  in  the  coming  summer  flowers  of  the  same 
form  will  spring  up.  Then  all  the  powers  of  nature  act  according 
to  laws  imposed  on  them,  and  amidst  the  flux  of  things  these  laws 


92  TEE  NOTION. 

are  permanent.  Still  more  important,  we  find,  amidst  the  imper- 
fections and  sins  of  humanity,  the  moral  law  of  God  abideth  for- 
ever. 

131.  Nominalism  errs  by  defect.  It  forgets  that  there  must  be 
^ouping  of  objects  by  the  mind  in  order  to  the  introduction  of  a 
common  term,  and  an  apprehension  of  tlie  grouping  in  order  to  an 
intelligent  use  of  the  term.  It  forgets  that  the  mind  can  form  an 
image  of  a  class  of  objects,  inadequate,  but  still  sufficient  in  most 
cases  to  enable  it  to  think  about  them.  It  overlooks  the  important 
circumstance  that  in  nature  there  are  laws  and  types  ordained  by 
the  Being  who  formed  the  objects  themselves.  The  truth  contained 
in  nominalism  is,  that  words  greatly  aid  the  mind  in  thinking,  and 
enable  it  to  conduct  its  cogitations  much  farther  than  it  otherwise 
could. 

132.  Conteptualism,  has  often  taken  a  wrong  form.  It  does  su 
when  it  regards  the  conception  combining  the  objects  as  an  idea  in 
the  sense  of  image.  This  was  the  mistake  of  Locke,  when  he  saj'S 
that  in  forming  our  idea  of  man  we  leave  out  of  the  complex  idea 
that  which  is  peculiar  to  each  of  the  individuals,  and  retain  only  what 
is  common  to  all.  (See  §79.)  Again  it  errs  when  it  overlooks  or 
denies  the  utility,  in  some  cases  the  necessity,  of  signs  to  enable  us 
to  conduct  our  blinking.  And  Conceptualists  have  often,  in  looking 
at  the  idea,  forgot  that  there  is  an  actual  order  among  the  things 
on  which  the  idea  is  founded.  But  if  it  avoids  these  mistakes  and 
oversights,  which  are  not  parts  of  the  doctrine  properly  understood, 
conceptualism  is  the  true  theory.  For  in  general  notions,  the  essen- 
tial element  is  the  grouping  by  the  mind  of  objects  by  common 
properties,  and  putting  in  the  group  all  objects  possessing  the 
properties. 

There  are  universalia  ante  rem  in  the  Divine  Mind.  Tliere  are  uni- 
veisalia  in  re  in  Natural  Classes.  There  are  universalia  post  rem  in 
human  concepts  and  terms. 


PART   SECOND. 

JUDGMENT 


-s=OOOo»- 


1,  Judgment  is  defined  by  logicians  "  as  the  comparing 
together  in  the  mind  two  of  the  notions  or  ideas  which  are 
the  objects  of  apprehension,  and  pronouncing  that  they 
agree  or  disagree."  But  this  definition  can  be  accejited 
only  when  we  understand  by  notions,  not  mental  states 
as  such,  but  objects  apprehended.  "When  we  say  "  Alex- 
ander the  Great  was  ambitious,"  we  are  comj taring 
"  Alexander  the  Great "  and  "  ambitious,"  and  not  mere 
ideas  of  the  mind — it  being  always  presupposed  that  the 
objects  are  pre^^ously  apprehended  by  us.  A  Proposition 
is  a  Judgment  exju'essed  in  words,  and  in  it  we  compare 
two  Terms,  so  called  because  they  are  the  termini  (boun 
daries)  of  the  proposition. 

OATEGOEICAL  PKOPOSITIONS. 

2m  Judgment  is  psychologically  one  act  of  the  mind, 
but  is  of  a  concrete  nature,  and  we  analyze  it  into  three 
elements,  two  notions,  and  the  declaration  of  theii-  agree- 
ment or  disagreement.  That  notion  which  we  seek  pri- 
marily to  compare  is  called  the  Subject ;  that  with  which 
wc  compare  it,  the  Predicate ;  and  the  determination  of 
the  agi'eement  or  disagreement,  the  Copula.     The  Judg- 


1)4  JUDGMENT. 

ment  may  be  expressed  in  three  words,  or  in  a  number  ot 
■words,  or  even  in  one  word.  When  we  say  "  selfishness 
is  hateful,"  we  have  subject,  copula,  and  predicate,  each 
in  one  word.  But  there  are  tongues  in  which  the  judg- 
ment can  be  expressed  in  one  word,  as  amat ;  which,  when 
we  wish  to  bring  out  each  of  the  parts  we  analyze  and 
say,  illc  est  amans,  he  is  loving.  Active  verbs  ia  a  sen- 
tence commonly  express  both  copula  and  predicate ; 
thus,  when  we  say  "  the  horse  neighs,"  the  word  '  neighs' 
contains  both  predicate  and  predication,  and  when  ex- 
panded takes  the  form  "  the  horse  is  neighing."  In  order 
to  determine  what  are  the  terms,  we  must  look,  not  to 
the  mere  words,  which  may  differ  in  different  languages 
and  even  in  the  .same  language  in  expressing  the  same 
idea,  but  to  the  notions.  "Wlien  it  is  said  that  "  it  is  a 
true  saying  and  worthy  of  all  acceptation,  that  Jesus 
Christ  came  into  the  world  to  save  sinners,"  the  two 
terms,  as  ascertained  from  the  two  notions,  are  "  Jesus 
Chri-st  coming  into  the  world  to  save  sinners"  and  "a 
true  saying  and  worthy  of  all  acceptation  ; "  these  are  the 
things  compared  in  the  mind,  and  in  respect  of  which  we 
predicate  their  agreement. 

.3,  The  copula  is  usually  expressed  by  logicians  by  the 
present  tense  of  the  verb  '  to  be,'  by  '  is,'  or  '  is  not,'  (or 
*  are  '  and  '  are  not.')  But  we  are  not  to  understand  '  is  '  in 
such  a  connection,  as  being  the  substantive  verb— the  sub- 
stantive verb  in  the  Latin  form,  est,  contains  subject, 
copula,  and  predicate,  meaning  "he  is  existing."  The 
copula  is  an  abstract,  expressing  neither  less  nor  more  than 
the  agreement  or  disagreement.  Every  thiug  else  in  a 
proposition  is  to  be  regarded  as  part  of  the  subject  or  of 
the  predicate.  The  element  of  time,  when  it  is  involved 
m  a  judgment,  is  not  to  be  attached  to  the  copula.  WTien 
we  say  "  Napoleon  Bonaparte  was  unfortunate  in  1815," 
the  notions  compared  are  "Napoleon  in  1815  "  and  "un- 


CATEGORICAL  PROPOSlTlONa.  95 

fortunate,"  and  it  is  on  comparing  these  that  we  declare 
thoir  agreement ;  if  we  were  spcating  of  "  Napoleon  in 
1808,"  we  should  have  to  declare  that  it  disagreed  with 
"  uufortunate." 

4.  It  is  thus  that  most  logicians  do  now  dispose  of  what  are 
called  Motlals,  that  is,  propositions  in  which  we  make  a  predication, 
not  absolutely,  but  after  a  mode.  Thus,  when  it  is  said  that  "  Bru- 
VU3  killed  C;esar  justly,"  we  are  not  to  understand  the  predicate  as 
being  "  the  killer  of  Ciesar,"  but  "  the  just  killer  of  Caesar." 

5.  The  Quality  (7TOi6r7/f )  of  a  proposition,  that  which 
makes  it  to  be  a  proposition  or  a  judgment,  is  its  predica- 
tion, its  affirming  or  denying  an  agTeemont  or  disagree- 
ment between  the  terms.  In  respect  of  Quality,  all  prop- 
ositions are  either  Affirmative  or  Negative — they  either 
affirm  or  deny  the  agreement  of  the  subject  and  predicate. 

6*.  The  predicate  may  be  affirmed  or  denied  either  of 
the  whole  or  part  of  the  subject.  "SMien  it  is  predicated 
of  the  whole,  the  proposition  is  said  to  be  Universal ; 
when  not  of  the  whole,  it  is  said  to  be  Particular  {tv  fiEpEi). 
This  division  of  propositions  is  said  to  be  made  in  respect 
of  their  Qc.v>TrrY,  that  is,  the  extent  of  the  predica- 
tion. "When  it  is  said  "all  poets  are  men  of  genius," 
the  proposition  is  universal,  the  affirmation  is  made  of  all 
poets.  ^\Tien  it  is  said  "  some  poets  have  not  common 
sense,"  the  assertion  is  made  only  of  a  part  of  the  class. 
Such  phrases  as  "  every  one  "  and  "  all "  in  affirmative 
propositions,  and  "  no,"  "  no  one,"  and  "  none  "  in  nega- 
tive propositions,  are  the  signs  of  universahty.  The  sign 
of  particularity  is  "  some  "  in  the  sense  of  "  some  at  least," 
— ^we  may  not  know  how  much  or  how  many. 

7.  The  word  "  all  "  is  ambiguous.  It  may  mean  "  every  one," 
every  one  of  a  class,  as  when  we  say  "  all  books  are  meant  to  be 
read."  It  may  also  mean  all  collectively,  meaning  the  whole  class, 
as  "  all  the  books  constitute  the  library."  In  this  latter  sense,  the 
term  is  singular-abstract.  (See  §48).  In  both  senses  the  pro posi 
tion  is  reckoned  Universal.    The  word  "  some  "  is  also  ambiguous. 


\ 


96  JUDGMENT. 

It  may  signify  "  some,  not  all,"  "some  at  most ; "  as  wten  we  say 
"some  lawyers  are  not  greedy,"  implying  that  there  are  some 
who  are.  It  may  mean  "some-certain,"  as  when  it  is  said  that 
"  some  sciences  are  classificatory,"  pointing  to  mineralogy,  botany, 
and  zoology.  In  Logic  "  some,"  as  the  sign  of  particularity,  signi 
fic's  "  some  at  least ;  "  it  may  be  only  one,  or  it  may  even  be  all, 
provided  we  do  not  declare  it  to  be  all. 

8.  In  order  to  determine  the  quantity  of  a  proposition, 
■we  must  look,  it  is  evident,  to  the  subject.  In  many  sen- 
tences the  quantity  is  not  indicated  by  the  language,  but 
it  must  always  be  understood  in  thought.  "When  it  is 
said  that  "  men  have  the  power  of  speech,"  we  mean  "  all 
men,"  and  not  merely  "  some  men."  But  when  it  is  said 
that  "  books  are  necessary  to  a  library,"  we  mean  not  "  all 
books,"  but  "  some  books."  Terms  in  which  the  quantity 
is  not  indicated  by  the  language  are  called  "  indefinite  " 
or  *•  indesignate  "  (Hamilton). 

().  Combining  these  cross-divisions,  we  have  a  fourfold 
division  of  jDropositions  : 

UNivERS-Ui  AFFiKMATrvE  dcuoted  by  A. 

TJjnVEESAL  KEGATrVE  "  E. 

Particulab  Affirmative  "         I. 

Particular  Negative  "         O. 


\  Assent  A,  negat  E,  verum  generaliter  ambo. 

\  Asserit  I,  negat  O,  sed  particulariter  ambo. 

"70.  This  may  be  the  proper  place  for  explaining  what 
is  meant  by  the  Distribution  of  Tenns  in  a  proposition. 
A  term  is  said  to  be  distributed  when  it  is  used  for  all  its 
sigriificates.  "When  it  is  said  "  reptiles  are  cold-blooded," 
the  general  term  "  reptiles  "  is  distributed— it  includes  all 
and  every  reptile.  But  when  it  is  said  that  "food  is 
necessary  to  life,"  the  general  term  "  food "  is  not  dis- 
tributed, for  it  does  not  mean  every  kind  of  food,  but 
food  of  some  kind.  Singular  Tenns  and  Abstracts  are 
always  to  be  reckoned  as  distributed.    When  it  is  said 


\ 


CATEGORICAL  PROPOSITIONS.  97 

S^aakespeare  is  tlie  gi*eatest  poet  that  ever  lived," 
Shakespeare  is  to  be  taken  for  the  man,  for  the  man  as 
a  whole — we  do  not  make  the  affirmation  of  some  Shake- 
speare, or  Shakespeare  in  part  ;  and  the  proposition  is 
regarded  as  universal.  A,  by  logicians.  It  is  the  same 
with  abstracts  proper,  as  "pride  goeth  before  destruc- 
tion," meaning,  not  "  some  pride,"  but  the  one  thing 
"  pride."  It  is  always  to  be  kejDt  in  mind,  indeed,  that 
abstracts  may  become  common  terms  (see  §49),  as  when 
we  tallc  of  various  kinds  of  pride,  as  pride  of  intellect, 
pride  of  hfe  ;  in  such  we  are  to  ascertain  whether  the 
term  is  distributed  or  not,  as  we  do  in  the  case  of  any 
other  general  term. 

1 1 .  From  the  account  now  given,  it  is  clear  that  in  all 
Universal  propositions,  A  and  E,  the  Subject  is  distribu- 
ted, and  that  in  all  particular  propositions,  I  and  0,  it  is 
undistributed.  As  to  the  Predicate,  it  is  to  be  regarded 
as  distributed  in  all  negative  propositions.  When  we 
say  "  no  brute  is  immortal,"  "  some  men  are  not  misers," 
we  exclude  brutes  fi'om  the  whole  class  of  immortals,  and 
certain  men  from  the  whole  class  of  misers.  When  the 
Predicate  is  a  general  notion,  it  is  not  to  be  understood 
as  distributed  in  affii'mative  propositions.  When  it  is 
said  that  "  men  are  mortal,"  the  term  mortal  is  not  taken 
for  all  its  siguificates  ;  we  cannot  say  "  all  mortals  are 
men."  But  it  is  of  importance  to  remark  (the  signifi- 
cance of  it  will  come  out  as  we  advance)  that  as  singidar 
and  abstract  terms  are  distributed  and  regarded  as  uni- 
versals,  so  the  predicates  which  are  foi-med  by  such  are 
always  to  be  regarded  as  distributed.  In  the  proposi- 
tions "Homer  was  the  author  of  the  Hiad "  and  the 
"  Ihad  was  the  greatest  of  Greek  poems,"  the  terms 
"author  of  the  Hiad,"  and  "the  greatest  of  Greek 
poems,"  are  taken  in  all  their  extent. 

12,  The  question  is  much  discussed,  what  are  the  re- 

7 


98  JUDGMENT. 

lations  between  the  objects  compared  in  a  judgment. 
The  proper  answer  is  that  they  may  be  as  many  and  va- 
ried as  the  relations  which  can  be  discovered  between 
things  by  the  mind  of  man.  "^Tiat  is  the  number  and 
what  the  nature  of  these  relations,  is  a  question  to  be 
settled — if  it  can  be  settled — by  physics  or  metaphysics, 
and  not  by  logic.  The  varied  relations  are  all  involved 
in  those  acts  in  which  we  compare  single  objects  with 
each  other.  Judgments  in  regard  to  individual  things 
must  evidently  be  the  first  formed  by  the  mind — they 
must  precede  the  fonnation  of  concepts,  for  it  is  by  re- 
semblance between  individuals  in  respect  of  some  quality 
that  we  are  able  to  gather  them  into  classes.  Such  judg- 
ments have  been  called  Psj^chological  by  Dr.  Mansel,  to 
distinguish  them  fi-om  Logical.  For  logical  piu-poses, 
that  is  in  the  discursive  comparison  of  notions,  judg- 
ments may  be  regarded  as  of  two  kinds. 

J.j».  N.B.  Tlie  relations  whicli  the  mind  can  discover  have  been 
variously  classified  by  pliilosophers.  In  the  Intuitions  of  the  Mind, 
(P.  II.,  b.  iii.),  the  human  intellect  is  represented  as  capable  of  -per- 
ceiving  the  relations  of  (1)  Identity,  that  is,  that  the  same  is  the 
Bame  observed  at  different  times  and  in  different  circumstances  ;  (2) 
Whole  and  Parts  (Comprehension,  Abstraction,  Analysis,  Synthesis) ; 
(S'y  Space  (Extension,  Figure)  ;  (4)  Time  ;  (5)  Quantity  (Less  or  More)  ; 
(G)  Resemblance  (Classification);  (7)  Active  Property;  (8)  Cause  and 
Effect.  These  may  all  be  noticed  in  the  relation  of  indi\1dual 
things.  But  for  logical  ends  the  relations  may  be  considered  as 
two. 

14,  First.  There  are  Equivalent  Propositions,  or 
Equipollent  Propositions — to  use  a  phrase  of  the  old  lo- 
gicians somewhat  modified.  Here  the  agreement  of  the 
terms  is  one  of  identity  or  equahty.  In  all  such  the  sub- 
ject may  take  the  place  of  the  predicate,  and  the  predi- 
cate the  place  of  the  subject  without  any  change.  Under 
this  head  should  be  placed  all  those  cases  in  which  both 
the  notions  compared  are  Singulars  or  Abstracts,  as 
''^Milton  was  the  author  of  Paradise  Lost,"  "Piomulua 


CATEGORICAL  PROPOSITIONS.  99 

was  the  founder  of  Rome."  These  propositions  being 
given,  we  can  say  "The  author  of  Paradise  Lost  was 
Milton,"  "  The  founder  of  Rome  was  Romulus."  To  this 
class  belong  arithmetical  and  geometrical  propositions  as 
3  +  3  =  6.  Here  the  terms  are  abstracts,  and  we  can  say 
6  =  3  +  3.  It  is  of  importance  to  observe  that  to  tliis 
class  belong  all  definitions,  as  "  Logic  is  the  science  of 
the  laws  of  discursive  thought,"  Natural  History  is  the 
science  of  the  classification  of  animals  and  plants."  In 
these  propositions  the  terms  are  Abstracts,  neither  Per- 
cepts on  the  one  hand,  nor  Concepts  on  the  other  ;  and 
we  can  convert  simply,  and  say  "  the  science  of  the  Laws 
of  discm-sive  thought  is  Logic  "  and  "  the  science  of  the 
laws  of  the  classification  of  animals  and  plants  is  Natural 
History."  (See  P.  I.,  §  73.)  In  all  such,  neither  term  has 
any  claim  in  itself  to  be  regarded  as  subject  or  as  predi- 
cate. That  is  the  subject  which  is  jDrimarily  before  the 
mind  of  the  speaker  to  be  compared  with  something  else, 
and  that  is  the  predicate  with  which  it  is  compared  ;  and 
the  speaker  or  writer  may  have  either  term  primaiily  in 
his  thoughts,  or  now  he  may  have  one  and  now  the 
other. 

15,  Second.  There  are  propositions  in  which  the 
agi'eemcnt  is  one  of  joint  Comprehension  and  Extension. 
In  all  such  it  will  be  found  that  one  of  the  notions  is  a 
concept,  or  that  both  are  so.  Take  the  proposition 
"  Longfellow  is  a  poet."  Here  the  subject  is  a  Percept, 
and  the  predicate  a  Concept.  The  proposition  may  bo 
interpreted  in  one  or  other  of  two  ways  :  in  Comprehen- 
sion, meaning  that  "Longfellow  has  the  attribute  of 
writing  poetiy  ; "  or  in  Extension,  meaning  that  "he  is  in 
the  class  of  poets."  Or  we  may  take  a  case  in  which  both 
tenns  are  Concepts,  as  "  Crocodiles  are  reptiles  ; "  which 
may  be  interpreted  "  the  class  crocodiles  possess  the  at- 
tributes of  reptiles  ; "  or,  "  the  class  ci-ocodiles  are  in  the 


100  JUDQMENT. 

class  reptiles."  It  has  often  been  disputed  whether  prop- 
ositions are  to  be  understood  in  Comprehension  or  Ex- 
tension. The  proper  account  is  that  in  those  we  are  now 
speaking  of  they  are  to  be  understood  in  both.  I  be- 
lieve, indeed,  that  in  the  gi'eater  number  of  propositions, 
in  pai'ticular  in  all  proi^ositions  in  which  the  predicate  is 
a  verb,  the  uppermost  thought  is  in  Comprehension  : 
when  we  say  "  men  think,"  we  mean  that  they  are  in 
\he  exercise  of  thinking.  But  as  an  attribute  possessed 
by  objects  may  always  be  a  bond  to  unite  them  into  a 
class,  so  we  may  interpret  the  jDroposition  in  Extension 
also,  and  say  "men  are  among  the  class  of  thinking 
beings."  And  in  many  propositions  the  uppermost 
thought  is  in  Extension.  When  we  say  "  the  crocodile  is 
a  reptile,"  our  primary  intention  may  be  to  indicate 
that  it  is  in  the  class.  But  as  Extension  always  implies 
Comprehension,  that  is,  a  class  always  imphcs  a  quality 
to  bring  the  objects  into  the  unity  of  a  concept,  so  we 
may  always  interpret  the  proposition  in  Comprehension 
hkewisc,  and  say  "  the  crocodile  has  the  attributes  of 
reptiles." 

IG,  The  distinction  between  these  two  classes  is  of 
great  logical  importance.  It  was  noticed  by  Ai'istotle 
who  divided  propositions  into  Convertible  and  Uncon- 
vertible, and  appears  in  the  present  day  in  the  distinction 
drawn  by  Archbishop  Thomson  between  Substitutive  and 
Attributive  Judgments.  We  have  seen  that  in  the  former 
class  we  can  at  once  put  the  subject  in  the  place  of  the 
predicate,  and  the  predicate  in  the  room  of  the  subject. 
In  the  other  we  cannot  do  so  without  changing  the  predi- 
cate ;  thus  in  the  Attributive  Judgment  "  all  men  tliink," 
we  cannot  convert  simply,  and  aihrm  "all  thinking  beings 
arc  men."  It  has  not  been  noticed  that  in  the  first  class 
both  notions  are  Percepts  or  Abstracts,  and  that  in  the 
second  the  predicate  is  a  Concept. 


CATEOORICAL  PROPOSITIONS.  101 

17.  In  the  second  class  there  is  a  real  difference  be- 
tween the  subject  and  the  predicate,  whereby  the  one 
comes  primarily  and  the  other  secondai-ily  iu  the  order  of 
thought.  We  may  say  for  poetical  effect  "  sweet  is  the 
breath  of  morn,"  but  the  natural  order  in  thought  is 
"  the  breath  of  mom  is  sweet."  The  rationale  is,  that  in 
predication  we  ascribe  an  attribute  to  an  object,  or  we 
place  it  in  a  class  ;  and  in  both  the  predicate  must  be 
more  extensive  and  less  comprehensive  than  the  subject. 
This  is  the  the  rule  at  least  for  affirmative  propositions, 
that  the  subject  is  the  more  comprehensive  and  less  ex- 
tensive. 

18.  Certain  negative  propositions  seem  to  be  exceptions.  Thus 
when  we  say  "  all  Greeks  were  not  Athenians,"  the  subject  is  more 
extensive  than  the  predicate.  But  tlie  proposition  is  not  a  univer- 
sal negative,  E  :  we  do  not  say  of  every  one  of  the  Greeks  that  they 
were  not  Athenians,  or  that  no  Greek  was  an  Athenian  ;  but  that 
"some  Greeks  were  not  Athenians."  But  then  even  in  this  form  the 
subject  is  the  more  extensive.  But  is  not  the  proposition  in  thought 
"  some  Greeks  were  Not-Athenians,"  in  which  we  constitute  a  class 
of  all  persons  Not-Athenians,  which  is  more  extensive  than  Greeks  ? 

li).  It  is  disputed  what  we  are  to  make  of  those  prop- 
ositions in  which  the  predicate  is  a  general  notion  dis- 
tributed, e.  g.,  "all  men  are  all  rational  beings."  It  is 
clear  that  when  we  say  simply  "  all  men  are  rational,"  we 
mean  that  every  one  man,  every  one  in  the  class  man,  is 
in  the  class  rational.  But  if  we  have  farther  found  that 
every  rational  being  is  in  the  class  man,  we  are  entitled 
to  say  "  all  men  are  all  rational."  But  what  do  we  mean 
when  we  say  so  ?  The  terms,  it  appears  to  us,  are  no 
longer  general,  standing  for  each  and  eveiy  one  of  a  class  ; 
we  do  not  mean  "every  one  man  =  all  rational,"  nor 
"  every  one  man  =  every  rational."  The  word  "  all " 
does  not  now  mean  "  every  one,"  but  the  whole  collec- 
tively (see  §  48).  The  meaning  in  fact  now  is,  "  the 
whole  class  men  =  the  whole  class  rational."    If  so,  the 


102  JUDGMENT. 

terms  are  not  General,  applicable  to  eacli  and  every  one 
of  an  indefinite  mimber,  but  Singular,  witli  a  process  of 
Abstraction  involved.  To  take  one  other  example.  The 
mathematician  demonstrates  that  "  equilateral  triangles 
are  equiangular,"  meaning  that  every  one  equilateral  tri- 
angle is  so.  He  also  demonstrates  that "  equiangular  tii- 
angles  are  equilateral."  He  can  now  say  "the  whole 
class  of  equilateral  triangles  is  equal  in  extent  to  the 
whole  class  of  equiangular,"  and  the  terms  are  Singular 
Abstracts,  and  the  propositions  Convertible,  Substitutive, 
Equivalent  or  Equipollent. 
"  20.  We  have  called  attention  (§  9)  to  the  fourfold 
division  of  propositions  A,  E,  I,  0.  But  we  have  now 
seen  that  there  is  a  class  of  Universal  Afifirmative  prop- 
ositions in  which  the  predicate  is  distributed.  To  dis- 
tinguish them  from  A,  in  which  the  predicate  is  not  dis- 
tributed, it  is  proposed  to  designate  them  by  the  vowel 
U  (Hamilton),  or  A""  (Spalding),  which  would  represent 
that  class  of  propositions  in  which  the  terms  are  Sin- 
gulars or  Abstracts,  and  Convertible. 

21.  According  to  Aristotle,  every  proposition  declares  a  genus 
{vevor),  or  a  property  {Tidiov),  or  a  definition  (5pof),  or  accident  {cv/i^e 
drjKoc),  of  the  subject.  Genus  denotes  a  part  or  attribute  belonging 
to  the  subject,  but  also  to  other  subjects,  as  "  mammals  are  verte- 
brates," where  the  predicate  applies  to  other  subjects  as  well.  A 
property  belongs  invariably  to  the  subject,  but  without  being  the 
mark  which  explains  its  nature,  as  that  "  mammals  are  warm- 
blfx^xled."  Definition  is  an  attribute  or  set  of  attributes  explaining 
the  very  nature  of  the  subject,  as  that  mammals  suckle  their  young. 
Accident  is  an  attribute  belonging  to  the  subject,  but  which  might 
be  conc<,-ivab!y  sej^arated  from  it,  as  that  mammals  are  found  in 
America.  This  makes  the  predicables  four  in  number.  Pori^hjry 
baa  five  Predicables,  genus,  species,  proprium,  differentia,  and  acci- 
dent, leaving  out  definition  and  adding  species  (h^or)  and  differentia 
(Aiaiioftn).  Species  is  the  whole  essence  of  its  subject.  Differentia 
ifl  that  attribute  or  set  of  attributes  by  which  a  species  is  distin- 
guished  from  other  species  of  its  genus. 


CATEGORICAL  PROPOSITION'S.  103 

Some  of  these  distinctions  are  of  great  importance,  as  that  be- 
tween genus  and  species  (P.  I.,  §  35) ;  and  tliat  between  definition 
and  proprium,  or,  as  Porpliyry  makes  it,  between  difFerentia  and 
proprium.  In  species  and  differentia,  e.  g.,  "  mammals  suckle  their 
young,"  the  subject  and  predicate  are  convertible  or  equivalent  or 
coextensive.  In  proprium,  e.  g.,  tliat  "  mammals  are  warm-blooded," 
the  terms  are  not  convertible,  for  there  are  warm-blooded  animals 
which  are  not  mammals.  The  distinction  between  differentia  and 
propri  um  is  valuable  as  showing  that  when  we  have  fixed  on  the 
differentia  of  a  class,  we  may  often  find  other  at^butes  conjoined 
with  it  which  may  be  called  propria.  This  is  the  case  with  those 
classes  wliich  are  calicd  Kinds  (see  P.  I.,  §  136).  It  is  diflBcult,  how- 
ever, in  some  circumstances,  to  determine  what  is  differentia  and 
what  is  property.  Under  one  view,  that  is,  to  the  sailor,  polarity 
would  be  the  differentia  of  the  magnet,  while  under  another  aspect, 
"  to  those  manufacturers  who  employ  magnets  for  the  purpose  of  more 
expeditiously  picking  up  small  bits  of  iron  and  for  shielding  their 
faces  from  the  noxious  steel-dust  in  the  grinding  of  needles,  the  at- 
tracting power  of  the  magnet  is  the  essential  point."  (Whately.)  It  is 
extremely  ditBcult  to  carry  out  these  distinctions  thoroughly  and  con- 
Bistently.  We  cannot  tell  what  is  the  whole  essence  of  any  subject  ; 
all  that  we  can  do  is  to  specify  one  or  more  of  the  determining  attri- 
butes of  a  species.  Nor  can  we  say  in  all  circumstances  what  is  an 
accident  as  distingvushed  from  a  property,  say,  e.  g.,  whether  that  it 
lives  on  the  earth  is  the  property  or  accident  of  a  mammal.  The 
distinction  adopted  in  the  text  between  Equivalent  propositions  in 
which  the  terms  are  coextensive  and  interchangeable,  and  Attribu- 
tive propositions  in  which  the  relation  is  one  of  joint  comprehension 
and  extension  and  in  which  the  predicate  is  undistributed,  seems  to 
be  the  important  one  for  logical  ends. 

22.  Hamilton  maintains  that  the  predicate  should  always  bo 
quantified,  tliat  is,  declared  to  be  either  particidar  or  universal ;  that 
we  should  say  logically,  "  all  men  =  some  fallible."  He  argues  this 
on  the  ground  that  whatever  is  contained  implicitly  in  spontaneous 
thought  should  be  unfolded  explicitly  in  logical  forms.  Wo  admit 
the  principle,  but  we  deny  that  it  requires  the  quantification  of  the 
predicate  in  athrmative  propositions.  In  the  great  majority  of 
aflBrmative  propositions,  the  predication  is  made  in  comprehension 
rather  than  extension.  When  we  say  "  the  bird  sings,"  we  are  at- 
tributing a  quality  to  the  bird,  and  we  are  not  determining  in 
thought  whether  there  are  or  are  not  other  creatures  that  sing 


lOi  JUDGMENT. 

Wlicn  we  say  "  man  reasons,"  we  are  ascribing  a  property  to  him 
probably  without  settling  whether  there  are  or  are  not  other  beings 
who  reason  ;  and  so  the  logician  is  not  required  to  put  the  proposi- 
tion either  in  the  form  "  all  men  =  some  reasoning  beings,"  or  "  all 
men  =  all  reasoning  beings."  And  this  may  be  the  proper  place 
for  stating  that  there  is  no  appropriateness  in  using  the  sign  of 
equality,  =,  which  has  a  definite  meaning  in  mathematics,  to  ex- 
press the  connection  of  the  notions  in  attributive  propositions  in 
which  the  relation  is  one  of  comprehension  and  extension  and  not 
of  mere  equality. 

23.  Carrying  out  his  doctrine  of  the  thorough  quantification  of 
the  predicate  in  all  propositions,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  gives  the  follow- 
ing Table  of  Judgments : 

A  All  plants  grow. 

E  No  right  action  is  inexpedient. 

I  Some  muscles  are  without  our  volition. 

O  Some  jilants  do  not  grow  m  the  tropics. 

U  Common  salt  is  chloride  of  sodium. 

T  Some  stars  are  all  the  planets. 
Ti  No  Frenchman  is  some  German. 

o)  Some  trees  (oaks)  are  not  some  trees  (elms). 
The  two  marked  by  the  Greek  letters  are  criticised  by  Thomson  and 
rejected  on  the  ground  that  while  they  are  conceivable  cases  of  neg- 
ative predication  they  are  not  actual — we  would  add  in  spontaneous 
thought.  Thus  I]  has  the  resemblance,  not  the  i)Owcr  of  denial ;  it 
denies  nothing,  and  decides  nothing.  Y  should  also  be  discarded  on 
the  ground  that  it  is  never  uttered  by  us  in  spontaneous  thought,  in 
which  we  say  instead  "  all  the  planets  arc  stars,"  which  is  A.  Rejecting 
these  three  forms  on  these  special  groimds,  we  farther  decline  to  give 
them  a  separate  place  in  the  Table  of  Judgments,  on  the  general 
ground  that  in  spontaneous  thought  the  predicate  is  not  quantified 
in  all  or  even  in  most  judgments.  We  admit  that  they  are  forms 
which  may  be  reached  by  Conversion  or  other  kinds  of  Immediate 
Inference  to  be  explained  forthwith ;  but  then  it  has  never  been 
deemed  necessary  or  even  proper  to  introduce  such  among  the  forms 
of  spontanr-ous  judgment ;  and  if  we  adopt  these  we  must  by  parity 
of  reason  introduce  others,  and  make  the  Table  contain  many  more 
judgments.  We  are  inclined,  however,  to  think  that  it  is  of  im- 
portance to  separate  tliose  propositions  which  are  Equivalent  from 
others,  and  to  have  a  letter,  U,  to  designate  them.  But  let  it  be 
observed  that  in  the  Judgments  thus  denoted,  the  notions  compared 


CONJUNCTION  OF  PROPOSITIONS.  106 

are  Percepts  or  Abstracts.  We  are  thus  enabled  to  retain  the  old 
Table,  A,  E,  I,  O,  for  all  those  judgments  in  which  we  have  a  Con- 
cept, while  U  is  added  to  designate  that  class  of  propositions  which 
have  been  seen  to  be  Convertible  since  the  days  of  Aristotle,  and 
which  turn  out  to  be  those  in  which  the  notions  compared  are  not 
general  or  class  notions. 


CONJUNCTIONS  OF  PROPOSITIONS,  CONDITIONALS,  AND 

DISJUNCTIVES. 

24:.  We  have  now  to  consider  propositions  in  their 
relations  one  to  another.  Most  of  these  relations  are  of 
so  loose  a  natiu-e  that  they  cannot  be  brought  under  any 
laws  of  discursive  thought.  When  we  say  "  the  road  was 
long  and  steep,"  we  have  two  propositions,  "  the  road  was 
long  "  and  "  the  road  was  steep,"  but  with  no  special  con- 
nection except  that  in  both  the  affirmation  is  made  of 
"  road."  When  we  say  that  "  the  fever  was  vinilent,  but 
the  patient  recovered,"  we  have  two  affirmations  so  far  in 
a  state  of  opposition,  but  not  involving  any  discursive  j^ro- 
cess  falling  under  Logic.  Such  connections  of  sentences 
are  indicated  by  connective  particles,  such  as  "  and," 
"  but,"  "  then,"  "  afterwards,"  "  either,"  "  neither,"  "  so," 
"  however,"  and  attempts  have  been  made  by  gramma- 
rians, with  only  imperfect  success,  to  classify  them  into 
conjunctive,  adversative,  &c. 

2ii,  But  propositions  may  be  so  connected  as  to  in- 
volve a  discursive  process  falling  under  the  laws  of 
thought.  We  do  not  refer  now  to  that  formal  conjiuic- 
tion  of  propositions  which  forms  reasoning,  but  to  the 
throwing  of  two  or  more  connected  propositions  into  one. 
The  propositions  hitherto  considered  are  called  Categor- 
ical, in  which  one  proposition  is  simply  said  to  agi'ce  or  not 
to  agree  with  another.  But  there  are  propositions  in  which 
the  predication  is  made  hypothetically,  and  which  are 


106  JUDGMENT. 

therefore  called  Hypothetical.  Tliey  are  of  two  liinds,  one 
called  Conditionals,  the  other  Disjunctives. 

20»  There  are  Conditionals  or  Conjunctives  in  which 
the  i^redication  is  made  under  a  condition.  "If  the  night 
continues  clear  there  will  be  dew  on  the  grass."  Here  we 
have  two  categorical  propositions,  "  the  night  is  clear  " 
and  "  dew  will  be  on  the  grass,"  and  we  pat  them  into  one 
proposition,  which  affirms  that  they  are  so  related  that  the 
one  depends  on  the  other.  It  is  certainly  desirable  in  every 
way  to  have  the  propositions  spread  out  and  their  connec- 
tion intimated  in  the  conditional  form,  as  it  is  only  thus  we 
can  perceive  fully  the  relations  of  things  and  of  thoughts. 
But  it  is  of  equal  importance  that  we  should  be  able  to 
detect  the  one  proposition  in  the  affirmation  that  they 
agree,  and  that  we  should  be  able  to  point  out  its  subject, 
its  predicate,  and  coiDula. 

27.  The  proposition  on  which  the  other  depends,  wheth- 
er placed  first  or  last,  is  called  the  Antecedent,  that  which 
depends  on  it  the  Consequent,  and  the  relation  between 
them  the  Consccjuence.  Sometimes  there  are  four  terms 
in  the  Conditional.  "  If  the  sun  attracts  in  the  same  line 
as  the  moon,  the  tides  are  at  the  highest."  Here  we  have 
four  terms  ;  "  sun,"  "  attracting  in  the  same  line  as  the 
moon,"  "  tides,"  "  at  the  highest."  But  in  propositions 
with  such  a  connection  it  will  often  happen  that  the  same 
term  appears  both  in  the  antecedent  and  consequent, 
either  as  subject  or  as  predicate.  "  If  the  man  pursues 
an  honest  course  he  will  pro.sper."  "  If  virtue  is  volun- 
tary, vice  is  voluntary."  In  all  cases  the  two  propositions 
are  put  into  one  in  the  Conditional,  and  we  have  to  find 
the  one  subject  and  the  one  predicate  in  the  affirmation. 
"  The  night  continuing  cleai',"  subject ;  "  will  have  dew 
on  the  grass,"  predicate.  "  The  sun  attracting  in  the 
same  line  as  the  moon,"  subject  ;  "  wiU  have  tides  at  the 
highest,"  pn;<licate.     All  Conditional  Propositions  are  to 


CONJUNCTION  OF  PliOPOSITIONb  107 

be  regarded  as  affirmative.  Even  wlien  we  say  that  "  if 
the  night  becomes  cloudy  there  will  be  no  dew,"  the  prop- 
osition is  not  to  be  regarded  as  negative,  for  what  we 
affirm  is  a  relation  between  the  cloudiness  of  the  night 
and  the  absence  of  dew. 

2S.  The  logfician  does  not  require  to  consider  what  is  the  nature 
of  the  dependence  of  the  consequent  on  tlie  antecedent,  whether 
it  is  in  thinors  or  in  thou<jht,  whether  it  is  or  is  not  the  relation  ol 
cause  and  effect,  or  whether  tlie  relation  of  cause  and  effect  is  neces- 
sary or  c<5ntingent.  He  leaves  all  these  questions  to  the  physical 
investigator  or  the  metaphysician.  To  him  the  relation  of  the  two 
propositions  is  given,  and  he  has  to  consider  the  discursive  thought 
involved  in  the  relation  of  the  two  propositions. 

2!).  Conditional  propositions  may  be  Equivalent  or 
they  may  be  Attributive,  and  we  are  to  determine  to  which 
class  they  belong,  in  the  same  way  as  we  do  in  Categori- 
cals.  The  examples  given  above  are  all  of  Attributives. 
But  when  the  terms  are  singular  and  abstract,  we  shall 
have  Equivalent  Conditionals,  e.  g.,  "  If  the  relation  be  as 
4  to  16,  it  is  the  same  as  that  of  1  to  4,"  or,  in  Categorical 
form,  "  the  relation  of  4  to  16  is  the  same  as  the  relation 
of  1  to  4." 

30.  Disjunctive  Peopositions  express  the  relation  of 
two  or  more  judgments  which  cannot  all  be  trae,  but  one 
or  more  of  which  must.  It  involves,  two  or  more  judg- 
ments brought  into  one.  It  proceeds  on  the  principle  of 
Logical  Division  (P.  I.,  §  58),  implying  that  we  have 
divided  a  genus  into  its  co-ordinate  sj)ecies.  "Judgment" 
is  the  genu.s,  and  we  find  in  respect  of  quality  that  "  every 
judgment  is  affirmative  or  negative."  Here  we  have  two 
members  in  two  propositions,  "  every  judgment  affirms," 
"  every  judgment  denies,"  and  we  declare  that  "  every 
judgment  either  affirms  or  denies."  These  cannot  both 
be  true,  but  one  or  other  must,  on  the  supposition  that 
oiu*  division  of  the  species  is  adequate  to  the  genus.  In 
the  same  way  we  may  have  three  members,  as  "  all  notions 


108  JUDGMENT. 

are  Percepts,  or  Abstracts,  or  Concepts."  Or  we  may  haro 
four  members,  as  when  we  say  that  in  respect  both  of 
quantity  and  quality,  every  proposition  is  A,  or  E,  or  I,  or 
O  ;  or  we  may  have  five  members  if  we  add  U,  and  say 
"  all  propositions  are  A,  E,  I,  0,  or  U." 

31.  All  Disjunctive  Propositions  are  Equivalent  or 
Substitutive.  The  predicates  in  the  above  examples, 
"  either  affirms  or  denies,"  "  Percepts,  Abstracts,  or  Con- 
cepts," "  A,  E,  I,  and  O,"  are  not  general  notions  embrac- 
ing an  indefinite  number  of  individuals,  but  abstract  no- 
tions to  be  taken  in  their  full  extent. 


IMPLIED  JUDGMENTS,  OR  IMMEDIATE  raiEEENOES. 

32,  From  any  given  proposition  certain  others  can  be 
drawn  discursively  by  processes  which  the  logician  can 
analyze  and  express.  These  have  been  called  Syllogisms 
of  the  Understanding  by  Kant,  to  distinguish  them  from 
Syllogisms  of  Reasoning.  Some  British  writers  call  them 
Immediate  Inferences,  as  distinguished  from  Mediate  In- 
ferences, or  reasoning  by  means  of  a  middle  term.  We 
are  inclined  to  designate  them  Imphed  or  Transposed 
Judgments.  They  aU  flow  from  the  nature  of  the  Notion 
as  aliove  unfolded,  from  its  interpretation,  comprehension, 
extension  and  denomination,  and  from  the  relation  of  the 
notions  in  the  proposition. 

33*  CONVERSION.  In  this  process  the  terms  are 
transposed  so  that  the  subject  becomes  the  predicate,  and 
the  predicate  the  subject.  In  order  to  its  validity,  the 
truth  of  the  converse  must  be  implied  in  the  truth  of  the 
exposita  or  proposition  given.  The  main  rule  for  secur 
ing  this  is,  that  no  term  is  to  1)6  distributed  in  the  con- 
verse which  was  not  distributed  in  the  exposita.  It 
may  be  effected  \n  two  or  three  ways.    (1)  Simple  Conver 


nrPLIED  JUDGMENTS.  109 

sion,  in  which  tho  terms  are  transposed  without  any  change 
of  quantity.  This  can  be  done  in  propositions  in  E, 
in  which  both  terms  are  distributed,  and  in  I,  in  which 
neither  is,  as  E  "  No  man  is  perfect,"  converted  "  No  per- 
fect being  is  man  ; "  I  "  Some  men  are  generous,"  con- 
verted "  Some  generous  beings  are  men."  (2)  Conver- 
sion by  Limitation  or  per  accidens,  by  changing  the 
quantity.  It  being  given  that  "  all  deception  is  mean,"  we 
cannot  say  "  all  mean  things  are  deception,"  but  "  mean  " 
being  undistributed  in  the  exposita,  we  give  it  the  sign 
of  particularity  or  non-distribution  in  the  converse, 
and  say,  "Some  mean  thing  (or  among  mean  things)  is 
deception."  A  can  be  converted  in  this  way,  as  may  also 
E.  (3)  It  is  disputed  whether  O  can  be  legitimately  con- 
verted. "  Some  students  are  not  industrious."  We  can- 
not, therefore,  say  "  some  industrious  are  not  students," 
for  you  would  have  students  limited  in  the  original  prop- 
osition and  distributed  in  the  converse.  Some  logicians 
think  that  conversion  may  be  accomplished  by  what  is 
called  Contraposition,  that  is,  by  attaching  the  negative 
to  the  predicate  and  reckoning  the  proposition  affirmative, 
thus  making  the  j)redicate  undistributed.  "Some  stu- 
dents are  not-industrious,"  converted  "  some  not-indus- 
ti'ious  are  students."  This  is  certainly  a  legitimate  dis- 
cursive process,  but  seems  to  imply  Privative  Conceptions 
(see  infra,  §  49). 

3rl,  OPPOSITION.  Light  is  often  thrown  on  the 
natui'e  of  a  proposition  by  its  being  put  in  the  various 
forms  of  what  is  called  Opi^osition.  In  Equivalent  prop- 
ositions there  is,  properly  speaking,  only  one  kind  of 
Opposition,  that  between  an  afl^-mative  and  negative 
proposition  with  the  same  terms.  "  Common  salt  is 
chloride  of  sodium,"  its  opposite  is  "common  salt  is  not 
chloride  of  si)dium."  This  Opposition  is  Contradictory  : 
that  is,  both  propositions  cannot  be  true  ;  and  yet  one  <)» 


110 


JUDGMENT. 


other  must  be  ;  and  the  truth  of  the  one  implies  the  false- 
hood of  the  other,  and  the  falsehood  of  the  one  the  truth 
of  the  other. 

,'?  J.  But  -svhen  we  have  Concepts  in  the  proposition, 
then  the  forms  of  Opposition  become  more  varied.  They 
are  exhibited  in  the  following  diagram. 


Brery  nun  has  a  conscience. 


Bom*  nun  have  a  conscience. 


Contraries. 


Subconttaries. 


No  man  has  a  oonaelenM. 


Some  men  bare  not  a  conactenee 


Suhdlternalion,  or  the  relation  between  two  propositions 
which  with  the  same  terms  differ  in  quantity,  the  one 
being  universal  and  the  other  particular.  It  holds  be- 
tween A  and  I,  between  E  and  O.  It  can  scarcely  be 
seid  to  be  a  form  of  Opposition.  The  rule  is,  that  the 
truth  of  the  universal  implies  the  truth  of  the  particular. 
If  it  be  true  that  "  all  men  have  a  conscience,"  it  follows 
that  "some  men  have  a  conscience."  If  it  be  that  "no 
man  is  free  from  sin,"  it  is  also  that  "  some  men  are  not 
free  from  sin."  From  the  falsehood  of  I  we  can  argue  the 
falsehood  of  A,  and  fi-om  the  falsehood  of  O  the  falsehood 
of  E.  It  is  evident  that  we  cannot  reversely  argue  the 
truth  of  the  universal  fi'oin  the  truth  of  the  particular, 
that  we  cannot  argue  A  from  I  or  E  from  O. 

.76*.  Subaltemation  depends  on  the  principle  that 
whatever  is  true  of  a  class,  is  true  of  any  and  of  each  of 
the  members  of  the  class.  We  are  now  on  the  very  verge 
of  Mediate  Reasoning.      In  Subaltemation  we  say  "all 


IMPLIED  JUDGMENTS.  i[ll^ 

bodies  attract  each  other"  (A),  and  so  "some  bodies 
attract  each  other."  In  Mediate  Reasoning  we  introduce 
a  third  term  and  declare,  on  the  same  general  principle, 
that  "the  planets,  being  bodies  (some  bodies),  attract 
each  other,"  (see  Part  Third.) 

37 >  Contrary  Opposition,  in  which  the  propositions, 
always  having  the  same  terms,  differ  in  Quality.  It  holds 
between  A  and  E.  Contraries  cannot  both  be  true.  If  all 
men  are  liars,  that  is,  included  in  the  class  liars,  it  cannot 
be  true  that  no  men  are  liars.  But  they  may  both  be 
false,  that  is,  it  may  not  be  true  either  that  "  all  men  are 
liars,"  or  that  "  no  men  are  liars."  The  Opposition  be- 
tween I  and  O  is  called  Sub-Contrary,  They  may  both 
be  ti'ue  but  cannot  both  be  false.  Thus  it  is  true  that 
"  some  men  are  liars  "  and  that  "  some  men  are  not  liars." 
But  if  it  be  false,  that  "  some  men  are  sinless,"  it  must  be 
true  that  "  some  men  are  not  sinless,"  and  if  it  be  false 
that  "  some  men  have  not  a  conscience,"  it  must  be  true 
that  "  some  men  have  a  conscience." 

So  it  is  usually  said.  But  it  should  be  observed  that  in  the  twc 
last  instances  we  use  "  some,"  not  in  the  proper  logical  sense  o\ 
'  some  at  least,"  "  some,  we  know  not  how  many,"  but  in  another 
sense,  "  some  at  most,"  "  some,  not  all."     (See  §  7.) 

S8»  Contradictory  Opposition,  in  which  the  propositions 
differ  both  in  quantity  and  quality,  as  A  and  0,  E  and  I. 
From  the  truth  of  a  proposition  we  can  posit  the  false- 
hood of  its  contradictory.  If  it  be  true  that  "  all  men 
have  a  conscience "  (A),  it  cannot  be  that  "  some  men 
have  not  a  conscience  "  (0) ;  and  if  "  some  men  have  not 
a  conscience  "  (O),  it  cannot  be  that  all  men  have  a  con- 
science (A).  If  "no  man  has  a  conscience"  (E),  it  can- 
not be  that  "  some  men  have  a  conscience"  (I)  ;  and  if 
"  some  men  have  a  conscience "  (I),  it  cannot  be  that 
"  no  man  has  a  conscience "  (E).  "Wlien  two  prop- 
ositions ai'e  in  the  relation  of  contradictories,  the  truth 


112  JUDGMENT. 

of  the  one  implies  the  falseliood  of  the  other,  and 
the  falsehood  of  the  one  the  truth  of  the  other.  This  is 
the  Law  of  Contradiction,  or,  as  it  is  called  by  Hamilton, 
of  Nou-Contradiction.  But  there  is  another  law  involved 
called  the  Law  of  Excluded  Middle, — that  of  two  contra- 
dictories one  or  otlier  must  be  true,  there  is  no  Middle 
between.  It  must  either  be  that  "  all  men  have  a  con- 
science "  (A),  or  that  "  some  men  have  not  a  conscience  " 
(0)  ;  that  "no  man  has  a  conscience  "  (E), or  that  "some 
men  have  a  conscience  "  (I).  It  follows  that  if  you  prove 
the  truth  of  a  proposition,  you  thereby  prove  the  false- 
hood of  its  contradictory  ;  or  if  you  j^rove  the  falsehood 
of  a  proposition,  you  estabHsh  the  tnith  of  its  contradic- 
tory. If  you  prove  that  some  doctrines,  such  as  the  con- 
nection of  mind  and  body,  are  to  be  believed,  though  they 
are  not  comprehensible,  you  have  thereby  shown  that  a 
doctrine  is  not  to  be  disbelieved  because  it  is  incompre- 
hensible. 

Jiit,  Demonstration,  that  is,  the  establishment  of  a 
point  by  a  pure  discursive  process  founded  on  trath  al- 
lowed, is  of  two  kinds,  direct  and  indii-ect.  When  the 
proposition  is  established  by  proving  its  truth,  it  is  said 
to  be  direct.  We  should  use  this  method,  as  being  the 
most  satisfactory,  whenever  it  is  available.  But  there  is 
another  mode  called  indirect  which  is  also  valid.  You 
may  prove  not  that  a  proposition  is  true,  but  that  its  con- 
tradictory must  be  false,  which  imj)lies  the  truth  of  the 
proposition  of  which  it  is  the  contradictory  opposite. 
Euclid  often  employs  this  method  of  demonsti*ation, 
showing  that  you  contradict  a  conceded  truth  by  follow- 
ing any  other  supposition  than  that  which  he  makes.  We 
shall  see  that  the  same  mode  is  emjiloyed  in  Logic  in 
establishing  the  Special  Rules  of  the  Figures  and  in  cer- 
tain forms  of  Reduction, 

4:0*     It  is  desirable  in  controversy  to  have  the  prop- 


IMPLIED  JUDGMENTS  113 

ositious  defended,  put  in  the  form  not  of  contrary  but  of 
contradictory  opposition.  Without  this  the  combatants 
may  fight  without  ever  facing  each  other,  and  the  whole 
discussion  will  bo  characterized  by  hopeless  confusion. 
One  asserts  that  men  may  be  trusted,  another  that  men 
may  not  be  ti'usted,  and  the  contest  may  go  on  forever 
with  abundant  evidence  on  botli  sides  ;  but  let  the  posi- 
tions assume  the  form  "  all  men  are  to  be  trusted  "  and 
"  some  men  are  not  to  be  tnisted,"  and  the  question  may  be 
settled.  One  holds  that  such  branches  as  history  and  meta- 
physics should  bo  studied,  another  that  they  should  not, 
and  both  are  right  and  both  are  wrong  ;  but  let  the  state- 
ments be,  on  the  one  hand,  that  "  no  histoiy  is  to  be  stud- 
ied," or  that  "no  metaphysics  are  to  be  studied,"  and  on 
the  other  that  "  some  histoiy  is  to  be  studied,"  or  that 
"  some  metaphysics  are  to  be  studied,"  and  the  victory 
will  easily  be  gained  by  those  who  hold  the  affii'mative. 
'^Mien  arguing  with  an  opponent,  let  it  be  your  business 
to  prove  the  contradictory  of  his  position  ;  and  you  may 
insist  on  his  pro\'ing  not  the  mere  sub-contrary  of  your 
statement,  but  the  contrary  or  contradictoiy.  In  all 
cases  it  is  desii-able  that  we  should  know  what  is  the  con- 
tradictory (^/ley^of)  of  the  proposition  we  are  holding 
or  impugning. 

41.  The  following  are  the  transposed  propositions  we  may  ob 
tain  by  means  of  Opposition  : 

If  A  be  true,  E  is  false,  I  true,  0  false. 

If  A  be  false,  E  is  unknown,  I  unknown,  O  true. 

If  E  be  true,  A  is  false,  I  false,  0  true. 

If  E  be  false,  A  is  unknown,  I  true,  0  unknown. 

If  I  be  true,  A  is  unknown,  E  false,  0  unknown. 

If  I  be  false,  A  is  false,  E  true,  O  true. 

If  O  be  true,  A  is  false,  E  unknowTi,  I  imknown. 

If  0  be  false,  A  is  true,  E  false,  I  true. 

F^om  the  truth  of  a  universal  or  falsehood  of  a  particular,  we  may 
tofer  the  quality  of  all  the  opposed  propositions  ;  but  from  the  false 

8 


114  JUDGMENT. 

hood  of  a  universal  or  truth  of  a  particular  we  can  know  only  the 
quality  of  the  contradictory. 

42»  It  should  be  observed  that  both  in  Conversion  and 
Opposition  we  gain  the  Implied  Judgments  simply  by  the 
contemplation  of  the  Extension  together  wdth  the  involved 
Comprehension  of  the  Notions.  In  Subalternation,  if  A 
be  true,  I  must  be  true,  because  I  is  involved  in  the  Ex- 
tension of  A.  If  A  be  true,  E  is  false,  for  in  A  we  ascribe 
an  attribute  to  all  A  and  in  E  we  deny  it.  In  aU  the 
trar.pposed  judgments  we  must  see  that  the  judgment 
reached  has  not  a  greater  Extension  than  the  judgment 
given,  and  that  we  predicate  of  both  the  same  attribute 
or  group  of  attributes. 

4/i.  Conversion  and  Opposition  are  treated  of  in  all  the  older 
loprical  treatises,  in  which,  however,  it  is  not  noticed  that  the  prop- 
ositions reached,  are  drawn  by  a  contemplation  of  the  Extension 
and  Comprehension  of  the  Notions.  Nor  has  it  been  explicitly 
stated  that  the  above  rules  of  Conversion  and  Opposition  do  not 
apply  to  propositions  in  which  there  is  no  concept.  Of  such  all  Con- 
version is  Simijle,  and  all  Oi)position  is  Contradictory  ;  thus  it 
being  stated  that  "  Newton  discovered  the  law  of  gravitation,"  it 
would  be  unmeaning  to  say,  by  the  law  of  subalternation,  that 
"  some  Newton  discovered  the  law  of  gravitation."  Later  logi 
ciaus  liave  noticed  that  there  are  other  Immediate  Inferences  equally 
entitled  to  a  place  in  the  exposition  of  Logical  Judgment.  It  may 
be  doubted  whether  they  have  seen  their  exact  nature. 

4:J:.  2'he  I II t'rpr elation  of  Judgments  gives  certain  Im- 
plied Propositions.  If  it  be  given  "the  orbit  of  the 
planets  is  elliiitical,"  we  have  by  Denomination  "  the  epi- 
thet elliptical  may  be  applied  to  the  orbits  of  the  planets ; " 
by  Extension,  "  the  orbits  of  the  planets  are  among  the 
things  that  are  elliptical,"  and  by  Comprehension  "  ellip- 
tical is  an  attribute  of  the  planetary  orbits."  L'ke  Trans- 
posed Judgments  may  be  derived  from  jiropositions  in  E, 
I,  and  O  :  as  O,  "  some  metals  are  lighter  than  water," 
by  Denomination  the  phrase  "  lighter  than  water  "  may 
be   applied    to    "  some   metals  ; "   by   Extension    "  some 


IMPLIED  JUDGMENTS.  115 

metals  may  be  incluclecl  in  the  tilings  which  are  liglitcr 
than  water  ;  "  by  Comprehension  "  the  property  of  lighter 
than  water  belongs  to  some  metals."  Propositions  in  U 
may  always  be  interpreted  by  Denomination  and  Com- 
prehension. It  being  given  that  "  Ethics  is  the  science 
of  man's  motive  and  moral  nature,"  we  may  say  "  the 
plu'ase  science  of  man's  motive  and  moral  natiu'e  may  be 
apphed  to  Ethics,"  and  "  the  attributes  of  the  science  of 
man's  motive  and  moral  natui-e  belong  to  Ethics." 

4o.  There  are  Imphed  Judgments  obtained  by  the 
special  consideration  of  the  Comprehension  of  the  No- 
tions, as  by 

Tlie  Interpretation  of  Marks,  as  when  it  is  said  "  John 
loved  Jesus,"  it  is  imj)Ued  that  "John  lived"  and  that 
"  Jesus  lived,"  and  that  "  there  is  such  a  thing  as  love." 

40,  .^f/cZecZ  il/ar/<:s  to  both  subject  and  predicate.  Thus 
if  it  be  declared  that  "  a  negro  is  a  fellow-creature,"  we  may 
say  "  a  negi-o  in  suffeiing  is  a  fellow-creature  in  suffering." 
If  "  learning  be  useful  "  then  "  injury  to  learning  would 
be  injury  to  what  is  useful." 

4:7,  Added  Subject  and  Predicate  may  give  other  judg- 
ments by  being  added  to  a  conception.  Thus  as  "  hon- 
esty is  the  best  pohcy,"  "  the  disregard  of  honesty  would 
be  the  disregard  of  the  best  policy." 

48.  A  Summation  of  Predicates  may  give  us  an  Im- 
plied Judgment.  Thus  if  it  is  found  (1)  that  vii'tue  is 
voluntaiy,  (2)  in  obedience  to  a  law,  which  is  (3)  the  law 
of  God,  then  we  may  combine  the  predicates  and  get  a 
definition  of  virtue  :  "  Virtue  is  a  voluntary  act  done  in 
obedience  to  the  law  of  God." 

4i)»  Privative  Conceptions  may  yield  Transposed  Judg- 
ments. We  have  seen  (P.  I.,  §  53)  that  fi'om  any  given 
concept  we  obtain  another  by  leaving  out  its  mark  :  thus 
from  the  positive  concept  "  wise,"  we  may  obtain  the 
privative  concept  "  unwise."     Any  judgment  pi  onounced 


116  JUDGMENT. 

on    tlie  positive   concept,   implies  judgments  upon   the 

privative. 

The  folloAving  is  taken  from  Thomson's  Outlines  of  the  Laws  oj 
Thought  (see  also  De  Morgan's  Formal  Logic,  p.  61),  leaving  out  the 
examples  in  Y  : 

I.       A    All  the  rifrhteous  are  happy. 

None  of  the  righteous  are  unhappy. 
All  who  are  unhappy  are  unrighteous. 

E     No  liuman  virtues  are  perfect. 
All  human  virtues  are  imperfect. 
No  perfect  virtues  are  human. 

I    Some  possible  cases  are  probable. 

Some  possible  cases  are  not  improbable. 
Some  probable  cases  are  not  impossible. 

U     The  j  ust  are  all  the  holy. 
All  unlioly  men  are  unjust. 
No  just  men  are  unholy. 

tL     A     All  the  insincere  are  dishonest. 
No  insincere  man  is  honest. 
All  honest  men  are  sincere. 

E  No  unjust  act  is  unpunished. 
All  unjust  acts  are  punished. 
All  acts  not  punished  are  just. 

I     Some  unfair  acts  are  unknown. 
Some  unfair  acts  are  not  known. 
Some  unknown  acts  are  not  fair. 

0    Some  improbable  cases  are  not  impossible. 
Some  improbable  cases  are  possible. 
Some  possible  cases  are  not  probable. 

U    The  unlawful  is  the  only  inexpedient. 
Tlie  lawful  is  the  expedient. 
The  lawful  is  not  the  inexpedient. 

We  may  make  a  proyjosition  assume  any  one  of  these  fonns  as 
may  seem  best  fitted  to  give  clearness  of  thought  and  to  enable  us 
to  afiBrm  or  deny  it ;  and  we  may  express  it  in  the  form  which  may 
best  ac<xjmj)li8h  the  end  we  have  in  view  in  the  expression.  It  is 
by  thiH  pnjcess  that  from  0,  "  some  mathematicians  have  not  had 


IMPLIED  JUDGMENTS.  117 

macL  practical  wisdom,"  we  get  "some  without  practical  ^visdom 
havo  been  matliematicians,"  (§33.)  From  any  one  of  tlie  alxj\e 
propositions  (except  those  in  0)  we  may  derive  another  proposition 
by  conversion. 

50,  Condilional  Propositions  give  implied  judgments. 
"  If  tliis  man  has  consumption  he  will  not  recover."  This 
implies  that  the  "  case  of  a  man  who  has  a  consumption 
is  the  case  of  a  man  who  will  not  recover,"  or  bringing 
the  notions  into  closer  relation,  "  One  who  has  consump- 
tion will  not  recover." 

51,  Disjunctive  Propositions  involve  other  propositions. 
Thus  if  it  be  allowed  that  "  every  given  time  must  be 
spring,  or  summer,  or  autumn,  or  winter,"  we  are  entitled 
fi-om  the  rale  of  Logical  Di\dsion,  that  the  members  must 
make  up  tlie  w^hole  (I.,  §  58),  to  say,  that  "all  times  not 
spring,  or  summer,  or  autumn,  must  be  winter,"  and  from 
another  rule,  that  the  members  must  exclude  one  an- 
other (I.,  §  59),  to  affirm  that  "  winter  is  neither  spring, 
nor  summer,  nor  autumn." 

t'T,*?.  In  all  these  cases  the  nile  is  to  be  rigidly  observed, 
that  a  tenn  must  be  distributed  in  the  transposed  prop- 
osition only  when  it  is  distributed  in  the  original  one. 
Because  we  ai^e  entitled  to  make  a  predication  of  some, 
we  are  not  therefore  entitled  to  make  the  same  predication 
of  all. 

53,  The  above  are  examples  of  Implied  Judgments 
derived  according  to  rules  specified.  We  beheve  there 
may  be  other  kinds  drawn  by  disciu'sive  thought,  and 
that  the  logician  could  formuhze  the  law  which  niles 
them.  It  may  be  interesting  to  show  how  many  other 
propositions  could  be  got  fi-om  the  single  one  "  men  are 
responsible,"  by  simply  contemplating  the  Extension  and 
Comprehension  of  the  Notions. 

Extension. 
Every  man  is  in  the  class  responsible. 
This  man  is  responsible. 


1 18  JUDGMENT. 

Rome  men  are  responsible. 

Every  tribe  of  mankind  are  responsible. 

Some  resiwnsible  beings  are  men. 

It  is  not  true  that  no  men  are  responsible. 

It  is  not  true  that  some  men  are  not  responsible,  &c.,  &a 

Comprehension. 
Man  exists. 

Responsibility  is  a  real  attribute. 

Responsibility  is  an  attribute  of  every  man. 

Responsibility  is  an  attribute  of  this  man. 

Responsibility  is  an  attribute  of  every  tribe  of  men. 

Responsibility  is  an  attribute  of  some  men. 

Irresponsibility  may  be  denied  of  all  men. 

No  man  is  irresponsible. 

Irresponsible  beings  are  not  men. 

Men  of  wealth  are  responsible  with  their  wealth. 

To  punish  men  is  to  punish  responsible  men,  &c.,  &c. 
In  treating  of  Implied  Judgments   we  have  been   indebted   to 
Thomson's   Outlines  of  the  Laics  of  Thought,  where,  however,  they 
are  called  Immediate  Inferences  and  placed  mider  Reasoning,  and 
are  not  derived  from  the  nature  of  the  Notions.  N. 

ii4:.  We  may  close  the  part  of  Logic  which  treats  of  \ 
Judgment,  by  .showing  what  Logic  can  do  in  settling  for  us 
what  are  and  what  are  not  true  propositions.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  it  cannot  determine  for  us  directly  "what  j^rop- 
ositions  imply  and  what  do  not  imply  Objective  reality, 
e.  g.,  whether  there  is  or  is  not  a  sea-serpent.  But  it  can 
do  much  in  the  way  of  enabling  us  to  pronounce  a  right 
judgment  upon  evidence.  It  requires  us  to  ascertain  what 
are  the  Notions,  that  is,  the  things  compared  and  in  regard 
to  which  we  make  the  affii'mation  or  denial.  It  makes  us 
look  at  the  nature  of  the  notions  and  find  whether  they 
are  singulars,  abstracts,  or  general  concepts,  and  to  de- 
cide about  them  accordingly.  Thus  when  it  is  said  that 
"  virtue  is  that  which  promotes  the  greatest  happiness," 
we  see  that  b(jth  subject  and  predicate  are  abstracts,  and 
that  therefore  the  terms  must  be  convertible  (§  14)  ;  and 
as  we  see  tbis,  we  are  better  able  to  determine  whether 


IMPLIED  JUDGMENTS.  119 

the  proposition  is  true,  for  we  ask  whether  "  that  which 
promotes  the  greatest  happiness  is  (always)  \irtue  ?  "  If 
it  bo  maintained  that  "sea-serpents  exist,"  we  perceive 
that  seii^ent  is  a  common  term,  and,  we  inquii'e  what  are 
the  common  qualities  (differentia)  of  serpents,  and  are 
thus  in  a  better  position  to  detennine  whether  serjients 
can  exist  in  the  sea,  and  whether  the  appearances  which 
sailors  have  noticed  can  be  of  sea-serpents.  Logic  urges 
us  farther  to  inquire  into  the  relation  of  subject  and 
predicate,  whether  it  is  one  of  equivalence  or  attribution. 
Every  one  will  admit  the  truth  of  the  attributive  prop- 
osition that  "  virtue  promotes  happiness,"  but  many  deny 
the  truth  of  the  equivalent  one,  "that  which  promotes 
happiness  is  vii'tue."  We  believe  that  more  than  one 
half  of  the  error  in  the  world  proceeds  not  from  mere 
ignorance,  but  fi-om  inattention  and  confusion,  which  find- 
ing us  ignorant,  tends  to  keep  us  in  ignorance.  Logic 
helps  to  cure  the  evil  by  requii-ing  of  us  to  determine 
what  are  the  notions,  and  to  place  these  fully  and  fairly 
before  the  mind  ;  and  when  this  is  done,  we  will  be  able 
either  to  see  what  judgment  we  should  pronounce,  or  to 
wait  for  further  light  before  we  come  to  any  decision. 


PART   TIIIED. 

REASONING. 


1,  "  In  every  instance  in  which  we  reason,  in  the  strict 
Bense  of  the  word,  i.  e.,  make  use  of  arguments  (I  mean 
real,  i.  e.,  vaHd  arguments),  whether  for  the  sake  of  refut- 
ing an  adversary,  or  of  couvejdng  instruction,  or  of  satis- 
fying our  own  minds  on  any  point,  whatever  may  be  the 
subject  we  are  engaged  on,  a  certain  process  takes  place 
in  the  mind  which  is  one  and  the  same  in  all  cases,  pro- 
vided it  be  rightly  conducted.  Of  course  it  cannot  be 
supposed  that  every  one  is  even  conscious  of  this  pi'ocess 
in  his  own  mind  ;  much  less  is  competent  to  explain  the 
piinciples  on  which  it  proceeds.  This  indeed  is,  and  can- 
not but  be,  the  case  with  eveiy  other  process  respecting 
which  any  system  has  been  formed  ;  the  practice  not  only 
may  exist  independently  of  the  theory,  but  must  have 
preceded  the  theory.  There  must  have  been  Language 
before  a  sj'stem  of  grammar  could  be  devised  ;  and  mu- 
sical compositions  previous  to  the  science  of  Music.  This, 
by  the  way,  will  serve  to  expose  the  futility  of  the  popular 
objection  against  Logic,  that  men  may  reason  very  woU 
who  know  nothing  of  it.  The  parallel  instances  adduced, 
show  that  such  an  oljjection  might  be  a^^phed  in  many 
other  eases  where  its  absurdity  would  be  ob\-ious  ;  and 
that  there  is  no  ground  for  deciding  thence,  either  that  the 
Bjstem  has  no  tendency  to  improve  practice,  or  that  even 


ITS  NATURE.  121 

if  it  had  not,  it  miglit  not  still  be  a  diguiiieJ  and  interest- 
ing piu-suit." 

2,  It  will  be  shown  that  the  principles  involved  in  the 
reasoning  process  are  one  and  the  same,  whatever  be  the 
things  about  which  we  argue,  be  they  material,  or  mental, 
or  moral,  or  mathematical,  or  political,  ov  theological. 
"  One  of  the  chief  impediments  to  the  attainment  of  a 
just  view  of  the  nature  and  object  of  Logic,  is  the  not 
fully  understanding,  or  not  sufficiently  keeping  in  mind, 
the  sameness  of  the  reasoning  process  in  all  cases.  This 
error  may  at  once  be  illustrated  and  removed  by  consider- 
ing the  parallel  instance  of  Ai'ithmetic,  in  which  every 
one  is  aware  that  the  process  of  a  calculation  is  not  af- 
fected by  the  nature  of  the  objects  whose  numbers  are 
before  us  ;  but  that  (e.  g.)  the  multipHcation  of  a  number 
is  the  very  same  operation,  whether  it  be  a  number  of 
men,  of  miles,  or  of  pounds."  Nor  is  Logic  to  be  regarded 
as  a  peculiar  ipethod  of  reasoning,  "  which  is  in  fact  as 
great  a  blunder  as  if  any  one  were  to  mistake  grammar 
for  a  peculiar  language,  and  to  suppose  it  possible  to 
speak  correctly  without  si^eaking  grammatically." 

3,  "  Sujiposing  it  then  to  have  been  perceived  that  the 
operation  of  reasoning  is  in  all  cases  the  same,  the  analy- 
sis of  that  operation  could  not  fail  to  strike  the  mind  as 
an  interesting  matter  of  inquiry.  And  moreover,  since 
(apparent)  arguments  which  ai'e  unsound  and  inconclusive, 
are  so  often  employed,  either  from  error  or  design,  and 
since  even  those  who  are  not  misled  by  these  fallacies  are 
so  often  at  a  loss  to  detect  and  expose  them  in  a  manner 
satisfactory  to  others,  or  even  to  themselves,  it  could  not 
but  appear  desu-able  to  lay  down  some  general  rules  of 
reasoning  apphcable  to  all  cases,  by  which  a  person 
might  be  enabled  the  more  readily  and  clearly  to  state 
the  grounds  of  his  own  con"\-iction,  or  of  his  objection 
to  the  ai'gumcnts  of  an  opponent,  instead  of  arguing  at 


122  HEASONINQ. 

random  •without  any  fixed  and  acknowledged  jDrinciples 
to  guide  his  procedm-e.  Such  rules  would  be  analogous 
to  those  of  Ai'ithmetic,  which  obviate  the  tediousness  and 
uncertainty  of  calculations  in  the  head ;  wherein  after 
much  labor,  different  persons  might  arrive  at  different 
results,  without  any  of  them  being  able  distinctly  to  point 
out  the  error  of  the  rest.  A  system  of  such  rules,  it  is 
obvious,  must,  instead  of  deserving  to  be  called  *  the  art 
of  wrangling,'  be  more  justly  characterized  as  '  the  ait 
of  cutting  short  wrangling'  by  bringing  the  parties  to 
issue  at  once,  if  not  to  agreement,  and  thus  saving  a 
waste  of  ingenuity." — "VMiately's  Elements,  Analytical  Out- 
line. 

4*  In  Judgment  Proper,  we  compare  immediately  the 
two  notions,  that  ib,  the  things  apprehended,  and  declare 
their  agreement.  But  there  are  cases  in  which  we  do  not 
perceive  the  relation  of  the  notions  immediately,  but  in 
which  we  may  discover  them  mediately,  by  means  of  a 
third  or  mediating  notion.  Thus  I  wish  to  know  whether 
John  the  Baptist  was  a  priest,  and  I  cannot  jDronounce  an 
immediate  judgment,  for  it  is  not  expressly  said  in  Scrip- 
ture that  he  was  a  priest.  But  we  remember  that  hib 
father  Zacharias  was  a  priest,  and  using  son  of  a  priest  a& 
a  middle  term,  and  finding  from  the  Old  Testament  that  the 
sons  of  priests  were  themselves  priests,  we  argue  that  "the 
Baptist,  being  the  son  of  a  f>riest,  was  a  priest."  Here,  it 
will  be  observed,  we  have  three  terms,  the  two  terms  we 
wish  to  compare,  "  Baptist "  and  "  priest,"  and  the  term 
by  which  we  compare  them,  "  son  of  a  priest."  In  the 
discursive  process,  when  we  analyze  it,  there  will  be  found 
three  acts  of  comparison  :  one  in  which  we  compare  one 
of  the  original  terms  with  the  middle  ;  a  second  in  which 
we  compare  the  other  original  term  with  the  middle  ;  and 
the  third  in  which  we  bring  the  two  terms,  which  we 
have  compared  separately  with  the  middle,  into  compar- 


ITS  NATURE.  123 

ison  witli  each  other.  This  is  Reasoning  which  is  defined 
as  "  the  act  of  proceeding  from  certain  judgments  to 
others  founded  on  them." 

^,  To  bring  out  the  acts  of  comparison  involved,  wo 
unfold  them  in  three  propositions  : 

The  sons  of  priests  were  priests  ; 
The  Baptist  was  the  son  of  a  priest ; 
The  Baptist  was  a  priest. 

"When  reasoning  is  thus  analyzed  and  expressed,  it  la 
called  a  Syllogism. 

0.  The  syllogistic  analysis  of  reasoning,  so  far  as  is  known,  was 
first  unfolded  by  Aristotle  in  the  Prior  Analytics,  and  constitutes 
the  most  certain,  and  altogether  the  greatest,  discovery  ever  made 
in  mental  science.  It  has  been  discussed,  and  attempted  improve- 
ments made  on  it,  by  commentators  on  Aristotle,  by  the  medieval 
Bcholastics,  by  the  logicians  of  the  17th  century,  and  by  modem 
writers  from  Kant  to  the  present  time. 

7.  Some  have  thought  that  we  can  reason  fi'om  oua 
judgment.  And  it  is  quite  true  that  from  any  one  judg- 
ment we  can  draw  others  immediately  in  the  mode  ex- 
plained in  speaking  of  Imphed  Judgments.  But  the 
judgments  thus  reached  are  confined  within  very  narrow 
limits.  AVhen  we  have  two  judgments  in  a  certain  rela- 
tion to  each  other,  a  much  wider  range  of  judgments  can  be 
drawn,  and  the  process  involved  constitutes  Mediate 
Reasoning,  or  Reasoning  Proper.  It  often  happens,  in- 
deed, that  in  reasoning  thus  understood,  there  is  ouly 
one  judgment  expressed  in  what  is  given  or  allowed.  But 
if  we  carefully  examine  the  process  it  will  be  found  that 
there  is  another  judgment,  which  though  suppressed  in 
statement,  is  involved  in  thought.  A  man  has  taken  ar- 
senic and  we  conclude  that  he  shall  die.  Here  are  two 
judgments  implied  in  order  to  the  validity  of  the  reasoning. 
One  is,  the  matter  of  fact  that  he  has  taken  arsenic  ;  and  the 
other,  the  general  fact  that  he  who  has  drunk  arsenic  shixU 
die.     "We  may  not  think  it  necessary  to  enunciate  both  of 


124  REASONLXO. 

these.  We  ■would  not  mention  the  one  to  a  person  who 
had  seen  him  tate  the  arsenic  ;  we  w  onld  not  announce 
the  other  to  a  man  who  knew  that  arsenic  was  poison. 
But  we  would  have  to  state  both  to  one  ignorant  of  both  ; 
and  both  if  not  expUcitly  announced  are  imphcitly  im- 
phed  in  the  reasoning. 

An  arpTiment  with  one  premiss  suppressed  is  vulgarly  called  an 
Enthymeme.  Aristotle,  however,  defines  Entliymeme  ivdvfiTjfia  fiiv 
ovv  icTL  cv'/.'/.oyicfio^  ef  eIkotuv  ^  arjueluv  (Anal.  Pr.  II.,  27.  See  Ham- 
ilton's Discussions,  Art.  Logic,  and  Trendelenburg  Elementa,  %  .37). 

8»  In  a  syllogism  as  an  analysis  of  the  reasoning  pro- 
cess we  must  have,  as  we  have  in  the  reasoning  process 
itself,  three,  and  no  more  than  three  terms  :  the  two 
whose  agreement  or  disagreement  we  are  seeking  to  deter- 
mine, and  a  third  by  which  we  determine  it.  The  two  first 
are  called  the  Extremes,  and  the  third  the  Middle.  Again 
in  a  syllogi-^m,  in  order  to  unfold  the  relation  of  the  three 
terms,  there  must  be  three  propositions,  two  in  which  we 
compare  each  of  the  Extremes  with  the  Middle,  and  a 
thii'd  in  which  we  compare  them  with  each  other.  The 
two  first  are  the  Premisses,  and  the  thii'd  the  Conclusion. 
It  is  evident  that  the  ^Middle  term  will  appear  in  each  of 
the  premisses,  but  not  in  the  conclusion.  The  laws  of 
discursive  thought  do  not  require  us  to  follow  any  order 
in  the  arrangement  of  the  tliree  propositions.  What  we 
have  to  look  at  is  the  relation  of  the  terms  ;  and  if  we 
bring  out  this,  it  is  no  matter  whether  we  begin  with  the 
premi.sses,  or  which  of  the  premisses  we  place  first.  Thus 
instead  of  the  order  followed  above,  we  might  say, 

The  Baptist  was  a  priest  ; 
for,     He  wa.s  the  son  of  a  priest ; 
and,    The  sons  of  priests  were  priests. 

From  these  definitions  and  general  statements  we  may 
derive  certain  Rules,  which  are  apphcable  to  reasoning  of 
every  Icini 


ITS  RULES.  125 

0'  (1)  In  a  syllogism  there  should  only  be  three  terms. 
This  has  akeady  been  explained. 

10,  (2)  In  a  syllogism  there  can  only  be  one  middle 
term.  It  is  only  thus  we  can  bring  the  extremes  into 
comparison.  When  a  middle  term  is  ambiguous  we  may 
have  two  middle  terms  in  sense  though  not  in  sound  ; 
and  we  are  ever  liable  to  compare  the  one  extreme  with 
the  middle  used  in  one  sense,  and  the  other  extreme  with 
the  middle  in  another  sense.  Hence  the  fallacy  of  Am- 
biguous Middle  which  will  often  fall  under  our  notice. 

11,  (3)  One  premiss  must  be  affirmative.  In  other 
words  two  negative  premisses  prove  nothing.  For  unless 
there  be  an  affii'mative  judgment  declaring  the  agree- 
ment of  the  middle  with  one  of  the  extremes,  there  can  be 
no  inference  about  the  terms  which  we  wish  to  compare. 
Two  negative  judgments  simply  declare  that  there  is  no 
relation  between  the  middle  term  and  the  extremes,  and 
authorize  no  judgment  as  to  the  relation  of  the  extremes. 

12,  (4)  If  either  premiss  is  negative,  the  conclu- 
sion must  be  negative.  For  one  of  the  premisses  being 
negative,  the  other  is  affirmative,  and  so  in  one  premiss 
we  assert  that  the  middle  disagrees  with  one  extreme, 
and  in  the  other  that  it  agrees  with  the  other  extreme, 
and  if  so  the  extremes  must  disagree  with  one  another. 

13,  (5)  To  prove  a  negative  conclusion  one  of  the 
premisses  must  be  negative.  "We  cannot  argue  that 
there  is  no  connection  between  the  extremes  till  we  have 
shown  that  there  is  no  connection  between  one  of  the  ex- 
tremes and  the  middle. 

11,  The  question  now  rises,  can  we  determine  and 
enunciate  what  is  the  principle  in  the  mind  which 
regulates  reasoning.  The  answer  is  that  this  can  be 
done  by  carefully  observing  examples  of  valid  reasoning,  by 
ascertaining  what  is  common  to  them  all,  and  expressing 
this  in  a  general  formula.     The  rule  in  its  most  general 


123  BEASONINO. 

form  is,  that  "  notions  which  agree  with  one  and  the 
same  notions  agree  with  one  another."  This  for  affirm- 
atives, and  for  negative  conchisions,  "  of  two  notions  if 
one  aijrees  and  the  other  does  not  with  one  and  the  same 
notion,  tliey  disagree  with  each  other."  But  in  such  a 
rule  the  phrases  "agree"  and  "disagree"  are  wide  and 
vague,  and  it  is  desirable  to  become  more  particular  ana 
specify  the  nature  of  the  agreement.  The  distinction 
which  we  have  drawn  between  percepts  and  abstracts 
on  the  one  hand  and  concepts  on  the  other  (P.  I.,  §  38) 
leading  to  the  distinction  between  propositions  in  which 
the  relation  is  one  of  equivalence,  and  those  in  which  it  is 
one  of  joint  extension  and  comprehension  (P.  II.,  §  14, 
ib),  will  help  us  here,  and  show  us  two  regulating  princi- 
ples emerging  for  two  kinds  of  reasoning. 

13.  FIRST  REGULATING  PRINCIPLE.  "No- 
tions equivalent  to  one  and  the  same  third  notion  are 
equivalent  to  one  another  ; "  and  for  negative  reason- 
ing "  notions  which  are  not  equivalent  to  one  and  the 
same  notion  are  not  equivalent  to  one  another."  This 
dictum  rules  all  reasonings  in  which  the  three  notions  are 
Percepts  or  Abstracts. 

Shakespeare  wrote  Hamlet  ; 

He  who  wrote  Hamlet  is  the  greatest  English  poet ; 
.*.  Sliakespoare  was  the  greatest  English  poet. 

Under  this  same  head  I  place  the  following,  and  in- 
deed most  arithmetical  and  geometrical  inferences  : 

A  =  B 

B  =  C 

•.  A  =  C 

In  all  ratiocination  of  this  description,  the  subject  of 
each  of  the  propositions  may  be  made  the  predicate,  and 
the  predicate  the  subject,  and  the  reasoning  will  be  valid 
and  formally  correct. 


REGULATiyO  PRmClPLES.  127 

He  who  wrote  Ilamlot  was  Shakespeare  , 
He  is  the  greatest  English  poet  who  wrote  Hamlet , 
.-.  The  greatest  English  poet  was  Shakespeare. 

In  these  and  in  like  propositions,  the  terms  are  per- 
cepts or  abstracts,  and  the  relations  in  the  propositions 
and  in  the  ar^ment  is  of  identity  or  of  equality.  It  is 
of  great  moment  to  separate  these  simple  cases  of  reason- 
ing from  more  complex  ones,  to  be  immediately  consid- 
ered, in  which  we  have  concepts,  and  exteDsion,  and 
minor  and  major  terms,  and  mood  and  figure. 

Id.  We  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  what  we  should 
make  of  the  unfigiircd  syllogism  of  Hamilton. 

Copperas  and  sulphate  of  iron  are  identical ; 
Sulphate  of  iron  and  sulphate  of  copper  are  not  identical ; 
.*.  Copperas  and  sulphate  of  copper  are  not  identical. 
Here  he  has  turned  "  identical,"  which  is  neither  less  nor  more 
than  the  copula,  into  a  separate  term.     The  reasoning  should  stand 

thus : 

Copperas  is  sulphate  of  iron ; 

Sulphate  of  iron  is  not  sulphate  of  copper  ; 

.'.  Copperas  is  not  sulphate  of  copper. 

17.  SECOND  REGULATING  PRINCIPLE.  "What- 
ever is  predicated  of  a  class  may  be  predicated  of  all  the 
members  of  that  class."  In  the  afiu'mative  form,  the  Dic- 
ium  de  omni,  it  is,  "  "S^Tiatever  is  affirmed  of  a  class  may 
be  affii-med  of  all  the  members  of  the  class."  In  the  nega- 
tive form,  the  Dictum  de  nullo,  it  is,  "  Whatever  is  denied 
of  a  class  may  be  denied  of  all  the  members  of  the  class." 
It  is  otherwise  expressed,  "  "VMiatever  is  predicated  of  a 
concept  distributed  may  be  predicated  of  all  that  is  con- 
tained in  the  concept."  This  is  the  famous  Dictum  of 
Aristotle,  which  has  been  held  to  be  the  regulating  prin- 
ciple of  reasoning  by  most  logicians  fi'om  the  time  of  the 
Stagyrite.  We  hold  it  to  be  the  true  regulating  principle 
in  all  reasoning  in  which  there  is  a  General  Notion.  It 
must  be  so  from  the  very  nattu'e,  from  the  very  meaning, 
of  a  General  Notion,  and  the  employment  of  it  in  reason- 


128  BEASONma. 

ing.  Foi'  it  will  be  found  tliat  in  tlie  reasoning  wliicli 
contains  a  concept,  tliere  is  a  predication  in  regard  to  the 
concept  generally,  and  a  predication  in  regard  to  a  class 
or  individiials  contained  in  it,  and  the  conclusion  is 
necessitated  by  the  two,  or  rather  by  the  relation 
of  the  two,  the  one  embracing  the  other  in  its  exten- 
sion. 

IS.  At  this  point  it  will  be  necessary  to  explain  some 
terms  which  are  found  in  attributive  (but  not  in  equiva- 
lent) reasoning.  The  subject  of  the  conclusion  is  called 
the  INIinor  Term,  and  the  predicate  the  Major  Term  : 
this  because  the  Minor  Term  (at  least  in  affirmative 
propositions,  P.  IT.,  §  17)  is  the  least  extensive,  and  the 
Major  Term  the  more  extensive.  The  premiss  containing 
the  Major  Term  is  called  the  Major  Premiss — sometimes 
also  the  Sumption  ;  that  containing  the  IVIinor  Term,  the 
Minor  Premiss — or  the  Subsumption  ;  and  this,  which- 
ever of  the  premisses  is  placed  first. 

From  the  time  of  Aristotle  to  tbat  of  Boetliius,  the  minor  premiss 
was  phiccd  first — following  the  analytic  mode  ;  from  the  time  of 
Boethiufl  it  has  been  customary  to  put  the  major  premiss  first — fol- 
lowing the  synthetic  method. 

If),  The  Dictum  of  Aristotle  is  the  regulating  princi- 
ple of  all  reasoning  in  which  there  is  a  Concept.  But  in 
order  to  seciure  that  arguments  be  put  in  correct  form, 
logicians  lay  down  certain  rules  derived  from  it.  These 
niles  are  additional  to  those  given  above  (§  9-13),  as 
apphcable  to  all  reasoning. 

20.  (1)  The  middle  term  must  be  distributed  at  least 
once  (by  being  the  subject  of  a  universal  or  predicate  of 
a  negative).  For  if  it  were  taken  only  in  part,  it  might 
happen  that  in  the  one  premiss  we  compared  an  extreme 
with  one  part  of  the  middle,  and  in  the  other  premiss  the 
other  extreme  with  another  part  of  the  middle,  and  thus 
entii'ely  failed  to  biing  the  extremes  into  comparison. 


RULES.  129 

WLen  this  rule  is  violated,  we  have  tlie  fallacy  of  Undis- 
tributed IVIiddle  : 

All  good  men  are  sincere ; 

Rousseau  was  sincere  ; 
/.  Rousseau  was  a  good  man. 

Here  the  Middle  Term  is  undistributed  in  both  premis- 
ses, being  the  predicate  of  two  affirmatives  (P.  II.,  §  11). 
What  we  have  done  is  to  declare  that  all  good  men  are 
among  the  "  sincere,"  that  Rousseau  is  among  the  **  sin- 
cere ;"  but  then  Rousseau  may  be  among  the  sincere,  and 
not  among  the  good,  of  whom  it  is  said  that  they  are 
among  the  sincere,  but  not  that  they  are  coextensive 
with  the  sincere.  But  it  is  enough  that  the  middle  be 
once  distributed,  for  as  one  extreme  has  been  compared  to 
the  whole  of  the  middle,  even  though  the  other  be  com- 
pared to  only  a  part,  we  have  brought  the  two  into  com- 
parison. 

21,  (2)  No  term  must  be  distributed  in  the  conclu 
sion  which  has  not  been  distributed  in  one  of  the  premis- 
ses. Otherwise  we  should  be  using  a  term  in  its  entire 
extent  in  the  conclusion  when  we  had  only  made  a  com- 
parison of  it  in  part  of  its  extent  in  the  jDremiss.  The 
violation  of  this  rule  is  called  an  lUicit  Process  of  the 
Major  or  Minor  Term,  according  as  it  is  the  major  or 
minor  terra  which  is  thus  illegitimately  used. 

Whatever  gives  pleasure  is  to  be  valued ; 
The  learning  of  logical  formulje  does  not  give  pleasure ; 

is  not  to  be  valued. 

Here  "  to  be  valued  "  is  taken  only  in  part  in  the  pre- 
miss, being  the  predicate  of  an  aOirmative,  whereas  it  ia 
taken  in  all  its  extent  in  the  conclusion,  and  we  have  an 
illicit  process  of  the  major  term. 

22.  (3)  From  two  particular  premisses,  no  conclusion 
can  be  dra\\-n.  For  if  they  were  both  negative  (O  O),  you 
could  get  no  inference  (§  11).     If  they  were  both  affirm- 

9 


130  REASONING. 

ntive  (IL),  tlie  middle  would  be  undistributed  in  eitber 
premiss  (P.  11.,  §  11).  Tbere  is  left  only  10,  where  the 
negative  conclusion  makes  the  major  term  distributed, 
which  it  is  not  in  the  major  premiss ;  and  01  with  either 
undistributed  middle  or  illicit  process  of  major, 

23,  (4:)  If  one  of  the  premisses  be  particular,  the  con- 
clusion must  be  particular.  By  a  like  process  to  that  fol- 
lowed in  liule  (3),  it  can  be  shown  that  the  violation  of 
this  rule  imphes  an  iUicit  process  of  the  minor. 

24:.  It  should  be  observed  that  these  rules  apply  simply  to  reason- 
ing in  which  we  have  a  concept.  The  rules  given  from  §  9  to  §  13, 
apply  to  all  reasoning.  The  main  rules  are  summed  up  by  logi- 
cians in  the  following  mnemonic  lines : 

Distribuas  medium  ;  nee  quartus  terminus  adsit. 
Ultraque  nee  praemissa  ncgans,  nee  particularis. 
Sectetur  partem  conclusio  deteriorem. 
Et  non  distribuat,  nisi  cum  praemissa,  negetve 
To   understand   tlie  third   line,  that  the  conclusion  follows  the 
worse  part,  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  logicians  reckon  the 
particular  as  worse  than  the  universal,  and  the  negative  worse  than 
the  affinnative. 

2o.  MOODS.  By  Mood  is  meant  the  legitimate  forms 
of  the  syllogism  indicated  by  the  symbolic  vowels  A,  E,  I, 
O,  designating  the  quantity  and  cj^uabty  of  the  proposi- 
tions in  their  respective  order. 

E  No  planet  twinkles  ; 
A  That  body  twinkles  ; 
.*.  E  It  is  not  a  planet. 

As  there  are  four  kinds  of  propositions,  and  three 
propositions  in  each  syllogism  ;  and  as  any  one  of  the 
four  may  be  the  major  premiss  ;  and  each  of  the  four 
majors  may  have  four  different  minors  ;  and  each  of  the 
sixteen  pairs  of  premisses  may  have  four  different  con- 
clofiions,  it  might  look  as  if  the  possible  moods  might  be 
4  X  4  (=  IG)  X  4  =  G4.  But  many  of  these  moods  are 
illegitimate  as  violating  the  rules  of  the  syllogism  as 
above  laid  down  (§  20-23);  some  from  negative  premisses, 


FIQURES.  131 

Bome  from  particular  premisses,  &c.  When  sifted  it  will  be 
found  tbat  there  remain  only  eleven  legitimate  moods, 
AAA,  AAI,  AEE,  AEO,  AH,  AOO,  EAE,  EAO,  EIO,  lAI, 
OAO. 

^6*.  The  rest  are  excluded  for  the  following  reasons  : 

EEA,  EEE,  EEI,  EEO,  EOA,  EOE,  EOI,  EOO,  OEA,  OEE,  OEI, 
OEO,  OOA,  OOE,  001,  000,  =  IG  for  negative  premisses. 

UA,  HE,   III,   no,   lOA,  lOE,  lOI,  100,  OIA,  OIE,  OH,  010, 
=  12  for  particular  premisses. 

AEA,  AEI,  AOA,  AOI,  EAA,  EAI,  EIA,  EII,  lEA,  lEI,  OAA,  OAl, 
=  12,  because  of  a  negative  premiss  without  negative  conclusion. 

AIA,  AIE,  AOE,  EIE,  lAA,  lAE,  lEE,  OAE,  =  8,  because  of  a 
particular  premiss  Mitliout  particular  conclusion. 

AAE,  AAO,  AIO,  lAO,  =  4,  because  of  negative  conclusion  witb 
out  negative  premiss. 

lEO  is  rejected  for  an  illicit  process  of  the  major  in  every  figure. 

27.  FIGURE.  This  consists  in  the  position  of  the 
middle  term  in  reference  to  the  extremes.  As  the  middle 
term  is  the  very  bond  of  the  argument,  syllogisms  may  be 
divided  very  conveniently  in  respect  of  figure.  In  the 
First  Figure,  the  middle  term  is  the  subject  of  the  major 
premiss  and  predicate  of  the  minor.  In  the  Second  Fig- 
ure it  is  the  predicate  of  both  premisses.  In  the  Third 
Figure  it  is  the  subject  of  both.  In  the  Foui'th  Figiu-e  it 
is  the  predicate  of  the  major  premiss,  and  subject  of  the 
minor.  Let  P  stand  for  the  major  term  (the  predicate  of 
the  conclusion)  ;  S  for  the  minor  term  (the  subject  of  the 
conclusion) ;  and  M  for  the  middle  term. 

28.  Fig.  I.    M  P  A  All  human  beings  are  responsible  to  God  ; 

S  M    A  The  negro  race  are  human  beings  ; 

SPA  They  are  responsible  to  God. 
The  Dict^im  is  applicable  at  once  to  an  argument  in 
this  figure.  We  afiirm  P  (responsible)  of  M  (human 
beings),  and  ]M  (hiiman  beings)  of  S  (negi'oes),  and  in 
the  conclusion  we  affirm  P  (responsible)  of  S  (negroes). 
This  figiu'e  admits  of  fom-  moods,  AAA,  EAE,  All,  EIO. 
From  this  it  appeai-s  that  it  admits  of  conclusions  in  everj 


132  BEASONINa. 

kind  of  proposition,  A,  E,  I,  O ;  and  it  is  the  only  figiire 
in  -vNliich  a  universal  affirmative  (A)  can  be  di-awn.  We 
sliall  see  vlien  we  come  to  consider  Reduction  that  every 
kind  of  argument  can  be  made  to  take  this  form  ;  but 
there  ai-e  arguments  which  fall  naturally  into  other 
figures. 

2i).  There  are  Special  Rules  to  ^iiide  us  in  determining  what  are 
legitimate  moods  in  each  figure.  Thus  for  the  first  figure  :  (1)  The 
minor  premiss  must  be  affirmative ;  for  if  it  were  negative  the  con- 
clusion must  be  negative  and  distribute  the  major  term  (P),  which 
would  not  be  distributed  in  the  major  premiss,  which  must  be  af- 
firmative when  the  minor  is  negative.  (2)  The  major  premiss  must 
be  imiversal ;  for  if  it  were  particular,  the  middle  term  (M)  would 
not  be  distributed  in  the  major  premiss,  and  could  not  be  distributed 
in  the  minor  premiss  as  being  the  predicate  of  an  affirmative. 

30,  Fig.  II.    PM    A  Reptiles  bring  forth  their  young  by  eggs; 

S  M    E  The  rat  does  not  bring  forth  its  young  by 

eggs; 
S  P  E  The  rat  is  not  a  reptile. 
Arguments  fall  naturally  into  this  figure  when  we 
have  to  disprove  something  which  has  been  maintained 
or  believed  (as  when  we  prove  that  the  rat  is  not  a  rep- 
tile), or  when  we  have  to  bring  out  the  differences  of 
things,  which  we  do  by  the  negative  premisses  and  con- 
clusion. 

31.  The  Special  Rules  are  (1)  One  of  the  premisses  must  be 
negative,  to  admit  of  M  being  distributed.  (2)  The  conclusion 
must  be  negative,  because  of  the  negative  premiss.  (3)  The  major 
premiss  must  be  universal,  for  the  conclusion  being  negative  dis- 
tributes P,  which  must  be  distributed  in  the  premiss.  The  special 
reguliiting  ])riiicipie  is  the  Dictum  de  Divemo,  "  if  one  term  is  con- 
tained in,  and  another  excluded  from,  a  third  term,  they  are  mu- 
tually excluded." 

ii/i.  Fig.  III.    M  P    A  Tlie  connection  of  soul  and  body  is  to  be 

believed ; 
MSA  The  connection  of  soul  and  body  is  iucom 

prehensible ; 
SP    I  Some  tilings  incomprehensible  are  to  be 
believed. 


FIOURES.  133 

Arguments  fall  into  this  form  when  the  middle  term  is 
Bingiilar,  since  a  singular  term  is  natm-ally  the  subject 
when  the  predicate  is  a  concept.  It  is,  therefore,  useful 
in  bringing  in  examples.  It  is  also  efficient  in  establish- 
ing an  exception  to  an  opponent's  premiss,  when  his  argu- 
ment requires  the  premiss  to  be  universal.  Thus,  some 
one  maintains  that  certain  Scripture  doctrines  are  not  to  bo 
believed,  as  they  are  incomprehensible.  In  order  to  the 
validity  of  his  argument  it  is  necessary  to  assume  as  his 
major  premiss,  that "  everything  incomprehensible  is  not 
to  be  beheved "  (E).  Now  we  can,  as  in  the  example, 
show  in  opposition  to  him,  that  "  some  things  incompre- 
hensible are  to  be  believed  "  (I),  which  is  the  contradic- 
tory of  his  major  premiss. 

33»  The  Special  Rules :  (1)  The  minor  premiss  must  be  affirma- 
tive. For  if  it  were  negative  the  conclusion  would  be  negative,  and 
would  distribute  P,  which  cannot  be  distributed  in  the  major  pre- 
miss, which  must  be  affirmative  when  the  minor  is  negative.  (2) 
The  conclusion  must  be  particular,  otherwise  there  would  be  au 
illicit  process  of  the  minor,  which  as  the  predicate  of  an  affirmative 
is  not  distributed  in  the  premiss,  and  cannot  therefore  be  distrib- 
uted in  the  conclusion.  Its  special  rule  is  the  Dictum  de  exemplo, 
"  Two  terms  which  contain  a  common  part  partially  agree,  or  if  one 
contains  a  part  which  the  other  does  not,  they  partial!}'  differ." 

3  J:.  Fig.  IV.   PM  A  What  is  expedient  is  conformable  to  nature  ; 
M  S  E  WTiat  is  conformable  to  nature  is  not  hurt- 
ful to  society ; 
SP  E  What  is  hurtful  to  society  is  not  expedient 

Tlie  Special  Rules  are  (1),  Major  premiss  not  0,  else  illicit  maj-i 
(3)  Minor  premiss  not  0,  else  middle  not  distributed.  (3)  Conclu 
sion  not  A,  else  illicit  minor. 

,V.T.  The  fourth  figui-e  is  not  found  in  Aristotk',  and  many  logi- 
cians have  rejected  it.  In  the  minor  premiss,  S,  the  predicate  is 
more  extensive  than  M,  the  subject ;  and  in  the  major  premiss,  M, 
the  pretlicate  is  more  extensive  than  P ;  consequently  S  is  more 
extensive  than  P.  But  in  the  conclusion  we  find  S,  the  more  exten- 
sive, the  subject,  and  P,  the  less  extensive,  the  predicate,  which  is 
not  agreeable  to  sixmtaneous  thought,  and  should  not  have  a  place 
Inrefiective  thought.     Figure  fi)urth  is  peif.-ctly  valid,  Itul  is  not  a 


134  REASONINO. 

form  into  wLicli  tliouglit  spontaneously  falls.  It  is  reached  by  con- 
version or  other  fomis  of  transposed  judgments.  To  take  the  ex- 
ample ^^^■hate]y'8) :  the  conclusion  is  not  in  the  form  which  natu- 
ral  thought  would  use ;  we  should  rather  say,  "  What  is  expedient 
is  not  hurtful  to  society."  This  makes  "what  is  expedient "  which 
has  been  placed  as  if  narrower  than  "  conformable  to  nature  "  in  the 
first  premiss,  which  has  again  been  placed  as  if  narrower  than  "hurt- 
ful to  society  "  in  the  second  premiss,  to  take  its  proper  place  in  the 
conclusion  as  the  subject,  as  narrower  than  "  hurtful  to  society  "  in 
the  predicate.  But  in  this  collocation  the  reasoning  is  in  the  first 
figure,  which  is  its  natural  form. 

What  is  conformable  to  nature  is  not  hurtful  to  society ; 
What  is  expedient  is  conformable  to  nature ; 
What  is  expedient  is  not  hurtful  to  society. 

30.  Mnemonic  Lines,  devised  to  exhibit  the  available 
moods  in  each  figure,  and  also  to  assist  in  Eeduction. 

Fig.  I.       bArbArA,  cElArEnt,  dArll,  fErlOque  prioris  ; 

Fig.  II.     cEsArE,  cAmEstrEs,  fEstInO,  bArOKO,  secundse; 

Fig.  III.   tertia,  dArAptI,  dIsAmIs,  dAtlsI,  fElAptOn, 

bOk ArdO,  fErlsOn ,  habet ;  quarta  insuper  addit. 

Fig.   IV.  brAmAntIp,   cAmEnEs,   dImArls,   fEsApO,    frEsIsOn. 
Quinque  subalterni  totidem  generalibus  orti, 
Nomen  habent  nullum,  nee  si  bene  colligis,  usum 

In  these  lines  the  vowels  indicate  the  mood  of  the  syl- 
logism, e.  g.,  AEE  in  Camestres  (Fig.  II.)  denotes  that 
the  major  premiss  is  universal  affirmative,  and  the  minor 
premiss  and  conclusion  both  universal  negative.  The 
five  subaltern  moods  which  might  be  drawn,  are  AAI, 
EAO,  in  Fig.  I.  ;  EAO,  AEO,  in  Fig.  n.,  and  AEO,  in 
Fig.  rV.  ;  Ijut  they  are  useless,  as  universals  can  be 
dravm,  and  they  are  comprised  in  AAA,  E-IE,  EAE, 
AEE,  AEE. 

37.  JiEDUCTION.  In  this  we  bring  a  syllogism  in 
one  Figure  into  the  fonn  of  a  syllogism  in  another.  It  is 
possible  to  reduce  syllogisms  in  the  first  figure  to  syllo- 
gisms in  the  others.  But  the  phrase  is  specially  ai)plied 
to  that  process  in  which  wc  turn  syUognsms  of  the  second, 
third,  and  fourth  figures  into  the  first.     The  object  of  re- 


REDUCTION.  135 

duction  is  first  to  show  that  the  Dictum  of  Aristotle, 
which  is  obviously  the  regulating  principle  in  the  first 
figure,  is  truly  the  regulating  principle  in  all  reasoning — 
in  which  a  concept  is  involved.  But  it  shows  secondly, 
and  in  a  very  interesting  way,  that  the  reasoning  process, 
whatever  be  the  forms  which  it  takes  spontaneously,  or 
those  in  which  it  is  made  to  appear  by  logicians  in  order 
to  bring  out  the  natui-e  and  validity  of  the  process,  is  in 
all  cases  one  and  the  same  in  substance  and  in  principle. 

38.  The  reduction  is  made  in  every  instance  by  Im- 
plied Judgments,  specially  by  Conversion  ;  that  is,  we  put 
one  or  more  of  the  propositions  in  a  transposed  form. 
The  mnemonic  lines  are  meant  to  direct  us  in  this.  The 
initial  consonants  b,  c,  d,  f,  show  that  the  mood  so  marked 
in  the  second,  third,  and  foiu'th  figui'es,  is  to  be  reduced 
to  the  mood  marked  by  the  same  letter  in  the  first.  Thus 
c  in  camestres,  shows  that  the  syllogism  is  to  be  reduced 
to  celarent  in  the  first.  The  consonants  in  the  middle 
of  the  words,  show  how  the  reduction  is  to  be  effected. 
Thus  6'  indicates  that  the  projjosition  designated  by  the 
vowel  before  it,  is  to  be  converted  simply  ;  p,  that  it  is  to 
be  converted  per  accidens  ;  and  ?n,  that  the  premisses  be- 
tween which  it  stands  are  to  be  transposed.  The  k  in 
baroko  and  bokardo  denotes  that  the  mood  is  to  be  re- 
duced per  impossibile — a  process  to  be  explained  forth- 
with. 

30.  Ostensive  Reduction  is  accomplished  directly  by 
Conversion  and  other  Imphed  Judgments.  We  may  give 
an  example  from  each  figiu-e  : 

Pig.  II.  cA   All  men  have  the  power  of  speech  ; 

mEs  Gorillas  have  not  the  power  of  si^eech; 
trEs  Gorilhis  are  not  men. 

reduced  to        cE  Beings  having  the  power  of  speech  are  not 
goriUas ; 
lA  All  men  have  the  jjower  of  speech  ; 
rEnt  Gorillas  are  not  men. 


136  REASONING. 

Fig.  in.  clA  Theft  is  a  crime ; 

tie  Some  kinds  of  theft  were  encouraged  by  the 
laws  of  Sparta ; 
I  Some  of  the  things  encouraged  by  the  laws  of 
Sparta  were  crime ; 
reduced  to      dA  Theft  is  a  crime  ; 

rl  Some  things  encouraged  by  the  laws  of  Sparta 

were  theft ; 
I  Some  things  encournged  by  the  laws  of  Sparta 
were  crime. 
Big.  IV.         brA  Political  economy  is  a  profitable  study  ; 
mAn  Profitable  study  sliarpeiis  the  intellect ; 
tip  Among  the  things  that  sharpen  the  intellect  is 
political  economy. 
reduced  to   bAr  Profitable  study  sharpens  the  intellect; 
bA  Political  economy  is  a  profitable  study ; 
rA  Political  economy  sharpens  the  intellect. 
40,  Ri'duclio  per  Impossibile.    In  this  process  we  pro- 
ceed on  the  principle  that  of  two  contradictory  proposi- 
tions, one  must  be  trae  and  the  other  false.    We  prove 
not  that  the  original  conclusion  is  true,  but  that  its  con- 
tradictory must  be  false.     By  it  the  older  logicians  re- 
duced the  syllogisms  AOO  in  the  second  figui'e,  and  OAO 
in  the  third.     The  method  of  effecting  it  is  indicated  by 
baroko  and  bokardo  in  the  mnemonic  lines,  where  the 
letter  k  intimates  that  the   proposition  denoted  by  the 
vowel  immediately  before  it  must  be  left  out,  and  the  con- 
tradictory of  the  conclusion  substituted  : 
bO  Some  poets  are  not  wise  ; 
kAr  Poets  are  nion  of  genius  ; 
dO  Some  men  of  genius  are  not  wise. 
If  this  conclusion  is  not  true,  its  contradictory  must, 
"  all  men  of  genius  are  wise."     Let  this  be  substituted  for 
the  major  premiss  : 

bAr  All  men  of  genius  arc  wise ; 
bA  All  poets  are  men  of  genius  ; 
rA  All  poets  are  wise. 
This  is  the  contradictory  of  the  originally  granted  major 


REDUCTION.  137 

premiss,  and  must  therefore  be  false.  But  one  of  the  pre- 
misses which  proves  a  falsehood  must  be  false.  This 
cannot  be  the  minor,  which  was  one  of  the  originally 
gi-anted  premisses ;  it  must  therefore  be  the  major. 
But  tliis  major  thus  shown  to  be  false,  is  the  contradictory 
of  the  original  conclusion,  which  must  therefore  be  true. 
Tbe  same  mode  of  demonstration  is  employed  for  baroko, 
and  may  be  emi^loyed  in  the  reduction  of  all  the  moods 
of  the  second,  third,  and  fourth  figures.  But  it  is  not 
necessary  to  resort  to  this  method.  For  while  baroko 
and  bokardo  cannot  be  reduced  by  Conversion  either 
simple  or  per  accidens,  they  may  by  the  Imphed  Judg- 
ments involved  in  Privative  Conceptions,  (P.  II.,  49). 

dA  All  true  poets  are  men  of  genixis  ; 
rl  Some  not  wise  are  poets  ; 
I  Some  not  wise  are  men  of  genius ; 
or,  Some  men  of  genius  are  not  wise. 

If  we  adopt  this  method,  which  is  perfectly  legitimate, 
quite  as  much  so  as  that  by  conversion  or  contradictoiy 
opposition,  then  we  require  to  substitute  fakoro  and 
dokamo  in  the  place  of  bai'oko  and  bokardo  in  the  mne- 
monic Hues. 

■4:1,  Generally  it  may  be  remarked,  that  in  all  Mediate 
Reasoning?  we  mav  use  what  are  called  Immediate  Infer- 
ences.  "We  may  put  either  of  the  premisses  or  the  con- 
clusion in  the  form  of  any  Implied  Judgment,  if  thereby 
we  are  enabled  to  see  the  relation  of  subject  and  predi- 
cate more  clearly.  Thus  in  the  last  example  the  conclu- 
sion may  be  expressed  either  "  some  men  not-wise  are 
men  of  genius,"  or  "  some  men  of  genius  are  not  wise." 
This  enlarges  indefinitely  the  number  of  forms  in  which 
reasoning  may  be  expressed  and  still  be  vaUd.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  spread  out  aU  the  forms  which  reasoning 
may  thus  be  made  to  take.    It  is  enough  to  know  what 


138  REASONmO. 

we  are  entitled  to  do,  and  how  to  do  it  legitimately,  when 
perspicuity  of  thought  requires  it, 

JV.  REASONING  IN  COMPREHENSION.  In  rea- 
soning, so  far  as  we  have  considered  it,  the  propositions 
have  been  understood  in  extension,  and  Ai'istotle's  Dic- 
tum, which  is  a  maxim  in  extension,  has  been  considered 
the  regulating  principle.  But  we  have  seen  that  all  projo- 
ositions  have  a  meaning  in  comprehension.  May  there 
not  then  be  reasoning  in  comprehension  also?  In  an- 
swering this  question  fairly,  it  should  be  allowed  that  in 
the  greater  number  of  propositions,  the  uppermost  thought 
is  in  comprehension  rather  than  extension.  "WTien  we  are 
saying  "  the  boy  plays,"  we  are  thinking  of  the  boy  as 
engaged  in  the  act  of  inlaying,  rather  than  among  the 
class  of  things  that  play.  But  it  is  diflfereut  when  we  con- 
sider judgments  so  connected  as  to  entitle  us  to  draw  a 
conclusion.  The  uppermost  spontaneous  thought  seems 
now  to  be  in  extension.  AMien  we  argue  that  "  the  Bed 
Indian,  having  the  power  of  speech,  is  a  human  being," 
we  refer,  in  thought,  the  Red  Indian  to  a  class  composed 
of  those  who  have  the  jDower  of  speech.  Of  course  the 
possession  of  attributes  is  impUed  in  each  of  the  terms  ; 
but  in  the  ratiocination  we  require  to  proceed  on  the 
principle  that  there  are  classes  possessing  the  attril'::tes  ; 
and  it  is  because  this  is  recognized,  that  the  conclusion  is 
seen  to  foUow.  If  we  argue  that  "man,  being  respon- 
sible, is  a  free  agent,"  the  reasoning  is  conclusive  only  on 
tbe  condition  that  the  whole  class  "  man  "  is  in  the  class 
"  responsible,"  which  again  is  in  the  class  "  free  agent." 
That  "  brutes  have  no  free  will "  cannot  give  the  conclu- 
sion that  "the  brutes  are  not  responsible,"  unless  we 
proceed  on  the  general  princii^le  tbat  "those  who  are 
without  free  will  arc  not  responsible." 

4:i.  But  then  aU  the  propositions  in  a  syllogism  may 
be  understood  in  couiiirehension  ;  and  a  syllogism  mav 


IN  COMPREHENSION.  139 

be  constructed  in  whicli  the  oomprehension  is  the  more 
prominent,  and  the  reasoning  will  be  perfectly  valid,  and 
the  form  accurate,  though  not  the  form  expressing  the 
thought  which  the  mind  spontaneously  follows.  The 
regulating  piinciple  will  now  be,  "  a  part  of  a  part  of  an 
attribute  will  be  part  of  the  whole  attribute." 

Free  will  is  an  attribute  of  responsibility  ; 
Responsibility  is  an  attribute  of  man  ; 
.*   Free  will  is  an  attribute  of  man. 

Bringing  foriih  its  young  by  eggs  is  an  attribute  of  reptiles  , 
Bringing  forth  its  young  by  eggs  is  not  an  attribute  of  rats  ; 
.'.  The  attributes  of  reptiles  do  not  belong  to  rats. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  order  of  the  terms  in  the 
proj)ositions,  is  here  the  reverse  of  what  it  is  when  we 
express  the  thought  in  extension.  In  extension  we  say 
in  the  major  premiss  "man  is  responsible,"  "reptiles 
bring  forth  their  young  by  eggs."  In  the  form  of  exten- 
sion, the  subjects  are  the  less  extensive  and  the  more 
comprehensive  ;  and  the  predicates  the  more  extensive, 
and  the  less  comprehensive.  But  in  comprehension  the 
subjects  are  the  more  comprehensive  and  the  less  exten- 
sive, and  the  predicates  the  less  comprehensive  and  the 
more  extensive. 

What  do  we  mean  when  we  say  that  in  reasoning  in  comprehen- 
sion the  ruling  principle  is  that  "  part  of  the  part  of  an  attribute 
is  a  part  of  the  whole  attribute  ?  "  We  mean,  on  the  principle  that 
the  abstract  implies  the  concrete,  that  whatever  things  contain  a 
part  must  also  contain  a  part  of  that  part,  e.  g.,  that  men,  having 
the  attribute  of  responsibility,  have  the  attribute  of  free  will  in- 
volved in  that  responsibility.  We  seem  thus  to  be  thrown  back  on 
extension  as  the  uppermost  thought  in  reasoning. 

4:4,  But  if  it  be  true  that  the  mind  reasons  primarily 
in  extension,  it  is  not  necessary  to  draw  out  the  forms  in 
comprehension,  the  more  so  as  the  forms  in  extension 
embrace  all  cases  of  reasoning — except  those  proceeding 
on  the  principle  of  Equivalence,  which  we  have  placed 


140  REASONING. 

onder  a  separate  head  (§  15).  But  tlie  student  should  bo 
able,  on  demand,  to  translate  reasoning  in  extension,  in 
the  way  above  indicated,  into  reasoning  in  comprehen- 
sion. 

45.  THE  TWO  DICTA  ABE  COMBINED.  We 
have  seen  in  our  survey,  that  there  is  one  rule  so  general, 
that  it  may  be  held  as  regulating  all  reasoning  that  "  no- 
tions which  agree  with  one  and  the  same  notion  agree 
with  one  another  "  (§  14).  But  this  rule  is  too  vague,  as 
not  specifj^ng  the  nature  of  the  agreement  ;  and  so  we 
lay  down  two  more  specific  rules,  the  one  the  rule  of 
Equivalence  (§15),  and  the  other  the  Dictum  of  Aris- 
totle (§  17) — to  which  we  may  add  the  rule  of  Comprehen- 
sion— if  we  allow  reasoning  in  comprehension  (§42). 
But  there  are  cases  in  which  the  rule  of  Equivalence  and 
the  Dictum  are  united  : 

A  Locke  lived  in  the  seventeenth  century ; 
U  Locke  is  the  greatest  of  English  metaphysicians ; 
A  The  greatest  English  metaphysician  lived  in  the  seventeenth 
century. 
This  is  in  the  Thii'd  Figure,  and  yet  we  legitimately 
draw  a  universal  conclusion,  and  the  reason  is  that  the 
minor  term  being  an  abstract  is  distributed,  is  distributed 
in  the  minor  premiss,  and  may  therefore  be  distributed 
in  the  conclusion. 

Both  Dicta  are  involved  in  Mathematical  reasoning,  as 
in  the  demonstration  of  Euclid,  B.  I.,  Prop.  I. 

(1)  The  radii  of  the  same  circle  are  equal  to  one  another ; 
A  C  and  A  B  are  radii  of  the  same  circle  (BCD); 

A  C  and  A  B  are  equal  to  one  another. 

(2)  The  radii  of  tlio  same  circle  are  equal  to  one  another; 
B C  and  A B  are  radii  of  the  same  circle  (ACE); 

B  C  and  A  B  arc  equal  to  one  another. 
(3;   AC  =  AB;  BC  =  AB.-.  AC  =  BC. 

Under  this  head  should  be  placed  what  is  called  a  Per- 
fect Ijiduction,  in   which  we  argue  that  what  wo  have 


THE  TWO  DICTA   COMBINED.  141 

found  true  of  eacli  of  the  members  of  a  class,  must  be  true 
of  the  whole  class. 

A  Slieiii,  Ham,  and  Japliet  were  in  the  ark  ; 

U  Shcui,  Ham,  and  Japliet  were  the  whole  sons  of  Noah  ; 

A  All  tlie  sons  of  Noah  were  in  the  ark. 

In  both  these  examples,  two  of  the  terms  are  singulars 
involving  a  process  of  abstraction  (but  not  of  generali- 
zation) ;  the  minor  premisses  are  equipollent,  with  both 
terms  distributed  ;  and  so  the  minor  term  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  distributed  in  the  conclusion,  which  is  univer- 
sal.    Of  the  same  description  : 

A  Certain  sciences  are  classificatory  ; 

U  These  sciences  are  Mineralogy,  Botany,  and  Geology  , 

A  Mineralogy,  Botany,  and  Zoology  are  classificatory. 

4(i,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  has  an  ingenious  mode  of  exhibiting  all 
the  possilile  forms  of  reasoning  both  in  extension  and  comprehen- 
sion. The  scheme  shows  36  moods  in  each  of  the  first  three  figures 
(the  fourth  is  not  allowed),  or,  in  all,  108.  Many  of  these  moods 
would  never  occur  (so  it  appears  to  us)  in  spontaneous  thought,  and 
arise  from  his  giving  Y,  ri,  and  u,  a  place  among  propositions.  Still 
the  scheme  is  worthy  of  being  looked  at  as  exhibiting  along  with 
the  forms  arising  in  spontaneous  thought,  those  that  may  be  reached 
by  immediate  inferences.  The  Table,  ^vith  the  explanations,  is 
taken  from  Thomson's  Outlines  of  the  Laics  of  Thovg/tt.    (See  p.  142.) 

In  this  Table  M  denotes  the  middle  term  ;  and  C  and  F  the  two 
terms  of  the  conclusion.  A  colon  (:)  annexed  to  a  term  denotes  that 
it  is  distributed,  and  a  comma  (,)  that  it  is  undistributed.  Where 
the  middle  term  has  a  :  on  the  right  side,  and  a  ,  on  the  left,  we 
understand  that  it  is  distributed  when  it  is  coupled  in  a  judgment 
with  the  term  on  the  right,  and  undistributed  when  coupled  with 
the  other.  The  syllogisms  actually  represented  are  all  affirmatives, 
being  twelve  in  each  figure  ;  and  the  affirmative  copula  is  the  lino 
» — ,  the  thick  end  denoting  the  subject,  and  the  thin  the  predicate, 
of  extension.  Thus  C :  - —  ,  M  would  signify  "  All  C  is  (some)  M." 
In  reading  off  the  intension,  the  thin  end  denotes  the  subject.  But 
from  each  affirmative  can  be  formed  two  negative  syllogisms,  by 
making  each  of  the  premisses  negative  in  turn.  The  negation  ia 
expressed  by  drawing  a  perpendicular  stroke  through  the  affirmative 
copula;  thus        I   .     In  the   negative  modes  the   distribution  oi 


14:2  KEAiSONlNG. 

Fia.  I.  Fia.  n.  Fig.  HL 


f     i.  C  : :  :^I : . :  r   C  : :  M  : :  r   C  : :  M  : 


U.  C, :  M  : ,  r   C,  :  M  : . ,  r   C,  :  M  : ,  r 


iiL  C, :  M  , •  =  T   C, ;  m  , :  r   C,  :  M  ,  ■ 


XXX 


iv.  C: ,  M : ' ,  r   C : ,  M  : . ,  r  C : ,  M  : ,  r 


V.  C, 1 :  M  , . .  r   C,  '——  :  M  ,  -^—  ,  r  C,   . :  M  ,  —  ,  r 


XXX 


vl.  C,  — ^ ,  M  :  —  ,  r  c,  ,  M  : ,  r  c,  ■ ,  M  : . 


vii.  C :  — — i :  M  :  —  .  r  C : :  M  :  ~^-  ,  r   C  :  —^  :  M :  '—  ,  T 


XXX 


viii.  C, :  M  : :  r   c, :  M  : < :  r   C,  :  M  : :  r 


Ix.  C : . :  M  , :  r  C  : :  M  , :  r   C  :  .  -.  M  , 


XXX 


I.  C : ,  SI : :  r   C  : ,  M  : :  T   C  : . ,  M  : :  I 

->  —  .  ■ 


■ » 


xl.  C: :M, ,r   C: :M, ,r   C: :M, ,r 


XXX 


xlL  C, ,  M  :  —^.  ■  r   C,  ,  M  : ■ :  V   C,   —  ,  M  : 


MILL'S  THEORY.  143 

terms  ^vill  remaia  exactly  the  same  as  it  was  in  the  aflBrmativea 
from  which  thoy  were  respectively  formed.  The  line  beneath  the 
three  terms  is  the  copula  of  the  conclusion  ;  and  in  the  second  and 
third  fifjfures,  as  there  may  be  two  conclusions  indifferently,  a 
line  is  also  inserted  above,  to  express  the  second  of  them.  The  mark 
"^ — y — '  under  a  mode  denotes  that  when  the  premisses  are  converted, 
the  syllogism  is  still  in  the  same  mode.  But  a  X  between  two 
modes,  signifies  that  when  the  premisses  of  either  are  converted,  the 
syllogism  passes  into  the  other.  The  middle  is  said  to  be  balanced 
when  it  is  distributed  in  both  premisses  alike.  The  extremes,  or  terms 
of  the  conclusion,  are  balanced,  when  both  alike  are  distributed  or  both 
undistributed  ;  unbalanced,  when  one  is  and  the  other  is  not.  Two 
propositions,  or  two  modes,  are  balanced,  when  the  distribution  of 
terms  is  the  same  in  both.  A.  i.  and  ii.  are  balanced.  B.  The  other 
modes  are  uvhalanced.  Of  these,  iii.  and  iv.  are  unbalanced  in  terms 
only,  not  in  propositions  ;  the  rest  in  both. 

4:7'  The  author  of  this  treatise  has  commented  elsewhere  on  Mr.  J. 
S.  Mill's  theory  of  the  reasoning  process.  "  The '  really  fundamental 
axiom  of  ratiocination,'  as  announced  by  him  is,  '  Tilings  which  co- 
exist with  the  same  thing,  co-exist  with  one  another ; '  and  '  a  thing 
which  co-exists  with  another  thing,  with  which  other  a  third  thing 
does  not  co-exist,  is  not  co-existent  with  that  third  thing.'  But  the 
phrase  '  co-exist,'  if  limited  to  co-existence  in  respect  of  time  or 
space,  docs  not  include  most  important  cases  of  reasoning ;  and  if 
widened  beyond  this  it  becomes  meaningless.  When  we  argue  that 
the  man  having  committed  murder  deserves  punishment,  the  pre- 
misses and  conclusion  have  reference,  not  to  space  or  time,  but  to 
far  different  relations.  When  we  infer  from  A  being  equal  to  B,  and 
B  to  C,  that  A  is  equal  to  C,  we  are  not  making  affirmations  about 
co-existence.  Tn  explanation,  he  tells  us  (Vol.  I.,  p.  202.  footnote,  6th 
ed.),  '  the  co-existence  meant  is  that  of  being  jointly  attributes  of  the 
same  subject.'  This  statement  is  still  vague,  and  is  not  adequate, 
for  it  does  not  specify  what  is  '  the  same  subject,'  and  it  does  not 
brine  out  that  the  attribution  involves  Extension  :  but  it  contains 
partial  truth,  and  it  has  a  meaning,  wliich  we  can  examine. 

This  new  Dictum  gives  him  the  following  universal  formula: 

Attribute  A  is  a  mark  of  attribute  B  ; 
A  given  object  has  the  mark  A; 
.'.  The  given  object  has  the  attribute  B. 

B»t  what  does  this  first  premiss  mean  when  we  translate  it  from 


144  REASONING. 

abstractions  into  concrete  realities  ?  As  there  cannot  be  an  attri 
bute  existinor  separately,  or  apart  from  objects,  it  must  mean, '  What 
ever  objects  have  the  attribute  A  have  the  attribute  B.'  And  wha' 
is  this  but  the  major  premiss  of  the  old  syllogistic  fonnula?  The 
second  premiss  requires  an  explanation.  "A  given  object  has  the 
mark  A:"  this  object  may  be  one  object  or  a  class  of  objects.  In 
order  to  give  the  formula  a  meaning,  we  must  interpret  it,  '  What 
ever  individual  or  class  has  the  attribute  A  has  the  attribute  B  ;  s 
given  object  or  class  C  has  the  attribute  A ;  therefore  it  has  the 
attribute  B.'  The  new  Dictum  and  new  Syllogistic  formula  are  just 
bad  versions  of  the  old  ones.  I  call  them  bad  versions,  for  the 
phrase  "co-exist"  does  not  bring  out  the  precise  relation  of  the 
terms  on  which  the  thought  proceeds  ;  and  the  phrase,  "  Attribute 
A,"  requires  to  be  interpreted  in  order  to  have  a  relevant  significa- 
tion."— Examination  of  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill's  Philosophy. 

4:8,  Some  eminent  mathematical  logicians  are  seeking 
to  introduce  into  Logic,  reasoning  founded  on  plui-ative 
judgments : 

Two-tliirds  of  mankind  are  heathens ; 

Two-thirds  of  mankind  live  in  Asia  ; 
.•.  Some  who  live  in  Asia  are  heathens. 

Now  there  is  no  doubt  that  this  reasoning  is  valid, 
But  so  also  : 

Lias  lies  above  Red  Sandstone  ; 
Red  Sandstone  lies  above  Coal ; 
.'.  Lias  lies  above  Coal. 

But  all  logicians  allow  that  in  the  latter  case  there  is  a 
major  premiss  implied,  that  "  when  one  stratum  lies  above 
a  second,  and  that  above  a  third,  the  first  must  be  above 
the  third  ";  and  then  the  minor  premiss  becomes,  "  there 
is  such  a  stratum  (Lias),  lying  above  a  second  stratum 
(Red  Sandstone),  which  lies  above  a  thii-d  (Coal)"  ;  and 
then  the  conclusion  follows.  It  is  the  same  in  plurativo, 
and  indeed  in  all  arithmetical  reasoning,  there  must  be  9 
major  premiss  got  from  arithmetic,  that  is,  from  a  region 
without  and  beyond  pure  discursive  thought. 


^f 


CONDITIONAL  REASONING.  U6 


CONDITIONAL  EEASONING. 

40*  111  this,  one  or  both  the  premisses  are  conditional 
propositions.  The  common  form  is  that  in  which  the 
major  premiss  (so  called)  is  a  conditional,  and  the  minor 
a  categorical. 

ANTECEDENT.  CONSEQUENT. 

If  this  man  has  consumption  |      he  shall  die  ;  major  premiss. 

He  has  consumption ;  minor  premiss. 

.-.  He  shall  die.  conclusion. 

This  is  called  a  Constructive  Conditional  Syllogism  :  it 
proceeds  on  the  rule  {modus  ponens),  Affirm  the  antecedent 
and  we  may  affirm  the  consequent.  In  the  Destructive  fonn 
the  rule  {modus  tollens)  is,  Deny  the  consequent  and  we  may 
deny  the  antecedent. 

If  this  man  has  consumption  he  shall  die  ; 
He  shall  not  die  ; 
.*.  He  has  not  consumption. 

But  we  are  not  entitled  by  denying  the  antecedent  to 
deny  the  consequent,  or  by  affirming  the  consequent  to 
affirm  the  antecedent  ;  for  the  consequent  may  follow 
from  some  other  antecedent.  We  cannot,  by  denj-ing 
that  this  m;in  has  consumption,  deny  that  he  shall  die  ; 
or  by  affirming  that  he  shall  die,  that  therefore  he  has 
consumption  ;  for  he  may  die  of  some  other  disease. 
Hence  aiise  two  fallacies  in  conditional  reasoning  :  one 
that  of  denying  the  antecedent  and  therefore  denying  the 
consequent ;  the  other  tlint  of  affirming  the  consequent 
and  therefore  affirming  the  antecedent. 

So  far  for  reasoning  in  which  the  major  premiss  has 
one  or  more  concepts,  and  in  which  the  proposition  is 
attributive  or  the  relation  one  of  joint  extension  and  com- 
prehension. But  there  are  cases  in  which  the  notions  are 
singular  or  abstract,  and  in  which  the  proposition  is 
10 


146  REASONING. 

equivalent,  U  ;  and  in  these  we  can,  from  the  denial  of 
the  antecedent  deny  the  consequent,  and  fr'om  the  affirm- 
ation of  the  consequent  affirm  the  antecedent.  "  If  Ho- 
mer va'ote  the  Iliad  he  is  the  greatest  poet  in  antiquity." 
From  this  we  can  infer  not  only  (1)  that  as  he  wrote  the 
Diad  he  is  the  greatest  poet  in  antiquity  ;  and  (2)  that  he 
is  not  the  greatest  poet  in  antiquity  if  he  did  not  write 
the  Diad  ;  but  farther  (:i),  that  if  he  did  not  write  the 
Iliad  he  is  not  the  greatest  poet  in  antiquity  ;  and  (4) 
that  as  he  is  the  greatest  poet  in  antiquity,  he  must  have 
wi'itten  the  Iliad. 

oO.  The  common  forms  with  a  conditional  major  and 
categorical  minor  ai-e  : 

1)  If  A  is  B,  B  is  C  (major). 

Equivalent  and  attributive  A  is  B  /,  B  is  C.     B  is  not  C.'.  A  ia 

not  B. 
Equivalent  additional  A  is  not  B  .•.  B  is  not  C.    B  is  C  .•.  A  is  B. 

(2)  If  A  is  B,  C  is  D  ;  A  is  B  .-.  C  is  D.     C  is  not  D  .-.  A  is  not  B. 

(3)  If  A  is  not  B,  C  is  not  D  ;  C  is  D  .-.  A  is  not  B. 

(4)  If  AisnotB,  CisD;  A  is  not  B.-.  C  is  D.    C  is  not  D .-.  A  is  B. 
{'))  If  A  is  not  B,  C  is  not  D  ;  A  is  not  B  .-.  C  is  not  D.  C  is  D  .-.  A  is  B. 

(6)  If  A  is  B,  either  C  is  D,  or  F  is  G. 

A  is  B .-.  either  C  is  D,  or  P  is  G.    Neither  C  is  D,  nor  F  is  G, 
.•.  A  is  not  B. 

(7)  If  either  A  is  B,  or  C  is  D,  either  E  is  F,  or  G  is  H. 
Either  A  is  B,  or  C  is  D  .*.  either  E  is  F,  or  G  is  H. 
Neither  E  is  F,  nor  G  is  H .".  neither  A  is  B,  nor  C  is  D. 

Other  conclusions  may  be  drawn  when  the  terms  are 
equivalent,  but  it  is  needless  to  forinulize  them. 

.7  2.  Reasoning,  being  all  the  while  one  and  the  same, 
will  spontaneously  take  the  conditional  or  cateij^orical 
form  according  to  the  case  to  which  it  is  applied.  We 
reason  and  conclude  that  "  a  man  guilty  of  murder  should 
be  punished."  If  we  know  that  a  particular  man  com- 
mitted the  murder,  the  reasoning  would  take  the  categor- 
ical form,  "  This  man,  having  committed  murder,  should 


CONDITIONAL  REASONING.  147 

be  punished."  "We  may  not  know,  however,  whether  the 
man  has  committed  the  murder,  and  we  simply  assert 
that  *'  this  man,  if  guilty  of  murder,  should  be  punished," 
thus  declaring  the  validity  of  the  consequence.  But  we 
come  to  know  that  he  has  committed  the  mui-der,  and  we 
apply  the  reasoning,  and  the  form  spontaneously  assumed 
will  be  the  categorical. 

52.  There  is  a  sense  In  Avliicli  all  reasoning  is  regarded  by  lo- 
gicians as  liypotlietical,  that  is,  he  does  not,  in  looking  at  the  valid- 
ity of  reasoning,  examine  the  truth  of  the  premisses.  Assuming 
them  to  be  true,  he  inquires  solely  into  the  relation  between  them 
and  the  conclusion.  But  in  Hypothetical  Reasoning  Proper,  there  is 
a  hypothesis  in  the  very  enunciation  of  the  argument.  The  relation 
of  categorical  and  hypothetical  reasoning  is  analogous  to  that  be- 
tween the  original  and  derived  propositions  in  Implied  Judgments. 

5'i»  All  conditional  reasoning  can  be  reduced  to  cate- 
gorical form.  This  is  accomplished  by  putting  the  major 
premiss  in  a  new  shape  by  immediate  inference  :  as  "  the 
case  of  a  man  committing  murder  is  a  case  in  which  he 
should  be  punished,"  or  more  simply  : 

He  who  is  guilty  of  murder  should  be  punished  ; 
This  man  is  guilty  of  murder ; 
.•.  He  should  be  punished. 

Wlien  in  conditional  form,  the  reasoning  is  to  be  tried 
by  the  rules  of  conditionals  ;  when  in  categorical  form  by 
the  rules  of  the  syllogism.  It  will  be  found  that  the  fal- 
lacy of  denying  the  antecedent  and  thence  denying  the 
consequent,  coiTCsponds  to  illicit  process  of  the  major  or 
negative  premisses,  or  the  introduction  of  more  than  three 
terms.  In  conditional  form,  "If  this  man  has  consump- 
tion he  shall  die  ;  he  has  not  consumption  ;  therefore  he 
shall  not  die,"  becomes  categorically,  "  Ho  who  has  con- 
sumption shall  die  ;  this  man  has  not  consumption  ;  there- 
fore he  shall  not  die  "  (iUicit  major).  The  fallacy  of  as- 
serting the  consequent  and  thence  inferring  the  antece- 
dent corresponds  to  the  fallacy  of  undistributed  middle  or 


118  REASOmNQ. 

negative  premisses.  "With  the  same  majors,  "  This  man 
shall  die,  therefore  he  has  consumption,"  is  in  conditional 
reasoniujT  the  fallacy  of  affirming  the  consequent,  and  in 
categorical  of  imdistributed  middle.  It  is  evident  fi'om 
these  considerations  and  examples,  that  conditional  rea- 
soning is  the  same  substantially  in  the  relation  of  the 
terms  as  categorical,  and  that  it  is  governed  in  thought 
by  the  princij^les  expressed  in  the  Dictum  of  Equivalence 
and  the  Dictum  of  Ai'istotle. 


DISJUNCTIVE  EEASONING. 

54:.  In  it  one  premiss  is  a  disjunctive  proj)osition,  and 
the  other  is  categorical.  The  disjunctive  proposition 
proceeds  on  the  principle  that  the  notion  is  divided  into 
subordinate  species,  and  is  governed  by  the  i-ules  of  Log- 
ical Division  (P.  I.,  §  58,  59)  :  that  the  species  must  make 
up  the  genus,  and  that  the  species  must  exclude  one  an- 
other. In  it  there  are  two  or  more  judgments  which 
cannot  all  be  true,  but  one  or  some  of  which  must.  In 
the  categorical  premiss  (called  the  minor)  we  make  a 
predication  as  to  one  or  other  of  the  species,  and  in  the 
conclusion,  we   di*aw  an   inference   as   to   the   other   or 

others : 

Lines  are  either  straight  or  curved ; 
The  line  A  B  is  not  straight ; 
.•.  It  must  be  curved. 

Here  we  find  "  line  "  divided  into  two  exclusive  species  ; 
we  affirm  that  it  is  not  in  the  one  species  and  so  infer  it 
must  be  in  the  other.  There  is  the  same  process  when 
the  members  are  three  : 

The  Apostles  must  either  have  been  deceivers,  or  deceived,  or  they 
spake  the  truth ; 

They  were  not  deceivers  nor  deceived ; 
.*.  They  spake  the  truth. 


DISJUNCT rVE  REASONING.  149 

Or  with  four  members  : 

The  season  mxist  have  been  spring,  or  summer,  or  autumn,  oi 

winter ; 
It  was  winter ; 
.•.  It  could  not  have  heen  spring,  or  summer,  or  autumn. 

A  fallacy  often  creeps  into  disjunctive  reasoning  in  con- 
sequence of  the  division  in  the  disjunctive  premiss  not 
being  exhaustive.  Thus  it  is  argued  "  either  that  all  our 
ideas  are  had  from  experience,  or  that  there  are  innate 
ideas."  Then  it  is  shown  that  "  there  are  no  innate  ideas," 
i.  e.,  that  the  child  is  not  bom  with  ideas ;  and  the  con- 
clusion follows  that  "  all  our  ideas  are  from  experi- 
ence." But  there  is  a  third  suj^position,  which  seems  the 
true  one,  that  "  there  ai'e  innate  laws  or  principles  in  the 
mind,  ready  to  be  called  forth  by  experience."  We  have 
given  other  examples  in  treating  of  Logical  Division, 
(P.  I.,  §  58.)  The  detection  of  such  fallacies  requires  us 
to  look  beyond  Formal  Logic,  but  Logic  tells  us  where 
they  Im-k. 

oo.  The  following  are  the  principal  forms  (Fowler's 
Logic) : 

Either  A  is  B,  or  C  is  D  (major). 

(1)  A  is  B .-.  C  is  not  D.     (2)  A  is  not  B  .-.  C  is  D. 

(3)  C  is  D .-.  A  is  not  B.     (4)  C  is  not  D .-.  A  is  B. 
Either  A  is  B,  or  C  is  not  D  (major). 

(1)  A  is  B  .-.  C  is  D.    (2)  A  is  not  B .-.  C  is  not  D. 

(3)  C  is  not  D  .-.  A  is  not  B.     (4)  C  is  D .-.  A  is  B. 

Either  A  is  B,  or  C  is  D,  or  E  is  F  (major). 

(1)  A  is  B .-.  neither  C  is  D,  nor  E  is  F.    (2)  A  is  not  B  .-.  either  C 
is  D,  or  E  is  F. 

(3)  Neither  C  is  D,  nor  E  is  F  .-.  A  is  B.    (4)  Either  C  is  D,  or  E  is 
F  .-.  A  is  not  B. 

(5)  Either  A  is  B,  or  C  is  D  .-.  E  is  not  F,  &c.,  &c. 

50t  Disjunctive  reasoning  can  be  reduced  to  categor- 
ical by  changing  by  immediate  inference  the  disjimctive 
proposition  according  to  the  rule  of  logical  division. 


150  BEASOmWO. 

All  lines  not-straight  are  crooked , 
A  B  is  not-straight ; 
'.  It  is  crooked. 

This  shows  that  ultimately  disjunctive  reasoning  is 
founded  on  the  same  j)riuciple  as  categorical,  that  is,  on 
the  principle  of  subalternation  of  the  species  to  the  genus, 
impHed  both  in  logical  division  and  in  the  Dictum  of 
Aristotle. 

DILEMMA. 

S7,  There  are  spontaneous  exercises  of  thought  in 
which  we  draw  a  conclusion  from  disjunctive  premisses, 
or  reach  a  disjunctive  conclusion  without  determining 
which  of  the  alternatives  is  to  be  preferred  ;  and  in  these 
the  reasoning  takes  the  form  of  a  dilemma.  In  it  we 
have  a  conditional  premiss,  in  which  cither  the  antece- 
dent or  consequent  is  disjunctive,  and  in  the  other  pre- 
miss we  make  a  predication  in  regard  to  the  exclusive 
nature  of  the  disjunctive  in  the  premiss,  and  thence  draw 
a  conclusion. 

Major.  Ka  man  can  help  a  thing  he  should  not  fret  about  it :  if 

he  cannot  help  a  thing  he  should  not  fret  about  it. 
Minor.  But  he  can  either  help  a  thing  or  not  help  it  ; 
.•.  He  should  not  fret  about  it. 

He  who  opposes  this  must  set  himself  against  one  or 
other  of  the  alternatives — must,  as  it  is  said,  choose  his 
horn,  and  if  the  alternative  is  exhaustive,  he  will  be  trans- 
fixed  by  either.  If  a  dilemma  is  accurate  in  form,  the 
conclusion  follows,  and  the  only  way  of  meeting  it  is  by 
showing  that  the  altematives  in  the  premisses  are  not 
exhaustive — that  there  may  be  another  supposition. 

If  that  narrative  be  true  you  must  believe  it;  if  it  be  false  yoa 

must  disbelieve  it ; 
But  it  must  either  be  true  or  false  ; 
•.  You  must  either  believe  it.  or  not  believe  it. 


But  there  may  be  a  thii'd  supposition,  that  it  is  partly 
true  and  partly  false.  The  niles  are  (1),  The  antecedent 
being  affirmed,  either  disjunctively  or  not,  as  the  case 
may  be,  the  consequent  must  be  admitted ;  (2)  The  conse- 
quent being  denied,  either  disjunctively  or  not,  the  ante- 
cedent must  be  denied. 

S8,  (1)  There  are  cases  in  which  the  first  premins 
consists  of  one  antecedent  and  several  consequents.  The 
conclusion  is  destructive. 

If  A  is  B,  C  is  D,  and  E  is  F  ; 
But  either  C  is  not  D,  or  E  is  not  F  ; 
.•.  A  is  not  B. 

(2)  In  which  the  major  consists  of  several  antecedents 
and  one  consequent ;  and  we  draw  the  common  conse- 
quent in  the  conclusion.     The  argument  is  constructive  • 

If  A  is  B,  or  if  C  is  D,  E  ia  F  ; 
But  eitlier  A  is  B,  or  C  is  D ; 
.-.  E  is  F. 

(3)  In  which  each  of  the  antecedents  has  a  different 
consequent,  and  we  can  draw  the  consequent  only  disjunc- 
tively.    The  argument  may  be  constructive  or  desti'uctive : 

Major.  If  A  is  B,  C  is  D,  and  if  E  is  F,  G  is  H  ; 
Minor.  But  either  A  is  B,  or  E  is  F ; 

.-.  Either  C  is  D,  or  G  is  H. 
Minor.  But  either  C  is  not  D,  or  G  is  not  H ; 

.•,  Either  A  is  not  B,  or  E  is  not  F. 

SO.  There  may  be  Trilemma   or  a  Tetralemma,  &c.,  when  ths 

number  of  antecedents  or  consequents,  one  or  both,  is  three,  four 

&c.     Trilemma.  If  the  universe  is  not  the  best  possible,  we  must 

suppose  that  God  did  not  know  a  better,  or  that  he  could  not  make 

a  better,  or  that  he  did  not  desire  a  better.     The  first  supposition 

cannot  be  true  (for  it  is  inconsistent  with  His  wisdom) ;  and  the 

second  (because  it  limits  His  power) ;  and  the  third  (because  against 

His  goodness) ;  therefore  the  universe  must  be  the  best  possible.        \ 

GO.  A  Dilemma  being  a  conditional  with  a  disjunctive 

/  proposition,  may  be   reduced   to   categorical   syllogistic 

/      form,  like  conditionals  and  disjunctives. 


152  REASONING. 


CHAINS  or  KEASONING.-THE  SORITES. 

Gl.  Froi<yUogism  and  Episylloghm.  Hitherto  we  Lave 
been  considering  single  arguments.  But  ratiocination 
is  commonly  conducted  in  a  train,  and  the  single 
argument  has  a  connection  with  what  goes  before  and 
^\-ith  what  follows.  The  major  or  minor  premiss,  one  or 
both,  of  any  syllogism,  may  have  been  established  by  a 
previous  act  of  reasoning,  which  in  relation  to  that  syl- 
logism is  called  a  Prosyllogisra.  Or  a  syllogism  may  be 
employed  to  establish  a  position  to  be  j^sed  as  a  premiss 
in  a  subsequent  syUogism  called  an  EpisyUogism.  The 
conclusion  in  the  ProsyUogism  is  a  premiss  to  the  syllo- 
gism which  it  precedes  ;  the  EpisyUogism  uses  the  con- 
clusion of  the  syllogism  which  goes  before  as  a  premiss. 
It  is  evident  that  the  same  syllogism  may  be  a  Pro-syllo- 
gism in  one  connection,  and  an  Epi-syUogism  in  another. 

Pro-Syllo^sm.         He  who  administers  arsenic  administers  poison ; 
The  prisoner  administered  arsenic  ; 
/.  The  prisoner  administered  poison. 
Given  Syllogism.     He  who  administers  poison  is  <?uilty  of  murder , 
The  prisoner  administered  poison ; 
.-.  He  is  guilty  of  murder. 
Epi-Syllogism.  He  who  is  guilty  of  murder  should  bo  executed , 

The  prisoner  is  guilty  of  murder ; 
.'.  He  should  be  executed. 

This  may  become  a  ProsyUogism  to  a  farther  act  of 
reasoning  : 

He  who  is  to  be  executed  should  not  be  executed  in  public ; 
This  man  is  to  be  executed  ; 
.'.  He  should  not  be  executed  in  publia 

This  may  be  taken  as  an  example  of  a  chain  of  reason- 
ing. It  is  not  to  be  understood  that  in  spontaneous 
thought,  the  mind  constructs  the  reasoning  into  syllo- 


CUAINS  OF  REASONINO,  ETO.  153 

gisms.  It  is  enougli  that  it  perceives  the  relations  in- 
volved in  the  terms.  The  formal  unfolding  of  the  rela- 
tions is  left  to  the  logician. 

02.  Logicians  have  drawn  the  form  of  one  of  these 
chained  trains  of  reasoning,  and  call  it  the  Sorites  (from 
(Twpof,  a  heap —  the  Germans  call  it  chain  argument,  Ket- 
tenschluss)  : — The  prisoner  administered  arsenic  to  the 
man  who  died  ;  he  who  administers  arsenic  administers 
poison  ;  he  who  administers  poison  is  guilty  of  murder  ; 
he  who  is  guilty  of  murder  should  be  executed  ;  he  who 
is  executed  should  not  be  executed  in  public  ;  .*.  the  pris- 
oner should  not  be  executed  in  public.  The  Sorites  con- 
sists of  a  series  of  propositions,  the  predicate  of  each  be- 
coming the  subject  of  the  one  following,  till  in  the  last 
step  the  predicate  of  the  last  is  affii-med  or  denied  of  the 
subject  of  the  first,  which  is  the  conclusion.  In  the  pro- 
cess there  are  as  many  middle  terms  as  there  are  prop- 
ositions between  the  first  and  the  last ;  and  the  mind  in 
reasoning  sees  the  connection  between  these  middles  and 
the  other  terms,  and  thus  passes  on  from  the  first  pre- 
miss to  the  final  conclusion.  The  Dictum  of  Aristotle 
slightly  modified,  is  the  regulating  principle.  "  Whatever 
is  affirmed  or  denied  of  a  whole  class,  may  be  affirmed  or 
denied  of  whatever  is  comprehended  in  any  class  that  is 
wholly  comprehended  in  that  class," — the  words  in  Italics 
being  an  addition.  In  the  Sorites  the  first  proposition, 
and  that  alone  (with  the  last),  can  be  particular  ;  because 
in  the  first  figure  the  minor  may  be  particular  but  not  the 
major  (§  29),  and  all  the  other  propositions  on  to  the  con- 
clusion are  major  premisses.  There  can  be  one  and  only 
one  negative  premiss,  and  that  the  last ;  for  if  any  others 
were  negative,  one  of  the  syllogisms  would  have  a  nega- 
tive premiss,  which  cannot  be  in  the  first  figiu'C. 

03»  The  reasoning  is  perfectly  valid,  but  we  may  in 
the  way  of  testing  it,  and  to  show  that  this   form  ol 


154  REASONING. 

reasoning  is  founded  on  the  same  principle  as  tlie  syllo- 
gism, draw  out  the  process  in  a  series  of  syllogisms. 
These  ^vill  all  be  in  the  first  figure  ;  the  same  in  number 
as  the  middle  terms  ;  and  the  first  will  have  for  its  major 
premiss  the  second  proposition  of  the  Sorites,  and  for  its 
minor  the  first.  Syllogisms  thus  di-awn  out,  will  take  the 
foi-m  of  syllogism,  pro-syUogism,  and  epi-syllogism,  given 
above  : 

The  form  is,    All  (or  some)  A  is  B; 

AllBisC; 

All  C  is  D; 

All  (or  no)  D  is  E  ; 
.".  All  (or  some)  A  is  (or  is  not)  E. 

Keduced  to  syllogisms  : 

All  B  is  C  ;  All  C  is  D  ;  All  (or  no)  D  is  E ; 

All  (or  some)  A  is  B ;  All  (or  some)  A  is  C  ;  All  (or  some)  A  is  D ; 
.*.  All  (or  some)  A  is  C.  /.  All  (or  some)  A  is  D.  .•.  All  (or  some)  A  is  (oi 

is  not)  E. 

The  Sorites  may  take  another  form  called  Qoclenian  (from  Gocle- 
nius  who  noticed  it).  The  subject  of  each  premiss  becomes  the 
predicate  of  the  next ;  the  conclusion  predicates  the  first  predi- 
cate of  the  last  8ubj(3Ct;  the  first  premiss  only  can  be  negative  and 
the  last  particular.  When  expanded  into  syllogisms  the  conclusion 
of  each  becomes  the  major  premiss  of  the  next.    The  form  is : 

All  (or  no)  E  is  F  ;  All  B  is  C ; 

All  D  is  E  ;  All  (or  some)  A  is  B ; 

All  C  is  D ;  .'.AH  (or  some)  A  is  (or  is  not)  F. 

He  who  is  executed  should  not  be  executed  in  public  ;  he  who  ia 
guilty  of  murder  should  be  executed  ;  he  who  administers  poison  is 
guilty  of  murder;  and  he  who  administers  arsenic  administers 
jKiison ;  the  prisoner  administered  arsenic ;  therefore  the  prisoner 
should  be  executed,  but  not  in  public.  These  two  forms  differ  from 
each  other  only  as  a  syllogism  with  the  major  premiss  put  first,  and 
the  minor  jjremiss  second,  differs  from  a  syllogism  with  the  minor 
premiss  put  first  and  the  major  last  (see  §  18).  A  series  of  Con- 
ditional arguments  may  in  the  same  way  be  abridged  into  a  Sorites. 
If  A  is  B  C  is  D ;  if  C  is  D,  E  is  F.     But  A  is  B  .-.  E  is  F. 


REMARKS  OJT  REASONING  PROCESS.         155 


GEKEEAL  REMAKKS  ON  THE  EEASONEfa  PEOOESS. 

f>4.  TVe  have  seen  tliat  in  all  reasoning  there  is  in- 
volved a  comparison  of  two  terms  by  means  of  a  third, 
and  that  when  the  process  is  fully  unfolded,  there  will  be 
three  propositions,  that  is,  two  premisses  and  a  conclu- 
sion. The  question  arises,  w^hence  do  we  get  the  premis- 
ses ?  The  answer  is,  that  they  may  be  obtained  either  by 
intuition  or  by  experience.  Fii'st  there  are  premisses 
gained  by  an  immediate  intuition  of  objects.  It  is  thus 
that  I  know  that  these  two  parallel  lines  will  not  meet 
however  prolonged  ;  that  these  two  straight  lines  cannot 
enclose  a  space  ;  that  this  deed  of  ingratitude  to  God  and 
cruelty  to  man  is  a  sin.  We  reach  these  truths  by  no 
process  of  inference  ;  we  perceive  them  to  be  true  on  the 
bare  contemplation  of  the  objects.  But  a  far  greater 
number  of  premisses  are  attained  by  ordinary  obser- 
vation— in  the  case  of  general  truths  by  a  gathered  obser- 
vation. It  is  thus  we  know  that  fire  burns,  that  all  bodies 
attract  other  bodies,  that  plants  and  animals  need  noiu'ish- 
ment,  and  that  animals  feed  on  other  organized  matter. 

6t>.  This  gathered  observation  may  be  made  by  the 
individual  for  himself,  or  by  the  combined  experience  of 
others.  Of  these,  the  individual  experience,  so  far  as 
it  goes,  is  by  far  the  more  valuable  ;  as  with  the  results 
we  have  the  processes  which  guide  and  restrain  in  the 
application  of  the  general  maxim.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  a  mere  school  or  book  learning  can  never  serve  the 
ends  of  a  practical  education  ;  and  that  a  dear-bought 
personal  experience  is  often  worth  all  the  labor  and  suf- 
fering which  may  have  been  expended  in  gaining  it.  But 
on  the  other  hand,  individual  observation,  however  en- 
larged, must  always  be  limited,  and  unless  widened  by 
intercourse  with  mankind  and  by  reading,  tends  to  bo- 


156  BEASOmACt. 

come  narrow  and  exclusive.  By  far  the  greater  part  of  any 
man's  knowledge  is  derived  fi'om  the  experience  of  others, 
and  is  conveyed  to  him  by  oral  instniction  and  books ; 
and  the  most  valuable  j)art  consists  in  nice  distinctions 
and  scientific  laws,  some  of  which  embody  the  results  of 
the  thoughts  of  the  greatest  men  who  have  appeared  on 
our  earth,  and  of  a  hundred  generations. 

00.  Some  of  these  have  been  written  out  and  pro- 
claimed to  the  world ;  such,  for  instance,  are  ascertained 
natiu'al  laws,  as  the  three  laws  of  motion,  the  classifications 
of  natural  history,  the  chemical  afiinities  of  bodies,  and 
certain  laws  of  the  mind,  such  as  those  of  the  logical  pro- 
cesses, of  intuition,  and  the  association  of  ideas.  It  is  one 
of  the  advantages  which  the  modern  reasoner  has  over 
the  ancient,  that  he  has  provided  for  him  and  placed  at 
his  disposal,  an  immense  number  and  variety  of  general 
principles  handed  down  from  the  ages  precedent.  Others 
of  the  published  maxims  are  of  a  moral  and  practical 
natiu'e,  such  as  proverbs  and  wise  saws  handed  down 
from  father  to  son  and  from  one  generation  to  another, 
as  "  Evil  communications  corrupt  good  manners,"  "  Sec- 
ond thoughts  are  best."  Others  of  the  maxims  have  not 
been  embodied  in  words  and  never  will  be.  For  example, 
you  have  discovered  of  a  certain  man  that  you  can  trust  him, 
and  you  confide  in  his  statements,  and  could  place  your 
property  in  his  hands.  Or,  you  have  found  of  a  certain 
look  and  manner,  which  you  know  but  could  not  describe, 
that  they  are  signs  of  deceit  and  dishonesty.  Such  media 
axiomrita,  as  Bacon  calls  them,  equally  removed  from  high 
generalizations  and  niinute  particulars,  are  most  useful 
of  all  in  the  arts  and  the  practical  business  of  life.  And 
observe  wherein  lies  their  utility.  They  form,  as  we  shall 
immediately  see,  the  major  premisses  in  that  reasoning 
which  the  mind  is  ever  conducting  in  regard  to  the  cases 
that  cast  up — these  cases  supplying  the   minors.     One 


MEMABKS  ON  REASONING   PROCESS.         157 

grand  use  of  education  in  tlie  higher  sense  of  the  term, 
of  travel,  and  of  an  acquaintance  with  the  world,  is  to 
supi^ly  such  majors  for  continual  use  and  api)hcation  in 
the  varied  circumstances  of  hfe. 

Ot,  Many  of  the  maxims  are  absolutely  certain.  Such 
are  estabhshed  scientific  laws,  as  those  of  chemical  affin- 
ity, of  physiology',  and  psychology.  Such  are  also  aL 
moral  maxims,  as  that  it  is  wrong  to  he,  to  thieve,  tc 
kill.  In  other  cases,  the  maxim  is  true  only  in  most 
cases.  For  examj)le,  the  rule  that  netted-leaved  plants 
are  exogenous  is  true  only  as  to  most  plants ;  for 
there  is  a  tribe  called  dictyogens  by  Lindley,  which  have 
netted-leaves  and  yet  are  endogenous.  The  general  ob- 
servation that  solanacese  are  poisonous,  has  a  still  greater 
number  of  exceptions — for  the  potato  is  a  solauaceous 
plant ;  and  all  that  such  a  rule  can  do  is  to  guard 
against  eating  the  flowers  or  berries  of  this  tribe  of 
plants  when  they  come  in  our  way.  Of  this  character 
are  the  loose  maxims  which  float  in  the  world  as  to  races 
and  nations.  Acting  on  them  we  are  commonly  right, 
while  we  should  greatly  eiT  if  we  insisted  on  applying 
them  rigidly.  "  One  of  themselves,  even  a  prophet  of 
their  own,  said,  the  Cretans  are  always  hars,  evil  beasts, 
slow  bellies,"  "Frenchmen  ai-e  Uvely,"  "The  Ii-ish  are 
witty,"  "  The  Scotch  are  cautious." 

08.  When  all  the  new  steps  in  the  reasoning  process 
are  seen  to  be  true  intuitively,  we  have  what  is  called 
Demonstration  {a~66ei^L(;).  The  fittest  example  is  to  be 
found  in  INIathomatics.  Here  we  start  with  things  defined, 
that  is,  with  points,  lines,  squares,  eUipses,  kc,  and  look- 
ing to  these  things,  on  the  bare  contemplation  of  them, 
we  discover  certain  truths  regarding  them.  This  is  what 
is  to  be  understood  by  intuitive  truths — truths  seen  on 
the  bare  inspection  of  the  things.  Having  thus  obtained 
»Tertain  tniths,  we  compare  two  truths   by  means   of  » 


158  BEASONING. 


third — wliicli  is  reasoning' — and  rise  to  farther  and  far- 
ther truths.  Finding  that  the  line  A  B  =  the  line  C  D, 
and  C  D  =  E  F,  we  conclude  that  A  B  =  E  F.  The  things 
we  thus  compare  are  all  abstracts,  and  the  notions  are  all 
distributed  both  in  the  subject  and  the  predicate.  This 
kind  of  reasoning  all  falls  under  the  head  in  which  the 
law  of  Equivalence  is  the  regulating  principle.  We  may 
an  tinge  the  terms  as  we  please  as  subject  and  predicate 
in  the  proposition,  and  the  propositions  as  we  please  iu 
the  syllogism — there  being,  properly  speaking,  no  major 
and  no  minor.  We  do  not  require  to  announce  a  gene- 
ral piinciple,  as  that  things  which  are  equal  to  the  same 
things  are  equal  to  one  another ;  on  the  bare  contem- 
plation of  AB  and  EF  being  equal  to  CD,  we  conclude 
them  to  be  equal  to  one  another.  This  reasoning  is 
also  found  to  a  limited  extent  in  Formal  Logic,  as  when 
we  draw  the  rules  of  the  syllogism  (§  20-23)  and  the  spe- 
cial rules  of  the  figures  (§  29-34)  fi-om  the  Dictum  of  Aris- 
totle. It  cannot,  however,  be  employed  in  any  of  those 
departments  of  knowledge  in  which  we  deal  with  scat- 
tered facts.  In  such  branches,  the  only  available  method 
is  that  of  Induction — a  subject  which  does  not  fall  under 
FoiTQal  Logic,  but  that  Secondary  department  which 
treats  of  discursive  thought  as  applied  to  certain  classes 
of  objects. 

00.  "SVTien  the  evidence  is  gained  fi'om  a  gathered  ex- 
perience, it  is  called  Experiential,  also  Probable,  and 
Moral.  It  is  of  importance  that  we  should  know  the 
difference  between  this  and  Demonsti'ative  or  Apodictive 
evidence.  (1)  The  essential  distinction  is  that  the  one 
is  derived  exclusively  from  intuition,  and  the  other  partly 
or  wholly  from  experience.  In  order  to  discover  the  truth, 
the  mind  in  the  former  case  looks  simply  at  the  object ; 
whereas  in  the  latter  there  is  need  of  observation,  com- 
monly  of  ol^f-ervation   upon   observation.     There   is   no 


BEMARKS  ON  REABONINO   PROCESS.  159 

Deed  of  trial  in  order  to  convince  us  that  two  parallel 
lines  will  never  meet ;  the  trnth  is  discovered  at  once  by 
the  bare  contemplation  of  parallel  lines.  But  we  cannot 
by  thus  inspecting  the  things  say  whether  the  planets  do 
or  do  not  move  in  elhpses,  whether  the  earth  is  or  is  not 
hot  in  the  centre.  "A  clever  man  shut  up  alone  and 
allowed  an  unlimited  time,  might  reason  out  for  himself 
a!l  the  truths  of  mathematics,  by  proceeding  from  those 
simple  notions  of  space  and  number  of  which  he  cannot 
divest  himself  without  ceasing  to  think  ;  but  he  could 
never  tell  by  any  effort  of  reasoning  what  would  become 
of  a  lump  of  sugar  in  water,  or  what  inij^ression  would  be 
produced  on  his  eye  by  mixing  the  colors  yellow  and 
blue."  (Sir  J.  Herschel.)  (2)  The  one  does  not,  the  other 
does,  admit  of  degrees.  Demonstration  does  not  allow  of 
degrees.  Every  one  proposition  so  substantiated,  is  as 
certain  as  any  other,  as  every  other.  Nor  can  we  add  to 
the  evidence  of  a  proposition  demonstrated.  That  the 
opposite  angles  fonned  by  the  crossing  of  two  straight 
lines  are  equal,  this  cannot  be  rendered  more  certain  by 
any  addition  of  proof.  It  is  different  with  observational 
evidence  which  admits  of  all  degrees  of  certainty.  That 
it  will  rain  to-morrow  is  a  vastly  more  uncertain  propo- 
sition than  that  the  sun  will  rise  to-morrow.  This  kind  of 
evidence  may  have  additions  made  to  it ;  the  probability 
of  there  being  rain  may  be  increased  by  the  fall  of  the 
barometer  and  the  threatening  aspect  of  the  sky.  It  may 
rise  at  last  to  moral  certainty,  which  ought  to  carry  our 
full  conviction  and  lead  to  corresponding  action.  (3)  In 
the  one  there  is  not,  in  the  other  there  commonly  is,  a 
balancing  of  seemingly  opposite  proofs.  In  Demonstra- 
tion there  never  is  anything  contrary,  even  in  appcai'ance, 
to  what  has  been  estabhshed.  But  in  Probable  evidence 
there  is  often  one  fact  or  argument  which  seems  to  in- 
cline one    way,  and  another   which   seems  to   tend  the 


160  I{EASO^^IIfCf. 

other  way  ;  and  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory^  conclu- 
sion, we  must  look  at  both,  and  give  to  each  its  proper 
weight.  What  a  number  of  considerations  require  to  be 
estimated  before  a  mei'chant  makes  an  extensive  piirchase 
of  certain  goods  ;  before  a  statesman  proposes  a  measure 
with  far-reaching  consequences ;  before  a  general  ventures 
on  a  perilous  campaign  1  The  most  useful  of  all  kinds 
of  practical  sagacity  is  that  wldch  enables  a  man,  in 
the  midst  of  complicated  circumstances,  to  determine  on 
which  side  the  balance  of  probability  lies.  (4)  The  one 
does  not,  the  other  does,  involve  responsibility.  There 
is  no  sort  of  accountability  attaching  to  intuitive  evidence  ; 
a  man  must  believe  it,  whether  he  will  or  not.  We  have 
no  credit,  or  the  reverse,  in  believing  that  if  we  take  equals 
fi-om  un equals  that  the  remainders  are  unequals  ;  or  that 
the  angles  at  the  basis  of  an  isosceles  triangle  are  equal 
to  one  another.  As  soon  as  any  one  understands  these 
propositions  and  the  evidence  advanced  in  their  behalf— 
if  they  need  proof — he  is  obliged  to  yield  his  assent  to 
them.  It  is  difi'ercnt  with  Experiential  Evidence.  A  man 
may  or  may  not  Listen  to  it ;  he  may,  but  he  also  may  not, 
act  upon  it.  There  is  room  here  for  the  influence  of  a 
spirit  of  candor,  or  for  the  opposite  temper  of  preijosses- 
sion  and  prejudice.  It  is  on  this  account,  that  experien- 
tial evidence  is  often  called  Moral,  because  it  is  possible 
for  us  either  to  attend  to  it  or  not  to  attend  to  it,  and  the 
act  to  be  morally  right  or  morally  wrong. 

70.  It  is  vain  to  expect  Demonstration  in  every  line  of 
inquiry.  Demonstration  is  confined  to  a  Hmited  class  of 
objects,  and  these  characterized  by  their  simple  and  ab- 
stract nature.  In  most  of  the  sciences  it  is  not  available  ; 
it  cannot  be  had  in  chemistry,  in  natural  histoiy,  in  psy- 
chology, in  political  economy.  In  the  practical  afiairs  of 
life  no  man  looks  for  it.  If  a  man's  house  is  on  fire,  he 
will  proceed  to  pour  water  upon  it,  though  it  cannot  be 


JIEMABKS   ON  REASONING  PROCESS.  ICl 

demonstrated  in  the  technical  sense  of  the  term,  tliat 
water  will  quench  the  flame.  The  evidence  adduced  in 
behalf  of  tiie  existence  of  God,  of  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  of  a  day  of  judgment,  and  of  the  tnith  of  the  Chris- 
tian rehgion,  is  all  of  this  moral  character.  It  is  addressed 
to  an  understanding  capable  of  weighing  it,  and  a  heart 
supposed  to  be  ready  to  receive  it.  There  may  bo  excel- 
lence implied  in  the  faith  that  receives  it ;  and  guilt 
involved  in  the  perverseness  which  rejects  it.* 

71»  To  return  from  this  seeming  digression.  It  is  to 
be  observed  that  all  reasoning  proceeding  on  experiential 
evidence  falls  under  the  Dictum  of  Aristotle,  and  in  order 
to  its  validity  we  must  have  a  major  as  well  as  a  minoi 
premiss.  The  major  may  not  always  be  expressed  ;  the 
argument  often  takes  the  form  that  is  vulgarly  called  tin 
Enthymeme,  that  is,  with  one  premiss  suppressed.  But 
one  reason  for  its  being  so  often  unnoticed  is  that  we  are 
so  familiar  with  it ;  and  whether  expressed  or  not,  it  is  in 
all  cases  imphed,  and  we  proceed  upon  it  iu  our  reason- 
ings. 

72.  It  has  been  disputed  whether  there  is  reasoning 
involved  iu  the  Inductive  Method  of  inquiry,  by  which  all 
discoveries  have  been  made  in  physical  and  mental 
science.  In  that  method  two  steps  are  involved  :  one  is 
the  gathering  of  the  facts  ;  the  other  the  gathering  of  the 
law  out  of  the  facts.  In  the  former  there  may  be  no 
special  exercise  of  ratiocination  ;  but  in  the  latter  there 
is  ;  wo  proceed  from  something  given  to  something  de- 
rived from  it,  from  the  facts  to  the  law  of  the  facts.     And 

♦  "  I  receive  mathemiitics  as  the  most  sublime  and  useful  science  as  long  ai 
they  arc  applied  iu  their  proper  place ;  but  I  cannot  commend  the  misuse  of 
them  in  matters  which  do  not  belong  to  their  sphere ;  and  in  which,  noble 
ecience  as  they  are,  they  seem  to  be  mere  nonsense  ;  as  if,  forsooth,  things  only 
exist  when  they  can  be  mathematically  demonstrated.  Tt  would  be  foolish  for 
a  man  not  to  believe  in  his  mistress's  love  because  she  could  not  prove  it  to  him 
mathematically.  She  can  mathematically  prove  her  dowry,  but  not  her  love."— 
Qoethb's  Conversations  ivith  Eckennann. 

11 


162  REASONma. 

this  reasoning  can  be  reduced  to  syllogistic  form.  In  the 
inference  there  are  two  things  involved  ;  one  is  the  facts 
gathered,  and  the  other  some  general  principle  on  which 
we  proceed  in  reaching  the  law  from  the  facts.  Attempts 
have  been  made  to  enunciate  the  principles  which  entitle 
us  to  rise  fi'om  the  particulars  to  the  laws  and  causes. 
The  fii'st  systematic  attempt  was  made  by  Bacon,  who 
enumerated  a  number  of  Prerogatives  of  Instances  (Pre- 
rogative Instantiai'um),  which  enable  us  to  proceed 
fi'om  the  facts  to  what  he  called  axioms,  causes,  and 
forms.  In  this  past  age  these  have  taken  a  better  form 
in  what  are  called  Canons  of  Induction.  Now  these  Pre- 
rogatives of  Instances,  or  Canons  of  Induction,  are  in 
fact  the  major  premisses,  while  the  observed  facts  consti- 
tute the  minor  premisses  iu  the  process  by  which  we  rise 
fi'om  the  facts  to  the  law.  To  give  an  example.  The  an- 
cients refeiTed  the  rising  of  water  in  a  pump,  and  of  mer- 
curv  in  a  tube,  to  natiu'e's  horror  of  a  vacuum.  Toricelli 
and  Pascal  referred  it  to  the  weight  of  the  atmosphere. 
The  case  wai  decided  by  taking  a  barometer  to  the  top  of 
a  mountain,  when  it  was  found  that  the  mercury  de- 
scended as  the  instrument  was  carried  up  to  a  higher 
elevation.  One  of  Bacon's  Prerogatives  of  Instances 
guarantees  the  process,  what  he  calls  the  Experimentum 
Crucis :  When  there  are  two  rival  theories,  let  us  produce 
a  phenomenon  which  can  be  explained  by  the  one  and  not 
by  the  other,  and  it  will  prove  the  truth  of  the  theory 
which  furnishes  the  explanation.  This  constitutes  the 
major  premiss,  and  the  minor  premiss  is  the  fact  that  the 
mercury  sinks  as  the  atmosphere  becomes  hghter, — a  fact 
which  cannot  be  explained  on  the  theory  of  natui'e's  hor- 
ror of  a  vacuum,  but  can  on  the  other.  The  process  may- 
be unfolded  still  more  clearly  by  that  Canon  of  Induction 
called  the  Metliod  of  Difference.  "  If  in  comparing  one 
case  ill  which  the  effect  takes  place,  and  another  iu  which 


REMARKS   ON  REASONING  PROCESS.  1(J3 

it  does  not  take  place,  we  find  the  latter  to  have  every  an- 
tecedent in  common  with  the  former  except  one,  that  one 
circumstance  is  the  cause  of  the  former,  or  at  least,  part  of 
tlie  cause  of  it."  This  is  the  major  premiss  in  the  argu- 
ment. The  minor  is,  that  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain 
where  the  atmosphere  was  heavy  the  mercury  was  high, 
while  it  was  low  at  the  top  where  the  atmosphere  was 
light.  The  two  together  guarantee  the  conclusion  that 
the  weight  of  the  atmosphere  is  the  cause,  or  part  of  the 
cause,  of  the  rise  of  the  mercury. 

73,  The  best  exposition  of  the  Canons  of  Induction  is  by  Mr. 
Mill  {Logic,  B.  III.,  c.  viii.).  He  states  and  illustrates  five  : — that  of 
the  Method  of  Agreement,  of  the  Method  of  Diiference,  of  the  Joint 
Method  of  Agreement  and  Diflference,  of  the  Method  of  Residues, 
and  of  Concomitant  Variations.  But  ho  does  not  perceive  that 
their  Canons  are  the  major  premiss,  while  the  facts  are  the  minor 
premiss,  in  the  process  by  vehich  we  reason  from  the  facts  to  the 
law.  We  are  prevented  from  enlarging  on  this  subject  only  by  the 
circumstance  that  it  would  carry  us  into  Particular  Logic.  It  is 
enough  to  show  here  how  the  reasoning  Involved  in  Induction  can 
be  reduced  to  syllogistic  form. 

74.  When  the  premisses  are  only  probably  true,  the 
conclusion  is  also  only  probably  true.  "  Eash  actions  lead 
to  evil  consequences,"  is  true  only  in  a  general  way — 
there  are  cases  in  which  rash  deeds  have  led  to  brilliant 
results.  But  in  dealing  with  such  general  maxims,  we 
arc  not  to  allow  to  the  conclusion  a  certainty  not  found 
in  the  premisses — to  use  a  graphic  illustration  of  "NVhato- 
ly's — "The  chain  is  not  stronger  than  its  weakest  part." 
It  is  e\'ident  that  if  both  the  premisses  in  an  argument, 
and  still  more  if  all  the  premisses  in  a  chain  of  argument, 
bo  only  probably  true,  the  conclusion  is  more  uncertain 
than  any  one  of  them.  If  a  story  has  reached  us  thi-ough 
a  number  of  persons  detailing  it  the  one  to  the  other,  it 
may  come  in  the  end  to  be  very  doubtful,  even  though 
each  narrator  be  probably  tnistworthy.  It  is  thus  that 
events,  handed  down  from  age  to  age  by  tradition,  bo' 


164  REASONING. 

come  in  the  end  very  uncertain — tlie  stream  may  at  first 
have  been  pure,  but  it  receives  a  polluting  mixture  in 
every  region  through  which  it  passes.  Sometimes  we 
can,  in  a  loose  "way,  numerically  estimate  the  probability 
attaching  to  each  premiss  in  the  chain  of  proof,  and  then 
we  can  state  the  conclusion  numerically.  The  incident, 
we  may  suj)pose,  has  reached  us  through  three  persons  : 
one  trustworthy,  and  we  value  his  testimony  at  ^^^,,  re- 
garding 1  as  absolute  certainty  ;  the  testimony  of  another 
we  reckon  |,  and  of  tbe  other  h  ;  the  probability  of  the 
Btory  being  ti'ue  is  now  /o  x  |  x  A  =  y^  ;  and  we  see  that 
the  story  is  more  hkely  to  be  false  than  true.  The  suc- 
cess of  a  scheme  depends,  we  may  snpj)ose,  on  the  com- 
bined character  and  abihty  and  wisdom  of  the  person  who 
manages  it.  His  character  we  estimate  -j'-'^  ;  his  abihty, 
^xj ;  and  his  wisdom,  -j"y  ;  the  probabihty  of  his  success 
will  be  -^Q  X  y''^g  X  /jj  =  jVj^p  or  the  scheme  is  more  Hkely 
to  fail  than  to  succeed.  It  is  seldom  that  in  the  practical 
affairs  of  life  we  can  get  numerical  estimates  of  any  value. 
"When,  however,  the  data  are  derived  from  such  occur- 
rences as  the  average  number  of  deaths  taking  place  an- 
nually among  a  definite  number  of  persons,  and  of  fii-ea 
occun-ing  in  a  certain  description  of  property,  Insurance 
Companies  can  make  calculations  which  are  rigidly  cor- 
rect as  to  averages.  But  in  all  such  cases  the  calculation 
belongs  rather  to  the  arithmetician  than  the  logician. 
The  shrewd  man  of  the  world,  without  expressing  his 
premisses  or  conclusion  in  numbers,  can  commonly  ob- 
tain Kufiiciont  data  to  enable  him  to  reason  and  reach  a 
sound  conclusion,  as  to  the  side  on  which  the  probability 
lies,  in  departments  falling  under  his  habitual  notice.  He 
may  err  in  regard  to  a  given  proposal  made  to  him,  and 
lose  much  by  acting  or  not  acting  ;  but  in  the  long  run 
he  will  be  found  in  acting  on  the  rules  (majors)  which  he 
has  laid  down  for  himself,  to  have  acted  judiciously.     He 


REMARKS   ON  REASONING  PROCESS  1G5 

who  proceeds  habitually  on  such  principles  as  that  "  rash 
actions  are  to  bo  avoided,"  "  honesty  is  the  best  poHcy," 
will  be  found  in  the  end  to  have  acted  a  prudent  part  in 
this  world.  Swayed  by  other  and  moral  principles,  he 
vnli  be  found  to  have  acted  a  good  and  a  generous  part. 

7J.  When  there  is  a  concurrence  of  evidence  towards 
a  pai-ticular  point,  the  conclusion  is  more  probable  than 
any  of  the  premisses.  An  incident  is  detailed  to  us  by  three 
independent  witnesses  known  to  us  to  be  trustworthy,  and 
we  have  now  quite  as  certain  proof  as  is  to  be  had  in  this 
world.  We  estimate  the  probabiUty  of  each  of  them 
speaking  the  truth  as  j%  ;  this  makes  the  probability  of 
each  of  them  speaking  falsely  as  only  J,^,  and  the  proba- 
bility of  the  three  concurring  in  a  falsehood  as  y'^  x  J^  x 
-,'5,  or  only  jooo-  01  this  description  is  the  evidence  in  be- 
half of  the  great  doctrines  of  natiural  and  revealed  rehgion. 
Thus  in  behalf  of  the  existence  of  God,  we  have  the  argu- 
ment from  the  evident  design  in  the  stracture  and  adap- 
tations of  animal  and  plant,  the  native  disposition  to  ti-ace 
the  seen  effects  to  their  unseen  cause,  and  the  conscience 
or  law  in  the  heart  pointing  to  a  lawgiver.  In  favor  of 
the  Christian  religion  we  have  the  deposition  of  witnesses 
that  Jesus  performed  mu-acles  and  rose  fi'om  the  dead  ; 
and  we  have  the  character  of  Jesus  and  the  docti-ines  he 
taught,  the  spirit  he  inculcated  and  the  precepts  he  en- 
joined. Evidence  of  this  kind  is  called  Cumulative,  and 
may  amount,  as  in  the  cases  just  mentioned,  to  the  highest 
moral  certainty.  There  is  still,  to  be  siu-e,  a  bare  possi- 
bihty  of  error,  but  it  is  as  one  to  a  thousand,  a  million,  or 
a  million  millions.  Only  diseased  minds  will  allow  them- 
selves to  dwell  on  it — only  the  fool  will  saj'  in  his  heart, 
There  is  no  God.  But  healthy  minds  will  brash  it  aside, 
will  in  fact  not  feel  it  in  the  view  of  the  overwhehuing 
evidence  on  the  other  side. 

70.  When  there  is  a  concuiTence  of  facts  towards  a 


1G6  REASONma. 

conclusion,  the  point  may  be  regarded  as  established  wlien 
no  one  of  the  proofs  is  itself  sufficient.  This  is  what  is 
called  Circumstantial  Evidence.  A  murder  has  been 
committed,  a  person  is  charged  with  the  crime,  and  the 
proof  runs  as  follows  : 

The  m  iirdcrer  may  very  likely  liave  blood  on  his  clotlies  ; 

This  man  had  blood  upon  his  clothes  ; 
.".  He  is  the  murderer. 

The  murderer  must  have  been  prowling  about  the  premises ; 

This  man  was  prowling  about  the  premises  ; 
.*.  lie  is  the  murderer. 

The  murderer  will  have  some  of  the  goods  of  the  murdered  man 

This  man  had  some  of  the  goods  of  the  murdered  man ; 
•.  lie  is  the  murderer. 

No  one  of  these  arguments  is  in  itself  conclusive.  The 
syllogisms  are  all  in  the  second  figure  ;  the  premisses  are 
both  affirmative  ;  in  neither  is  the  middle  term  distribu- 
ted, and  so  no  conclusion  can  be  di'awn.  But  by  such 
considerations  we  reach  a  general  major  premiss,  that  the 
person  thus  found  with  blood  on  his  clothes,  thus  seen 
prowhng  about  the  premises,  and  caught  with  the  prop- 
erty of  the  murdered  man  in  his  possession,  must  be  the 
murderer,  and  the  conclusion  follows  syllogistically. 

77,  "Whence  the  rapidity  and  the  uureilective  nature  of 
the  process  ?  It  is  acknowledged  by  all  logicians,  that  in 
spontaneous  reasoning  we  have  not  before  us  consciously 
the  distinction  between  major,  minor,  and  middle,  the 
moods  and  the  figiu'es  of  the  syllogism.  I  hold,  indeed, 
that  in  all  reasoning,  the  mind  has  before  it  the  terms,  and 
perceives  the  relations  between  them  ;  but  having  this, 
it  proceeds  with  amazing  quickness  and  without  analyz- 
ing or  even  reflecting  on  the  process.  This  rapidity  pro- 
ceeds from  the  laws  of  the  association  of  ideas.  These 
laws  are  those  of  Coexistence  and  Correlation.  Things 
which  have  been  together  in  the  mind  tend  to  suggest 
each  other,  as  do  also  things  that  are  related,  say  by  re- 


REMARKS  ON  REASONING   PROCESS.  1G7 

semblance,  or  means  and  end,  or  by  cause  and  effectt.  Now 
in  subjects  witli  -vvliich  we  are  familiar,  we  have  laid  up  an 
immense  store  of  such  associations,  partly  by  the  things 
having  been  broiight  together  in  our  experience,  and 
partly  by  our  being  ever  called  on  to  notice  relations. 
What  a  number  of  such  associations  are  formed  in  the 
mind  of  the  mathematician,  the  mechanic,  the  pohtician, 
and  the  student  of  the  hue  arts,  each  in  his  own  depart- 
ment. And  when  he  is  meditating  on  any  one  topic,  his 
thoughts  flow  on  with  amazing  speed  fi'om  one  point  to 
another.  In  this  flow  the  terms  of  an  argument  or  a 
ti'ain  of  reasoning  come  up,  and  he  perceives  the  relations 
between  them,  and  goes  on  from  premiss  to  conclusion, 
and  from  one  conclusion  to  a  farther.  Meanwhile  he 
might  be  quite  incapable  of  unfolding  the  process,  or 
even  of  recalling  the  steps.  At  the  same  time  it  is  ever  to 
be  understood  that  the  train  of  ideas  raised  by  association 
does  not  amount  to  reasoning.  I  believe  that  much  of 
what  is  called  reasoning  in  brutes,  and  even  among  chil- 
dren, proceeds  from  mere  association.  When  the  biu'ut 
child,  and  wo  may  add  the  bui-nt  dog,  di-eads  the  fire,  it 
is  from  the  mere  law  of  coexistence.  All  their  lives  men 
are,  more  or  less,  under  the  influence  of  mere  association, 
in  cases  in  which  we  imagine  them  to  be  reasoning.  They 
are  led,  not  by  a  concatenated  train  of  argument,  but  by 
mere  impulse — as  it  is  said,  that  is,  by  the  suggestion  that 
comes  up.  Hence  the  mistakes  into  which  they  are  ever 
falUag — mistakes  not  to  be  referred  to  the  reasoning 
power.  In  all  judgment,  and  in  reasoning  as  implying 
judgment,  there  is  a  perception  of  the  relations  of  the 
notions  to  each  other  ;  and  it  is  only  thus  we  can  reach  a 
Bound  and  safe  conclusion.  Association  is  to  be  allowed 
to  aid  us  as  an  assistant,  and  to  suggest  terms  for  com- 
parison. But  above  it,  as  a  master,  there  is  to  be  an 
understanding  to  judge  of  the  relations  of  the  terms  thua 


168  REASOmNO. 

brought  before  the  mind  ;  not  that  we  should  adoj^t  them 
or  follow  them,  but  that  we  should  judge  of  them,  and 
beheve  and  act  accordingly. 

78,  In  what  sense  are  the  truths  reached  by  the  rea- 
soning i^rocess  new  truths,  and  in  what  sense  old  truths  ? 
The}'  ai-e  old  truths,  inasmuch  as  they  all  depend  ujjon, 
and  are  derived  fi'om,  the  truths  with  which  the  mind  has 
started  in  the  reasoning  process.  That  this  man  -will  die, 
may  depend  on  two  other  truths,  that  he  has  consump- 
tion, and  that  consumption  produces  death.  That  man 
will  have  to  appear  before  the  Judgment-seat,  may  depend 
on  other  truths,  as  that  he  is  a  moral  being,  possessing 
intelligence,  conscience,  and  fi*ee  will.  The  truths  of  the 
sixth  book  of  Eaclid  are  all  obtained  fi'om  the  definitions, 
axioms,  postulates  assumed  at  the  beginning,  and  from 
the  reasonings  of  the  fii'st  five  books.  But  in  another  and 
an  imj)ortant  sense  they  are  new  truths.  They  are  not 
truths  at  all  to  us,  till  they  are  reasoned  out ;  they  may 
not  be  known  to  us  till  they  have  been  unfolded  by 
the  reasoning  process.  There  are  truths,  esisecially  in 
morals,  but  also  in  the  fine  arts,  in  geometry  itself,  and 
indeed  in  every  department  of  knowledge,  thus  bursting 
upon  us  with  all  the  freshness  of  novelty,  because  in  fact 
they  are  now  brought  out  by  us  for  the  first  time,  from 
premisses — it  may  be  known  to  us  for  years.  Such 
truths,  it  is  often  said,  come  to  us  by  intuition  ;  but  in  fact 
they  are  obtained  by  a  rapid  reasoning  process  aided  by 
association  ;  and  we  forget  the  steps  we  have  taken  in 
chmbing,  in  the  joy  we  experience  because  we  have 
gained  the  height. 


FALLACIES.  1G9 


rALLAOIES. 

70,  A  fallacy  is  defined  "  any  unsound  mode  of  argu- 
ing, wbich  appears  to  demand  our  conviction  and  to  be 
decisive  of  the  .^uestion  in  band,  wben  in  fairness  it  is 
not."  Its  genus  is  "  any  unsound  mode  of  arguing  ; "  but 
every  unsound  mode  of  arguing  is  not  a  fallacy  ;  it  is  so 
only  wben  "  it  seems  to  demand  our  conviction  and  to  be 
decisive  of  tbe  question  in  band  wben  " — we  prefer  saying 
— "  ifc  is  not  according  to  tbe  laws  of  tbougbt."  In  order  to 
its  being  a  fallacy,  it  is  not  needful  tbat  it  sbQ"ld  be  stu- 
diously constructed  for  deceitful  purposes.  Tbe  man  wbo 
uses  it  may  bimself  be  deceived  by  it ;  or  more  fi'equently 
be  bas  first  been  deceived  by  tbe  influence  of  selfisbness 
or  passion,  and  "  tbe  wisb  becomes  fatber  of  tbe  tbougbt," 
and  tbe  argument  occurs  to  bim  and  be  advances  it  in  bis 
justification.  Some  logicians  call  a  fallacy  a  Paralogism, 
wlien  tbe  man  wbo  employs  it  ic  deceived  by  it,  and  a 
Sophism  wben,  being  aware  of  its  uusoimdness,  be  uses 
it  to  deceive  others.  We  need  to  be  warned  not  only 
against  tbe  sopbistry  of  designing  men,  but  against  tbe 
fallacies  laid  in  our  way  by  persons  wbo  bv.beve  what  tbey 
say  ;  and,  as  still  more  dangerous,  against  tbose  wbicb 
originate  in  tbougbts  tbat  favor  our  own  selfisb  and 
crooked  aims. 

SO.  In  order  to  avoid  all  seeming  exaggeration,  we 
may  state  precisely  wbat  Logic  cannot  do,  and  what  it 
can  do,  in  the  way  of  preventiug  us  from  being  led  astray 
by  fallacious  reasoning.  It  should  be  allowed  at  once 
tbat  tbe  best  safeguard  against  error  of  every  kind,  is  to 
be  found  in  a  sincere  desire  to  discover  tbe  ti'utb,  wbicb 
keeps  tbe  mind  open  to  facts  and  arguments  fi-om  what- 
ever quarter  they  come — "  When  tbe  eye  is  single  tbe  whole 
body  8  full  of  ligbt."     Without  this,  no  dialectic  skill  can 


17U  HEASONmtt. 

protect  ITS  from  so  insidious  a  foe  as  a  deceitful  heart.  It 
may  be  farther  admitted  that  native  shrewdness  can  de- 
tect fallacies  without  the  aid  of  logical  rules.  But  fi-eely 
granting  all  this,  it  may  yet  be  maintained  that  many  valu- 
able practical  as  well  as  scientific  ends  are  to  be  gained 
by  an  acquaintance  with  logical  principles  and  the  viola- 
tions of  them.  It  is  most  important,  for  the  guidance  of 
our  thoughts,  that  we  should  know  what  are  the  essentifd 
steps  involved  in  inference  ;  that  we  should  be  aware,  for 
example,  that  there  are  always  tlu'ee  terms,  and  a  com- 
parison of  two  of  these  by  the  third ;  and  that  in  most 
reasoning  there  is  a  major  premiss  implied  in.  the  form  of  a 
general  principle.  By  a  logical  training  the  mind  is  led  to 
look  keenly  into  the  meaning  of  terms  and  the  relation  of 
tenns  one  to  another,  to  place  the  case  fairly  before  it,  to 
sift  the  proof  which  may  be  proffered,  and  to  determine 
how  far  it  is  fitted  to  support  the  conclusion.  How  use- 
ful, too,  to  know  what  are  the  common  forms  of  invalid 
reasoning,  to  be  aware  of  the  places  where  error  lurks,  that 
so  wo  may  be  on  our  guard  against  its  iusidious  attacks, 
or  ready  if  need  be  to  seek  it  out,  and  exj)ose  it  to  view 
and  hunt  it  to  death.  By  such  a  discipline  the  mind  may 
acquire  a  habit  which  will  lead  it  spontaneously  to  reason 
accm-ately,  and  gender  a  spirit  of  penetration,  scrutiny,  and 
caution,  which  will  save  it  from  being  carried  along  by  im- 
pulse, by  plausible  statement  and  clap-trap  oratory.  We 
find  the  correct  speaker  and  writer  coming  to  speak  and 
write  accui'ately  without  constniing  his  sentences,  but  it  is 
because  he  has  previously  studied  gi'ammar  ;  and  the  arith- 
metician makes  his  calculations  without  referring  to  rules, 
because  the  habit  has  become  part  of  his  nature.  In  like 
manner  the  correct  thinker  can  conduct  a  long  chain  of 
ratiocination,  without  thinking  of  syllogistic  formulae,  but 
all  the  while  the  skill  may  be  the  result  of  logical  train- 
ing, and  there  ma}'  bo  throughout  an  unconscious  use  of 


FALLACIES.  171 

the  principles  of  reasoning.  And  just  as  an  author  when 
a  dispute  arises  about  liis  hiuguage,  is  obliged  to  resort 
to  the  rules  of  grammatical  construction,  and  as  the  mer- 
chant's clerk  when  his  accounts  will  not  balance  has  to 
fall  back  on  arithmetical  rules  to  corx*ect  his  blunders,  so 
the  reasoner  may  find  it  convenient  when  he  hag  any 
cause  to  doubt  of  his  own  arguments,  or  to  dispute  those 
of  his  neighbor,  to  have  logical  rules  ready  for  apphca- 
tion.  In  this  way,  any  one  who  has  a  sincei*e  desire  to 
discover  the  truth,  may  be  guided  aright  in  his  own  cogi- 
tations, and  kept  from  aberrations  on  cither  side,  and 
enabled  to  use  any  natural  shrewdness  which  God  may 
have  given  him,  in  dciocting  the  sophistries  laid  in  his 
way  by  others. 

SI.  Psychology  can  explain  how  the  heart  swaya  the  head.  lu 
all  judgment,  immediate  or  mediate,  there  is  comparison  ;  the  com 
parisou  of  objects,  two  or  mm'e,  represented  to  the  intelligence  and 
apprehended  by  it.  But  the  representation  may  be  a  misrepresen- 
tation, the  apprehension  a  mistaken  one,  and  the  judgment  become 
in  consequence  a  perverted  one.  A  prejudiced  heart  presents  a  par- 
tial, an  exaggerated,  a  distorted  case  to  the  judicial  power.  This  is 
effected  through  the  influence  of  the  will  on  the  train  of  association. 
We  have  already  noticed  the  fact  (§  7G)  that  wliile  reasoning  is  not 
the  same  as  the  association  of  ideas,  it  is  yet  greatly  dependent  on 
it.  It  is  by  the  laws  of  the  succession  of  our  ideas  that  the  notions 
comjiared  are  suggested.  Now  the  will  has  a  direct  and  an  indirect 
power  over  the  train  of  thought  and  feeling.  It  has  a  direct  power 
in  retaining  the  present  idea,  for  as  long  as  the  will  to  retain  it 
exists,  it  keeps  the  idea  before  the  mind  ;  and  it  is  apt  to  detain 
only  what  pleases  and  gratifies  vanity,  pride,  and  passion,  and  it 
turns  away  from  all  that  would  reprove  or  humble.  And  then  it 
has  a  more  important  indirect  intluenco.  In  detaining  the  present, 
it  collects  around  it  a  great  many  other  thoughts  connected  with  it 
by  the  laws  of  suggestion,  say  by  the  law  of  co-existence,  or  the  law 
of  correlation.  In  doing  this,  it  calls  into  operation  certain  second 
ary  laws,  such  as  when  we  bestow  a  great  amount  of  energy  of  any 
kind — say  of  thought,  feeling,  or  attention — on  any  object,  it  will 
come  up  more  frequently  before  the  mind.  The  heart  thus  sends  up 
to  the  head  an  immense  number  of  ideas,  all  of  one  complexion  ;  and 


1 72  EEASOJ^ING. 

the  will  seizes  eagerly  on  those  that  please  it,  and  as  it  lodges  them 
they  gather  other  ideas  of  a  like  description,  till  at  last  the  man  is 
bound  in  a  fellowship  from  which  he  cannot  extricate  himself  This 
we  believe  to  be  the  main  source  of  our  erroneous  judgments  and 
invalid  reasonings.  They  spring  not  so  much  from  the  understand- 
ing as  from  the  prepossessions  of  the  heart,  callLug  up  only  one  kind 
of  ideas,  and  tempting  us  to  look  at  them  exclusively  and  carelessly, 
keeping  us  from  distinguishing  between  the  things  thatdiflfer,  lead- 
ing us  to  trace  effects  to  wrong  causes,  and  deceiving  us  by  fail 
appearances  and  specious  analogies. 

82,  Fallacies  fi-om  the  days  of  Aristotle  have  been 
logically  divided  into  those  In  Dictione  aud  those  Extra 
Diciioncm,  or,  to  use  a  better  mode  of  expression,  into 
those  in  Form  and  those  in  Matter.  The  foimer  are 
found  in  the  very  form  or  expression,  and  we  need  look 
no  farther  ;  the  latter  can  be  detected  only  when  we  look 
to  the  matter  or  objects  of  thought.  Whately  introduced 
a  third  division,  intermediate  between  the  two  others, 
what  he  calls  semi-logical,  lying  partly  in  the  form,  and 
partly  in  the  matter.  The  division  is  a  very  convenient 
one,  but  cannot  be  consistently  carried  out.  For  Logic 
cannot  look  at  mere  material  errors  ;  if  it  did  it  would 
have  to  look  at  all  errors,  and  therefore  at  all  knowledge, 
historical,  ethical,  theological,  scientific,  practical.  When 
confined  to  its  proper  province,  it  can  look  at  mistakes 
only  so  far  as  they  imply  violations  of  the  laws  of  thought. 
But  then  in  order  to  detect  them,  it  is  often  necessary  to 
look  at  the  matter,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  understanding 
what  is  meant  by  the  propositions  and  the  argument. 
Fallacies  of  the  latter  kind  constitute  what  are  properly 
called  Material  fallacies,  which,  however,  must  always  be 
logical,  inasmuch  as  they  imply  a  disregard  of  the  laws  of 
thought,  but  which  may  be  more  or  less  logical  according 
as  we  have  to  look  less  or  more  to  the  matter,  that  is,  the 
objects. 

83,  FORMAL  FALLACIES.     These  can  be  detected 


FALLACIES.  173 

from  the  expression  apart  from  the  meaning  or  the  ob- 
jects. They  are  simply  violations  of  the  fundamental 
laws  of  reasoning,  and  may  best  be  exposed  by  an  appli- 
cation to  them  of  the  rules  of  the  syllogism. 

Undistributed  Middle.  Some  one  proves  that  Mohammed 
was  sincere,  and  thence  quietly  infers  that  he  was  a  good 
man.     The  reasoning  is  : 

All  goud  men  are  sincere  ; 
Mohammed  was  sincere ; 
.'.  Mohammed  was  a  good  man. 

This  violates  the  general  rule  that  the  middle  must  be 
disti-ibuted  at  least  once  in  the  premisses,  which  is  not 
done  here,  as  both  premisses  are  affirmative  with  the  mid- 
dle term  in  their  predicates  undistributed.  It  also  vio 
lates  the  sj^ecial  rule  of  the  second  figure,  which  requires 
one  of  the  premisses  to  be  negative.  To  legitimate  the 
conclusion,  the  reasoning  must  take  a  form  in  which  it 
will  be  at  once  seen  that  the  major  premiss  is  not  true  : 

All  sincere  men  are  good  men ; 
Mohammed  was  sincere ; 
.*.  Mohammed  was  a  good  man. 

Some  one  shows  that  rehgious  professors  have  been 
hypocrites,  and  thence  argues  that  this  man  who  is  a  re- 
ligious professor  is  a  hypocrite.  This  conclusion  is  valid 
only  when  he  has  distributed  his  middle  by  showing  that 
all,  and  not  merely  some,  rehgious  professors  have  been 
hypocrites. 

8-1.  Illicit  Process  of  Major  or  Minor  Term.  Thus  some 
one  allows  that  all  studies  are  useful  which  tend  to  pre- 
pare a  man  for  the  practical  and  professional  duties  of 
life,  but  shows  that  the  study  of  Latin  and  Greek  does 
not  accompUsh  this  end,  and  thence  argues  that  it  is  use- 
less. Put  the  reasoning  in  proper  form,  and  it  is  at  onco 
Been  that  there  is  an  Illicit  Process  of  tbe  Major,  whicli  \a 
dietributed  in  the  conclusion  and  not  in  the  premiss. 


174  BEASONmO. 

The  studies  wliicb  prepare  for  professional  life  are  useful ; 
The  study  of  Latin  and  Greek  does  not  prepare  for  such. ; 
'.  It  is  not  useful. 
Wliatever  represses  tlie  liberties  of  mankind  is  to  be  resisted ; 
Among  the  tilings  which  do  so  are  governments; 
.*.  Governments  are  to  be  resisted. 

Here  is  an  illicit  process  of  the  Minor.  All  that  we  can 
argue  is  that  some  governments  are  to  be  resisted.    . 

83.  Negative  Premisses.  Some  one  is  arguing  against 
a  doctrine  he  dislikes,  and  lays  down  a  number  of  neg- 
ative positions  in  the  way  of  objection,  and  imagines  that 
he  has  established  a  positive  truth.  Thus  he  shows  that 
Christianity  cannot  be  proven  to  be  true  by  its  success — 
for  Moliammedanism  succeeded  ;  nor  by  its  alleged  mira- 
cles— for  false  rehgions  have  had  alleged  miracles.  But 
he  is  not  entitled  thereby  to  draw  any  positive  conclusion, 
certainly  not  to  conclude  that  Christianity  cannot  be 
proven  by  evidence. 

80.  Argumeiits  with  more  than  Three  Terms.  Thus 
when  it  is  aigued,  "  Every  one  desires  happiness  ;  virtue 
gives  h:ip])inoss;  therefore  everyone  deshx's  virtue,"  we 
have  no  fewer  tlian  five  terms  :  "  every  one,"  "  desirous 
of  happiness,"  "  virtue,"  "  gives  happiness,"  "  desirous  of 
virtue."  It  might  be  possible,  no  doubt,  to  express  the 
tliought  so  as  to  exhibit  only  three  terms  ;  but  then  the 
fallaciousness  of  the  whole  would  be  evident.  When  it 
is  argued  that  "as  idolatry  is  a  sin;  and  as  magistrates 
should  punish  sin  ;  so  they  should  punish  idolatry,"  the 
fallacy  may  be  concealed  by  not  seeing  that  there  are 
more  than  three  terms,  and  will  at  once  become  visible 
when  the  comparison  is  distinctly  stated: 

Sin  fflome  sin)  should  be  punished  by  magistrates; 
Idolatry  is  a  sin. 

"We  can  draw  no  conclusion  as  the  middle  is  not  dis- 
tributed. 


FALLACIES.  175 

fit*  Fallacies  of  Conditionals,  in  den}4ng  the  antecedent 
and  tlicnce  deuj'ing  tlie  conscqiient,  or  affirming  tlie  con- 
sequent and  tbcnce  affirming  the  antecedent.  "Prayer 
may  be  regarded  as  useful,  if  indeed  we  can  regard 
our  prayers  as  announcing  to  Deity  what  he  does  not 
know,  or  changing  his  eternal  piu'poses  ;  but  as  we  can- 
not tell  the  Omniscient  what  he  does  not  ah-eady  know,  or 
change  his  plans,  we  may  regard  prayer  as  useless." 
Hero  we  deny  the  antecedent  and  can  draw  no  conclusion 
—as  prayer  may  be  useful  on  other  gi'ounds.  "  If  this 
man  has  been  much  injured,  he  is  unfit  to  travel ;  but  he 
is  unfit  to  travel ;  so  he  has  been  much  injured."  Here 
wo  affirm  the  consequent,  but  can  thence  draw  no  con- 
clusion as  to  the  antecedent,  as  the  man  may  have  been 
unfit  to  travel  from  other  causes. 

Fallacies  in  Disjunctives  arise  chiefly  from  the  dividing' 
members  not  making  up  the  whole.  But  in  order  to  dis- 
cover this,  we  must  look  at  the  objects  ;  and  so  tliis  class 
of  fallacies  falls  under  the  head  of  Material. 

88,  MA  TERIAL  FALLACIES.  All  fallacies  must  im- 
ply a  violation  of  the  laws  of  thought  in  order  to  bring 
them  within  the  domain  of  Formal  Logic  ;  but  in  those 
now  to  be  considered  we  have  to  look  to  the  matter  in 
order  to  discover  this. 

Ajibigcous  Terms,  specially  Ahibiguous  IMiddle,  in  which 
a  term  is  used  in  different  senses  in  the  premiss  and 
conclusion,  or  in  the  middle  as  it  appears  in  the  two 
premisses.  This  is  the  Material  Fallacy  which  approaches 
nearest  the  Formal  Fallacies.  In  fact  it  falls  under  the 
head  of  Fallacies  involving  more  than  three  toj-ms.  It 
is  called  semi-logical  by  Whately.  It  is  logical  in  that 
it  violates  the  law  of  thought  which  requires  that  there 
be  only  three  notions  compared  in  the  three  projiosi- 
tions.  But  so  far  as  the  language  is  concerned,  there 
seem  to  be   only  three   notions,  and   wc  have   to  look 


176  BEASONWG. 

beyond  the  expression  to  find  that  under  the  same  phrase 
two  notions  have  been  introduced. 

89-  In  Part  First  we  have  dwelt  at  considerable 
length  ou  the  incidental  disadvantages  of  language,  and 
specially  on  those  which  spring  from  the  ambiguity  of 
terms.  No  evil  would  arise  from  the  double  meaning  of 
a  word  provided  we  always  had  a  clear  apprehension  of 
the  two  senses,  and  never  slid  fi'om  the  one  signification 
to  the  other  ra  the  coiu-se  of  the  argument.  When  Paul 
concludes  (Rom.  iii.  28),  that  "  a  man  is  justified  by  faith 
without  the  deeds  of  the  law,"  he  is  using  the  word  '  jus- 
tify' consistently  throughout,  as  meaning  'treated  by 
God  as  free  fi'om  guilt.'  "SVhen  James  says  (ii.  24),  "  Ye 
see  then  how  that  by  works  a  man  is  justified,  and  not  by 
faith  only,"  he  too  is  using  the  phrase  consistently, 
meaning  '  seen  to  be  just  before  God,'  which,  he  says, 
requires  the  evidence  of  works.  All  candid  minds  will 
see  and  acknowledge  that  in  such  a  case  the  two  state- 
ments are  not  contradictory,  and  that  both  argmmenta 
may  be  conclusive.  Were  we  steadily  to  bear  in  mind 
that  some,  as  Locke  and  Kant,  understand  '  reason '  as 
including  '  reasoning,'  and  that  others  employ  it  to  signify 
intuitive  reason,  which  excludes  '  reasoning,'  no  mischief 
could  arise  from  the  word  having  two  meanings.  The 
evil  arises  from  the  circumstance  that  people,  both  those 
who  employ  the  argument  and  those  to  whom  it  is  ad- 
dressed, are  apt  to  pass  from  the  one  sense  to  the  other 
without  being  aware  of  it. 

00.  Paul  says  (CoL  ii.  16),  "Let  no  man  judge  you 
in  meat,  or  in  drink,  or  in  respect  of  an  holyday,  or  of  the 
new  moon,  or  of  the  Sabbath-days,"  meaning  by  Sabbath- 
day,  the  seventh  day  of  the  week  kept  at  that  time  by 
many  Jewish  Clu'istians.  But  from  this  some  have  ar- 
giaed  that  Christians  are  not  now  bound  to  keep  the  Sab- 
bath-day, meaning  the  Lord's  day,  or  first  day  of  the 


FALLACIES.  177 

week.  Certain  of  the  ancient  philosophic  sects  of  Greece, 
as  the  Stoics,  laid  down  the  general  maxim,  whatever  is 
conformable  to  natui'e  is  virtuous  and  should  be  attended 
to.  The  Stoics  approved  of  the  principle,  undei-standing 
by  nature  what  is  godlike  within  and  without  us.  Bishop 
Butler  says  it  can  be  justified  only  when  we  properly  un- 
derstand our  nature,  and  give  to  the  moral  power  the 
highest  and  an  authoritative  commanding  place.  But 
some  have  understood  by  it,  all  that  is  in  our  nature  ;  and 
that  therefore  addictedness  to  pleasure  in  youth  and  to 
gain  in  old  age  are  allowable,  as  being  agreeable  to  na- 
ture. Many  have  argued  in  former  ages  that,  as  a  coun^ 
try  is  prosperous  according  to  its  wealth  (which  is  true 
in  the  political-economy  use  of  the  phrase),  and  as  a  cer- 
tain nation  has  much  wealth  (meaning  coin  or  precious 
metals),  it  must  therefore  be  in  a  prosperous  condition. 
There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  logomachy  in  the  dispute 
as  to  whether  there  is  a  reahty  in  heat,  light,  and  color  : 
some  meaning  by  these  phi-ases  the  sensation  in  our 
frame  ;  others,  the  external  qualities  exciting  the  sensa- 
tion. Many  are  puzzled  in  the  present  day  when  they 
hear  heat  described  as  a  mode  of  motion,  understanding 
by  heat  the  feeUng  in  our  organism  which,  they  say  truly, 
cannot  be  a  mode  of  motion,  whatever  the  exciting 
cause  may  be.  There  is  an  ambig-uity  in  the  phrases 
'obliged,'  'necessitated,'  which  has  led  to  false  conclu-* 
sions  being  di'awn  ;  some  understanding  by  the  phrases 
an  external  physical  compulsion,  and  others,  a  moral  in- 
clination in  the  will.  Thus  some  argue  that  since  no  man 
has  any  discredit  in  what  he  is  necessitated  to  do,  and  as 
certain  men  are  necessitated  by  their  nature  to  do  base 
deeds,  so  they  are  not  to  be  blamed  nor  punished.  An 
unsatisfactory  ethical  discussion  has  been  encouraged  by 
the  uncertain  meaning  of  the  woi'd  '  good,*  which  some- 
times means  *  morally  good,'  and  sometimes  is  so  widened 
12 


178  BEASONING. 

as  to  include  happiness.  Tliere  are  wi'iters  wlio  deceive 
themselves  as  they  pass  from  one  of  the  meanings  to  the 
other.  They  show  that  happiness  is  a  good  thing  and 
to  be  promoted,  and  then  go  on  to  speak  of  it  as  moral 
good-  The  -words  '  conceivable '  and  '  inconceivable '  have 
helloed  much  to  confuse  the  c(jntroversy  between  the  a 
priori  vaid.  a  poderiori  philosophies.  Descartes  maintained 
that  whatever  is  cleai'ly  and  distinctly  conceived,  is  to  be 
at  once  believed  ;  and  many  have  argued  that  what  is 
inconceivable  is  to  be  rejected.  It  is  shown  in  oj)position 
to  them,  that  we  can  clearly  and  distinctly  conceive,  in 
the  sense  of  picture  or  image,  many  things,  such  as  ghosts, 
in  the  existence  of  which  we  have  no  faith  ;  and  that 
there  are  things,  such  as  antipodes,  which  were  reckoned 
inconceivable  in  one  age,  and  believed  in  a  later  age.  If  the 
defenders  of  intuitive  truth  would  not  render  themselves 
the  easy  prey  of  their  opponents,  they  should  abandon  all 
such  vague  language,  and  show  that  there  are  truths 
which  man  perceives  at  once.  There  is  a  like  ambiguity 
in  the  statement  that  all  man's  ideas  are  got  by  expe- 
rience :  it  is  true  in  the  sense  that  experience  is  neces- 
sary in  order  to  the  ideas  springing  up  ;  but  it  is  not  true 
that  experience  apart  from  an  intuitive  capacity,  can  give 
us  such  ideas  as  those  of  moral  good  and  infinity. 

01*  Falla/na  Accidentis,  with  its  converse,  Fallacia  a 
dido  secundum  quid  ad  dictum  simpliciter.  In  both,  a 
term  is  used  in  one  of  the  propositions  of  the  sj'llogism 
to  signify  a  thing  in  itself,  or  in  its  substance,  and  in  the 
other  with  certain  adjuncts  or  accidents  :  as  in  the  hack- 
nicd  example,  "  What  is  bought  in  the  market  is  eaten  ; 
raw  meat  is  bought  in  the  market ;  therefore  it  is  eaten."' 
It  is  thus  that  orators  and  devotees  deceive  others  and 
are  deceived  themselves,  while  they  use  the  phrases  loy- 
alty, authority,  liberty,  faith,  religion.  These  are  noble 
qualities  in  themselves,  but  men  confound  the  accompani- 


FALLACIES.  179 

monts  with  the  essence  :  and  they  commend  loyalty  to  a 
person  which  is  disloyalty  to  a  nation  ;  and  obedience  to 
a  power  which  has  no  rightful  authority ;  and  a  liberty 
which  is  licentiousness  as  being  without  law  ;  and  a  faith 
which  is  creduHty  ;  and  a  religion  which  is  superstition. 
It  was  thus  that  the  cavaUers  denounced  the  covenanters 
and  piu-itans  as  disloyal,  though  no  set  of  men  ever  so 
mrant  to  be  loyal.  It  is  thus  that  some  denounce  as  in- 
fidels all  who  will  not  understand  as  they  do  the  fii'st 
chapter  of  Genesis,  or  account  as  they  do  for  the  for- 
mation of  the  strata  of  the  earth's  sui-face,  or  the  origin 
of  animal  species. 

02*  Eqinvocation,  embvQ.c\r\Q  in  ii  Amphiboly.  A  mem- 
ber of  the  House  of  Commons  was  supposed  to  have  called 
another  member  a  Har,  and  a  confused  dispute  arose 
whether  that  member  had  been  called  a  liar,  or  had  told 
a  lie,  when  the  gentleman  charged  rose  and  said  sol- 
emnly, "  It  is  quite  true  and  I  am  sorry  for  it,"  meaning, 
"  It  is  quite  true  he  is  a  liar  ; "  but  understood,  "  it  is 
quite  true  I  said  it."  To  this  head  may  be  referred  the 
response  of  the  oracle,  "  Aio  te,  Aeacida,  Romanes 
vincere  posse,"  and  the  prophecy  "The  Duke  yet  lives 
that  Henry  shall  depose."  But  there  ai'e  far  worse  in- 
stances of  equivocation  than  these,  in  common  use.  A 
person  is  charged  with  having  stnick  another  with  a  stick 
to  the  danger  of  his  life,  and  he  rephcs  that  he  did  not 
injure  him  with  a  stick,  though  he  is  conscious  all  the 
while  that  he  did  so  with  a  bar  of  iron.  Or  some  one  is 
charged  ^\'ith  having  done  a  base  act  on  a  certain  day  in 
the  forenoon,  and  he  denies  it,  because  he  did  it  after 
twelve  o'clock.  It  is  a  weapon  which  has  been  employed 
in  all  ages  in  pohtics,  in  coui'tship,  in  commercial  trans- 
actions :  language  is  employed  which  is  capable  of  being 
understood  in  a  just  sense,  but  which  is  meant  to  leave 
a  diiierent  impression  on  those  to  whom  it  is  adtlressed. 


ISO  IiEAsom^'^o. 

The  person  wlio  resorts  to  tliese  mean  triclcs  may  ima^no 
that  he  is  free  fr'om  the  sin  of  lying ;  but  the  fact  is,  his 
lying  is  of  a  peculiarly  aggravated  chara'^ter,  as  with  the 
falsehood  there  is  low  and  deceitful  cunning.  Closely 
allied  is  the  fallacy  of  what  is  called 

0.3.  Oblique  Expression.  It  is  used  by  the  courtier  and 
the  flatterer,  who  keep  within  the  limits  of  truth  in  their 
statement,  but  intend  that  their  words  should  suggest 
much  more  to  those  whom  they  address.  It  is  employed 
by  the  calumniator  when  he  does  not  bring  a  direct 
accusation — which  might  be  met ;  but  he  hints  and  in- 
sinuates certain  dark  charges  fitted  to  raise  our  worst 
suspicions.  We  see  it  exhibited  by  the  guilty  man  when 
he  puts  on  a  look  of  injured  innocence  ;  or  affects  a  vir- 
tuous indignation  because  such  an  offence  could  be 
charged  against  him.  There  are  certain  speakers  guilty 
of  it  in  every  sentence,  and  certain  writers  exhibit  it  in 
every  page,  for  they  can  say  nothing  clearly  and  plainly. 
It  has  been  said  of  Hiime,  as  a  historian,  that,  "  without 
asserting  much  more  than  can  be  proven,  he  gives  prom- 
inence to  all  the  circumstances  which  support  his  case,  or 
ghdes  hghtly  over  those  which  are  unfavorable  to  it." 

04.  FALLACIES  OF  CONFUSION.  Almost  all 
paralogisms  mighi.  be  put  under  the  head  of  Confusion  of 
Thought.  It  is  the  office  of  Logic  to  correct  error  by  ex- 
hibiting the  various  kinds  of  confusion  into  which  the 
mind  may  fall  in  apprehending,  judging,  and  reasoning. 
The  phrase,  Fallacy  of  Confusion,  might  be  restricted  to 
those  errors  which  arise  from  confounding  in  our  minds 
tiie  nature  of  the  notions  and  the  relation  of  the  notions. 
Thus  we  may  be  employing  in  argument  a  notion  of 
which  we  have  a  vei^  obscure  apprehension.  It  is  a  con- 
cept, and  we  do  not  know  what  are  the  common  quahties 
whi(;h  join  the  objects  in  the  concept,  and  in  the  jjrocesa 
we  suppose  these  qualities  now  to  be  one  thing  and  now 


FALLACIES.  181 

another.  "We  are  reasoning  about  the  'good,'  and  now 
we  suppose  it  to  be  the  morally  good  and  now  to  be  liap- 
piuess.  Or  we  use  abstract  and  general  terms  as  if  they 
were  singulars,  and  after  making  proper  enough  predi- 
cations of  them,  we  reach  a  conclusion  in  which  they  are 
to  be  understood  as  indi^adual  existing  things.  Plato  is 
right  in  saying  that  there  are  ideas  in  and  before  the 
Divine  Mind ;  that  these  Ideas  exist  as  model  forms  or 
laws  in  natui'e  ;  and  that  the  human  mind  may  rise  to 
the  contemplation  of  them.  But  he  is  wi'ong  when  he 
speaks  of  them  as  existences,  like  God,  the  world,  and 
the  human  mind.  Scientific  men  are  right  when  they 
say  that  the  planets  are  held  in  their  spheres  by  gravita- 
tion, but  they  eiT  when  they  give  gravitation  a  being  and 
a  power  different  fi'om  the  bodies  themselves  of  which 
gravitation  is  a  property.  Under  this  head  we  may  place 
the  fallacy  of  huderon  proteron,  of  placing  that  ichich  is 
first  last,  and  last  first.  The  good  woman  mentioned  in 
the  "  Guesses  after  Truth,"  had  a  truth  in  her  mind,  but 
expressed  it  very  confusedly,  when  she  thanked  God  that 
he  had  placed  the  Sabbath  at  the  beginning  of  the  week 
instead  of  the  middle  of  it,  as  thereby  eveiythiug  was 
kept  in  order. 

i)o.  Fallacy  of  Division  and  Composition,  in  which  a 
term  is  used  in  one  judgment  collectively,  and  in  another 
distiibutively.  In  Division,  a  term  is  used  collectively  in 
the  major  premiss  and  distributively  in  the  minor,  and 
in  Composition,  the  reverse.  The  hability  to  fall  into 
this  fallacy  is  much  furthered  by  the  ambiguity  of  the 
word  "  all,"  which  may  signify  the  whole  collectively,  or 
may  mean  every  one  ;  and  we  fall  into  a  fallacy  when  we 
use  it  in  one  proposition  of  the  syllogism  in  one  sense, 
and  in  another  proposition  in  the  other.  It  is  thus  that 
when  an  army  gains  a  victory,  every  regiment  and  soldier 


182  REASOXlIfG. 

in  it  is  apt  to  claim  a  share  of  tlie  credit,  tliough  he 
may  in  no  way  have  helped  to  produce  the  result. 
Many  a  one  reasons  thus  : 

"Wliat  is  no  uncommon  occurrence  may  reasonably  be  expected ; 
To  be  successful  in  play  is  no  uncommon  occurrence  ; 
.*.  To  be  successful  in  play  may  be  reasonably  expected. 

This  fallacy  is  involved  in  the  reasoning  of  the  youthj 
who  says  or  feels  :— I  may  lay  out  a  certain  sum  on  fine 
clothes  and  not  be  in  difficulties,  and  a  like  sum  in  jewels 
and  not  be  in  debt,  and  as  large  a  sum  in  travelling  with- 
out spending  all  my  money,  and  concludes  that  he  may 
jDrocui-e  all  these  enjoyments.  The  same  error  is  involved, 
but  in  an  ojDposite  Avay,  when  the  gi-eedy  man  being  asked 
to  subscribe  to  one  charity  after  another,  and  finding  that 
if  he  gives  to  all  he  will  be  ruined,  determines  to  give  to 
none.  "  Two  distinct  objects  may,  by  being  dexterously 
presented  again  and  again  in  quick  succession  to  the 
mind  of  a  cursory  reader,  be  so  associated  together  in  his 
thoughts  as  to  be  conceived  capable,  when  in  fact  they 
are  not,  of  being  actually  combined  in  practice.  The  fal- 
lacious behef  thus  induced,  bears  a  striking  resemblance 
to  the  optical  illusion  efi'ected  by  that  ingenious  and 
philosophic  toy  called  the  Thaumatropc,  iu  which  two 
objects  pauited  on  opposite  sides  of  a  card — for  instance, 
a  man  and  a  horse,  a  bii'd  and  a  cage — are,  by  a  quick 
rotatoi-y  motion,  made  to  impress  the  eye  in  combination 
BO  as  to  form  one  pictm-e,  oAhe  man  on  the  horse's  back, 
the  bird  iu  the  cage."     (Whately.) 

i)(i.  Imperfccl  Dimsion.  This  fallacy  specially  appears 
in  Disjunctive  Reasoning,  in  which  it  is  impHed  in  order 
to  the  validity  of  the  reasoning,  that  the  members  make 
up  the  whole,  and  that  they  exclude  one  another.  But  it 
often  happens  that  the  parts  named  do  not  make  ui3  the 
whole  : 


FALLACIES.  183 

If  it  is  decreed  that  you  will  recover  from  this  disease  yon  do  not 
need  a  physician ;  if  it  is  decreed  that  you  will  not  recover 
you  do  not  need  a  physician  ; 
But  you  will  either  recover  or  not  recover ; 
. .  ifou  do  not  need  a  physician. 

Whereas  there  may  be  a  third  supposition  ;  that  it  is  de- 
creed that  you  are  to  recover  by  means  of  a  physician. 

Quite  as  frequently  the  di\dsions  are  not  exclusive,  in 
other  words,  cross  each  other.  In  the  famous  con- 
troversy between  the  a  jyi'iori  and  a  posteriori  philoso- 
phies, the  supporters  of  the  latter  shut  their  opponents 
up  into  the  dilemma,  that  such  ideas  as  those  of  power 
and  moral  good  are  to  be  had  either  from  some  innate 
power  exclusively  or  from  experience,  and  then  show 
that  experience  has  to  do  with  their  formation  ;  but  the 
truth  may  be  that  the  two  combine  ;  the  native  power 
may  work  in  our  experience,  and  on  the  occasion  of  our 
experience.* 

07*  We  now  come  to  consider  fallacies  arising,  not  so 
much  fr'om  the  tenns,  as  from  their  relation  to  one  an- 
other in  the  reasoning. 

Fallacy  of  Sliifling  Ground,  as  when  the  advocate  or 
opponent  of  a  cause  begins  as  if  he  were  about  to  prove 
it  to  be  good  and  right,  and  as  he  proceeds  shows  that 
some  good  may  be  derived  fr'om  it ;  or  that  it  is  wrong 
and  bad,  and  shows  that  it  has  led  to  certain  supposed 
evil  results.  Under  this  head  may  be  jDlaced  the  common 
practice  of  persons  professing  to  prove  that  a  certain 
deed  has  been  done,  but  dwelling  chiefly  on  the  enormity 
or  the  excellence  of  the  deed,  with  the  view  of  rousing 


*  Triptolemus  YoUowloy  thought  there  were  two  ways  of  diaininjj  Braebaster 
Iioch,  one  down  tho  Liuklater  Glen,  the  other  hy  the  Scahnester  burn.  But  the 
Udaller  saw  the  imperfection  of  bis  divi!»ion.  "  There  is  a  third  way ;  let  each 
of  us  start  an  eqnal  proportion  of  brandy,  lime  juice,  and  sugar,  into  the  loch, 
and  let  us  assemble  all  the  jolly  Udallcrs  of  the  country,  and  in  twenty-foul 
hours  you  shall  eee  diy  eround  where  the  loch  of  Braebaster  now  Ik." 


the  feelings  and  to  prevent  it  being  seen  that  they  have  not 
estabhshed  their  point.  Francis  Bacon  is  charged  with 
having  received  an  estate  from  his  friend  the  Earl  of  Essex, 
and  afterwards  being  unkind  to  him  ;  and  the  strength  of 
the  writer  is  expended  in  dwelling  on  the  evil  of  ingrati- 
tude, especially  on  the  part  of  so  great  a  man,  instead  of 
proving  the  alleged  facts.  In  oral  controversy  how  often 
is  it  found  that  you  combat  "  both  your  opponent's  pre- 
misses alternately,  and  shift  the  attack  from  the  one  to  the 
other,  without  waiting  to  have  either  of  them  decided 
before  you  quit  it.  '  And  besides '  is  an  expression  one 
may  often  hear  from  a  disputant  who  is  proceeding  to  a 
fresh  argument,  when  he  cannot  establish,  and  yet  will 
not  abandon,  his  first"     Under  this  head  may  be  placed  : 

f>^,  Fallacia  Flurium  Interrogalioiium  consists  ia  ask- 
ing two  or  more  questions  as  if  they  were  one  and  the 
same,  and  when  one  of  them  is  answered  it  is  interpreted 
as  applied  to  the  other.  It  is  a  trick  of  a  low  kind  often 
resorted  to  by  lawyers  in  examining  witnesses,  with  the 
view  of  puzzling  them,  and  tiu-ning  their  answers  to  a 
wrong  account.  "  You  were  swayed  by  the  love  of  money 
in  the  transaction  ?  "  (meaning  exclusively,)  to  which  the 
witness  answers  "  yes,"  (meaning  in  part.)  Another  ques- 
tion follows  :  "  In  being  swayed  by  money  you  were 
acting  selfi.shly  in  the  transaction  ?  "  The  fallacy  appears 
in  higher  matter.s.  Thus  the  utilitarian  puts  to  us  the 
questions  :  **  You  deny  that  virtue  consists  in  utility  ?  " 
"  Yes."  "  Then  you  deny  that  utility  is  a  good  thing." 
The  fallacy  is  to  be  rnet  l)y  accui-atoly  answering  each 
question  separately. 

!)i).  PETITIf/ PRINCIPII,  or  BEGGING  OF  THE 
QUESTION,  "in  which  one  of  the  premisses  either  is 
manifestly  the  same  in  sense  with  the  conclusion,  or  is 
actually  proved  from  it."  A  man  may  prove  that  the 
Bible  comes  frora  God  because  it  contains  certain  ele- 


FALLACIES.  185 

vatcd  doctrines  wLich  could  not  be  discovered  by  iLe 
natural  sagacity  of  the  writers  ;  but  after  lie  has  done 
this  he  cannot  turn  round  and  prove  that  these  doctrines 
are  true  because  they  are  contained  in  the  Bible.  We 
ought  not  to  prove  the  existence  and  unity  of  God  from 
its  being  contained  in  Scripture,  and  then  prove  the  truth 
of  Scripture  from  its  giving  us  such  high  views  of  the  ex- 
isteuce,  unity,  and  natiu-e  of  God. 

100.  And  here  it  may  be  proper  to  remark  that  the  Syllogism  or 
Syllogistic  reasoning  is  not,  as  has  often  been  alleged,  a  Petitio 
Principii.  As  put  in  syllogistic  form,  the  premiss  does  not  in  any 
sense  depend  on  the  conclusion;  and  the  conclusion  follows,  not 
from  one  of  the  premisses,  but  from  the  two,  or  rather  from  the  re- 
lations between  the  tilings  compared  in  the  premisses.  It  is  when 
the  relations  ]»redicated  in  the  two  propositions  are  brought  before 
the  mind  that  it  sees  the  force  of  the  inference. 

101,  Arguing  in  a  Circle  is  the  common  manifestation 
of  the  Petitio  Principii.  The  person  covertly,  it  may  be 
ignorautly,  assumes  a  fact  or  principle,  and  by  means  of 
it  reaches  a  conclusion,  which  he  is  found  after  a  while  to 
be  employing  to  estabhsh  the  fact  or  principle  with  which 
he  set  out.  Thus  we  find  persons  arguing  that  thcii-  church 
is  the  true  one  because  sanctioned  by  God ;  and  that  since 
it  is  the  true  church,  God  has  sanctioned  it.  Or  they  reach 
the  truth  of  the  Bible  fi*om  the  authority  of  the  Chui'ch, 
and  infer  the  authority  of  the  Church  fi-om  the  Bible.  A 
man  maintains  that  his  party  is  good  because  it  promotes 
good  measures  ;  and  that  a  measui'e  is  good  because  pro- 
moted by  his  party.  Malcbranelie  is  believed  by  many 
to  have  become  involved  in  this  circle,  when  he  proved 
the  existence  of  an  external  world  by  the  authority  of 
Scriptm-e  ;  and  he  certainly  did  so,  if  it  be  impossible  to 
establish  the  authority  of  Scriptui'e  unless  you  assume 
the  existence  of  an  external  world.  Much  of  the  elabo- 
rate reasoning  employed  in  the  discussion  of  intricate 
subjects — for  exjimple,  that  of  Spinoza  in  his  Ethics— is  a 


I8G  REASONING. 

moTemeut  in  a  cii'clc — like  that  oi  a  man  who,  after  toiling 
for  hours  in  the  dark,  comes  to  the  place  fi-om  which  he 
Btai't^d.  It  is  evident  that  the  more  involved  the  chain,  the 
more  difficult  to  detect  the  unsatisfactory  junctions.  The 
most  effective  way  of  exposing  the  whole,  is  to  insist  on 
naiTOAving  the  cu-cle,  and  so  spreading  out  the  links  that 
wo  may  see  the  feeble  place,  where  the  conclusion  is  em- 
ployed to  supjjort  the  premiss,  and  the  whole  chain  made 
to  hang  on  nothing. 

lO'i,  IGNORATIO  ELENCHI,  or  IRRELEVANT 
CONCLUSION.  Logicians  suppose  that  in  discussion 
the  opponent  should  prove  the  elenchus  or  contradictory 
of  youi'  doctrine  ;  and  when  he  fails  to  do  this,  and  es- 
tablishes a  different  proposition,  he  is  said  to  be  guilty  of 
an  Ignoratio  Elenchi.  But  the  language  may  be  so 
widened  as  to  include  under  it  all  cases  of  Ii'relevant 
Conclusion — that  is,  in  which  persons  establish,  not  the 
conclusion  which  they  ought,  but  another  which  may  be 
mistaken  for  it.  The  dispute  is,  whether  any  one  has  a 
light  to  compel  a  father  to  educate  his  child  in  a  way  dif- 
ferent from  what  he  is  doing,  in  religion  or  in  something 
else,  and  one  of  the  disputants  thinks  ho  has  settled  the 
whole  question  when  he  has  shown  that  the  father  is 
educating  his  child  wrong.  Locke  in  showing  that  the 
syllogism  is  of  little  or  no  value,  proves  that  man  can 
reason  without  the  use  of  syllogisms.  "  There  are  many 
men  that  reason  exceeding  clear  and  rightly,  who  know 
not  how  to  make  a  syllogism."  "  God  has  not  been  so 
sparing  to  men  to  make  them  barely  two-legged  crea- 
ture ;,  and  left  it  to  Aristotle  to  make  them  rational." 
Macaulay  in  his  Article  on  Bacon,  thinks  he  has  proven 
that  a  knowledge  of  the  canons  of  induction  is  of  Uttle 
use,  since  men,  without  knowing  them,  are  practising 
them  from  morning  to  night.  Under  this  general  head 
may  be  j^laccd  several  other  fallacies. 


FALLACIES.  187 

103.  Tl}e  Fallacy  of  proving  only  Part  of  the  Question. 
As  when  a  man  is  charged  with  mm-der,  and  the  prose- 
cutor proves  that  he  lulled  a  man.  The  judge  and  JU17 
will  insist  that  it  be  fartlier  shown  that  he  did  the  deed, 
not  in  self-defence,  or  from  provocation  at  the  moment, 
but  with  malicious  intent.  A  person  is  denounced  as  a 
liar,  and  his  accuser  when  asked  for  his  evidence  shows 
that  he  did  make  certain  misstatements,  it  may  be  fi-om 
misapprehension  or  misinformation.  When  the  agri- 
cultui-ist  objected  to  the  Shetland  plough  with  only  one 
handle,  Magnus  Troil  iDi-oved  part  of  his  point  when  he 
replied,  "  Tell  me  how  it  were  possible  for  Neil  of  Lup- 
ness,  that  lost  one  arm  by  his  fall  from  the  crag  of  Nek- 
brekan,  to  manage  a  plough  Avith  two  handles  ?  " 

104.  Fa/ lacy  of  Objections,  that  of  concluding  that  a 
proposal  is  to  be  set  aside  because  there  are  objections  to 
it — as  if  the  captiousness  of  men  were  not  prepared  to 
object  to  anything,  even  to  the  existence  and  worship  of 
God.  It  is  not  enough  to  show  that  there  are  objections  ; 
it  must  be  shown  that  there  are  stronger  reasons  against 
it,  than  for  it.  Thus  in  one  of  the  rising  questions  of  the 
day,  when  it  is  proposed  to  appoint  young  men  to  public 
offices  by  competitive  examination,  an  opponent  thinks  it 
sufficient  to  object  that  at  times  you  might  thus  get  a 
person  who  has  no  great  business  capacity ;  whereas  it 
properly  devolves  on  him  to  show  that  by  this  mode  of 
appointment  you  would  not  get  young  men  of  such  high 
business  talents  and  character  as  by  the  method  now 
practised  of  pohtical  patronage. 

105.  Argumentum  ad  Hominem.  As  all  reasoning  is 
CiE  concessis,  we  are  entitled  in  reasoning  with  any  one  to 
proceed  on  the  principles  avowed  by  him,  though  these 
might  not  just  be  the  principles  to  which  we  might  appeal 
m  dealing  with  others  or  AA-ith  mankind  generally.  Our 
Lord  often  cmploj-ed  this  method  in    dealing  with   the 


188  REASONING 

cavils  of  the  Pliarisees.  Tlie  argument,  however,  -will  not 
be  acknowledged  as  valid  by  those  who  do  not  admit  the 
principles  on  which  it  proceeds.  That  loose  appeal  made 
to  faith  in  the  last  age  by  so  many  German  and  British 
writers,  is  not  allowed  to  be  legitimate  by  those  who  in- 
sist on  your  proving  by  the  proper  tests  that  a  faith  must 
be  intuitive,  or  that  it  is  supported  by  sufficient  mediate 
evidence,  before  they  are  inchned  to  yield  to  it.  It  is  not 
an  honest  use  of  the  argumentum  ad  hominem,  when  we 
take  advantage  of  premisses  which  those  with  whom  we 
are  arguing  allow,  but  which  we  do  not  ourselves  believe, 
— except,  indeed,  when  our  aim  is  simply  to  make  them 
doubt  of  their  premisses  by  showing  the  consequences  to 
which  they  lead- 

10(i>  Arnumentum  ad  Populum,  or  an  appeal  to  prin- 
ciples cherished  by  the  great  body  of  the  people.  It  is 
allowable  only  when  the  principles  are  right  and  proper 
in  themselves,  and  are  conscientiously  entertained  by 
those  who  advocate  them.  It  is  not  legitimate  when 
they  are  wrong  in  themselves,  or  when  he  who  ui-ges 
them  is  doing  so  hypocritically.  It  will  commonly  hap- 
pen in  the  end  that  such  a  deceitful  use  of  the  argument 
will  turn  against  the  person  employing  it.  In  no  case  is 
it  allowable  to  employ  this  argument  to  stir  up  a  malig- 
nant spirit  or  violent  acts. 

107,  Argumentum  ad  Verecundiam.  It  consists  of  an 
appeal  to  antiquity,  to  the  opinions  of  ancestors,  to  the 
rehgion  of  the  country.  This  line  of  argument  may  prove 
that  we  are  not  rashly  to  disturb  the  estabUshed  order  of 
things  ;  but  it  goes  no  farther.  It  does  not  tend  to  prove, 
that  if  we  are  constrained  otherwise  by  truth  or  by  duty, 
we  must  beheve  as  our  forefathers  did,  or  decline  to  dis- 
turb the  present  order  of  things. 

lOS.  Argumentum  ad  Ignorantiam,  as  when  you  insist 
on  a  man  believing  a  thing  because  he  knows  notliing  to 


FALLACIES.  189 

the  contrary  It  is  thus  that  people  have  been  frightened 
by  horrid  pictui-es,  di-awu  by  priests  or  pretenders,  of  the 
world  to  come.  It  is  thus  that  some  would  have  us  be- 
lieve in  animal  magnetism,  in  claii'voyance,  and  the  like, 
because  tliey  exhibit  phenomena  which  we  cannot  explain. 
The  legitimate  conclusion  in  such  cases  is,  that  w^e  should 
suspend  our  judgment,  and  wait  for  light  to  come  fi'om 
true  religion,  or  scientific  research. 

lOi),  Fallacy  of  Pretension.  We  are  inclined  to  intro- 
duce some  such  head  as  this,  to  include  certain  very 
common  cases  of  wi'ong  inference.  It  would  embrace,  for 
instance,  the  Fallacy  of  References,  in  which  there  is  an 
appeal  by  authors  or  speakers  to  passages  or  to  authorities 
which  are  not  expected  to  be  very  narrowly  searched,  or 
which,  if  narrowly  scrutinized,  do  not  bear  out  the  con- 
clusion. It  is  thus  that  Buckle,  in  his  work  on  Civili- 
zation, has  deceived  (we  do  not  say  intentionally)  many 
by  numerous  quotations  which,  if  narrowly  sifted  in  their 
historical  connection,  are  not  fitted  to  bear  up  all  that  he 
would  rear  on  them.  It  is  thus  that  a  dogmatic  air  over- 
awes many  who  are  not  inclined  to  think  for  themselv(J8 
or  institute  an  independent  inquiry.  Man}'  feel  as  if  such 
men  as  Hobbes  and  Comte  must  be  speaking  truly  and 
with  a  profound  knowledge  of  theii*  subject,  when  they 
utter  their  statements  so  clearly  and  so  confidently — where- 
as all  this  may  have  arisen  fi-om  their  never  having  looked 
at  anything  more  than  one  side  of  a  very  complex  ques- 
tion. Under  this  head  we  place  the  Idola  Theatri  of 
Bacon,  or  the  deceiving  influence  exercised  by  gi'eivt 
doctors,  heads  of  sects,  and  leaders  of  opinion. 

110.  Argument  from  Consequences.  This  is  allowable 
in  questions  of  pui*e  expediency,  as,  for  example,  in  con- 
sidering a  proposal  to  pass  a  law  for  the  suppression  of 
intemperance,  or  gambling,  or  Hcentiousuess  ;  we  ought 
to  inquire  whether  it  would  eilect  the  end  in  view.     But 


130  BEA80NING. 

when  the  question  is  one  of  truth  oi-  right,  we  should  not 
in  the  fii-st  instance  appeal  to  results.  There  is  a  con- 
stant tendency  on  the  part  of  some,  when  a  new  scientiiic 
truth  is  divulged,  to  reject  it  because  it  may  produce  evil 
consequences  by  undermining  religious  beliefs,  or  good 
social  sentiments.  But  if  a  doctrine  be  true,  and  a  deed 
be  right,  the  consequences  must  be  good  whether  we  see 
it  or  not.  After  we  have  estabhshed  the  truth  or  false- 
hood of  a  doctrine  on  independent  evidence,  then  we  may 
aUowably  trace  the  consequences — always,  however,  in  a 
Rpu'it  of  candor  and  fairness. 

Ill,  Mistakes  as  to  the  Onus  Probandi.  'V\Tien  any  one 
makes  a  positive  affirmation,  the  Burden  of  Proof  un- 
doubtedly lies  on  him,  and  his  evidence  should  be  such 
as  can  stand  the  laws  of  evidence  in  the  particular  de- 
partment. If  it  be  a  mathematical  truth,  he  must  dem- 
onstrate it  by  principles  self-evident,  necessary,  univer- 
sal If  it  be  a  scientific  truth,  he  should  bring  evidence 
that  can  stand  the  tests  of  the  canons  of  induction.  If 
it  be  a  historical  event,  he  must  show  that  it  can  stand  the 
tests  of  historical  criticism.  If  it  be  reached  by  deduc- 
tion, it  may  be  tried  by  the  syllogism.  But  if  he  has 
failed  to  give  sufficient  proof,  he  is  not  entitled  to  insist 
on  those  who  may  not  give  in  to  his  affinnation,  proving 
the  contradictory  of  it.  They  may  very  properly  content 
themselves  with  suspending  their  judgment  till  proof  is 
adduced.  For  example,  if  a  man  says  a  particular  jilaut 
is  to  be  found  in  a  certain  country — say  azaleas  in  Scot- 
land— we  expect  him  to  produce  the  plant.  But  he  is  not 
entitled  to  demand  of  us  that  we  go  round  the  whole 
country  and  show  that  there  is  no  such  j)lant.  It  is  often 
easy  to  disprove  a  general  statement  by  an  individual 
case.  If  a  man  were  to  say  that  all  the  blessings  wliich 
God  sends  are  universal  or  common  to  the  whole  race, 
you  could  confute  him  by  showing  (in  the  third  figiire  of 


FALLACIES.  191 

ttiG  syllogism)  that  certain  blessings,  sucli  as  the  means  of 
education,  had  not  been  placed  within  the  power  of  aU 
mankind.  But  to  prove  a  general  negative  is  often  diffi- 
cult or  impossible  ;  for  you  would  have  to  go  round  all 
possible  cases,  and  show  that  no  one  of  them  admits  of  a 
positive  affirmation  being  made  regarding  it. 

112.  We  now  come  to  consider  certain  Fallacies 
usually  treated  of  in  works  of  Formal  Logic,  but  conduct- 
ing us  into  Particular  or  Objective  Logic,  which  looks  at 
thought  as  directed  to  special  classes  of  objects.  No 
doubt  there  are  violations  of  the  laws  of  discursive 
thought  involved,  but  in  order  to  find  out  what  they  are, 
and  how  they  are  to  be  remedied,  we  must  go  to  other 
departments  of  knowledge. 

Fallacies  of  Analogy.  By  analogy  we  are  to  understand, 
not  the  resemblance  of  one  thing  to  another,  but  the  re- 
semblance of  ratios  or  relations.  Thus  the  sovereign  of  a 
country  is  said,  by  analogy,  to  be  the  head  of  the  country, 
because  he  bears  the  same  relation  to  the  country  as  the 
head  does  to  the  body.  Two  fallacies  may  spring  from 
the  use  or  abuse  of  analogies.  First  we  may  suppose 
that  the  things  related  resemble  each  other  because  their 
relations  do.  The  wing  of  a  bii'd  and  the  wing  of  a  but- 
terfly are  said  by  naturalists  to  be  analogous,  for  they 
serve  the  same  purpose,  that  of  flight ;  but  the  two 
members  do  not  resemble  each  other  in  their  structure. 
We  are  exhorted  by  our  Lord  in  praying  to  God,  to  imi- 
tate the  importunity  of  the  woman  who  continued  to 
apply  to  the  judge  till  she  gained  her  case  ;  but  we  ai-e 
not  to  imderstand  that  God  resembles  that  judge  in 
chai-acter,  or  the  motives  by  which  he  is  swayed.  An- 
other fallacy  arises  fi-om  carrying  the  analogy  too  far. 
Thus  some  have  argued  that  since  all  nations  resemble  ani- 
mals, in  having  a  period  of  childhood,  youth,  and  matiuity, 
they  will  therefore  resemble  them  in  ha\iug  a  time  of  de- 


192  REASONING. 

creptitude  and  death — wliereas  there  may  be  causes  al 
work  in  certain  nations,  such  as  education  and  Christian- 
ity, which  will  save  them  from  the  latter  stages.  The 
ai'gument  fi-om  Analogy  is  :  "  Things  resemble  each  other 
in  certain  known  respects ;  they  will  therefore  resemble 
each  in  certain  other  and  unknown  respects."  This  is  an 
argument  which  is  often  conclusive.  Thus  the  connois- 
seur argues  :  this  painting  resembles  the  paintings  of 
Kubens  in  certain  characteristic  marks,  and  must  resem- 
ble them  in  this  respect  also,  that  it  has  been  produced 
by  the  same  hand.  Thus  it  is  that  the  anatomist  finding 
one  fossH  hind  leg  of  an  animal,  concludes  that  the  other 
must  have  been  like  it.  It  is  in  a  great  measiu-e  by  this 
principle  that  the  j)alseontologist  can  construct  the  whole 
animal  from  a  few  bones  found  in  the  dust  of  the  earth. 
It  is  the  province  of  Inductive  Logic  to  lay  down  some 
rule  to  guide  us  as  to  when  the  conclusion  is  vahd,  and 
when  it  is  invalid.  Formal  Logic  can  assist  us  no  way  at 
this  place.  All  that  it  can  do  is  to  show  where  error  may 
lurk,  and  insist  on  our  seeking  to  obtain  some  general 
principle  (as  a  major)  to  guide  and  guard  us. 

113.  Imperfect  Enumeration.  In  all  departments  of 
science  and  practical  knowledge,  general  laws  are  gained 
by  the  observation  of  particular  facts.  But  what  number 
and  what  kind  of  observations  are  sufficient  to  entitle  us  to 
declare  that  we  have  discovered  the  law  ?  A  sailor  reasons  : 
*  Three  times  did  I  set  sail  on  a  Friday,  and  in  each  of 
the  vovages  I  encountered  a  storm  :  it  is  clear  that  Fri- 
day  is  an  unlucky  day.'  Another  met  once  or  twice  with 
a  calamity  after  sitting  at  a  table  where  there  was  a  com- 
l>any  numbering  thirteen,  and  resolves  always  to  leave  a 
company  when  he  discovers  it  to  be  composed  of  this 
number.  A  third  met  with  calamities  on  several  occa- 
sions when  he  persevered  in  a  journey  after  a  hare  had 
crossed  hia  path,  and  he  now  turns  back  whenever  that 


FALLACIES.  193 

animal  crosses  the  road  on  which  he  is  travelling.  Every 
enlightened  man  sees  that  these  are  cases  of  narrow  enu- 
meration. But  what  is  a  sufficient  enumeration  ?  It  can 
easily  be  shown  that  the  sufficiency  does  not  depend  on 
the  number  of  the  cases.  Mr.  JMill  puts  the  question  : 
"  Why  is  a  single  instance  in  some  cases  sufficient  for  a 
complete  induction,  while  in  others  myriads  of  concui-- 
liug  instances,  without  a  single  exception  known  or  pre- 
sumed, go  such  a  very  little  way  towards  establishing  a 
universal  projDosition  ? "  and  declares  that  he  who  will 
answer  this  question  is  wiser  than  the  ancients.  Bacon, 
followed  by  Sii"  J.  Herschell,  Mr.  Mill,  and  others,  have 
tried  to  answer  it  by  means  of  Prerogative  Instances 
(§  71)  and  Canons  of  Induction,  and  have  been  so  far 
successfuL  The  Logic  of  Induction  is  seeking  to  lay 
down  principles  which  may  decide  for  us  when  we  have 
Buch  an  enumeration  as  to  authorize  us  to  say  that  we 
have  reached  a  law.  But  Formal  Logic  can  do  nothing 
more  than  warn  us  against  trusting  in  imperfect  enumer- 
ations, and  require  us  to  look  out  for  some  principle  to 
authorize  the  conclusion  we  would  draw. 

114:,  Non  Causa  pro  Causa.  The  inquiry  into  Causes 
is  not  the  same  as  the  inquiry  into  Laws,  referred  to  in 
last  section.  In  the  inquiiy  into  Laws,  we  are  seeking  a 
mere  co-ordination  of  facts  ;  in  the  inquiry  into  Causes  we 
are  seeking  after  antecedent  agents  having  a  producing 
power.  The  one  inquiry,  as  well  as  the  other,  carries  us 
beyond  Formal  Logic  into  Inductive  Logic,  and  indeed 
into  the  Natural  Sciences  which  treat  of  objects.  Formal 
Logic,  howevei',  can  guard  us  against  certain  eiTors,  and 
draw  our  attention  to  some  important  distinctions. 

lis.  Post  Hoc  ergo  propter  Hoc.     A  remarkable  meteor 

was  seen  in  the  sky,  and  followed  by  a  dreadful  national 

calamity  :  a  conjunction  among  the  planets  was  followed 

by  a  royal  mai'riage  which  issued  in  far-reaching  couse- 

13 


194  REASONINO. 

quences;  and  tLe  superstitious  conclude  that  one  of 
tlie  facts  had  some  kind  of  causal  connection  with  the 
other.  We  have  outHved  these  weaknesses  of  past  ages  : 
but  we  have  not  outgi-own  the  fallacies  on  which  they 
proceeded.  A  country  or  college  has  prospered  under  a 
certain  government  or  management,  and  some  conclude 
that  it  was  because  of  the  government  or  management, 
and  oppose  all  projected  impx-ovements. 

llXi,  Fallacy  of  mistaking  Sign  for  Cause,  The  quack 
doctor  falls  into  this,  when  on  seeing  certain  spots  on  the 
body  he  attacks  and  removes  them,  thereby,  it  may  be, 
sending  the  malady  farther  into  the  frame,  instead  of 
curing  it  in  its  seat.  The  quack  statesman  is  guilty  of  the 
same  error,  when  discovering  the  existence  of  ignorance 
and  crime  in  a  country  he  contents  himself  with  punish- 
ing them,  instead  of  trying  to  remove  the  deep  moral 
causes  fi-om  which  they  sj^ring.  Buckle  has,  as  it  ap- 
pears to  us,  fallen  into  the  fallacy  ;  he  traces  all  civiliza- 
tion to  mere  intellectual  power,  excluding  moral  causes  : 
whereas  the  intellect  in  many  cases,  as  in  Scotland  and 
the  United  States,  was  awakened  by  moral  causes  of 
which  the  intellectual  life  was,  properly  si^eaking,  the 
eiiect. 

117 1  In  order  to  keep  us  from  falling  under  the  power 
of  these  fallacies.  Logic  calls  our  attention  to  two  im- 
portant distinctions.  There  is  the  distinction  between 
the  Causa  Easendi  and  the  Causa  Cognoscendi.  The  for- 
mer is  the  objective  cause  in  the  powers  of  nature  or  of 
God  ;  the  latter,  the  facts  or  means  by  which  we  come  to 
know  the  objective  cause  of  the  occurrence.  The  two  are 
often  confounded  by  much  the  same  language  being  em- 
ployed by  us  to  denote  them.  Thus  we  speak  of  the 
ground  being  wet  because  it  has  rained  ;  and  of  its  hav- 
ing been  rain  because  the  gi'ound  is  wet.  It  is  evident 
that  the  Causa  Cognoscendi  is  often  an  effect  indicating 


FUNDAMENTAL  LAWS  OF  TnOUGHT.  195 

the  Causa  Essendi;  tlius  the  melting  of  snow  may  be  a 
proof  or  a  sign  of  the  rise  of  temperature  which  has  made 
the  snow  to  melt.  Of  very  much  the  same  character  is 
the  distinction  between  Reason  and  Cause  ;  the  Reason 
being  that  which  brings  conviction  to  us,  and  the  Cause 
that  which  produces  the  phenomenon.  The  increase  of 
temperature  is  the  cause  of  the  melting  of  the  snow,  but 
the  melting  of  the  snow  as  being  an  effect  may,  on  being 
contemplated  by  us,  be  the  means  of  reveahng  the  action 
of  the  Cause. 


FUNDAMENTAL  LAWS  OF  DISCUESIVE  THOUGHT. 

118.  It  now  only  remains  to  try  to  enunciate  the 
fundamental  laws  which  He  at  the  basis  of  all  Logical  op- 
erations. These  work  in  our  minds  without  our  being 
conscious  of  them — we  are  as  Uttle  conscious  of  them,  as 
we  are  of  the  physiological  laws  involved  in  our  breathing. 
We  can  discover  them  only  by  careful  observation  and 
analytic  generalization  of  the  operations  of  discursive 
thought.  A  knowledge  of  them  does  not  assist  us  in 
spontaneous  reasoning,  but  it  is  of  gi-eat  value  to  all  who 
would  reflectively  acquaint  themselves  with  the  processes 
of  thinking.     They  are  such  as  the  following  : 

110.  1.  The  Law  of  Identity,  which  may  be  expressed, 
*'  the  same  is  the  same,  perceived  it  may  be  at  different 
times  and  with  different  concomitants."  This  rules  all 
cases  in  which  we  draw  an  affirmative  proposition  from  a 
proposition  or  propositions,  in  which  the  relation  of  the 
two  terms  is  one  of  identily.  Thus  it  being  given  that 
"  Jonathan  Edwtu'ds  is  the  greatest  American  metaphy- 
sician," we  get  the  Implied  Judgment  "  the  gi-eatest 
American  metaphysician  was  Jonathan  Edwards  ; "  or,  it 
being  farther  sillowed  that  "  Jonathan  Edwards  was  the 


196  CONCLUSION. 

IMissionary  to  the  Indians  at  Stockbridge,"  we  get  by 
reasoning  the  Conclusion  that  "  the  Missionary  to  the 
Indians  at  Stochbridge,  was  the  greatest  A  meiican  meta- 
physician." 

J,i?0.  II.  The  Law  of  Contradiction.  This  law  is  "  it 
is  impossible  for  the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  at  the 
same  time."  Or  bringing  out  a  farther  aspect  of  the  same 
truth,  it  may  take  the  form  :  "  A  thing  cannot  have,  and 
not  have,  the  same  attribute  at  the  same  time."  It  rules 
in  all  cases  in  which  we  get  a  negative  proposition  from  a 
negative  proposition  by  implication,  or  from  negative 
propositions  by  reasoning,  as  when  it  is  given  ns  that, 
"  Francis  Bacon  is  not  the  same  as  Roger  Bacon,"  we  say 
that  "  Eoger  Bacon  was  not  the  same  as  Francis  Bacon," 
or,  with  another  proposition  allowed,  that  "  Francis  Ba- 
con was  the  expounder  of  the  Inductive  Method,"  so 
"  Roger  Bacon  was  not  the  expounder  of  the  Inductive 
Method." 

121*  III.  The  Law  of  Excluded  Middle,  Lex  Exclusi 
Tertii  aut  Medii ;  that  is,  either  a  given  judgment  is  true, 
or  its  contradictory — there  is  no  middle  course  or  third 
suj^position.  Thus  it  must  either  be  true  or  not  true 
that  "  God  exists  ; "  and  it  must  either  be  true  or  false 
that  "  this  man  was  ignorant  of  the  deed  ; "  and  if  it 
can  be  shown  that  he  was  not  ignorant  of  it,  you  cannot 
look  upon  him  as  if  he  was  ignorant. 

122.  rV.  The  Principle  of  Equality,  "things  which 
are  equal  to  the  same  things,  are  equal  to  one  another." 
It  is  thus  we  argue  that  2  +  2  =  4;  and  2x2  =  4; 
therefore  2  +  2  =  2x2. 

In  all  cases  in  which  the  propositions  are  Equivalent 
(P.  n.,  §  14),  these  are  the  sole  regulating  principles. 
But  where  the  propositions  imply  Extension  and  Compre- 
hension, other  Laws  come  in  and  act  along  with  these. 

123,  V.  The  Dictum  of  Aristotle,  "  whatever  iis  predi* 


FUNDAMENTAL  LAWS  OF  THOUOnT,         197 

cated  of  a  Class  Notion,  may  be  predicated  of  all  that  is 
contained  in  it."  This  is  seen  to  be  true  on  the  bare  con- 
templation of  the  natm'e,  of  the  extension,  of  a  concept. 
Combine  this  piinciple  with  that  of  Identity,  and  we  get 
Affirmative  Judgments  impUed  or  inferred.  Thus  as  "  all 
plants  die,"  so  "  some  plants  die,"  and  as  "  Coniferoe  are 
plants,"  so  "  Coniferse  die."  Combine  this  principle  with 
that  of  Contradiction,  and  we  draw  negative  propositions. 
As  "  no  men  are  perfect,"  so  "  some  men  are  not  perfect," 
and  "the  Greeks"  "who  were  some  men,"  "were  not 
perfect."  These  principles,  the  Dictum  combined  with 
the  Law  of  Identity  in  affirmatives,  and  of  Contradiction 
in  negatives,  rule  all  ordinary  syllogistic  and  conditional 
reasoning. 

Combine  the  Dictum  with  the  principle  of  Excluded 
Middle,  and  we  get  a  number  of  Implied  Judgments. 
Thus  we  argue  that  if  it  be  false  that "  no  metal  is  heavier 
than  water,"  it  must  be  true  that "  some  metals  are  heavier 
than  water."  Reductio  per  Impossibile  (P.  in.,  §  40),  pro- 
ceeds on  these  two  principles. 

12  J:,  VI.  The  Principles  of  Attribution,  "  eveiy  at- 
tribute imphes  a  thing  of  which  it  is  an  attribute."  Or, 
it  may  take  a  subordinate  form,  "  All  that  is  in  an  attribute 
is  in  the  thing  that  contains  the  attribute,"  or,  as  Leib- 
nitz expresses  it,  "  Nota  notse  est  nota  rei  ipsius."  This 
law  has  a  place  in  Abstraction  (P.  I.,  §  11) ;  in  Imme- 
diate Inferences  from  Privative  Conceptions  (P.  II.,  §  49), 
and  in  all  reasoning  in  Compi'ehension  (P.  HI.,  §  42),  that 
is,  reasoning  in  which  we  specially  look  at  the  attiibutes. 
Thus  we  argue  that  as  intelligence,  conscience,  and  free 
will,  make  the  beings  who  possess  them  moral  and  re- 
sponsible agents,  so  man,  as  possessing  these,  must  be 
regai-ded  as  a  moral  and  responsible  agent. 

123,  VII.  The  Law  of  Division,  "the  dividing  mem- 
bers make  up  the  whole  class."     This  is  the  principle — al- 


108  CONCLUSTOK. 

ways  along  witli  tlie  Dictum — ^regulating  Disjunctive  Rea- 
soning, as  Tvlien  we  argue  that  if  a  man  has  not  taken 
two  of  three  possible  roads,  he  miist  have  taken  the  third. 
Combined  with  the  principle  of  Excluded  Middle,  it  regu- 
lates reasoning  in  which  we  argue  on  the  supposition 
that  the  members  exclude  one  another.  "  If  this  man 
must  be  either  a  fool  or  a  knave,"  it  follows  if  he  is  not  a 
fool,  "  he  must  be  a  knave." 

12  (i,  Vm.  The  Principles  op  Whole  aot)  Parts. 
"  "What  is  true  of  the  whole  is  true  of  each  of  the  parts." 
This  holds  good  of  parts  whether  they  be  sub- classes  or 
attributes.  This  principle  helps  to  guide  us  in  Subalter- 
nation,  and  in  all  reasoning  involving  Extension  and  Com- 
prehension. Another  Principle  to  be  placed  under  the 
same  head  is,  "  The  parts  make  up  the  whole ; "  a  prin- 
ciple involved  in  all  reasoning  which  proceeds  on  tha 
completeness  of  Division. 

127.  In  lookin<r  at  tlie  discursive  operations  of  the  mind,  Ave 
have  constantly  come  to  such  principles  as  these.  The  consider 
ation,  however,  belongs  not  to  Logic,  hut  to  Metaphysics  (P.  I.,  §  1), 
or  the  science  of  First  or  Fundamental  truths.  The  author  of  this 
treatise  has  treated  of  them,  of  their  nature  and  mode  of  develop 
raent,  in  the  Inluiliom  of  the  Mmd  Inductively  Inrcstigated,  He 
has  there  shown  that  such  principles  are  Intuitive,  tiiat  is,  are  seen 
to  be  true  at  once ;  and  this  not  by  any  form  in  the  mind,  but  by 
the  capacity  which  the  mind  has  to  contemplate  objects,  and  by  the 
exercise  of  that  capacity  in  looking  at  objects.  lie  has  shown  that 
the  Law  is  not  consciously  before  the  mind  when  it  is  exercising  it, 
and  that  it  is  in  looking  at  an  individual  object,  or  judgment,  that 
it  is  called  forth.  The  mind  has  not  consciously  before  it  the  Law 
of  F/piiility  wlien  it  declares  that  if  A  is  equal  to  B,  and  B  to  C,  then 
A  must  be  equal  to  C.  It  reaches  the  conclusion  At  once  on  the 
Cjntemijlation  of  the  equal  lines.  The  Law  of  ICquality  is  discov- 
ered by  us  by  a  generalization  of  the  individual  judgments. 


APPENDIX. 


-oocoo- 


I.-EXERCISES  AS   TO  FORMS. 
The  Notion. 

1.  Are  the  following  Singulars,  Abstracts,  or  Universals,  ana 
if  Universals,  are  they  Generalized  Abstracts  or  Generalized  Con- 
cretes, viz. :  Aristotle,  Rationality,  Rational,  Man,  Beauty,  Good, 
The  Good,  Homeless,  The  Creator,  Creature,  Resolute,  Plant, 
Mammal,  Substance,  IVIind  ? 

What  sort  of  terms  are  the  following,  viz. :  Multitude,  Thia 
Regiment,  David  King  of  Israel,  The  First  King  of  Rome,  The 
greatest  living  Sculptor,  The  Dog  Cesar,  This  Dog,  That  Bird- 
Flying,  The  most  distinguished  Soldier  in  the  Army,  Husband, 
Husband  and  Wife, 

"  The  glass  of  fashion  and  the  mould  of  form. 
The  observed  of  all  observers." 

2.  What  are  the  Terms  in  the  following,  and  what  sort  ot 
Terras  ?  "  Thou  (Falstaff )  didst  swear  to  me  upon  a  parcel  gilt 
goblet,  setting  in  my  Dolphin  Chamber,  at  the  round  table,  by 
a  sea-coal  fire,  upon  Wednesday  in  Whitsunweek,  when  the 
prince  broke  thy  head  for  liking  his  father  to  a  singing  man  of 
Windsor ;  thou  didst  swear  to  me  then,  as  I  was  washing  thy 
wound,  to  marry  me  and  make  me  my  lady  thy  wife.  Canst 
thou  deny  it  ?  Did  not  good  wife  Keech,  the  butcher's  wife, 
come  and  call  me  Gossip  Quickly  ?  Coming  in  to  borrow  a  mesa 
of  vinegar  ;  telling  me  she  had  a  good  dish  of  prawns,  whereby 
thou  didst  desire  to  cat  some  ;  whereby  I  told  thee  they  were  ill 
for  a  green  wound  ?  And  didst  thou  not,  when  she  was  gone 
down  stairs,  desire  me  to  be  no  more  so  familiarity  with  such 
poor  people,  saying,  that  ere  long  they  would  call  me  madam." 


2uvJ  APPENDIX. 

"  Because  A  F  is  equal  to  A  G,  and  A  B  to  A  C,  the  two  sides 
F  A,  A  C  are  equal  to  the  two  G  A,  A  B,  each  to  each  ;  and  they 
contain  the  angle  FAQ  common  to  the  two  triangles  AFC, 
A  G  B ;  therefore  the  base  F  C  is  equal  to  the  base  G  B,  and 
the  triangle  A  F  C  to  the  triangle  A  G  B ;  and  the  remain- 
ing angles  of  the  one  are  equal  to  the  remaining  angles  of  the 
other,  each  to  each,  to  which  the  equal  sides  are  opposite,  viz. : 
the  angle  A  C  F  to  the  angle  A  B  G,  and  the  angle  A  F  C  to  tlie 
angle  A  G  B,"  &c. 

"  To  be,  or  not  to  be,  that  is  the  question ; 
■Whether  'tis  nobler  in  the  mind  to  suffer 
The  stings  and  arrows  of  outrageous  fortune, 
Or  to  take  arms  against  a  sea  of  troubles, 
And,  by  opposing,  end  them  1    To  die — to  sleejv— 
No  more  :  and,  by  a  sleep,  to  say  we  end 
The  heart-ache  and  the  thousand  natural  shocks 
That  flesh  is  heir  to — 'tis  a  consummation 
Devoutly  to  be  wished.    To  die  ?  to  sleep  ? 
To  sleep— perchance  to  dream  ;  aye,  there's  the  rub, 
For  in  that  sleep  of  death  what  dreams  may  come, 
When  we  have  shuffled  off  this  mortal  coil, 
Mast  make  ns  pause." 

.5.  Are  the  following  pairs  of  Notions  Contrary  or  Contradictory^ 
viz. :  Sweet  and  Bitter,  Organic  and  Inorganic,  Greek  and  Bar- 
barian, "Wise  and  Foolish,  Animate  and  Inanimate,  Finite  and  Infi- 
nite, Alive  and  Dead,  Short  or  Long,  Existent  and  Non-existent  ? 

4.  What  sort  of  reality  is  there  in  the  following,  viz. :  Popu- 
larity, The  Rose  Tribe  of  Plants,  Gravitation,  Tlie  Vine,  Love  of 
Fame,  Imagination,  Roman  Citizen,  Heat,  Cold,  Blue,  Substance, 
Body? 

5.  Logically  Define  Notion,  Percept,  Abstract,  Concept,  Genus, 
Species,  Differentia,  Judgment,  Equivalent  Proposition,  Attribu- 
tive Proposition,  Conditional  Proposition,  Disjunctive  Proposi- 
tion, Implied  Judgments,  Conditional  Reasoning,  Disjunctive 
Reasoning,  Reasoning  in  Comprehension,  Sorites,  Fallacy,  Am- 
biguous ^Middle,  Petitio  Principii,  Irrelevant  Conclusion. 

<i.  Logically  divide  and  subdivide  Notion,  Judgment,  Reason- 
ing. Fallacy. 

7.  Analyze  General  Notion,  Collective  Notion,  Judgment, 
Argument,  A  Horse  Galloping,  Unappeasable  Revenge,  Remorse 
of  Conscience. 


APPENDIX.  201 


Judgment. 

8.  Point  out  Subject  and  Predicate  and  designate  the  Quality 
and  Quantity  of  following,  viz. : 

A  soft  answer  turneth  away  wrath. 

The  man's  heart  is  not  in  the  right  place. 

Bogs  bark. 

Great  is  the  work  of  life. 

Sailors  are  needed  for  the  vessel. 

It  is  wrong  to  put  an  innocent  man  to  death. 

It  is  the  duty  of  every  man  to  fear  God  and  honor  the 

king. 
Man  is  capable  of  living  in  a  greater  variety  of  climates  than 

any  of  the  lower  animals. 
There  was  no  possibility  of  substantiating  the  allegations. 
The  evidence  proves  that  Phalaris  was  not  the  author  of  the 

Epistles. 
Few  i^atriots  have  been  disinterested. 
All  gold  mines  cannot  be  wrought  with  profit. 
The  eagle  lost  much  time  when  he  submitted  to  learn  of  the 

crow. 
The  English  can  scarcely  be  said  to  be  humble-minded. 
Nothing  is  so  easy  as  to  object. 
"  In  jewels  and  gold  men  cannot  grow  old." 
There  is  no  place  like  home. 
Kone  but  the  brave  deserve  the  fair. 
None  but  whites  are  civilized. 

9.  ^Vhat  is  the  Nature  of  the  Terms  in  the  following  ?    A.e 
fh(!  Propositions  Equivalent  or  Attributive  ? 

The  crocodile  is  a  reptile. 

Alexander  was  a  great  conqueror. 

Alexander  was  the  greatest  conqueror  of  antiquity. 

Logic  is  the  science  of  the  Laws  of  Discursive  Thought. 

"  The  most  sublime  act  is  to  put  another  before  thee." 

3x3  =  9. 

If  the  clouds  rise  from  the  hill-top  it  will  be  a  fine  day. 

If  A  =  B  then  C  =  D. 

The  evt^ut  must  have  occurred  either  on  Saturday  or  Sunday 


202  APPENDIX. 

"  Man  is  endoTved  with  the  capacity  of  laughter."  Under 
■what  head  of  Predicables  would  this  be  put  by  Aris- 
totle ?    By  Porphyry  ?    And  in  this  Treatise  ? 

10.  Convert  the  following: 
Every  circle  is  a  conic  section. 

Two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space. 

No  brutes  are  responsible. 

Some  students  are  diligent. 

Some  students  do  not  fail  in  anything. 

Perseverance  is  a  condition  of  success. 

Perseverance  is  the  condition  of  success, 

Washington  was  the  first  American  President. 

11.  Put  the  following  in  the  forms  of  OpiJosition  : 

The  Duke  of  AYellington  was  the  conqueror  at  Waterloo. 
Dogs  bark  and  bite. 
What  are  the  Contradictories  ? 

12.  Interjjret  the  following  as  to  Denomination,  Extension, 
and  Comprehension : 

Iklan  is  fallible. 

David  was  the  sweet  Psalmist  of  Israel. 

The  man  who  slanders  his  neighbor  is  not  innocent. 

13.  What  Implied  Judgments  can  be  derived  from  "  Benevo- 
lent actions  are  commendable." 

14.  Put  the  following  in  correct  form  as  a  Conditional,  anu 
indicate  the  Terms,  the  Antecedent,  and  Consequent :  "  This 
patient  will  recover  if  he  takes  care  of  himself."  Put  it  in  Cate- 
gorical Form,  and  indicate  the  Subject  and  Predicate. 

Reasoning. 

15.  Examine  the  following,  and  say  if  they  are  valid  ;  and  ii 
BO,  according  to  what  principle  : 

David  was  the  youngest  son  of  Jesse  ; 
David  was  the  youth  who  slew  Goliath  ; 

.'.  The  youngest  son  of  Jesse  was  the  youth  who  slew  Goliath- 
Logic  is  the  Science  of  the  Laws  of  Discursive  Tliought ; 
Metaphysics  is  not  the  Science  of  the  Laws  of  Discursive 
Thought ; 

.*.  Logic  is  not  Metaphysica. 


APPENDIX.  203 

Jii.  Put  the  following  in  Syllogistic  Form  ;  indicate  the 
Major,  Minor,  and  ]\Iiddle  Terms  ;  the  Major,  and  Minor 
Premisses,  and  coucliision;  and  the  !Mood  and  Figure: 

No  one  is  free  who  is  enslaved  by  his  appetites  ;  a  sensual- 
ist is  enslaved  by  his  appetites ;  therefore  a  sensualist 
is  not  free. 
Heavy  dews  fell  last  night  and  so  it  has  not  been  cloudy. 
From  the  case  of  the  soul  and  body  we  see  that  there  are 
some  things  to  be  believed  which  cannot  be  compro- 
bended. 
t7.   Supply  the  wanting  proposition  in  the  following : 
No  branch  of  science  has  reached  perfection  ; 
All  branches  of  science  deserve  to  be  cultivated. 


All  homed  animals  are  ruminant, 

•  ••••■• 

.*.  The  elk  is  ruminant. 

The  adaptation  in  the  shoulder-joint  is  effected; 
.*.  It  must  have  had  a  cause. 

18.  Put  the  following  in  Syllogistic  Form,  supplying  Premis- 
6es  when  necessary,  and  indicating  Mood  and  Figure  : 

When  Columbus  was  sailing  the  ocean  in  search  of  a  new 
world,  he  fell  in  with  a  flock  of  laud  birds  and  con- 
cluded that  he  could  not  be  far  from  land. 

It  has  been  argued  by  some  that  electricity  is  the  agent  by 
which  the  nerves  act  upon  the  muscles.  But  that  this 
is  not  the  case  appears  from  the  fact  that  electricity  may 
be  transmitted  along  a  nervous  trunk  when  a  string  \» 
tied  lightly  round  it ;  while  the  passage  of  ordinary  ner- 
vous power  is  as  completely  checked  by  this  process  as 
if  the  nerve  had  been  divided. 

His  imbecility  of  character  nught  have  been  inferred  from 
his  proncness  to  favorites ;  for  all  weak  princes  have 
this  failing. 

"  Suppose  ye  that  these  Galileans  were  sinners  above  all 
the  Guliheaus  because  tla-.y  sufl'ered  such  things." 


20-4  APPENDIX. 

The  Scriptures  cannot  come  from  God  because  tliey  contain 
some  things  -fthich  cannot  be  comprehended  by  man. 

That  persons  may  reason  without  language  is  proven  by 
the  circumstance  that  infants  reason  and  yet  have  no 
language. 

Bolingbroke,  in  arguing  against  the  truth  of  the  Christian 
religion,  shows  that  the  Christian  religion  has  bred 
contentious,  Burke  answered  him  by  showing  that 
civil  government  had  bred  contentions. 
*The  barbarians  of  the  isle  of  Melita,  when  they  saw  the 
venomous  beast  hang  on  Paul's  hand,  said  among  them- 
selves, No  doubt  this  man  is  a  murderer,  whom  though 
he  hath  escaped  the  sea,  vengeance  sufiFereth  not  to  live. 
Howbeit,  they  looked  when  he  should  have  swollen  or 
fallen  down  dead  ;  but  after  they  had  looked  a  great 
while  and  saw  no  harm  in  him,  they  changed  their 
mind  and  said,  he  is  a  god." 

The  dervis  who  told  the  merchants  that  they  had  lost  a 
camel,  blind  in  his  right  eye,  lame  in  his  left  leg,  with- 
out a  front  tooth,  loaded  with  honey  on  one  side  and 
wheat  on  the  other,  describes  the  steps  which  had 
passed  through  his  mind,  "  I  knew  that  I  had  crossed 
the  track  of  a  camel  which  had  strayed  from  its  owner, 
because  I  saw  no  mark  of  human  footsteps  on  the  same 
route ;  I  knew  that  the  animal  was  blind  in  one  eye, 
because  it  had  cropped  the  herbage  only  on  one  side  of 
its  path  ;  and  I  perceived  that  it  was  lame  in  one  leg 
from  the  faint  impression  that  particular  foot  had  jiro- 
duced  on  the  sand ;  I  concluded  that  the  animal  had 
lost  one  tooth,  because  wherever  it  had  grazed  a  small 
tuft  of  herbage  was  left  uninjured  in  the  centre  of  its 
bite,"  etc. 

If  it  can  be  shown  that  there  are  two  or  more  j^ersons,  it 
follows  that  all  is  not  one,  that  all  is  not  God.  Accord- 
ing to  every  scheme  of  pantheism,  I,  as  part  of  the  uni- 
verse, am  part  of  God,  part  of  the  whole  which  con- 
fltitutcs  God.  In  all  consciousness  of  self  we  know  our- 
selves as  persons;  in   all    knowledge   of  other  o])jecta 


APPENDIX.  205 

we  know  them  as  different  from  ourselves  and  ourselves 
as  different  from  them.  God  then  must  be  different  from 
one  part  of  his  works.     He  must  be  different  from  me. 

19.  If  the  Major  Term  be  the  Predicate  of  the  Major  Propo- 
Bition,  prove  that  the  Minor  Premiss  must  be  Affirmative.  In 
what  Figures  does  this  happen  ? 

Prove  that  the  Major  is  Universal  in  the  First  Figure,  and  the 
conclusion  Particular  in  the  Third  Figure. 

If  the  Middle  Term  be  the  Predicate  of  both  Premisses,  prove 
tliat  one  of  the  Premisses  must  be  negative. 

Given  the  Minor  Term  the  Predicate  of  Minor  Premiss,  prove 
that  A  cannot  be  a  Conclusion. 

Given  the  Major  Term  the  Subject  of  Major  Premiss,  prove 
that  A  cannot  be  a  conclusion. 

Prove  that  A  can  be  drawn  only  in  the  First  Figure. 

Prove  that  the  Minor  Premiss  cannot  be  Negative  in  First 
and  Third  Figures. 

If  the  Minor  Premiss  be  E  or  O,  the  Major  must  be  Universal. 

Given  I  as  the  Major  Premiss,  determine  the  Mood  and  Figure. 

Prove  that  O  cannot  be  a  Premiss  in  First  Figure  ;  that  it  can- 
not be  the  Major  in  the  Second  Figure ;  or  the  Minor  in  the 
Third  Figure  ;  and  that  it  cannot  be  a  Premiss  in  the  Fourth. 

20.  Reduce  the  following  to  First  Figure  : 
Every  virtue  promotes  the  general  happiness  ; 
Cunning  does  not  promote  the  general  happiness ; 

,*.  Cunning  is  not  a  virtue. 
All  men  are  liable  to  sorrow  ; 

Some  men  are  in  the  enjoyment  of  great  prosperity  ; 
.•.  Some  in  the  enjoyment  of  great  prosperity  are  liable  to  suf- 
fering. 
All  men  are  sinners ; 
Some  men  are  not  cruel ; 
.*.  Some  not  cruel  are  sinners. 
Every  liar  is  mean  ; 

No  mean  man  should  have  a  public  office ; 
.•.  No  man  should  be  elected  to  public  office  who  is  a  Uar. 
21.  Put  the  following  in  the  form  both  of  Extension  and 
Conjprehcnoiou : 


206  APPENDIX. 

Deceit,  being  a  sin,  will  be  detected  and  punished. 
Cause  and  effect,  not  being  a  law  of  Discursive  Thought, 
does  not  come  within  the  province  of  Logic. 

22.  Psychology,  Logic,  Ethics,  Esthetics,  all  tend  to  give  a 
power  of  internal  observation  and  of  analysis  to  the  student ; 
and  these  being  all  the  mental  sciences,  we  may  conclude  that 
all  the  mental  sciences  tend  to  give  a  power  of  internal  obser- 
vation and  analysis. 

Oxygen,  chlorine  and  steam,  etc.,  are  all  the  gases ;  and  as 
they  are  elastic,  it  follows  that  all  the  gases  are  elastic. 

23.  Dr.  Reid  says,  "  This  simple  reasoning,  A  is  equal  to  B, 
and  B  to  C,  therefore  A  is  equal  to  C,  cannot  be  brought  into  any 
syllogism  in  mood  and  figure." 

The  narrative  is  trustworthy  because  the  author  has  means 
of  knowing  about  what  he  writes,   and  trustworthy 
authors  must  have  means  of  knowing  about  what  they 
write;  the  narrative  is  trustworthy  because  it  is  evi- 
dently sincere  and  candid,  and  trustworthy  writers  aro 
sincere  and  candid;    the  narrative  is  consistent,  and 
trustworthy  narratives  are  consistent. 
24:.  Elephants  are  stronger  than  horses  ; 
Horses  are  stronger  than  men  ; 
.'.  Elephants  are  stronger  than  horses. 

A  is  greater  than  B,  and  B  than  C,  therefore  A  is  greater  than  C. 
Plato  lived  after  Socrates,  and  Aristotle  after  Plato,  and  so 

Aristotle  lived  after  Socrates. 
Three-fourths  of  the  fruit  in  the  garden  were  apples; 
Three-fourths  of  the  fruit  were  blown  down  ; 
.-.  Some  of  the  fruit  blown  down  were  apples. 
2.5.  The  fact  that  I  defended  him  is  a  proof  that  I  held  hJm 
innocent  (stated  both  as  Conditional  and  Categorical). 

When  about  to  prove  the  equality  of  two  given  Figures, 
Euclid  shows  that  if  the  one  is  not  equal  to  the  other,  it  must 
either  be  greater  or  less  ;  and  he  points  out  the  absurdity  cf  both 
these  suppositions : 

It  is  known  tliat  a  rider  proceeding  along  a  road  and  coming 
Ui  a  place  where  other  three  roads  meet,  must  have 
taken  one  or  other  of  the  three ;  we  examine  two  of 


APPENDIX.  207 

them,  and  find  that  he  had  not  gone  by  them,  and  we 
at  once  conclude  that  he  must  have  gone  on  the  third. 

L  I  man  is  not  a  brute  or  a  divinity,  he  is  capable  of  maldng 
Ijrogress. 
26.  Put  the  following  in  form  of  Sorites  and  draw  it  out  in  a 
series  of  Syllogisms : 

A  demagogue  must  hold  the  populace  in  contempt ;  for 
being  a  favorite  with  the  populace,  he  must  know  how 
to  manage  them,  and  in  doing  so  he  understands  their 
weaknesses,  and  understanding  these  must  hold  them  ia 
contempt. 

n.-EXEECISES  AS  TO  VIOLATIONS  OF  TEE  LAWS  OP  THOUGHT. 

In  Notions. 

27'  Examine  the  following  : 

A  line  is  said  to  have  length  without  breadth.  There  can 
be  no  such  line ;  it  is  a  mere  abstraction,  a  ghost,  a 
nonentity ;  and  all  that  is  demonstrated  regarding  it 
can  have  no  objective  value. 

"  What  follows  from  a  definition  follows  in  reality  from  an  im- 
plied assumption,  that  there  exists  a  real  thing  conform 
able  thereto.  This  assumption  in  the  case  of  the  defini- 
tions of  geometry  is  false.  There  exist  no  real  things 
exactly  conformable  to  the  definition.  Tliere  exist  no 
points  without  magnitude,  no  lines  without  breadth  and 
perfectly  straight,  no  circles  with  all  their  radii  exactly 
equal,  nor  squares  with  all  their  angles  perfectly  right." 

"  Concreta  vere  res  sint :  abstracta  non  sunt  res  scd  reruni 
modi ;  modi  antem  nihil  aliud  sunt  quam  relationes  rei 
ad  intellectura  "  (Leibnitz). 

"  A  concept  cannot  in  itself  be  depicted  to  sense  or  imagina 
tion." 
2S.  Universals  have  an  existence  prior  to  things  and  above 
tilings. 

The  One,  the  Good,  are  the  highest  realities,  are  the  only 
realities,  and  the  mind  is  in  its  highest  exercise  when 
it  is  contemplating  them. 


208  APPENDIX. 

29.  Try  the  following  by  the  Rules  of  Definition,  and  amend 
A  square  is  a  four-sided  figure. 
(Amended)  A  square  is  a  four-sided  rectilinear  figure  witl 

its  sides  equal. 
A  deer  is  an  animal  with  branching  horns. 
The  judicial  power  is  not  the  legislative. 
A  newspaper  is  a  printed  paper  apjjearing  periodically. 
Words  are  the  signs  of  thought. 

A  general  notion  is  an  inadequate  notion  of  an  individual. 
Judgment  compares  notions. 

Conversion  is  the  changing  of  terms  in  a  proposition. 
Opposed  propositions  are  those  which  differ  in  quantity  and 

quality. 
Contradictory  opposition  is  the  opposition  of  contradictories. 
A  conditional  proposition  consists  of  two  categorical  propo- 
sitions connected  with  each  other. 
A  digunctive  proposition  consists  of  two  or  more  categori- 

cals  connected  by  the  prepositions  either  and  or. 
Reasoning  is  the  deriving  of  one  truth  from  another. 
A  fallacy  is  an  unsound  mode  of  arguing. 
Ambiguous  middle  is  a  fallacy  in  which  the  terms  admit  ot 

more  than  one  meaning. 
Ignoratio  Elenchi  is  drawing  a  wrong  conclusion. 
Petitio  Principii  is  a  begging  of  the  question. 
30.  Trj'  the  following  by  the  Rules  of  Division  : 
Discursive  Thought  may  be  divided  into  the  Term,  Judg 

ment,  and  Syllogism. 
Animals  may  be  divided  into  Quadrupeds,  Birds,  Fishes, 
Reptiles,  and  Invertebrata. 
Literature  consists  of  llistory,  Biography,  Tales,  Theol- 
ogy, Poetry. 
Notions  are  Concrete,  Singular,  and  Universal. 
Propositions  are  Affirmative,  Negative,  Universal. 
All  our  ideas  must  be  had  either  from  Experience  or  a 
pri/jri. 
SI.  Analyze  Pleasure,  the  Sensation  of  Heat,  the  Idea  of  tna 
Color  White,  Conaciousncea. 


APPENDIX.  209 

IN   Judgments. 

32.  Criticise  the  following  :  "  Every  notion  holding  the  place 
ot  a  predicate  in  a  proposition  must  have  a  determinate  quantity 
in  thought."  "  Th^'  relation  between  the  terms  of  a  propositioi 
is  one  not  only  of  similarity,  but  of  identity."  "  The  terms  of  a 
proposition  are  of  an  absolute  equality,  and  all  propositions  an 
equation  of  subject  and  predicate." 

33.  What  is  conducive  to  happiness  is  good,  and  so 
The  good  is  that  which  is  conducive  to  hajipiness. 

All  equilateral  triangles  are  equiangular,  and  therefore 
All  equiangular  triangles  are  equilateral. 
That  God  is  infinite  implies  that  the  Infinite  is  God. 
We  are  not  entitled  to  say  that  because  Raphael  was  the 
greatest  painter  which  Italy  has  produced,  that  there- 
fore the  greatest  painter  which  Italy  has  jjroduced  was 
Raphael ;  but  simply  that  among  the  greatest  painters 
which  Italy  has  produced  was  Raphael. 
34:.  Since  it  is  false  that  all  men  are  liars,  its  contrary  must 
be  true,  that  no  men  are  liars. 

Since  it  is  true  that  some  men  are  very  designing,  it  cannot 
be  true  that  some  men  are  not  designing. 
35.  If  Alexander  was  the  son  of  Philip,  we  can  surely  argue 
by  Immediate  Inference  that  Philip  was  the  father  of  Alexander. 

In  Reasoning. 

30.  Are  the  following  allowable,  E  A  I,  A  E  I,  E  A  E  ?  Is 
A  A  I  admissible  in  Fig.  I.  ?  Or  I  A I  or  A  E  E  ?  In  what  Fig- 
ures are  A  A  I  and  I  A  I  admissible  ? 

37.  Why  is  I  E  O  to  be  rejected  ?     A  person  urged  that  there 
might  be  a  valid  syllogism  in  I  E  O,  and  gave  the  following : 
I    Some  X  is  Y  ; 
E  Every  Y  is  not  Z  ; 
O  Some  X  is  not  Z. 
SS.  All  wise  legislators  suit  their  laws  to  the  genius  of  tbeij 
nation ; 
Lycurgus  did  so ; 
.'.  Lycurgus  was  a  ^vise  legislator. 

14 


210  APPENDIX. 

WTiatever  is  universally  believed  must  be  tnie  ; 
The  existence  of  God  is  not  universally  believed  ; 
.*.  It  cannot  be  true. 

Cloven  feet  being  found  universally  in  homed  animals,  w« 
may  conclude  that  this  fossil  animal,  since  it  appears  to 
have  had  cloven  feet,  veas  homed. 
He  must  be  an  atheist,  for  all  atheists  hold  these  opinions. 
Tou  see  that  men  -who  are  indifferent  to  all  religion  do  not 
seek  to  compel  others  to  believe  as  they  do ;   and  as 
this  man  docs  not  seek  to  compel  others  to  believe  as 
he  does,  we  may  conclude  that  he  is  inditferent  to  reli- 
gion. 
30.  Liberty  is  a  good  thing,  provided  it  is  not  abused;  bu* 
It  is  abused,  so  it  is  not  a  good  thing. 

All  those  who  say  that  Logic  can  teach  man  to  reason  must 
approve  of  Logic ;    but  as  you  cannot  say  that  Logic 
teaches  man  to  reason,  you  cannot  approve  of  it. 
This  world  would  be  a  happy  one  if  all  men  were  good ;  but 
all  men  are  not  good,  so  our  world  is  not  a  happy  one. 
40.  Examine  the  following,  both  as  Categoricals  and  Condi- 
tionals ; 

A.I1  must  approve  of  this  student  who  consider  him  diligent; 
and  as  you  approve  of  him,  you  must  consider  him  dili- 
gent. 
There  is  always  discontent  in  a  country  when  it  is  ill-gov- 
erned ;  and  as  there  is  always  discontent  in  Ii'eland,  we 
may  conclude  that  it  is  ill-governed. 
Provided  the  differences  between  one  political  party  and 
another,  and  one  religious  sect  and  another,  are  of  no 
moment,  they  ought  to  tolerate  each  other :  but  the 
differences  are  important,  so  they  ought  not  to  tolerate 
each  other. 
4  1 .  Honors  and  rewards  by  the  government  or  private  patrons 
are  useless  ;  they  cannot  influence  the  stupid,  and  men  of  genius 
rise  above  them. 

There  is  and  can  be  no  revelation  of  His  Will  by  God  :  for 
if  the  matter  of  it  cannot  be  received  and  comprehended 
by  the  human  faculties,  it  is  no  revelation ;  and  if,  on 


APPENDIX.  211 

the  other  hand,  it  can  be  compassed  and  comprehended 
by  the  human  faculties,  it  could  be  attained  by  them, 
and  is  no  revelation. 
£2.  If  it  be  a  good  thing  to  have  faith,  surely  he  who  believes 
in  the  >Loran  has  faith,  aiid  must  have  a  good  thing. 

It  IS  absurd  to  maintain  that  when  we  cannot  avoid  think- 
ing or  conceiving  of  a  thing,  it  must  be  true  ;  for  some 
persons   cannot  bo  in   darkness  without   thinking  of 
ghosts,  in  which  they  do  not  believe. 
•45.  I  think  the  government  should  puninh  this  man,  as  he 
h\r  told  a  flagrant  falsehood,  whioh  is  wrong,  and  he  who  does 
w   mg  deserves  to  be  jjunished,  and  government  is  appointed 
fi     the  punishment  of  evil  doeiu 

i^.  The  Irish  aie  witty,  and  this  man  being  an  Irishman,  must 
\     witty. 

Epimenides  the  Ci-etan  says,  that  '  all  the  Cretans  are  liars  ;" 
but  Epimenides  is  himself  a  Cretan :  therefore  he  is 
himself  a  liar.     But  if  he  be  a  liar,  what  he  says  is  un- 
true, and  consequently  the  Cretans  are  veracious :  but 
Epimenides  is  a  Cretan,  and  therefore  what  he  says  is 
true. 
If  I  buy  this  piece  of  land  it  vnW  be  profitable  ;  if  I  engage 
in  this  mercantile  speculation  it  will  be  profitable  ;  if  I 
buy  this  house  it  will  be  profitable ;  and  so  I  may  do 
all  these  and  find  it  profitable. 
To  lay  restriction  on  the  importation  of  iron  is  profitable  to 
all  home  iron  masters  and  iron  workers  ;  to  lay  restric- 
tion on  the  importation  of  linen  goods  is  profitable  to  all 
in  the  linen  trade  ;  and  so  to  lay  restriction  on  woollen 
goods,  to  all  who  are  in  the  woollen  trade,  etc. ;  and  so  to 
lay  restrictions  on  all  these  and  other  articles  will  be 
favorable  to  the  nation  composed  of  such  traders. 
45.  I  believe  this  on  the  authority  of  my  church,  which  is 
founded  on  the  Word  of  God,  which  all  the  Church  believes  in. 

40.  It  is  clear  that  the  United  States  do  not  acknowledge 
God  as  King  of  Nations,  for  they  have  no  Established  Church. 
Some  one  proposes  what  seems  a  good  measure  for  the 
country  at  large  ;  and  it  is  shown  that  it  will  cause  some 


212  APPENDIX. 

people  to  grumble  and  a  number  of  persons  in  the  pub^ 
lie  service  to  be  discharged. 
Our  forefathers,  the  ^\ise  and  good  in  former  generations, 
all  believed  this  and  acted  on  it,  and  I  am  satisfied  to 
follow  their  example. 
47.  The  theories  of  geologists  cannot  be  true,  for  they  tend  to 
nndermine  our  belief  in  Scripture. 

■is.  I  charge  you  with  having  started  this  calumny  against 
me ;  and  if  you  deny  it,  you  must  disprove  the  allegation. 

4:i).  I  know  that  this  man,  that  man,  and  others,  all  gained 
large  sums  at  play  ;  and  surely  I  may  do  the  same. 

I  have  found  on  three  occasions,  when  I  had  a  dream  of  this 
kind,  I  heard  soon  after  of  the  death  of  a  friend.  So 
when  I  dream  in  this  way,  I  expect  to  hear  of  a  death. 

50.  The  institution  has  flourished  under  these  rules ;  and  it 
would  be  wrong  in  any  one  to  attempt  to  change  them. 

51.  Aut  Sirius  ardor ; 

Hie  sitim  morbosque  ferens  mortalibus  jegris 
Nascitur,  et  laevo  contristat  lumine  coelum. 
The  weather  cannot  be  warmer  till  the   snow  is  off  the 

ground. 
As  long  as  the  interest  of  money  is  so  low,  trade  cannot  be 
prosperous. 

52.  This  story  is  likely  to  be  true,  for  I  had  it  from  a  man  of 
fair  character,  who  lived  soon  after  the  event  (estimated  value  of 
testimony  -j^^),  who  probably  had  it  from  his  father  Q). 

As  each  of  the  witnesses  may  i^ossibly  be  wrong,  we  may 
believe  them  both  to  have  been  in  error. 


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HODGE,  A.  A.,  D.D. 

Outlines  of  Theology.  Revised  and  enlarged  edition.  Svo  jfj.oo 
"  At  its  first  publication  in  i860,  this  work  attracted  much  atlen- 
lion,  and  ever  since  it  has  had  a  large  sale,  and  been  carefully  studied 
boih  in  this  country  and  in  Great  Britain.  It  has  been  translated  into 
Welsh  and  modem  Greek,  and  has  been  used  as  a  text-book  in  several 
theological  schools."  —  Presbyterian  Bantur. 

HODGE,  Charles,  D  D. 

Uii  Romans.     Svo 3-oo 

On  Romans.    Abridged.     lamo 1.75 

On  Ephesians.     i2mo      .  1.75 

On  Corinthians.     2  vols.     i2nio 3.50 

"  Most  valuable.     With  no  writer  do  we  more  fully  agree.     The 

more  we  use  Hodge,  the  more  we  value  him.     This  applies  to  all  bis 

Commentaries."  —  Rev.  C.  H.  Spurgeon. 

HOLT,  Emily  Sarah. 

Historical  Tales. 

Isoult  Barry.     i2mo 1.50 

Robin  Trcmayne.     i2mo 1.50 

The  Well  in  the  Desert 1.25 

Ashcliffe  Hall.     i2mo 1-50 

Verena.     A  Tale.     i2mo 1.5° 

The  White  Rose  of  Langley.     i2nio 1.50 

Imogen.     i2mo 1-50 

Clare  Avery.     i2mo 1.50 

Lettice  Eden.     i2mo 1.50 

For  the  Master's  Sake i-oo 

Margery's  Son.     i2mo 1.50 

Lady  Sybil's  Choice.     i2mo 1.50 

The  Maiden's  Lodge.     i2rao 1.25 

^o 


Earl  Hubert's  Daughter i 


Joyce  MorrelTs  Harvest.     i2mo 1.50 

At  ye  Grene  GritTm.     i2mo 100 

Red  and  White.     i2mo 1-50 

Not  for  Him,     i2mo 1-25 

Wearyholme.     i2mo i-5° 

John  De  WiclifTe.     i2mo 1-25 

The  Lord  Mayor  of  London 1-50 

The  Lord  of  the  Marches 1.25 

A  Tangled  Web 1-50 

In  All  Time  of  our  Tribulation i-S" 

JACOBUS,  Melancthon  W.,  D.D. 

Notes,  Critical  anu  E.\plan.\tory. 

Genesis.     i2mo i-S" 

Matthew  and  Mark 'oo 

Luke  and  John.     i2mo >  i-5<* 

Acts.     i2mo '-S* 

(6) 


KITTO,  John. 

liible  Illustrations.     8  vols.     i2mo $7.09 

"  They  are  not  ex.ictty  commentaries,  but  what  marvellous  expo- 
sitions you  have  there  !  You  have  reading  more  interesting  than  any 
novel  that  was  ever  written,  and  as  instructive  as  the  heaviest  theol- 
i)g>'.  The  matter  is  quite  attractive  and  fascinating,  and  yet  so  weighty 
that  the  man  who  shall  study  those  volumes  thoroughly  will  not  fail  to 
read  his  Bible  intelligently  and  with  growing  interest."  —  Spurgeon. 

LEE,  William. 

The  Inspiration  of  the  Holy  Scriptures:  Its  Nature  and 

Proof.    8vo 2.50 

"We  consider  'Lee  on  Inspiration'  as  beyond  all  comparison 
superior  to  any  work  on  the  subject  yet  issued  in  our  language."  — 
Church  Journal. 

LEIGHTON,  Bishop. 

Complete  Works.     8vo 3.00 

LEWIS,  Prof.  Tayler. 

The  Six  Days  of  Creation.     i2mo 1.50 

LORD,  Willis,   D.D. 

Christian  Theology  for  the  People.     8vo 2.50 

"  I  do  not  hesitate  in  expressing  the  opinion  that  this  work  is,  so 

far  as  I  know,  the  best  book  in  existence  for  the  purpose  of  popular 

instruction  in  theology."  —  Dr.  E.  P.  Humphrey. 

LOWRIE,  Samuel  T.,  D.D. 

The  Epistles  to  the  Hebrews  Explained.    8vo     ....       3.00 

"  It  gives  evidence  not  only  of  diligent  and  thorough  study,  but 
of  a  high  degree  of  scholarship  and  acquaintance  with  the  Scriptures. 
.  .  .  We  think  we  hazard  nothing  in  saying  that  this  exposition  of  this 
important  portion  of  Scripture  is  at  least  equal  to  any  that  has  been 
produced  in  this  country."  —  Herald  and  Presbyter. 

MATHEWS,  Joanna  H. 

Bessie  Books.     6  vols.,  in  a  box 7.50 

Flowerets.    6  vols.,  i8mo,  in  a  box 3.60 

Little  .Sunbeams.     6  vols.,  in  a  box 6.00 

Kitty  and  Lulu  Books.     6  vols.,  i8mo,  in  a  box    ....  3.60 

Miss  Ashton's  Girls.     6  vols •j.z.o 

Haps  and  Mishaps.     6  vols.,  i6mo 7.50 

MATHEWS,  Julia  A. 

Dare  to  Do  Right.     5  vols.     i6mo 5.50 

Drayton  Hall  Series.     6  vols.    .  4.50 

Golden  Ladder  Series.    3  vols 3.00 

(7J 


McCOSH,  Dr. 

•Works.     New  and  neat  edition.     5  vols.,  Svo,  uniform     .  5«o-oo 
Comprising  :  — 

1.  Divine   Government.  4.   Defence   of  Fundamental 

2.  Typical  Forms.  Truth. 

3.  The  Intuitions  of  the  Mind.      $•   The  Scottish  Philosophy. 

Any  volume  sold  separately  at 2.00 

"Thousands  of  earne.-t,  thoughtful  men  have  found  treasures  of 
argument,  illustration,  and  learning  in  these  pages,  with  which  their 
miiuU  anJ  hearts  have  been  enriched  and  fortified  for  better  work  and 
wider  influences."  —  Nrw  York  Observer. 

Dr.  McCosh's  Logic.     i2mo 1.50 

Christianity  and  Positivism.     i2mo 1.75 

MACDUFF.  J.  R.,  D.D. 

Mt)rning  and  Night  Watches.     32mo 0.50 

Mind  and  Words  of  Jesus,  and  Faithful  Promiser     .     .     .  0.50 

Footsteps  of  St.  Paul 1.50 

Family  Prayers.     i6nio i.oo 

Morning  Prayers  for  a  Year 2.00 

The  Bow  in  the  Cloud 0.53 

Wells  of  Baca 0.50 

Gates  of  Prayer 0.75 

MILLER,  Hugh. 

Liic  and  Works.     12  vols.     i2mo 9.00 

Comprising  "Life  and  Letters,"  "Testimony  of  the  Rocks," 
"Old  Kcd  Sandstone,"  "Footprints  of  the  Creator,"  "First  Im- 
pressions of  England,"  "Schools  and  Schoolmasters,"  "Tales  and 
Sketches,"  "  Popular  Geology,"  "  Cruise  of  the  Betsey,"  "  Essays," 
and  "  Headship  of  Christ." 

These  are  sold  only  in  sets  ;  but  the  separate  works  can  be  still 
got  at  ihe  former  prices,  as  follows  :  — 

Footprints  of  the  Creator 1.50 

Old  Ked  Sandstone 1.50 

Schools  and  Schoolmasters 1.50 

Testimony  of  the  Rocks 1.50 

Cruise  of  the  Betsey 1.50 

Popular  Geology 1.50 

First  Impressions  of  England 1.50 

Tales  and  Sketches 1.50 

Essays 1.50 

Headship  of  Christ ...  1.50 

Life  of  Millei.     By  B.iyne.     2  vols 3.00 

"  Was  tliere  ever  a  more  delightful  style  than  that  in  which  his 
works  are  written?  Smooth  and  easy  in  its  flow,  yet  sparkling  ever 
more,  like  the  river  as  it  reflects  the  sunbeam,  and  now  and  then  rag- 
ing with  torrent-like  impetuosity,  as  it  bears  all  opposition  before  it." 
'•Kev.  Dr.  W.  At.  TayUir. 

(8J 


NEWTON,  Richard,  D.D. 

The  Jewel  Case.    6  vols.     i6mo ?7-5o 

The  Best  Things 1.25 

The  King's  Highway 1.25 

The  Safe  Compass 1.35 

Bible  Blessings 1.25 

The  Great  Tilot 1.25 

Bible  Jewels 1.25 

The  Wonder  Case.    6  vols.     i6mo 7.50 

Bible  Wonders 1.25 

Nature's  Wonders 1.25 

Leaves  from  the  Tree 1.25 

Kills  from  the  Fountain 1.25 

The  Jewish  Tabernacle 1.25 

Giants,  and  Wonderful  Things 1.25 

Rays  from  the  Sun  of  Righteousness 1.25 

The  King  in  His  Beauty.     i2mo 1.25 

Pebbles  from  the  Brook 1.25 

Bible  Promises.     i6mo 1.25 

Bible  Warnings.     i2mo 1.25 

Covenant  Names.     i2mo 1.50 

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tude to  the  young,  and  the  pleasing  form  in  whicli  lliey  convey  religious 
truth.  While  they  are  called  sermons,  and  each  passage  is  expository 
of  some  passage  of  Scripture,  they  are  so  simple,  so  full  of  striking 
and  apposite  illustrations,  that  a  child  will  read  them  with  as  much 
curiosity  as  he  would  a  narrative  of  travel  or  adventure,  and  certainly 
with  far  more  profit. "  —  Episcopal  Methodist. 

NEWTON,   Rev.  W.  W. 

Little  and  Wise.     i6mo 1.25 

The  Wicket  Gate.     i6mo 1.25 

1'he  Interpreter's  House.     i6mo 1.25 

The  Palace  Beautiful.     i6mo 1.25 

Great  Heart.     i6mo 1.25 

TfiE  Pilgrim  Series,  comprising  the  alx)ve  five  volumes 

in  a  box 6.00 

*OLIVE  LIBRARY. 

40  large  i6mo  volumes,  containing  15,340  pages,  in  a  neat 

wooden  case,  net 25.00 

PALEY,  Wm. 

Evidences  of  Christianity.    Edited  by  Professor  Naime. 

i2mo 1.50 

PEEP  OF  DAY  LIBRARY. 

8  vols.,  i.Smo 4.50 

Line  upon  Line.     i8mo 0.50 

Precept  upon  Precept.     i8n)o 0.50 

9 


fo.6o 
0.60 
0.60 
0.50 
060 
0.60 


7.50 


1.50 


PEEP  OF  DAY  LIBRARY,  continued. 
'J'hc  Kings  of  Israel.  iSmo 
Tlie  Kings  of  Judah.  iSmo  . 
Captivity  of  Judah.  iSmo  .  . 
Peep  of  Day.  i8mo  .... 
Sequel  to  Peep  of  Day.  i8nio 
.'^tory  of  the  Apostles.      iSnio   . 

♦POOL'S  ANNOTATIONS. 

3  vols.  Royal  Svo.  3,077  pages.  In  cloth.  (Half  the 
former  price) 

"  Pool's  Annotations  are  sound>  clear,  and  sensible;  and,  taking 
for  all  in  ail,  I  place  liini  at  the  head  of  English  commentators  on  the 
whole  r.iblc."  —  A'«'.  7-  C.  Ryle. 

PRIME,  E    D.  G.,  D.D. 

Forty  Years  in  the  Turkish  Empire.  A  Memoir  of  Rev. 
W.  C.oodcll,  D.n.     i2nio 

"  Thi:  Rcnial  spirit,  iho  humor  and  wit,  the  shrewd  sense,  the  sin- 
cere and  cheerful  piety  of  Dr.  Uoodell  made  him  one  of  the  most  in- 
teresting companion?,  and  now  make  his  Memoir  one  of  the  mo»» 
agreeable  books."  —  Bibliotheca  Sacra. 

"  We  know  not  what  to  say  of  '  Forty  Years  in  the  Turkish  Em- 
pire,' except  to  advise  our  readers  to  get  the  book  at  once  and  devote 
their  first  spare  time  to  its  perusal."  — Prestyierian. 

RYLE,  J.  C. 

Notes  on  the  Gospels.    7  vols.     i2mo Jo. 50 

Matthew 1.50 

Mark 1.50 

Luke.     2  vols 3.00 

John.     3  vols. 4.50 

"  It  is  the  kernels  without    the   shells,  expressed   in   language 

adapted  to  the  quick   comprehension  of   all   readers."  —  rAr«.'/Vi» 

Union. 

"The  'Expository  Thoughts'  are  excellent  and  useful  aids  to 

Bible  study  and  devotion,  and  many  souls  will  be  comforted,  blessed, 

and  instructed  by  so  clear,  practical,  and  evan^'elical  a  work."  —  Xew 

SHAW,  Catharine. 

The  (iableil  I'"arm.     i2nio i 

Nellie  Aruiulel.     i2mo i 

In  the  Sunlight.     i2nio i 

Hilda.     i2mo i 

Only  a  Cousin.     i2mo i 

Out  in  the  Storm.     iSmo     .     , 


-3 

-5 
~5 
25 
25 
0.50 

Alick's  Hero.     i2nio 1.25 

Left  to  Ourselves,     izmo i.oo 

Fathoms  Deep.     i2mo 125 

On  the  Cliffs 1.25 

Dickie's  .■Mtic • 1.25 

(10) 


SPURGEON'S  WORKS. 

New  Sermons. 

X.  Storm  Signals.     i2mo Ji.oo 

2.  Hands  full  of  Honey.     iSSj; i.oo 

3.  Ketiim,  O  Shulamite  !     18S4 t.oo 

4.  Healing  and  Service.     1885 i.oo 

5.  Pleading  for  Prayer.     1886 i.oo 

6.  Present  Truth.     i2mo i.oo 

7.  Types  and  Emblems.     i2mo i.oo 

SPURGEON'S   SERMONS. 

Comprising  nearly  Two  Hundred  and  Fifty  Discourses, 
with  complete  Indexes  of  both  Texts  and  Subjects.     10 

vols.     i2nio 10.00 

None  of  the  previous  named  volumes  is  in  this  set. 

SPURGEON'S  SERMON  NOTES. 

I.     From  Genesis  to  Proverbs i.oo 

II.     From  Ecclesiastes  to  Malachi i.oo 

III.     From  Matthew  to  Acts.     Just  ready i.oo 

IV.     From  Romans  to  Revelation.     (Shortly)    ....  i.oo 
All   of  Grace.    An    Earnest  Word  with   those  who  are 
seeking  Salvation  by  the  Lord  Jesus   Christ.     (New.) 

i6mo 0.50 

Feathers  for  Arrows i.oo 

Morning  by  Morning;  or,  Daily  Readings i.oo 

Evening  by  Evening I  00 

Lectures  to  my  Students.     i2mo i.oo 

John  Ploughman's  Talk.     i6mo 0.75 

John  Ploughman's  Pictures.     i6mo 0.75 

John  Ploughman's  Talk  and  Pictures.     In  i  vol.     i2mo    .  i.oo 

WALTON,  Mrs.  O.  F. 

Christie's  Old  Organ.     i8mo 0.40 

Saved  at  Sea.     i>^mo 040 

Little  Faith.     i8mo 0.40 

Christie's  Organ,  Saved  at  Sea,  and  Little  Faith.     In  one 

vol.     i6mo I.oo 

A  Peep  behind  the  .Scenes.     i6mo i.oo 

Was  I  Kight?     i6mo i.oo 

Olive's  Story.     i6mo 0.7; 

Nobodv  Loves  Me.     i8mo 0.5a 

Nobody  Loves  Me,  and  Olive's  Story.    In  one  vol.    ifimo  i.oo 
Shadows:  Scenes  an  I  Incidents  in  the  Life  of  an  Old  Arm- 
chair.    i6mo I.oo 

Taken  or  Left.     i8mo 0.40 

Foppy's  Presents 0.40 


WARNER,  Anna  B. 

Blue  I'l.i);  and  Clotli  of  Gold.     l2mo 3'. 25 

Stories  of  Vinegar  Hill.     3  vols.     i6mo 3.00 

Ellen  Montgomery's  Bookshelf.     5  vols. 5.00 

Little  Jack's  Four  Lessons.     iSmo 0.50 

A  Bag  of  Stories.     i6mo 0.75 

The  Shoes  of  I'cace 0.75 

Tired  Church-Members 0.50 

WARNER,  Susan. 

Tile  Old  Helmet.     121110 1.50 

Melbourne  House.    i2mo 1.50 

Pine  Needles.     A  Tale 1.25 

My  Desire.     i2mo 1.50 

The  End  of  a  Coil i  .50 

The  Letter  of  Credit i.ee 

Nobody.     i2mo 1.50 

Stephen,  M.D.     i2mo 1.50 

The  Red  Wallflower.     121110 1.50 

Daisy  Plains 1.50 

Small  Beginnings.    4  vols 5.00 

Say  and  Do  Series.    6  vols 7- 5° 

The  King's  People.     5  vols 7.00 

"  There  is  a  charm  about  Miss  Warner's  books  that  insures  each 

new  volume  of  a  welcome  from  a  wide  circle  of  readers."  —  Herald 

and  Presbyter. 

WIN  AND  WEAR  SERIES. 

6  vols 7-50 

By  the  Same  Author. 

Green  Mountain  Series.     5  vols.,  in  a  box 6.00 

Ledgeside  Series.    6  vols.,  in  a  box 7.50 

Butterfly's  Flights.     3  vols.,  in  a  box 2.25 

The  Highland  Series.     6  vols.,  in  a  box 7.50 

Hester  Trueworthy's  Royalty 1.2 

Mabel's  Step-mother 1.2 

Faith  Thurston's  Work 1.2 

Robert  (irahani's  Promise 1.2 

The  Gillettes.     6  vols 4-50 

YOUNG,  John. 

The  Christ  of  History.     i2mo 1-25 

"  The  work  belongs  to  the  highest  class  of  the  productions  of 

modern  disciplined  genius.  .  .  .  We  commend  it  heartily  to  all  earnest 

thinkers,  for  such  alone  know  the  worth  of  a  helpful  book."  —  London 

Morning  A  dvtrtiur. 


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